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At the beginning of the Cold War, the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Union's 
current and future military capability seemed a near-impossibility. Soviet high-level 
communications were secure against decryption. Agent networks in the USSR were 
very difficult to establish and of uncertain reliability. Aerial reconnaissance of war-
related targets in the Soviet Union was risky and could only be occasional. But 
valuable intelligence was gathered in the years 1945-55 on the USSR's frantic arms 
build-up, thanks to its policy towards Germans and their country. Its exploitation of 
Germans and its Zone of Germany in its war-related research and development and 
the reconstruction of its war-related industries gave British Intelligence penetrable 
targets in the Soviet Zone and gave great numbers of Germans sought-after 
info rmation on the USSR itself. The ease of recruiting age nts in East Germany and 
the flight (including enticed defections) of refugees from it allowed research and 
development projects and uranium.-mining operations there to be penetrated. 
Intelligence of Soviet weapons development and of the quality of Soviet military 
technology was obtained. The mass interrogation of prisoners-of-war returned by the 
Soviets to the British Occupation Zone in the late 1940s yielded a wealth of valuable 
information on war-related construction and the locations of numerous intelligence 
targets in the Soviet Union: most importantly, those of atomic and chemical plants, 
aircraft and aero-engine factories, airfields, rocket development centres and other 
installations. When, (nthe period 1949-58, some 3,000 deported German scientists , 
engineers and technicians were sent back to their homeland from the USSR, 
promising sources among them were enticed West and intef(ogated for their 
knowledge of the Soviets' research and development projects. The cream of the 
information they provided was crucial intelligence on the locations of atomic plants 
and laboratori es and uranium deposits; useful information on structural weaknesses in 
the Soviet system of scientific and economic management; expert (if out-of-date) 
assessments of the quality of Soviet accomplishments in atomic science, electronics 
and other fields; and well-informed indications as to possible lines of development in 
guided missile and aircraft design. One Soviet scientific defector in Germany 
provided similar information which influenced British perceptions of the Soviet 
Union's scientific potential and missile development plans. Refugees entering the 
British Zone from East German y, intercepted letters and monitored 
telecommunications, informal contacts and, of course, secret agents all made 
significant contributions to the gathering of scientific and technical intelligence in 
Germany too. The British passed to the Americans much of the intelligence they 
acquired in Germany and the installations identified and located by German sources 
were overtlown by spyplanes in the 1950s and particularly by U-2s in the latter hal f 
of-the decade. Priceless information was obtained, which establi shed that the USSR's 
war-related scien tific research and development and its actual military capability were 
both inferio r to those of the West. Thus the Gem1ans enabled Soviet security to be 
deeply penetrated and helped "to stabilize the Cold War. They are the missing link 
between Ultra and the U-2. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
'ABC' weapons: atomic, biological and chemical weapons 
ABM: anti-ballistic missile 
AOZ: American Occupation Zone 
BIOS: British Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee 
BND: Bundesnachrichtendienst (West German Federal Intelligence Service, which 
until 1956 was simply the Gehlen Organization). 
BW: Biological Warfare 
BOZ: British Occupation Zone 
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (BOB refers to its Berlin Operations Base) 
CIOS: Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee 
COMINT: communications intelligence 
CW: Chemical Watfare 
CCG(BE): Control Commission for Germany (British Element) 
Dipl. Ing. (or Ing.): Diplom-Ingenieur (which is the German way of indicating the 
possession of a bachelor's degree in engineering) 
D.At.En.lD.At.En.Int.: Division (previously Department) of Atomic Energy of the 
Ministry of Supply (its intelligence unit was known as 'D.At.En.Int. ' , but was often 
known simply as 'D.At.En.' and will be referred to by that name in this thesis) 
DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) 
DPs: Displaced Persons 
ELINT: electronic intelligence 
FCD: First Chief Directorate (of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics) 
FIAT: Field Information Agency, Technical (a division of SHAEF. EPES (Br) and 
EPES (US) refer to FIAT's British and American Enemy Personnel Exploitation 
Sections) 
GRU: Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravlenie (Main Intelligence Directorate of the 
Soviet Army) 
GW: Guided Weapons 
HUMINT: human intelligence 
HV A: Hauptverwaltung Aufklfuung (Main Intelligence Directorate of the MfS) 
ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile 
IMINT: imagery intelligence 
IRD: Information Research Department (of the Foreign Office) 
JIB: Joint Intelligence Bureau (responsible for economic intelligence-gathering) 
HC: Joint Intelligence Committee 
JSIJTIC: Joint Scientific and Joint Technical Intelligence Committees 
MfS: Ministerium fUr Staatssicherheit (the GDR's MinistlY of State Security) 
MVDINKVDIMGB/KGB: the various Soviet acronyms for the USSR' s ministries of 
internal affairs and state security (i .e. its intelligence and security agencies) during the 
period of the Occupation. All these acronyms are used in this thesis. That acronym is 
used which was in use at the time in question. 
MISA: Military Intelligence Service Austria 
NIl: Nauchno-issledovatelskiilispitatelnyi institut (Scientific Research or Testing 
Institute) 
PoWs/PWX: prisoners-of-war 
REG: Returnees Exploitation Group (US intelligence unit) 
RFT: Rundfunk- und Fernmeldetechnik (radio and communications technology) 
SAC: Strategic Air Command (of the United States Air Force) 
SAM: surface-to-air missile 
SED: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party) 
SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
SIGINT: signals intelligence 
SMAG: Soviet Military Administration 10 Germany (also known by its Russian 
acronym, SV AG) 
SOZ: Soviet Occupation Zone 
STIB: Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch (of Intelligence Division of the 
CCG(BE)) 
TCS: Technical Coordinating Section (of MI6) 
Tech. Sec.: the Technical Section of MI6 Germany 
TsAGI: Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute 
UN: United Nations 
USAF: United States Air Force 
USAFE: United States Air Force Europe 
VHF: Very High Frequency 
VHSIC: very-high-speed integrated circuit 
ZLF: Zentralforschungslaboratorium (Central Research Laboratory) 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis concerns the acquisition of scientific and technical intelligence by British 
intelligence agencies in Germany during and just after the Occupation. Scientific 
intelligence is intelligence of research projects, scientific ideas or capabilities; 
technical intelligence is intelligence of weapons either planned or in production. The 
distinction between the two is the drawing board; once plans exist for a weapon, 
intelligence of it is technical intelligence. I Intimately connected with both is 
information on the scientific and technical personnel and war-related laboratories, 
research institutes and factories which make up a country's military-industrial 
complex; this is .called 'scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence'. Only occasional 
mention is made of signals intelligence-gathering and the work of MI6, which are too 
secret for official records to have been made available to researchers. However, other 
British intelligence agencies in Occupied Germany acquired much valuable 
intelligence on the Soviet Union's post-war arms build-up.2 Chief among these were 
two agencies of whose archives I have made much use: the Scientific and Technical 
Intelligence Branch of the Intelligence Division 3 of the Control Commission for 
IReport by R. D. Neville, Chairman of the JS/JTIC, dated 29 July 1949 and entitled, 'Preliminary Notes for Dr. 
Blount', DEFE 40/26. Despite the difference between the two forms of intelligence, they overlap and I have 
tended to use the words 'scientific intelligence' as a short form for 'scientific and technical intelligence' . 
20ne of these was Intelligence Division ' s Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch and its archive throws 
some light on M16's work in Occupied Germany. The gathering of scientific and technical intelligence was in this 
period M16' s top priority there. In mid-1947, MI6 had five main areas of operation , the most important of which 
was scientific and technical intelligence. The other four were: counter-espionage and subversive political 
movements ; intelligence for the Services; economic and industrial information; and political intelligence. In the 
field of scientific intelligence, MI6 was charged with acquiring the following information: 'information about 
scientific developments; the training and deployment of scientists needed to influence such developments; 
nuclear physics ; guided missiles; chemical warfare; "airground developments" ; naval developments ; the work 
and personnel of universities and technical colleges ' (minutes of JlC (Germany) Coordinating Committee 
meeting on 21 July 1947, DEFE 41/68). Given the revolution in nuclear weaponry and other military technologies 
in the years 1947-55, it is likely that scientific intelligence-gathering remained a principal concern. The work of 
MI6 in Germany was discussed at a series of conferences held in the summer and autumn of 1955. This review 
resulted in the ruling that it should seek above all to acquire scientific and political intelligence on the Soviet 
Union and its Bloc (G. Blake, No Olher Choice, pp. 167-8). 
3-rhe intelligence arm of the CCG(BE) was Intelligence Division (from 1952 the British Intelligence 
Organization (Germany». The following were branches of Intelligence Division: Security Directorate (counter-
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Germany (British Element), to which I refer as STIB4, and FIAT (the Field 
Information Agency, Technical), a division of SHAEF which outlived SHAEF itself. 
FIAT's British element was the principal British agency responsible for the 
colJection of scientific and technical intelligence until STIB came into being. 5 
Scientific and technical intelligence-gathering during this period was intelligence of 
the arms race. The years of the Occupation were the period of the greatest revolution 
in military technology in history. Both the USA and the USSR in the years 1945-55 
developed atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and guided missiles and long-range 
bombers to carry them. Spurred on by intelligence of a mighty Soviet arms build-up, 
Britain in this period tested her own atomic bomb, pressed on with the development 
of a hydrogen bomb and a nuclear strike force, manufactured chemical weapons, 
launched a number of missile development projects and conducted research into 
intelligence); Production Directorate (intelligence-gathering on the Soviet Bloc from sources other than secret 
agents, such as refugees, other 'line-crossers', deserters and returning PoWs); Analysis Directorate (intelligence-
gathering using secret agents); Censorship Branch (interception of communications); and STIB (scientific 
intelligence collection). Intelligence Division had a Technical Section of its own (see, for example, an EPES, 
FIAT letter dated 21 August 1946, FO 1031/59). More importantly, MI6 had a Technical Section responsible for 
the recruitment of agents in targeted scientific installations. Operation 'Dragon Return' interrogation reports were 
copied to M16's Technical Section (see Chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of 'Dragon Return'). MI6 and Analysis 
Directorate worked closely together. Both were responsible for sending agents into the Soviet Zone. Analysis was 
probably an MI6 unit under the control of the Chief of Intelligence Division. Much remains to be learned about 
them and the relationship between them. 
4-rhis body was created late in 1946 as an advance unit in Germany of the Joint Scientific and Joint Technical 
Intelligence Committees. These two Committees came into being in the wake of the review of scientific 
intelligence conducted in 1945 by the Blackett Committee. They represented the scientific and technical 
intelligence sections of the Service Ministries, MI6, the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the Ministry of Supply and 
acted as the Joint Intelligence Committee' s advisers on scientific and technical questions. They were often known 
during their lifetime as the 'Joint Committees' or 'lSIJTIC'. In 1956, STIB became the Overseas Liaison Branch; 
in 1958 or so, it was abolished. The Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee (JSIC) became in 1950 the 
Directorate of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) of the Ministry of Defence (the Director of Scientific Intelligence was 
also the Chairman of the Joint Technical Intelligence Committee, or HIC). I have also made much use of the 
OS I' s archi ve. 
SplAT was set up by SHAEP on 18 May 1945 to exploit German science. On II July 1945 it was divided into its 
British and American sections. The British section was controlled by the Control Commission for Germany 
(British Element). SHAEF was dissolved three days later (letters dated 23 July 1946, FO 1031/75). The two 
sections continued to work as one organization until the end of 1946. FIAT maintained an office in West Berlin, 
the FIAT Forward office, which, by reason of its close links with scientists, engineers and technicians working 
for the Soviets or thinking of doing so, was used to acquire intelligence on Soviet research and development 
projects. The Special Detention Centre at Kransberg, codenamed 'Dustbin', to which frequent reference is made 
in Chapter I, was operated by the Enemy Personnel Exploitation Sections (both British and American, and known 
as EPES (Br) and EPES (US» of FIAT (letter dated 6 August 1946, FO 1031/75). 
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agents of biological warfare.6 This thesis focuses on the five military technologies of 
most concern to defence planners in the ten years after the War: atomic, biological 
and chemical weaponry 7, guided missiles and electronics. 8 These were the 
technologies about whose development in the USSR intelligence was most sought. 
On the same level of priority was Order-of-Battle intelligence on Soviet science.9 In 
the early years of the Cold War, fear of biological and chemical weapons was great. 
Nazi Germany's nerve gases were much feared. Almost colourless, almost odourless 
and highly toxic, they could, unlike the older war gases, be delivered in 
concentrations which were both lethal and very difficult to detect. 10 Since the USSR 
might be unable to develop an atomic bomb quickly, it might make considerable 
6Books examining these aspects of Britain's post-war weapons research and development are: M. Gowing, 
Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atolllic Energy, 1945-52; D. Baker, Th e Rocket: The HistOl), and 
Development oj Rocket and Missile Technology; G. B. Carter, POI·ton Down: Seventy-Jive Years oj Chemical and 
Biological Research ; and E. Spiers, Chemical Weapon I) ': A Continuing Challenge. 
7The first three of these are often called 'ABC weapons' and will be referred to by this name in this thesis. 
8Electronics was a technology which consistently rose in importance throughout this period. It was relevant to 
Soviet development of radar, radio communications, radio navigational aids, missile guidance and telemetering 
systems, radio counter-measures and television. The development of high-speed digital computers formed a 
crucial part of the electronics revolution of this period and presaged the later development of 'smart weapons'. In 
the 1 940s and 1950s, computers were of immense value, both as calculating aids in the development of powerful 
weapons and as control devices which were essential to other advanced weapons. In their former role, they were 
used to perform long and very complex calculations necessary to projects for the development of supersonic 
aircraft, guided weapons and atomic weapons; in their latter role, they formed an essential part of predictor and 
gunfire-control equipment and guided missile control systems (JS/JTIC(49)92 dated 19 October 1949 entitled 
'Russian Development of Computing Machines', DEFE 41/151). 
<>When the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch of Intelligence Division, CCG(BE), was first established 
in 1946, the technologies on which it was instructed by the JIC to acquire intelligence were the ' ABC weapons', 
guided missiles, electronics and metallurgy (the last, in particular special heat-resisting steels, being relevant to 
turbo-jet aero-engine manufacture) (paragraph 2, nC(46) 109(0) dated 14 December 1946 and entitled, 'Brief for 
the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch, Control Commission for Germany' , CAB 81/134). Also sought 
were 'particulars of scientists and technicians and general educational standards'. In addition to acquiring 
information on these subjects of interest to all the armed forces, STIB had the task of obtaining information on 
subjects of interest to specific services (naval equipment, for example). It was also responsible for gathering 
intelligence for the Joint Intelligence Bureau on, for instance, the removal of factory equipment and personnel to 
the USSR and their location there. Three years later, the 'ABC' weapons, guided missiles and electronics were 
still the technologies of most interest. This appears from the Annex to JSIJTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and 
entitled, 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' (DEFE 
411150), for these are the technologies chiefly discussed in the report. The main SIGINT targets were the 'ABC' 
weapons and guided missiles, the Soviet long-range bomber and fighter defence forces and new war-related 
scientific inventions (JIC(48) 19(0) dated 11 May 1948 and entitled, 'SIGINT Intelligence Requirements - 1948 ', 
at f.2, LlWS/1/1196, India Office Library and Records, London, discussed at p. 536, R. 1. Aldrich & M. Coleman, 
The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948', Intelligence & National SeCllrity, Vol. 4, No.3 
(October 1989), pp. 535-49, and appended to the article). 
1%. Spiers, Chemical Weapon I)': A Continuing Challenge, p. 57. 
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efforts to develop biological weapons. Biological agents were cruder weapons of 
mass destruction, more easily within the reach of Soviet science than the atomic 
bomb, easier to mass-produce and perhaps capable of development into weapons of 
devastating power. In 1947, the lIC thought it probable that, 'the atomic bomb will 
remain the most potent destructive weapon within the foreseeable future, but 
biological warfare will be a close second' . II 
Scientific developments menaced Britain by strengthening the arsenal of her 
potential attackers. The atomic bomb would enable sudden and devastating attacks to 
be made without warning. The only defence would be to threaten to use the bomb in 
retaliation. 12 Long-range guided missiles would also make Britain more vulnerable 
to bombardment. 13 Submarines powered by hydrogen peroxide or atomic energy, 
with range and speed underwater much greater than the submarines at sea in 1945 
and armed with fast, long-range torpedoes, would present a great threat to Britain's 
sea communications. 14 But no possible aggressor could prepare to make such an 
attack without indications of his intentions becoming noticeable. Consequently, 
Britain's intelligence services were her first line of defence and their activities after 
the War were not sharply cut back, as they had been after the Great War. 15 To give 
II Paragraphs 62-3, JIC(46)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests , Intentions and Capabilities', 
CAB 158/1 . 
12Paragraphs 65-6, p. 18, COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons 
and Methods of War', CAB 80/94. This report was written by an 'ad hoc' committee chaired by Sir Henry Tizard, 
whose terms of reference were to predict, on the basis of the evidence available in 1945, what developments 
would take place in weapons and methods of warfare over the following ten or twenty years. Another member of 
the committee was Professor P. M. S. Blackett. 
I3Paragraphs 8-9, p. 6, COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and 
Methods of War', CAB 80/94. 
14paragraph 12, p. 7, COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and 
Methods of War', CAB 80/94. 
15pp. 331-2, R. J. Aldrich, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold 
War', Review of illrel'llariollai Srudies, Vol. 24, No.3 (July 1998), pp. 331-51 . Aldrich puts this down to fear of 
an atomic attack. In fact , intelligence-gathering, in Germany at least, targeted a number of new technologies, of 
which atomic science was only one. There was also great interest in biological and chemical weapons, 
particularly in the form of missile warheads. 
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warning of what was in the wind, Scientific Intelligence was re-organized in 1945 by 
a committee chaired by the physicist, P. M. S. Blackett. 16 
On~ argument of this thesis is that the arms race with the West resumed by Stalin in 
1945 was a cause of the Cold War. It is wrong to view the Cold War as chiefly a 
clash of political and economic systems between which there could be no 
compromise. Anti-Soviet feeling grew in the West because the military threat posed 
by the USSR grew in consequence of the latter's conquest of much of Germany, 
which made German military technology available to it. This was particularly true of 
Britain, which was immediately and gravely threatened by the Soviet Union's post-
war arms build-up. Political opinion in Britain was always anti-Communist. But her 
politicians were not hostile to the USSR until it seemed threatening. Its growing 
military power was an essential part of the threat it posed. Britain's military 
inferiority to the USSR made her an early Cold Warrior. Naturally, the Americans 
also felt threatened by the Soviets' clear determination to develop atomic and 
thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems for them. Melvyn Leffler's depiction of 
the early Cold War as a clash of economic and political initiatives does not 
sufficiently recognize the importance then given to keeping abreast of the 
development of Soviet armaments and ensuring that the West retained military 
superiority.17 The United States may have had unprecedented economic and 
16R. 1. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (article by R. 1. Aldrich on 'Secret 
Intelligence for a Post-war World: reshaping the British intelligence community, 1944-51 '), pp. 29-30. Further 
measures were taken to ensure the effective collection of scientific and technical intelligence. An example is the 
creation, in 1946, of Intelligence Division 's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch. The Scientific Order-
of-Battle Section was established within the Joint Intelligence Bureau, following a recommendation of the lIC to 
this effect (JIC(47) 15(0) dated 7 March 1947, CAB 158/1). The JIC thought that the establishment of such an 
Order-of-Battle Section was of 'extreme importance' (paragraph 14). The Section 's work represented a 
systematic effort to acquire detailed knowledge of the personalities and institutions which made up the scientific 
potential of the major Powers, using both secret sources and such open sources as scientific journals. This 
knowledge was recorded in card indices. The Section took over this work from the Technical Coordinating 
Section (TCS), the scientific intelligence section of MI6. 
17See, for example, pp. 497-8 of M. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Sew,.ity, the Trull/an 
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technological power in the 1940s and 1950s, but, as the age of atomic and 
thermonuclear weapons dawned, that power was unprecedentedly vulnerable. This 
thesis relates how and how much British Intelligence learned about the Soviet 
Union's frantic arms build-up in the first ten years or so of the Cold War. Leffler 
argues that the arms race was the consequence of the Soviet Union's political and 
economic challenge to the West. 18 It was not: it was a result of the USSR's military-
technological challenge. Leffler even claims that, 'Policymakers in Washington 
understood that their principal task was not to deal with Russian military power but 
to fill the vacuums of power, infuse a spirit of hope, promote economic 
reconstruction, and champion the principle of self-determination' .19 This is nonsense. 
It is no coincidence that, a mere five months after receiving intelligence of the 
USSR's first atomic test, President Truman ordered that the hydrogen bomb be 
developed.20 The United States was now racing the Soviet Union, and racing to stay 
ahead. Eisenhower was so concerned about the speed of Soviet weapons 
development that he appointed a special adviser on science and technology, whose 
job was above all to keep him informed about 'the relative progress of Soviet and US 
science and technology'. 21 By contrast, Britain could not win a war with the USSR. 
She was therefore dependent for her security on the United States and military and 
intelligence cooperation with the Americans became overriding aims of her policy. 
Administration and the Cold War. Leffler here lists the four principal threats in the mid-1940s to the Americans' 
plans for the international order. The Soviet Union's growing military power is not mentioned. The four sources 
of Soviet strength are stated to have been: the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and Asi a; the rise of 
Communism in such countries as France, Greece, China and Korea; the perceived vulnerability of war-wrecked 
Germany and Japan to Communist or neutralist influence; and the rise of nationalism in South-eas t Asia, North 
Africa and the Middle East. 
18In Leffler's own words (on p. 498 of A Preponderance of Power), the Americans 'came to believe that ever 
more weapons were necessary to support the ri sk-taking that inhered in co-opting the industrial core of Eurasia 
and in integrating its underdeveloped periphery ... So eventually rearmament became the essential prerequisite to 
America's diplomatic, economic, and political initiatives'. 
19M. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 499. 
200 . Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 301. 
21e. M. Andrew, For the President 's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from 
Washington to Blish, pp. 241-2. 
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In its post-war weapons development, the Soviet Union used German scientists, 
engineers, technicians, knowhow, weaponry and material resources . In the 
reconstruction of its military industries, it used German prisoners-of-war. These 
exploited Germans gave information on their work for the Soviets to British 
Intelligence. This thesis tells the story of what was learned from them. Scientific and 
technical intelligence gathered in Germany gave the British and the Americans some 
insight into the military strength of the Soviet Union. Above all, the thesis finds and 
begins to fill two large gaps in intelligence history. These gaps have long been 
concealed by official secrecy. Firstly, although security measures largely prevented 
exploited Germans from learning much about the USSR's research and development 
projects of most interest, they were able to betray to the West, for the first time, the 
skeleton of the Soviet military-industrial complex. It was from them that British and 
US Intelligence first learned the location of atomic reactors, uranium enrichment 
plants, atomic and guided missile testing sites, uranium mines, processing plants, 
research institutes, airfields and aircraft and other war-related factories essential to 
the Soviet Union's ability to fight a modern war. This intelligence was vital. Without 
it, efforts to gather imagery, signals and human intelligence on the Soviet Union's 
advanced weapons would not have been successful. Businessmen, academics and 
other visitors to the USSR observed and took photographs of high-priority targets, 
supplying 'an extraordinary amount of information ' on them.22 Signals from the 
Kapustin Yar medium- and intermediate-range missile testing site were intercepted 
and revealed characteristics of the missiles in question. Most importantly, the 
installations located in the USSR were overflown and the photographs taken yielded 
crucial intelligence, dispelling the fears of a bomber and a missile gap and 
establishing that the West still enjoyed military superiority over the Soviet Bloc. This 
22H. Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operatiolls: Espiollage, COlillter-espiollage and Covert Actioll, p. 59. 
7 
established, there was no need fo~' a further escalation of the arms race. The Germans 
had helped to stabilize the Cold War. However, the studies of overflight, 
intelligence-gathering and intelligence analysis fail to mention how the Americans 
knew where these installations were in the most security-conscious state on earth.23 
The intelligence exploitation of Germany itself is a much-neglected theme of 
historical writing. For instance, John Lewis Gaddis, in his recent We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History, writes both about the Occupation of Germany and the 
success of U-2 overflight, but fails even to mention either the Western Allies' 
exploitation of Germany for intelligence or that without it the aerial reconnaissance 
of key intelligence targets in the Soviet Union would not have been possible. 
Intelligence-gathering from human sources assumed disproportionate importance in 
the early years of the Cold War because of the difficulty of penetrating the Soviet 
Union by other means. Since Germany and Austria contained human sources with 
knowledge of developments in the Soviet Bloc who were more numerous and 
valuable than those available for exploitation anywhere else, it was on these two 
countries that efforts to gather intelligence on the Bloc focused. Other sources of 
intelligence on the Soviet Union itself then promised little. Soviet security seems to 
have presented a bigger obstacle to communications intelligence (CO MINT) 
operations than to human intelligence measures . The 'Venona' success against Soviet 
cables only related to communications between 1940 and 1948.24 That was the result 
23Such books are Christopher Pocock's, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane, Paul Lashmar's, Spy 
Flights of the Cold War, Jeffrey Richelson ' s, AlI1erican Espionage and the Soviet Targ et, Lawrence Freedman 's, 
US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat and John Prados ', The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis 
and Soviet Strategic Forces. 
24p. I, 'Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work Undone' , by M. Warner & R. L. Benson, Intelligence & 
National Security, Vol. 12, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 1-13. In time, some 2,900 messages sent between 1940 and 
1948 were decrypted in whole or in part. Using a flaw in the encipherment of messages which itself resulted from 
the repeated use of 'one-time pads' sent out to NKGB residencies , cryptanalysts at the US Army Security Agency 
were from late 1946 on able to decrypt Soviet cables. Although originally believed to be diplomatic messages, 
they turned out to have been sent by five different organizations, among them the NKGB and the GRU. The 
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of an extraordinary slip by Soviet Intelligence and there is no evidence that later 
high-grade communications were similarly decrypted. The Brownell Report of June 
1952 on American COMINT operations indicates that the Americans had little 
success in the early years of the Cold War in decrypting Soviet communications. The 
report admits that, 'We may never see a return of the great successes and victories 
attributable to CO MINT during the course of World War II', 'our successes are 
smaller and fewer today' and 'we have seen that at the present time AFSA's efforts 
in certain important parts of the cryptanalytic field have not been crowned with 
success to say the least' . 25 So long as the 'one-time pads' used for their encipherment 
were employed correctly, Soviet high-grade communications should have been 
secure and British ~nd American surprise at such events as the Tito-Stalin split in 
1948 and the Soviet atomic test in 1949 suggests that they were.26 Lower-grade voice 
and cipher communications were intercepted in vast quantities, but most of the 
intelligence obtained was of little value.27 By way of exception, the Americans 
managed for a time in the late 1940s and early 1950s to intercept radio messages 
transmitted within Russia about shipments of uranium from the Erzgebirge in East 
Germany.28 The Soviets' extensive use of landlines for communication also made 
cryptanalysts had more success with NKGB than with GRU cables, and most success of all with messages sent in 
1944 to Moscow Centre from the NKGB residency in New York, about half of which were deciphered, in whole 
or in part, between 1947 and 1952 (pp. 20-1, 'OSS and the Venona Decrypts' , by H. Peake, Intelligence & 
National Security, Vol. 12, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 14-34). 'One-time pads', as their name implied, were meant 
only to be used once. The decrypted cables revealed that Soviet Intelligence was acquiring in North America a 
great deal of intelligence on a considerable variety of scientific developments. Such of this information as was 
shared with British intelligence agencies may have alerted them to the significance of Western ideas and devices 
to Soviet technological development. The Western countries' embargo of 1949 on the sale of strategic goods to 
the USSR may have been a response to this intelligence. 
2~hese quotations are from pp. 63,77 & 78 of G. A. Brownell, The Origin and DeveloplIlent of the National 
Secllrity Agency. This book contains the text of the report of the Brownell Committee, which in 1952, on behalf 
of the US Government, examined the USA's communications intelligence-gathering. 
26R. J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (article by R. J. Aldrich on 'Secret 
Intelligence for a Post-war World: reshaping the British intelligence community, 1944-51 '), p. 28. 
27C. M. Andrew, For the Presidelll 's Eyes Only, p. 219. 
280 . Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battlegrollnd Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, pp. 14-15. 
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interception very difficult.29 COMINT of real value began to flow in considerable 
quantity from Germany and Austria in the 1950s, when the British and Americans 
succeeded in tapping high-security communication cables of the respective Soviet 
Military Administrations. 3o 
It was only in the early 1950s that the Americans began to ring the USSR with 
SIGINT stations which could intercept signals transmitted within it.31 It was only 
from the mid-1950s, using their ground stations in Turkey - the great radar at 
Samsun, which had a range of 1,000 miles and was operational from 1955, and the 
Karamursel and Diogenes SIGINT stations - that they were able to use radar 
detection and interception of telemetry and communication signals to gather 
information on missiles being test-fired at the Soviet testing range for medium-range 
missiles, Kapustin Yar. 32 Imagery intelligence was sparse. Overflight of the USSR 
was occasional because it carried great diplomatic and operational risks. The USAF 
flew missions over Soviet territory (even in daylight) during the period of the 
Occupation, taking both radar and visual photographs, but these were relatively rare 
and some may not have had Presidential authorization. Some RAF overflights in the 
early 1950s were night flights which took advantage of the fact that Soviet fighters 
carried no radar sets and so could not find the intruders in the dark. Their cameras 
29p. 343 , R. J. Aldrich, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold 
War', Review of Illtematiollal Studies , Vol. 24, No.3 (July 1998), pp. 331-51 . 
30rhese were, respectively, Operations 'Si lver' (1949-55) and 'Gold' (1955-6). They werejoint operations of the 
MI6 and CIA stations in Vienna and Berlin (J. Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise alld Declille of the CIA, pp. 138-
40,290-96). Their story is told in many books. D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey's Battlegroulld Berlill 
discusses Operation 'Gold ' at length (at pp. 205-37). C. M. Andrew at p. 215 of For the President's Eyes Dilly, 
citing the authority of a senior CIA officer, claims that the operation produced much valuable scientific, military, 
political and economic intelligence. 
31J. Richelson, Americall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target, pp. 77-80. Leaving aside SIGINT stations in the 
occupied territories of Germany and Japan, the Americans' first three SIGINT stations abroad, targeting the 
Western USSR, were in Britain, at Edzell, Kirknewton and Chicksands, and went into operation in 1951 , 1952 
and 1952 respectively. 
32J. Richelson, Americall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target, pp. 84-6. 
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took photographs of the radar images of their targets. At that time the British 
Canberra was the only aeroplane able to fly high enough to be well out of the range 
of Soviet air defences.33 Not until 1956 were the Americans able to develop a plane 
which could overfly the Soviet Union more or less with impunity and even it was 
eventually shot down. During the early part of the Cold War, most intelligence 
flights against the Soviet Union were electronic (,Ferret') or photographic 
reconnaissance flights along its borders.34 From the late 1940s on (at the latest), 
specially-equipped RAF aircraft flew missions along the East German border and 
coastline and along the southern border of the USSR, intercepting radio 
communications and radar and other electronic emissions. Such aircraft, like the 
RAF signals base at Ayiou Nicolaos in Cyprus (completed in 1949), may well have 
picked up VHF radio signals emitted in the Soviet Union and propagated beyond the 
line of sight by 'super refraction' caused by weather conditions. 35 As far as the 
creation of networks of secret agents is concerned, MI6 and the CIA seem for a long 
time to have beaten their heads against a brick wall. MI6's efforts to land agents in 
the Baltic states were ended in 1954 by the KGB, which revealed that the operation 
had been under its control from the start, and most other attempts at infiltration 
likewise failed.36 Refugees, defectors and German PoWs returning from the USSR 
had to take the place of agents. Moreover, the failure of secret intelligence operations 
against the Soviet Union gave particular importance to espionage using secret agents 
33p . Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 67, 74, 78 & 84-91. 
34p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 89-90; 1. Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, 
pp. 103-7 & 109-15. 
35pp. 105-7, A. Thomas, 'British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War' , Intelligence & Nationapl 
Security, Vol. 3, No.4 (October 1988), pp. 103-10. The range of VHF radio is usually limited to the line of sight, 
but refraction, brought about by weather conditions in the lower atmosphere, causes the signals to travel further. 
36c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside S(01), of its Foreign Operationsjrom Lenin to Gorbachev , 
pp.316-19. 
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and informal contacts in Germaqy, since East Germany was far more vulnerable to 
such operations than the USSR. 
Consequently, until the mid-1950s deep penetration of the Soviet military-industrial 
complex could only be effected by human sources. Thanks to Soviet policy towards 
Germans, such sources abounded in Germany, where they were accessible to British 
Intelligence. They made known to the British, not only where key war-related 
installations were, but also how science and industry were managed by the Soviet 
bureaucracy. By exploiting these sources, British Intelligence began to discover the 
superiority of the free market as an instrument of technological progress. That is the 
second gap in the ~istory of the Western intelligence assault on the USSR which this 
thesis discovers and begins to fill. 
During the Second World War, intelligence like that gathered from Germans in the 
years of the Occupation would for the most part have been much less significant, 
because other sources yielded a wealth of crucial intelligence.37 Aerial 
reconnaissance had been possible and interpretation of aerial photography had 
proved very accurate. This was why, on his assumption of the Presidency in 1953, 
370f course, human sources had also provided valuable intelligence on weapons development projects during 
World War Two. The Oslo Report of November 1939 had forewarned British Inte lligence of a number of very 
significant developments in German military electronics and other fields. Among the technological developments , 
secrets of which were revealed to the British, were radar sets, a range-finding system for bombers which used, not 
pulses, but a continuous radio wave, an electronically-triggered proximity fuse, a gyro-stabilized radio-controlled 
rocket, a radio-controlled acoustic homing torpedo and a radio-controlled rocket-driven glider bomb. The report 
mentioned that the glider bomb was being developed at PeenemOnde, then unknown to British Intelligence (see 
R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, pp . 105-7, and, Reflections on IlIfelligence, pp. 265-75). The author of the report 
was Hans Mayer, then the director of the Central Laboratories of Siemens & Halske. In addition, word of the 
Germans' increased production of heavy water at the Rjukan plant in Norway was received from a Professor of 
Physics in Norway, LeifTronstad (see R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, pp. 269-70). Equally, some of the 
intelligence acquired in Germany in the years 1945-55 from PoWs and scientists on Soviet atomic development 
would, if obtained on German atomry, have been valuable even during World War Two. Despite Ultra, overflight 
and inside information , neither the British nor the Americans knew in 1945 how far the German atomic 
programme had progressed. 
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Eisenhower pressed for aerial reconnaIssance of the USSR.38 During the War, 
priceless communications intelligence had been acquired in abundance. The British 
had broken the versions of the Enigma machine cipher of all three of the German 
arI!led forces, while Japan's highest-grade diplomatic code had been cracked by the 
Americans.39 However, when the Cold War began neither Britain nor the United 
States had sources of intelligence in the USSR or Eastern Europe, since during the 
War they had left military intelligence-gathering on the Eastern Front, like military 
operations, to their Soviet ally.40 Immediately after the War, only very basic 
information was gathered on Soviet military strength.41 When the USSR was 
identified as an enemy, its government's mania for security and gigantic police 
apparatus made it qifficult to penetrate. Consequently, Western countries had almost 
no information on it.42 By contrast, the Bolsheviks had always regarded all the main 
Western countries as their enemies and both during and after the War had well-
placed agents in the centres of government and scientific research of Britain and the 
38C. M. Andrew, For the Presidellt's Eyes Ollly, pp. 220-1. 
39c. M. Andrew, Secret Service: The Makillg of the British Illtelligellce COllllllllllity, p. 451; J. Richelson, A 
Celltlll )/ of Spies: Illtelligellce ill the Twelltieth Celltury , pp. 118-19, 176-8 & 190-6. The intelligence acquired in 
the two operations was, famously, codenamed 'Ultra ' and 'Magic' . 
4Oxiii , Introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper to H. Hahne & H. Zolling, Network: The Truth about Gelleral Gehlell 
alld his Spy Rillg. The former CIA officer Harry Rositzke confirms at p. 15 of his book, The CIA 's Secret 
Operatiolls, that there were not 'even the rudiments of an American intelligence effort in the Soviet Union' 
during or in the years immediately after the War. I pointed out this contrast in the conclusion of my 1996 M. Phil. 
thesis, 'British Policy, the Soviet Union and Post-war Germany: The Role and Importance of Scientific 
Intelligence' . 
41c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays ill Twelllieth-Celltury AII/ericall Diploll/atic History Dedicated to Professor Dalliel 
M. SII/ith (aI1icle by J. Erdmann on 'The Wringer in Post-war Germany: Its Impact on United States-German 
Relations and Defense Policies'), p. 163 . 
42The JIC conceded in 1946 that it was forced to rely on guesswork, commenting in one report that, 'Any study 
of Russia's strategic interests and intentions must be speculative, as we have little evidence to show what view 
Russia herself takes of her strategic interests , or what policy she intends to pursue. We have practically no direct 
intelligence, of a detailed factual or statistical nature, on conditions in the different parts of the Soviet Union, and 
none at all on the intentions, immediate or ultimate, of the Russian leaders . For example, we have no intelligence 
whatever on two such crucial questions as whether Russia intends to continue her demobilisation during 1946 and 
whether Russian industry is to any substantial extent being reconverted from wartime requirements for the needs 
of peace. Our present appreciation is based, therefore, on the limited evidence which we have, on deductions 
made from such indications of policy as Russia has given, and on reasonable conjecture concerning the Soviet 
appreciation of their own situation' (paragraph 3, J1C(46) I (0) dated I March 1946 and entitled 'Russia's Strategic 
Interests & Intentions', CAB 811132). 
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United States. Furthermore, the op~nness of Western societies meant that the USSR 
had less need of secret intelligence than the West. The information on atomic 
installations, airfields and missiles sites in the USA which the Soviets could gather 
without difficulty, and often lawfully, the Americans could only acquire from aerial 
reconnaissance. The information obtained from Germans exploited by the Soviets for 
their labour and knowledge was therefore crucial because, whatever its 
shortcomings, it was the best information the British and Americans had on the 
current and future military capability of the USSR. 
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. CHAPTER 1 
THE SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF GERMAN SCIENCE AND BRITISH 
INTELLIGENCE POLICY TOWARDS THE U.S.S.R. 
A. The intelligence victory over Germany 
In the mid- and late-1940s, scientific intelligence operations against the Soviet Union 
were among the causes of the East-West hostility known as the Cold War. A decade 
later, such operations helped to stabilize the Cold War. The first post-war penetration 
of Soviet military capability by British Intelligence was a by-product of its effort to 
complete the victory over Germany. In 1945-6, British intelligence agencies had the 
task of achieving an intelligence victory over Germany, so that in a future war she 
would have no weapon with which her conquerors in 1945 were not familiar. As they 
overran the Reich, the victorious Allies sought to find out all about Germany's 
armaments and to acquire them for themselves. A special fighting unit, 'T' Force, 
was created by the British and Americans to take over and occupy installations 
engaged in weapons development and manufacture and war-related scientific 
research. These installations were then visited by Combined Intelligence Objectives 
Sub-committee (CIOS) teams brought into being by SHAEF to find out all there was 
to know about German war-related science.43 CIOS, as a division of SHAEF, was 
wound up in the summer of 1945, when SHAEF was dissolved. In its brief lifetime, 
43 , A History of 'T' Force' , FO 1031/49. 'T' stood for 'Target'. CIOS scientific intelligence teams were soon 
supplemented by British Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (BIOS) teams which did the same work in 
Britain's interest alone. Some priceless finds were made. For instance, when Kiel fell, Allied forces not only 
overran the great Waltherwerke but also captured Helmuth Walther himself. Although he had burnt all his 
records, he had microfilmed the most important of them and a prototype of his greatest creation, a Type XXVI 
hydrogen-peroxide-powered submarine capable of twenty-five knots underwater, was found in the works. The 
two targets, the investigation of which took the longest, were the Raubkammer, near Celie, a chemical weapons 
installation, and the huge Ordnance Testing Station at MUnster-Unterluss. 
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it produced reports on 3,377 targets.44 Its work amounted to the biggest single 
scientific intelligence operation ever conducted by any group of Powers against 
another. 
Events in Germany worked in favour of the Western Allies. Not only did they 
overrun the larger part of Germany, but German scientists and technicians in the last 
months of the War, like others, moved West so as to fall into Western hands. Thus 
the leaders of the German guided missile project (including its directing mind, 
Wernher von Braun) were captured by the Americans and the leaders of the German 
atomic energy and nerve gas development projects ended up in 'Dustbin', the Allied 
interrogation centre.which was first situated at Chesnay, near Versailles, and was in 
June 1945 moved to SchloG Kransberg, near Frankfurt.45 
44Minutes of BIOS meeting on 12 September 1945, FO 1031/50. 
45Intelligence operations encouraged this movement of German scientific workers to the West. Even in the last 
months of the War, it was the policy of the Western Allies to prevent German scientists, engineers and 
technicians whose knowledge would be of value to the USSR from falling into Soviet hands. If they were in the 
Soviet Zone, they were to be located and an attempt made to persuade them to come West. The most spectacular 
example of this policy was the evacuation by the Americans in June 1945, before their withdrawal from central 
Germany, of some 2,000 German scientific workers , many of them very important. Also evacuated were their 
families and vast quantities of equipment. Regarding the number of evacuees, the figure of 750 evacuees is given 
in the BIOS minutes of its meeting on 13 February 1946, FO 1031/50. But an EPES, FIAT report dated 14 
August 1946 (FO 1031/67) gives the greater figure of 2,000. Since the lists of those to be evacuated were prepared 
by EPES (FIAT's Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section) itself, I have preferred these figures. The British were 
also involved in this operation, evacuating some 250 scientists, engineers and technicians (and their families). 
Those selected for evacuation were, in part, chosen on the basis of information on them provided by such 
'Dustbin' detainees as Albert Speer and Werner Osenberg. The Carl-Zeil3 manufacturing complex at Jena, the 
Junkers factory at Dessau, the Telefunken research laboratory at Bad Liebenstein, the I. G. Farben factories at 
Wolfen, Leuna and Bitterfeld, the V-2 missile experimental establishment at Nordhausen, the universities of 
Leipzig, Jena and Halle and many other places were all stripped of people and equipment. Some 450 scientists 
and engineers were taken from the Zeil3 and Schott factories in Jena alone (letter dated I March 1946, FO 
1031/67). At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet delegation protested at the removal of scientific personnel and 
equipment from their Zone. Since the British and Americans were not willing to find work in their fields of 
expertise for these people, all but the most important of them had soon to be released (EPES, FIAT report dated 
14 August 1946, FO 1031/67). They were very unhappy in American hands, where their skills went completely 
unused. More than 40% of the Zeil3 and Schott evacuees had doctoral degrees. Their main aim was to find work 
in their field and by the spring of 1946 most had not succeeded in doing so. Naturally, on release many of those 
evacuated from central Germany made their way back to the Soviet Zone, where good, well-paid jobs in their 
specialist fields awaited them. The carrot was backed up with a stick: if they did not go back, their relatives in 
East Germany would be victimized (further EPES, FIAT report dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/67). The policy 
of control of German science meant that German scientific workers could not find work in their areas of expertise 
in Western Germany. They had either to go abroad or work for the Soviets. 
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The Special Detention Centre codenamed 'Dustbin' was established to hold scientists 
and administrators from whom information on Germany's great advances in military 
technology could be gathered. 46 This information was of importance for assessments 
of ~he future military strength of the Soviet Union as well, since the USSR, as a 
fellow-exploiter of Germany, would have overrun people, documents, components 
and weapons which would betray to it the advances the Germans had made. The 
'Dustbin' interrogators interviewed the leading administrators and scientists of the 
Nazi military-industrial complex. One important task was the interrogation of 
members of the special research staff of the Reichforschungsrat (Imperial Research 
Council).47 Among this group was the Director of the Planungsamt (Planning Office) 
of the Reichforschungsamt, Professor Werner Osenberg. The Planungsamt's most 
important files and records (above all its card indices of German scientific personnel) 
were flown to 'Dustbin' from Northeim, near Hannover, soon after it was captured in 
April 1945. These documents allowed German scientists, engineers and technicians 
with knowledge of military significance to be identified and tracked down and were 
therefore of great intelligence value.48 
Personnel from the Ministry of Armaments and War Production were imprisoned and 
interrogated there for information on the war production which they had directed. 
Among these people were the Minister himself, Albert Speer; Gerhard Steiler von 
Heydekampf, the Chairman of its Main Committee on Tanks and Vehicles; and Otto 
46'Dustbin' was originally established by SHAEF as a detention centre to be run jointly by the British and 
Americans. Until August 1946, when the Americans placed their own intelligence representative at the centre, the 
intelligence officers stationed there were British; its administrative staff was American. Until August 1946, the 
Americans were kept fully informed of the intelligence being gathered there by the British. In December 1946 the 
Americans decided to close down the centre and carry out the same work by themselves at the US Detention 
Centre MISC in Oberursel (reports dated 9 November and 3 December 1946, FO 1031/69). 'Dustbin 's ' annex 
was codenamed 'Ashcan'. 
47Report dated 2 December 1946, FO 1031/69. 
48Letter dated 8 August 1946, FO 1031/26. 
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Merker, the chairman of its Ma~n Committee for Shipbuilding. The interrogators 
sought information on radar and radio signalling, which had so greatly increased the 
effectiveness of airpower during the War. 49 Professor Abraham Esau, the supervisor 
of all German wartime research into radio, was held at the centre from October 1945 
to March 1946.50 Directors of the Telefunken company, a manufacturer of anti-
aircraft and fighter control radar sets,51 were also interrogated in the summer of 
1945. Electro-magnetic radiation allowed distant objects to be remotely controlled 
and, naturally, Professor Friedrich Gladenbeck, the plenipotenitary on the 
Reichforschungsrat for research into remote control, was admitted to 'Dustbin' in 
July 1945. Industrialists whose companies had been heavily involved in Germany's 
war effort, such as Fritz Thyssen of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Hermann Rochling of 
the Rochling Stahlwerke and Professor Ferdinand Porsche of the Volkswagenwerke, 
were likewise questioned in 'Dustbin' .52 
Leading figures in the wartime operations of the great chemical company, 1. G. 
Fat'ben, were put in 'Dustbin' and interrogated. Interest in these people was great 
because, late in April 1945, CIOS teams had overrun the main office of 1. G. Fat'ben 
in Frankfurt-am-Main and interrogated the scientists there, who had babbled about 
war gases of unheard-of toxicity. Accordingly, on 26 April 1945 SHAEF was 
informed by signal of the existence of a German poison gas, alleged to penetrate gas 
masks, which would be found at the 1. G. Farben works at Gendorf in Bavaria.53 This 
was tabun, the first of the nerve gases, though its toxicity, while great, was 
49The effect of radar and radio communications on airpower is discussed at p. 5, foreword by Sir Robert 
Cockburn, KBE, CB, to A. Price, Instrull/ents of Darkness: The HistOJ), of Electronic Wwjare. 
5Operiodic State Report No. 43 dated 21 March 1946, FO 1031170. 
51 A. Price, Instrull/ents of Darkness, pp. 60 & 64. 
52These and many other arrivals and departures are recorded in the Periodic State Reports contained in FO 
1031/52. 
53CIOS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 1945, FO 1031/81. 
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exaggerated in this report. Systematic interrogation of I. G. Fat'ben chemists and 
administrators revealed the chemical composition of the gases developed, their 
toxicity and mode of operation, the places where they had been made, the chemists 
involved in their development and production and the extent of the company's 
collaboration with the Nazis' armaments build-up. 54 Tabun had been mass-produced, 
at Dyhernfurth in Silesia. Sarin had only been made in the laboratory, at the 
Heeresgasschutzlaboratorium (Army Gas Protection Laboratory) in Berlin-Spandau, 
but a pilot plant for its manufacture had been three-quarters-built at Dyhernfurth and 
a plant for its mass production had been under construction at Falkenhagen, not far 
from Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, when the war ended. Both plants were in Soviet hands. 
Although all chemical weapons and all traces of the nerve gases were removed from 
the Dyhernfurth plants before they were abandoned to the advancing Soviet armies, 
the plants were not destroyed. 55 Those interrogated maintained that all documents 
relating to the nerve gases were destroyed, but the head of tabun production at 
54rhe nerve gases are so called because they attack the nervous system. Specifically, they attack the enzyme 
cholesterase, which is essential for nerve function. The codenames given to the two principal nerve gases 
invented by Gerhard Schrader were legion. The gas generally known as tabun was first synthesized late in 1936 
and was originally codenamed Le-IOO (for Leverkusen-I 00) and also had the codenames Gelan, Trilon-83, T-83 
and P-IOO. Sarin, first synthesized in 1938, was variously known by that name and as Le-213, Trilon-146 and T-
146. Tabun is the ethyl ester of dimethylaminocyanphosphoric acid; sarin the isopropyl ester of 
methylfluorophosphoric acid. Schrader did not know how tabun had been given its principal name, but knew that 
sarin stood for Schrader, Ambros, Rittler and von der Linde. Ambros had commissioned the putting of tabun into 
service as a weapon. An [. G. Farben director, he was the chairman of the Special 'C' (Chemicals) Committee of 
Speer's Armaments Ministry and as such was responsible for all Germany's war gas production. Rittler and von 
der Linde were chemists at the Heereswaffenamt who helped turn Schrader's invention into a weapon in 
production. Most of these details about the two gases are taken from CIOS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 
1945; Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945; letter dated 18 September 1945 
(all in FO 1031/81); report dated 26 September 1945 (FO 1031/82); and the reports made on the interrogations of 
Dr. Gerhard Schrader, which are contained in FO 1031/239. In these reports, statements as to the difference in the 
toxicity of tabun and that of sarin vary greatly. In C[OS Evaluation Report 26 dated 21 May 1945 (FO 1031/81) 
sarin is stated to be four times as toxic as tabun. [n C[OS Evaluation Report 11 dated 2 May 1945 (FO 1031/81) 
sarin is stated to be three times as toxic as tabun. Since this latter report is based on information taken from 
Schrader himself and from Prof. Dr. Eberhard Gross, who tested the nerve gases and determined their toxicity , 
this figure is the more likely to be accurate. However, in an Alsos report dated 26 September 1945 (FO 1031182) 
sarin is stated to be seven times as toxic as tabun, and Gross is cited as the source of this information. Ulrich 
Albrecht and Randolph Nikutta, in their book, Die SOlVjelische Riislllllgsilldllslrie (p. 75), state that sarin is six 
times as toxic as tabun and soman three times as toxic as sarin. [n all Schrader synthesized some 400 organic 
phosphorus compounds (report dated 26 September 1945, FO 1031/82). 
55Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945, FO 1031/81. 
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Dyhernfurth, Dr. Bernd von Bock, many years later told British and American 
interrogators that he doubted whether this was true. Shells and bombs containing 
approximately 10,000 tons of tabun had been hidden in places in the Soviet Zone and 
so had to be presumed to be in Soviet hands.56 As a result of such interrogations, 
documents were dug up at Gendorf which threw more light on 1. G. Farben's 
involvement in the Nazis' war drive.57 The most profitable interrogation of all was 
that of the inventor of tabun and sarin himself, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, who fell into 
Allied hands when the region around Leverkusen was captured in mid-April 1945.58 
Allied interrogators learned from the chemists they questioned of the invention of the 
most toxic of the nerve gases, soman, the pinacolyl homologue of sarin .59 Its 
inventor, Professor Richard Kuhn, was interrogated. As a result of its importance to 
Germany's war effort, all factories, properties and assets of 1. G. Farben were in 
November 1945 taken into the ownership and control of the Allied Control Council 
by its Law No. 9.60 
56Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945, FO 1031/81. 
57Letter dated 22 October 1945, FO 1031/81. 
58Schrader was taken into ' Dustbin' in August 1945 and not released until May 1946 (Periodic State Report No. 
47 dated 25 April 1946 (FO 1031170) states that Schrader was admitted to ' Dustbin' on 16 August 1945 and was 
to leave it a week from the date of the report. He wrote nine reports on his organic phosphorus compound 
insecticides during his time in the centre) . Admitted to ' Dustbin ' on the same day was his boss, Professor 
Heinrich Hbrlein, I. G. Farben 's Director of Research into Pharmaceuticals and a member of its Central 
Committee. Other I. G. Farben personnel held there included the company's chairman, Dr. Hermann Schmitz, Dr. 
Max Wittwer, the director of Anorgana, I. G. Farben's subsidiary for the manufacture of nerve gas, and Dr. 
JUrgen von Klenck, the manager-to-be of the uncompleted sarin plant at Falkenhagen (he was also the Deputy 
Chairman of the Speer Ministry 's Special 'C' Committee, which was responsible for chemical warfare) (Periodic 
State Report No. 63 dated 12 September 1946, FO 1031170). 
59 Abstract from Notes on Interrogation at Frankfurt: 21 April - 4 May 1945, FO 1031/81; report dated 26 
September 1945, FO 1031/82. News of the invention of the nerve gases must have come as an unpleasant shock 
to British military planners, who had only two months before considered that there would be no developments in 
chemical warfare beyond the level of advancement known to the British during the War (see the draft report of 
the Tizard committee charged in 1945 with predicting what developments would take place in weapons and 
methods of warfare over the following ten years. This draft report is attached to a covering letter WW/51/45 
dated 19 February 1945, CAB 137/19). This statement did not appear in the report actually submitted in June 
1945 (COS(45)402(0) dated 16 June 1945 and entitled, 'Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', 
CAB 80/94). 
60Letter dated 26 September 1945, FO 103 1/53 . 
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Since tabun-filled weapons, the tabun plant at Dyhernfurth, the uncompleted sarin 
pilot plant there, the unfinished sarin plant at Falkenhagen and quite possibly 
documents relating to the manufacture of the nerve gases had all fallen into Soviet 
haJ;1ds, it had to be assumed that the Soviets would soon be capable of making them 
and using them in war. The Germans' submarines, torpedoes, aerodynamics, fuels, 
infra-red detection and V-I engine were all superior to the Allies' counterpart 
technologies 61 and the Soviets came by German knowledge in all these fields. 62 
However, in the fields of atomic and biological warfare the Germans had not 
advanced beyond the level of Soviet science. When the War ended, the atomic 
energy project under Werner Heisenberg was still at a rudimentary stage. A self-
sustaining atomic reactor had not been built, and the scientists concerned had both 
not thought of using plutonium in the bomb and thought it impossible to separate 
uranium-235 (which is fissionable) from uranium-238 (which is not).63 Interrogation 
of captured scientists established that Allied fears of Nazi Germany's biological 
warfare capability had been exaggerated. German research into means of biological 
warfare had started later than in other countries (for instance, France and the USSR) 
and was a response to the Germans' own scientific exploitation of conquered France. 
61 xvii, introduction by Professor R. V. Jones to S. Goudsmit, Alsos. 
6brhe Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' (DEFE 41/150) contains details of German 
technologies which became available to the USSR at the end of the War. See p. 16 for information on missile 
guidance, p. 18 for information on infra-red, pp. 21-8 for information on guided missiles, pp. 35-6 for information 
on submarines and torpedoes. 
63S . Goudsmit, Alsos, pp. 176 & 182; xi, introduction by Professor R. V. Jones to Goudsmit'sAlsos. Goudsmit 
was the scientific leader of the Alsos II Mission, sent to Europe in 1944 by General Leslie Groves, the military 
chief of the Manhattan Project, to find out how much success the Germans had had in their efforts to develop 
atomic energy. As Goudsmit's book relates, the Mission discovered that Heisenberg's project had lagged far 
behind the Manhattan Project and was far from developing a bomb (foreword, xv-xvi; pp. 70-5, 90, 176-82). As 
Professor Jones relates in his introduction to Alsos, British Intelligence had reached this conclusion well before 
the War's end by using informants close to Werner Heisenberg to follow his movements. Their information 
established that he had not been associated with any large-scale construction project. The manufacture of an 
atomic bomb would have been such a project and might have required three years at least to bring to completion. 
When the War ended, the Soviets had not achieved a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction either. This was 
achieved by the 'F-I' reactor of Laboratory No.2 of the Academy of Sciences in December 1946 (D. Holloway, 
Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-56, p. 182). 
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An expert on disinfection, Professor Heinrich Kliewe, was commissioned by the 
Wehrmacht's Surgeon-General to conduct research into defence against a biological 
attack when, in 1940, German forces overran five laboratories at Le Bouchet, not far 
from Paris, in which bacterial cultures were found.64 Late in 1942 a committee was 
formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Walter Hirsch, the head of Department 9 
(chemical weapons) of the Waffenamt Prtifwesen (the German Army's Weapons 
Testing Office) to study means of waging biological warfare. Research was carried 
out by three groups overseen by this committee: a Human Section, for which Kliewe 
worked, a Veterinary Section and an Agricultural Section. However, Hitler hated the 
project and, according to Kliewe, forbade research into the offensive use of 
biological agents. His order frustrated progress and only three experiments of any 
significance were carried out.65 Unsurprisingly, research into the offensive use, on a 
strategic scale, of agents of biological warfare did not progress beyond a primitive 
64Report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83. 
65Alsos report dated 24 June 1945, FO 1031/83. Kliewe, the leading German researcher into means of defence 
against biological warfare, was interrogated in 'Dustbin' in the summer of 1945. As a result of his information, 
Prof. Dr. Kurt Blome was detained in 'Dustbin'. Blome was a long-serving NSDAP member and the 
plenipotentiary for cancer research on the Reichforschungsrat. In 1943, he had assumed responsibility for all 
research into biological warfare sponsored by the Wehrmacht (letter dated 3 July 1945, FO 1031/83). The Alsos 
report dated 24 June 1945 (FO 1031/83) contains information acquired by interrogating Professor Kliewe and Dr. 
Hirsch, the head of 'Wa PrOf 9'. Kliewe says that he first learned that Blome had been appointed director of all 
the army's research into biological warfare when he met Blome at a meeting in 1943 of the committee chaired by 
Hirsch. Hirsch, however, says that he had never been informed that Blome had been put in charge of all 
biological warfare research. This confusion is typical of the administrative disorganization which characterized 
the Nazi state. The interrogator of the two men remarked at the foot of the report that not only was Hirsch 
unaware of Blome's work, he and Kliewe were almost wholly ignorant of each other's work. This ignorance was 
remarkable given that they sat on the same small committee and Kliewe worked in a research section run by 
Hirsch. This suggested that there was simply no cooperation between BW scientists at all. However, both Hirsch 
and Kliewe stated that Hitler's ban on research into offensive BW acted as a severe constraint on all BW 
research. 
In the interrogations carried out at 'Dustbin', it was often discovered where documents relating to advances in 
military technology had been hidden. For example, Kliewe revealed that the records of the German Army's 
Surgeon-General's office (Heeressanittitsinspektion), for which he had worked, had in mid-March 1945 been 
taken from Berlin by personnel of that office on a special train. Interrogation of the Army's Surgeon-General, 
General Walter, and various of his underlings established that the records of the office had been hidden in a 
monastery at Niederviehbach, near Landshut in Bavaria, from the cellars of which they were promptly recovered 
(letter dated 24 May 1945, FO 1031/83). Reports on guided missile research and development at PeenemOnde and 
plans for new projects were also dug up in the wake of later interrogations at the American interrogation centre at 
Oberursel (report dated 9 June 1947, FO 1031112). Several thousand documents, giving the formulae and 
production methods of the nerve gases and much information on I. G. Farben ' s invol vement in Nazi Germany 's 
arms build-up, were found buried near the company's Gendorf plant and in the safe of the factory (report on 
interrogation of Dr. J. von Klenck dated 6 December 1945, FO 1031/91). 
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stage. 66 Likewise, no weapons were developed to defend German troops against a 
biological attack. 67 Therefore, there was nothing the Soviets could learn from 
German research into means of biological warfare. Extensive research had before the 
War been conducted into agents of biological warfare in the Soviet Union.68 
Kliewe seemed to provide snippets of more valuable information on Soviet interest 
in biological warfare, for to help him in his work he had been sent intelligence 
reports on Soviet research.69 Above all, he told his interrogators that, in the light of 
the evidence gathered by their intelligence services of Soviet BW research, the 
German BW scientists had assumed that their Soviet counterparts had made enough 
progress for the USSR to be able at any time to use plague or anthrax bacilli as 
offensive weapons'?o Kliewe, drawing on the reports he had seen, gave his 
interrogators the names of Soviet scientists who might be conducting research into 
66DSI Memorandum No. 15 dated 17 May 1952 and entitled, 'Science in the German Democratic Republic' , 
DEFE 411153; S. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Wmfare 1932-45 and the American Cover-Up, 
pp. 160-1. 
67Report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83. 
68S. Harris, Factories of Death, p. 157. However, the Soviets must have benefited from their exploitation of 
Japanese research into biological warfare agents. Japanese biological warfare experts fell into Soviet hands after 
the War. In the last few days of 1949, more than four years after their capture, twelve Japanese officers were tried 
in the USSR for conspiring to use biological warfare agents during the War. Even though these men had 
committed their crimes in Manchuria, the Soviet Union assumed jurisdiction over their case and their trial took 
place at Khabarovsk in Siberia. All the accused admitted to the charges made against them, including the charge 
that they had killed many Soviet citizens in their BW experiments. Despite the gravity of the charges, none was 
sentenced to death. All received sentences of imprisonment and even those sentenced to twenty-five years' hard 
labour were back in Japan by 1956. The US State Department drew from the delay in bringing them to trial the 
natural conclusion that the MvD had wanted to extract as much information about Japanese methods of waging 
biological warfare as possible from the accused (S. Harris, Factories of Death , pp. 226-30). 
69Report on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031183. Another source on Soviet 
BW was Dr. Hirsch, who had also been given information acquired from intelligence sources. Among these was a 
Soviet defector, an officer who called himself von Apen and who flew to Berlin during the War claiming that he 
was a Trotskyist dissident. Von Apen's information on Soviet biological warfare research was obviously of very 
doubtful value. Dr. Hirsch maintained in interrogation that German BW researchers suspected throughout that 
von Apen might be a Soviet agent peddling them disinformation , because he claimed to have top-secret 
information on so many subjects. The Germans could not believe that knowledge of so many research projects 
could genuinely have been acquired (Alsos report dated 24 June 1945, FO 1031/83). 
7~eport on the interrogation of Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83. Dr. Hirsch and Professor 
Kliewe disagree on the key question of whether the Soviets were actually in a position to use agents of biological 
warfare. Hirsch maintains that the German scientists doubted whether any Soviet biological attack would be 
effective. They were much more interested in French research into combining biological and chemical agents 
(Alsos report dated 24 June 1945, FO 1031183). 
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agents of biological warfare, sp~cified pathogens they might be seeking to use as 
weapons and means by which they might be contemplating disseminating them. For 
a time, the information acquired from such prisoners and from captured German and 
Japanese documents, indicating that there had been 'considerable activity in the 
past', influenced British intelligence assessments of the USSR's biological warfare 
capability. It formed the basis of the JIC's 1947 assessment of Soviet work on 
biological warfare, simply because it was the only information the Committee then 
had on the subject. 71 However, within two years or so, the scientific intelligence 
community had lost all confidence in the information and preferred to resort to 
guesswork in estimating the USSR's progress in developing agents of biological 
warfare. 72 
71 Kliewe seems to have been the principal source of the information on Soviet BW contained in JIC(47)22(0) 
dated 25 April 1947 entitled, 'Present State of Biological Warfare in Foreign Countries' , CAB 15811 (the 
quotation is from paragraph 3). Some of the pathogens he mentioned are listed in the report as BW agents the 
USSR might be developing (anthrax, plague, tularaemia and glanders); the JIC also asserted that those 
responsible for tetanus, cholera, dysentery, typhoid and brucellosis might be under development in the USSR. 
The information he provided on means of disseminating such agents was also incorporated into the report (such 
as dropping from aeroplanes sealed glass containers, holding infectious cultures, which subsequently broke open) . 
The JIC listed four possible research centres in the Soviet Union: by Lake Seliger (about halfway between 
Moscow and Leningrad), by the Aral Sea, at Fort Alexander (at SchlosseIberg near Leningrad) and in 
Vladivostok. Of these, the first three were mentioned by Kliewe in interrogation (report on the interrogation of 
Professor H. Kliewe dated 13 May 1945, FO 1031/83). In all, Kliewe had received sixteen reports on BW 
developments in the Soviet Union , most of which concerned interest in plague. 
72JS/JTIC(49)47 dated 14 July 1949 and entitled, 'Present State of Progress in Biological Warfare in Foreign 
Countries', DEFE 411150. In this report , the Joint Committees dismiss earlier intelligence of Soviet research into 
biological warfare agents with the words, 'Critical survey of intelligence from ex-enemy sources has, in light of 
knowledge derived from later overt and covert sources, shown that this intelligence may largely now be relegated 
to our records as being either inaccurate or of historical interest. ' The result was that British Intelligence had 
almost no reliable information on Soviet research into biological warfare. Some intelligence had been acquired 
suggesting that a small-scale research project was being carried out on behalf of the Soviet Army, but no 
intelligence had been obtained of any weapons research and development and none of any weapons trials. The 
Joint Committees were therefore reduced to making an educated guess . They therefore concluded in 
JS/JTIC(49)47 that the Soviet Union was probably not yet capable of manufacturing and using bacteria on a 
massive scale. This was a guess, based on the simi larity between the techniques for the large-scale production of 
antibiotics and those for the large-scale production of agents of biological warfare. Since penicillin was known to 
be in short supply in the USSR and its pl anned future production was on a much smaller scale than in the USA or 
Britain, it followed that the Soviet Union cou ld not be capable of the mass production of agents of biological 
warfare. However, given their intellectual interest (revealed by the Soviet press), their skill in medicine and 
biology and their efforts to produce antibiot ics, the Joint Committees forecast that the Soviets wou ld be able to 
produce bacteria and toxins for war purposes on a large scale within three years (i.e. by 1952: JS/JTIC minutes, 
16 March 1949, DEFE 41172). By 1952 it was indeed clear that the Soviets had established an antibiotics industry 
manufacturing a number of ant ibiotics. Eight factories were known to be manufacturing penicillin and there 
might well be more. The improvement in the quality of Soviet penicillin had been quick and it was reasonable to 
assume that equally rapid progress had been made with efforts to mass-produce pathogenic bacteria. It could 
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The information yielded by the interrogations of German scientists and 
administrators about their success in developing new weapons brought with it fear 
for the future: fear that the USSR would incorporate into its arsenal the German 
military technology which had come into its hands and would, sooner or later, use it 
in a war with the West. By 1946, the interrogations in 'Dustbin' had the aim of 
finding out about Soviet development projects as well as German wartime 
achievements . Scientific workers threatened with kidnapping 'by agents of Powers 
other than the USA or the UK' were held there.?3 The quoted words refer chiefly to 
the USSR, but may also refer to France. Scientists and technicians who had worked 
on Soviet development projects, or had otherwise come by information on them, and 
thus had knowledge of them to pass on were also held in 'Dustbin'. 
Operation' Apple Pie' 
The documents of German wartime intelligence agencies were examined for 
information on the USSR acquired in the course of the Wehrmacht's invasion of the 
Soviet Union. The Germans' information had come principally from the millions of 
Soviet troops who had been taken prisoner. Likewise, German intelligence experts on 
the USSR were tracked down to provide more information. Among them were 
intelligence officers of the Wannsee Institute and agencies connected with it, who 
were commissioned to write up their knowledge of the Soviet Union (for a fee).?4 
therefore be assumed that the mass cultivation of some pathogenic bacteria could have begun in the USSR in 
1951 and that from 1952 several tons of weapon charging per day could be in production (DSI Paper dated 7 
February 1952 and entitled, 'Soviet Intentions and Capabilities', Working Party on BW Prophylaxis and Therapy, 
DEFE 41/156). 
73Report dated 2 December 1946, FO 1031/69. 
74HQ.Int.Div./JlCI702113 Memorandum No.5 dated 13 January 1947, discussed at meeting of JlC (Germany) on 
23 January 1947; minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 10 February I947, DEFE 41/62. 
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This was Operation 'Apple Pie', which began in 1946.75 The results of the operation 
were shared with the Americans, who likewise handed over the intelligence yield of 
their counterpart operation. 76 Intelligence documents were dug up wherever they had 
been. hidden. For example, with the help of MI6 documents of the Wehrmacht's 
Feldwirtschaftsamt (Field Economic Office) were in 1947 recovered from the Soviet 
Zone of Austria.?7 As late as the early 1950s, the intelligence machine in Germany 
was running in part on oil extracted from this very old chestnut, though the 'Apple 
Pie' organization had by then become the Documents Research Section of 
Intelligence Division's Production Directorate. 
A great deal of the intelligence yielded by the operation was economic intelligence.?8 
Nevertheless, reports were produced which contained technical intelligence of 
interest, among them, 'Experiences of the German Air Force with radio intelligence 
75Letter dated 29 December 1949 from Maj.-Gen. Haydon to Dr. B. K. Blount , DEFE 41/83. The exploitation of 
German intelligence documents played a role in the 'Venona ' breakthrough (see Introduction , footnote 24). The 
NKGB diplomatic codebook used by the 'Venona' cryptanalysts in the 1950s had been found by US Army Target 
Intelligence Committee (TICOM) teams in German archives in 1945 (p. 9, 'Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on 
Work Undone', by M. Warner & R. L. Benson, illtelligellce & Natiollal Security, Vol. 12, No.3 (July 1997), pp. 
1-13). In addition, German experts on cryptology wrote valuable reports on Soviet cryptology for the British and 
Americans (see 'Russian Cryptology during World War II', at pp. 159-65, R. L. Benson & M. Warner (eds.), 
Vellolla: Soviet Espiollage and the Americall Respollse 1939-57). 
76Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 30 June 1947, DEFE 41/63. 
77Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 30 June 1947, DEFE 41/63. 
78Letter dated 29 December 1949 from Maj.-Gen . Haydon to Dr. B. K. Blount, DEFE 41/83. Haydon, the Chief 
of Intelligence Division, also told Blount , the Chairman of the JS/JTIC, that the operation had yielded political 
and topographical information. Further evidence that ' Apple Pie' principally yielded economic intelligence is the 
fact that the work of the Documents Research Section in the 1950s was considered by JIB (London) to be of great 
value to it (minutes of J1C (Germany) meeting on 17 April 1952, DEFE 41167) . Even as late as this, the Section 
employed a large staff on the preparation of reports for Ministries in London (minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting 
on 25 March 1952, DEFE 41/67) . Examples of the kind of economic intelligence yielded by the Section's work 
are the reports by an Oberst Kirsch of the Feldwirtschaftsamt on such topics as 'The Future Development of the 
Economic Potential of the Soviet Union' and 'The Evaluation of Factory Marks and Numbers on Soviet Heavy 
Equipment ' . The documents of the Dienststelle Gordes (Gordes Office) were recovered and gave the British 
excellent information on the Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Tartarstan. Among the documents were maps of the 
Caucasus and German economic reports on the area (including information on oil and manganese production) 
(HQ.lnLDivJJlCI7021/3 Memorandum No. 6 dated 17 March 1947, discussed at meeting of JIC (Germany) on 24 
March 1947, DEFE 41/62) . The' Apple Pie' report on 'The Formation and State of Development of the Industrial 
Areas of the USSR ' probably provided source material for the map set out at Appendix B to this thesis. For more 
on this map, see Chapter 3. The report in question is referred to in HQ.Int.DivIJICI7021/3 Memorandum No.7 
(contained in agenda for J1C (Germany) meeting on 19 May 1947, DEFE 41/62). 
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in the war with Russia'.79 Among 'other early reports were 'The Development of the 
Soviet Tank Industry during the War', 'The Development of the S. P. Gun Industry 
during the War' and one on Soviet raw materials and industries. 80 Valuable technical 
intelligence was acquired from once high-ranking German officers on such subjects 
as Soviet engineering and factory markings on Soviet materiel.81 Interesting snippets 
of scientific intelligence were also acquired. Nevertheless, the yield of scientific and 
technical intelligence was limited because German intelligence agencies had not 
made systematic efforts to procure such intelligence. 82 Efforts were made to locate 
the Wannsee Institute's card index of 'Soviet Personalities' comprising some 8,000 
cards and 3,000 photographs. It is not clear whether these efforts were successful, 
but, if they were, among the cards recovered must have been ones relating to leading 
figures in the Soviet military-industrial complex. A knowledgeable figure who fell 
into the hands of the British was Professor Steinmann. He had once been director of 
the BUro Steinmann, the agency which had briefed those charged with carrying out 
sabotage attacks on industrial installations in the Soviet Union.83 
It is clear from the exploitation by the British of German wartime intelligence 
documents that the Germans' interrogation of Soviet prisoners-of-war had yielded 
valuable information on the military capability and strategy of the USSR. For 
example, before the War the British had managed to come by indications that some 
79Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 13 February 1951, DEFE 41/66. 
8C1-iQ.Int.Div.lJlC/702113 Memorandum No, 7, contained in agenda for JlC (Germany) meeting on 19 May 1947, 
DEFE 41/62. 
81Address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(Int)BAOR, to the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference for Assistant 
Military Attaches, June 1951, DEFE 411125. The Americans must have derived benefit from the report on Soviet 
intentions and capabilities with regard to chemical warfare which they commissioned from Dr. Walter Hirsch , the 
former chief of the Waffenamt PrUfwesen 's chemical weapons section (letter dated I December 1949, DEFE 
411130). 
82Letter dated 29 December 1949 from Maj .-Gen. Haydon to Dr. B. K. Blount, DEFE 41/83. 
83Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 12 August 1947; minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 4 November 
1947, DEFE41/63. 
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eight-to-ten factories in the USSR might be manufacturing war gases. However, the 
Soviet PoWs in German hands named about a hundred chemical and other factories 
at eighty-or-so places scattered throughout the old industrial areas of European 
Russia and the newer ones in the Urals and Siberia which, they said, were engaged in 
war gas production. Of course, these were simply assertions on the part of men 
without technical expertise and were, therefore, highly unreliable. The Joint 
Committees in London drew up a 'tentative shortlist' of twenty-five-to-thirty 
factories, the involvement of which in war gas manufacture was most credible. 84 The 
information on the list was of long-term significance for British Intelligence. One of 
the factories listed was Shikhani, on the southern part of the Volga, not far from 
Volsk. German intelligence documents described the plant in detail and gave its 
precise location. They also established that there was more than a factory at 
Shikhani: the Soviet Army's principal chemical weapons testing range, the Central 
Military Chemical Range, was situated there. This confirmed and added to 
information received before the War that chemical weapons were tested at Shikhani. 
The plant and testing ground at Shikhani played an important role in Soviet post-war 
chemical weapons development. In 1987, following a landmark Soviet admission of 
possession of chemical weapons, representatives of forty-five states were invited to 
inspect a large and top-secret weapons factory. This was Shikhani. There they 
witnessed the demonstration of nineteen types of chemical weapon, including shells 
for cannon, warheads for rockets and hand grenades. The poisons contained in these 
weapons included mustard gas, lewisite, sarin, soman, CS gas and, most advanced of 
84JS/JTIC(49)69 dated 4 August 1949 and entitled 'Chemical Warfare in the USSR: Summary of Available 
Information to 1946' , DEFE 41/150. It is likely that there was a considerable overlap between the installations on 
this shortlist and the factories referred to in the STIB file list in DEFE 41/29. This latter list mentions nineteen 
files on chemical installations and institutes which were of interest. The installations in the USSR were at 
Aleksin; Asha-Valashov; Beketovka; Beresniki; Dzerzhinsk (the [gumnovo, Ivanovo, Kalinin, Oka, Rulon , Stroi 
and Yava factories) ; Gorlovka; Kemerovo; Kineshima; Kolomna; places in the Leningrad area; Lybertsi , Lublino; 
places in the Moscow area; Vladimir; Volsk (the Shikhani and Tomka installations); Yaroslavl. 
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eight-to-ten factories in the USSR might be manufacturing war gases. However, the 
Soviet PoWs in German hands named about a hundred chemical and other factories 
at eighty-or-so places scattered throughout the old industrial areas of European 
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without technical expertise and were, therefore, highly unreliable. The Joint 
Committees in London drew up a 'tentative shortlist' of twenty-five-to-thirty 
factories, the involvement of which in war gas manufacture was most credible. 84 The 
information on the list was of long-term significance for British Intelligence. One of 
the factories listed was Shikhani, on the southern part of the Volga, not far from 
Volsk. German intelligence documents described the plant in detail and gave its 
precise location . They also established that there was more than a factory at 
Shikhani: the Soviet Army's principal chemical weapons testing range, the Central 
Military Chemical Range, was situated there. This confirmed and added to 
information received before the War that chemical weapons were tested at Shikhani. 
The plant and testing ground at Shikhani played an important role in Soviet post-war 
chemical weapons development. In 1987, following a landmark Soviet admission of 
possession of chemical weapons, representatives of forty-five states were invited to 
inspect a large and top-secret weapons factory. This was Shikhani. There they 
witnessed the demonstration of nineteen types of chemical weapon, including shells 
for cannon, warheads for rockets and hand grenades. The poisons contained in these 
weapons included mustard gas, lewisite, sarin, soman, CS gas and, most advanced of 
84JS/JTIC(49)69 dated 4 August 1949 and entitled 'Chemical Warfare in the USSR: Summary of Available 
Information to 1946', DEFE 41/150. It is likely that there was a considerable overlap between the installations on 
this shortlist and the factories referred to in the STIB file list in DEFE 41129. This latter list mentions nineteen 
files on chemical installations and institutes which were of interest. The installations in the USSR were at 
Aleksin; Asha-Valashov; Beketovka; Beresniki; Dzerzhinsk (the Igu mnovo, Ivanovo, Kalinin , Oka, Rulon, Stroi 
and Yava factories); Gorlovka; Kemerovo ; Kineshima; Kolomna; places in the Leningrad area; Lybertsi, Lublino; 
places in the Moscow area; Vl adimir; Volsk (the Shikhani and Tomka installations); Yaros lavl. 
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all, VX gas. They were told that most of these weapons had been developed in the 
1950s and 1980s and that means of chemical warfare had been actively developed in 
the USSR until very recently.85 Other places where German intelligence documents 
indicated that war gas factories existed were Moscow and Leningrad (inevitably), 
Chapayevsk, Beresniki and Beketovka. 
Although there was hard evidence that the Soviets were interested in chemical 
weapons, it was unclear how they would actually use them in war. Interrogation of 
Soviet PoWs revealed to the Germans how the Soviet Army planned to defend itself 
against any chemical attack; this information obviously became available to the 
British and gave rise to a report giving details of the defensive equipment against gas 
issued to Soviet troops.86 However, since the Soviets ruled out the offensive use of 
chemical weapons, the PoWs could not say how their Army planned to use such 
weapons if it felt it had to. The Germans acquired no proof that offensive gas units 
existed in the Soviet Army. Information acquired before the War indicated that the 
Soviets would use most of the well-known war gases and that derived from captured 
German intelligence documents broadly supported that conclusion . The Germans 
also discovered that the Soviets had filled a wide variety of weapons with war gas . 
However, they captured a relatively narrow range of gas-filled weapons. Exploitation 
of German intelligence documents yielded very precise information on the weapons 
that had fallen into the hands of the Wehrmacht and useful information on gas-
charged weapons which had not. Of the captured weapons, aircraft weapons were far 
85U. Albrecht & R. Nikutta, Die SOlVjetische Riistllngsindllstrie, p. 76. The British may have had available to 
them in Germany other sources of information on Shikhani , namely I. G. Farben chemists who had worked at the 
plant. For it was at Shikhani (then called Trock) that the Red Army and the German Reichswehr had collaborated 
in the development of poison gases in the years 1925-33, in defiance of the ban in the Versailles Treaty on 
German development of these weapons. Whether British Intelligence exploited this source of information is not 
known. 
86JS/JTIC(49)70 dated 7 September 1949 and entitled, 'Russian Chemical Warfare Equipment', DEFE 41/150. 
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and away the most numerous. The Wehrmacht overran both stocks of gas-charged 
bombs (more than twelve types of them) and six different types of gas spray 
apparatus. This was very significant, for the presence of gas-charged aircraft 
weapons, in greater numbers than army weapons, in areas near the battle zones 
indicated that the service to which the leading role in the use of chemical weapons 
had been given was the Air Force. Walter Hirsch, in his long report for the 
Americans, also stressed Soviet interest in spraying a number of chemical agents 
from the air. This was consistent with information acquired before the War. Such 
reports were referred to for a long time after they were written, probably because of a 
dearth of intelligence on the thinking of the Soviet military, at least until the 
recruitment of OlegPen'kovskii as an agent. Soviet manuals on chemical warfare 
and translations of them in the satellites which came into the hands of the British 
confirmed that the Soviets planned to spray lethal chemicals from the air. 87 
B. Intelligence of the Soviet exploitation of German science 
Whatever rivalries existed between them in 1945, the wartime Allies were agreed, at 
least formally, that their main enemy was still Germany. The Potsdam Agreement 
proclaimed that Germany's capacity to make war would be destroyed.88 To control 
87 Address by Capt. Hogwood, MI lOB, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126. 
Perhaps in response to such intelligence, in the early 1950s the Briti sh Chiefs of Staff planned in war to drop gas-
filled weapons from the air. In 1952 it was assumed by the Chemical Warfare Sub-committee of the Chiefs of 
Staff's Committee that 10% of the overall effort of strategic bombers and 5% of the overall effort of tactical 
bombers wou ld be devoted to dropping bombs filled with mustard gas . The RAF was also to use sarin, but as a 
tactical weapon rather than a strategic one. 5% of the strategic bomber effort, but 10% of that of tactical bombers, 
was to be devoted to dropping sarin bombs (CW(52)9 dated 30 July 1952 and entitled 'Chemical Warfare 
Reserve Policy ' , DEFE 411157). 
8~he third of the 'Political Principles ' stated in the Agreement was that the Control Council should ensure ' the 
elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production ' . The Agreement also 
declared, as an 'Economic Principle' , that ' to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, 
ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and 
prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war 
economy, shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs .... 
Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan 
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German science, in April 1946 th~ Control Council adopted Law No. 25, prohibiting 
applied scientific research in the areas of most concern and permitting it in other 
areas only under licence; the Law also prohibited fundamental research 'of a wholly 
or primarily military nature' and forbade the Germans to possess certain kinds of 
apparatus. 89 It applied equally to all four Zones and came into effect on 7 May 
1946.90 Although the Soviets gave their assent to it in the Control Council , they 
never observed its terms or those of the Potsdam Agreement. 
Although the leaders of German science of military application for the most part 
managed to fall into the hands of the Western Allies, an army of scientific workers 
and a great number of war-related factories and laboratories were overrun by Soviet 
forces. The knowhow they represented addressed urgent needs of Soviet defence. 
The first post-war Five Year Plan, for the years 1946-50, gave priority to the 
advanced technologies which had emerged from the War - atomic energy, guided 
missiles, radar and jet propulsion. For the first time, there was a separate Technical 
Plan.91 Germany had made great progress in three of these fields and had able atomic 
scientists as well. When in July 1945 the Americans handed 'Middle Germany' 
(Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and parts of Saxony, and the heart of the Nazi military-
industrial complex) over to the Soviets as the Yalta Agreement required, included in 
the gift were two towns in the Harz mountains called Nordhausen and Bleicherode 
and their surrounding villages, which contained nearly all the V -2 and most other 
recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not 
removed shall be destroyed' (B . Ruhm von Oppen, DOclIlIlellts all GerlllallY IIllder Occllpatioll 1945-54, pp. 42-
4). 
89 Articles II and III , Control Council Law No. 25: Control of Scientific Research, dated 29 April 1946 (B. Ruhm 
von Oppen, DoculIlellts all GerlllallY IIllder Occupatioll 1945-54, p. 132). 
9OReport dated IS June 1948 on the work and future policy of the Research Branch of the Economic Sub- . 
commission, FO 371171040. 
91 D. Holloway, Stalill alld the BOlllb, pp. 144-9. 
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guided missile activity in Germqny. The Mittelwerk at Nordhausen was the only 
German production assembly plant for the V -2 rocket. Nearby Lehesten was a great 
testing site. The Zentralwerk at Bleicherode specialized in the design of guided 
m~ssiles . These were not the only key factories of the Nazi military-industrial 
complex which the Soviets captured intact. Middle Germany had fallen into the 
hands of the Western Allies without much of a fight and the CIOS teams had had too 
little time in May and June 1945 to remove everything and everyone worth 
removing. Consequently, the Soviets took over some 60% of the Nazis' aeronautical 
industry, including undamaged aircraft and jet engine factories.92 Of course, in 
acquiring Western technology, Stalin was not wholly dependent on the Soviet 
presence in Germany. He had other cards in his hand. His intelligence service, the 
NKGB, had created spy-rings whose activities extended throughout North America. 
The NKGB had even penetrated the Holy of Holies of American science, Los 
Alamos itself. 
Most famous among the missiles the USSR could be presumed to have acquired were 
the surface-to-surface missiles, the FZG-76 (generally known as the V-l) and the A-
4 (generally known as the V -2). Intelligence interest focused not just on these already 
developed missiles, but also on those German plans for future missiles which the 
Soviets could take further. These were the A-4b and the A-9 (winged versions of the 
V-2, with a longer range) and the A-lO. The last of these, a design for an enormous 
two-stage rocket, was only in the early stages of a paper study when the War ended 
and was not being actively developed.93 American removals meant that the Soviets 
92U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann , Die Spezialisten: Delltsche Natllnvissenscha!tlerllnd 
Teclllliker in del' SOlVjetllnion nach 1945, p. 124; N. Naimark, Th e RlIssians ill Ger/llallY, p. 215. 
93paragraph 19, Appendix C, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. The A-I 0 had been in such an early stage of development that it was believed that the 
design , even if it had fallen into Soviet hands, could not be of any benefit to them. In the words of paragraph 19 
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acquired no completed V-2s, few (if any) components for the V-2's control system 
and probably few technical drawings for the missile, but they nevertheless came by 
intact production facilities for the V -1 and the V -2, a stock of complete V -1 sand 
components for the missile, as well as large numbers of important components for 
the V-2.94 Moreover, although the leaders of the German guided missile project had 
made their way to the West, the Soviets, in overrunning a host of engineers and 
technicians, acquired a plentiful stock of knowhow. This army was placed under the 
command of the thirty-year-old Helmut Grottrup, the former assistant to the director 
of the Guidance, Control and Telemetry Laboratory at Peenemtinde. Grottrup was 
put in charge of the Institut Rabe 95 and rocket development was resumed in 
Bleicherode and its .environs. The Institut Nordhausen was soon founded to give 
further impetus to rocket work. 
In fact, British Intelligence soon learned that, far from controlling German science, 
Soviet policy was to exploit it thoroughly. This aim was pursued in a variety of ways. 
By July 1946 British Intelligence had evidence of three principal ways in which the 
USSR was seeking to use German knowhow to increase its scientific knowledge and, 
above all, its military power. The Technical Commission of the Soviet armed forces 
played a key role in each of these activities, indicating that all might be contributing 
to the USSR's post-war arms build-up. Special commissions of the Deutscher 
NormenausschuB (German Standards Committee), working in collaboration with the 
Technical Commission, were responsible for the open exploitation of aspects of 
of Appendix C: 'Owing to logistic and control difficulties inherent in such a missile and the distance from 
practical solution still to be covered by research and experiment, it is not considered to be of much consequence 
whether or not the Soviets were able to piece together the meagre progress in this project which had been made 
by the Germans.' 
94Paragraph 75, Appendix D, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE41/l60. 
95 'Rabe' stood for ' Raketenbau und Entwicklung ' (Missile Construction and Development). 
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German scientific knowledge. Eac::h commission prepared a report on the standards in 
force in a particular German industry for the corresponding Soviet industry . On 
completion, the report was handed over to the Technical Commission, which sent it 
on to Moscow. By July 1946, seventy-four such commissions had been set up for this 
purpose. Furthermore, very many USSR ministries (some forty at least, and perhaps 
all of them) had established technical offices in East Germany which were 
administered by the Soviet Technical Commission and which had the task of writing 
reports on German science and technology of military and of general industrial 
application and of sending this knowhow back to their parent ministries in Moscow. 
These ministries' responsibilities ranged from Communications to Machine Tools to 
Iron and Steel to Non-Ferrous Metals to Shipbuilding to Armaments to Vehicles to 
Rubber to Pharmaceuticals to the Construction of Heavy Industrial Plants and many 
more. Thus there was an office for machine tools in Chemnitz, an office for 
armaments in Dresden and an office for internal combustion engines in Berlin-
Mahlsdorf. Although the Soviets clearly wanted to keep the work of these offices 
secret, it was unlikely that any of them was charged with work so sensitive that the 
Soviets were determined that the Western Powers should not learn of it. This 
followed from the fact that the offices commissioned German scientific workers who 
lived in other sectors of Berlin than the Soviet Sector, and even in other Zones of 
Germany than the Soviet Zone, to write reports. 
This made the offices concerned very different from another group of establishments, 
which were charged with the development of weapons for the Soviet armed forces. 
Their work was meant to be strictly secret and only those who lived in, or were 
willing to move to, the Soviet Sector of Berlin or Soviet Zone were employed at 
these establishments. Some were merely engaged in research and development work; 
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others had by the summer of 1946 moved to the stage of production. The most 
important of all of them was the re-activated V -2 factory at Bleicherode in the Harz 
mountains, the Institut Rabe. The Soviets also showed great interest in German 
aeronautics, initiating development work at the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fUr 
Luftfahrt in Berlin-Adlershof. Other establishments which by July 1946 were 
carrying out development work on weaponry included the Technisches Spezialbtiro 
No. 4 in Berlin-Friedrichshagen (charged with rocket developments), the 
Technisches Spezialbtiro der Gummi-industrie in Berlin-Weissensee (charged with 
applying rubber to various military purposes), the Ingenieurbtiro SKG in Berlin-
Kopenick (working on a variety of rocket and radar tasks), the Torpedo 
Versuchsanstalt at Zwickau in Saxony, the Btiro ftir Nachrichtenwesen in Berlin-
Ostkreuz (concerned with telecommunications developments) and the SU Werk at 
Burgstadt in Saxony (responsible, among other tasks, for developing a missile 
control apparatus).96 Aircraft construction had resumed at such factories as Junkers-
Dessau, BMW -StaBfurt and Siebel-Halle. Among the factories in the SOZ 
manufacturing torpedoes and parts and equipment for U-boats were Brtickner-Kanis 
in Dresden, the Askania-Werke and GEM A in Berlin and the Carl-ZeiB-Werke in 
Jena,97 The HC promptly floated the idea that some of these places - the missile 
development installations around Bleicherode and at Peenemtinde and the Junkers 
and Heinkel factories in Dessau - be overflown and photographed as ' targets of the 
first importance' ,98 
96Reports dated 19 July 1946 and 6 September 1946, both entitled ' Russian-controlled Research Activities in 
Berlin and the Soviet Zone' , FO 371/55906. 
97]JC(46)61 (0) dated 27 June 1946 and entitled, 'Evidence of Russia ' s Contravention of the Potsdam 
Agreement', CAB 81/133. This report contains further examples of war-related research, development and 
production which the JIC considered breaches of the USSR's obligation of demilitarizing its Zone of Germany. 
98J[C(46)80 dated 29 August 1946 and entitled, 'Photographic Reconnaissance of Certain Territories', CAB 
81/134. This is only a selection from the list of top-priority targets. There was a second list of targets whose 
overflight was regarded as 'desirable' . All the targets were in Soviet-occupied Europe and their overflight would 
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Grottrup's Institut Rabe was given the task of manufacturing a small number of V-
2s. To undertake the task, design data had to be reassembled in their entirety. Once 
this had been done, complete working drawings, necessary for manufacturing the 
mi~siles, were made once more, to replace those the Americans had made a point of 
taking West with them. Then the manufacturing programme was recommenced, 
albeit on a small scale. About fifty V -2s were made, mainly using important 
components found in the area. The Germans designed a lengthened V -2 with a range 
of 600 kilometres. A large quantity of production machinery was dismantled and 
removed, but was probably of little benefit, since it was dismantled with little care. A 
certain quantity of V -2 production equipment was later dismantled with great care. It 
was probably serviceable on arrival in the USSR, but would only have sufficed to 
support an experimental and training programme in V -2 development. Test 
instruments and a large stock of recovered components were also among the Soviets' 
plunder. Between 200 and 300 Soviet engineers acquired experience in Germany of 
the design and manufacture of the V -2 and of German missiles in general; about the 
same number of Germans were in October 1946 deported to the USSR to assist in 
rocket development there.99 
In the wake of Hiroshima, the Soviet leadership knew that their country was 
vulnerable to an airborne American atomic strike. They could be assumed to be 
devoting considerable resources to the strengthening of the USSR's air defences. 
Once again, German knowhow threatened to increase Soviet military capability. 
involve only a shallow incursion into Soviet-occupied territory. The operational risks were seen as small and the 
political risks as acceptable. provided that the flights were few in number and confined to targets likely to reveal 
long-term plans. The intelligence photographic reconnaissance would yield was much sought-after. since Britain 
then had little knowledge of Soviet intentions. Soviet military dispositions and the level of advancement of Soviet 
weaponry. 
99Paragraphs 77-83. Appendix D. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: loint Anglo-American 
Conference. DEFE 411160. 
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Amongthe scientific workers who fell into Soviet hands were many who had worked 
on projects to develop surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. In 1945 four guided 
missiles had been under development in Germany (Wasserfall, Enzian, Schmetterling 
and. Rheintochter) and one unguided missile, Taifun, had almost reached the 
production stage. The Taifun was believed likely to appeal to the Soviets: not only 
would its supersonic speed and ceiling of 40,000-50,000 feet make it an effective 
weapon capable of doing great damage to slow-moving bombers flying in formation, 
but it was also easy to manufacture. With regard to the guided missiles, development 
work was almost complete as far as aerodynamics, missile design, propulsion and 
preliminary flight testing were concerned. The missing elements were that guidance 
and control systems had not yet been developed to guide a missile to its target, nor 
had a suitable proximity fuse been developed for detonating the missile warhead near 
its target so as to destroy or damage it. Various proximity fuses were under 
development. Despite these unfinished aspects, all in all German development work 
in the field of surface-to-air missiles was well-advanced. The Schmetterling was 
probably one year away from completion; the Wasserfall and Rheintochter, 
supersonic missiles for use against faster targets than the Schmetterling could cope 
with, were probably a couple of years from completion. 100 
Hydrogen peroxide was also developed in Nazi Germany to drive submarines and 
torpedoes, and even aircraft and guided missiles. It offered the prospect of the first 
submarine capable of remaining underwater for long periods of time. Hydrogen 
peroxide, to power any of the above engines, had to be of a concentration of 80% or 
higher. Until 1945, Germany was the only country in which it had been 
lOOparagraphs 21-4, Appendix A, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
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manufactured at this concentration in large quantities. But the I. G. Farben plant at 
Heydebreck fell intact into Soviet hands, together with full details of the I. G. Farben 
process for the manufacture of hydrogen peroxide. By 1949 intelligence had reached 
London that high-concentration hydrogen peroxide was being produced at the Stalin 
Dye Plant in Moscow and at a factory near Dzerzhinsk; it followed that the Soviets 
had to be capable of manufacturing this particular fuel at a sufficiently high 
concentration and in quantity, though the number of plants producing it was believed 
to be small. 101 At least one report was received (probably from a German prisoner-
of-war who had returned to West Germany) that the anthra-quinone process, once at 
Heydebreck, had been transported to Lisskhimstroi .102 
Scientific intelligence-gathering in Germany established that the Soviet leadership 
had launched an arms race with the West and that the USSR's military capability was 
growing fast. 103 The JIe warned a year after the War's end that, 'The alliance of 
101 Paragraphs II & 12, Appendix P, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 411160. 
I02Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I September 1950, DEFE 41110. 
I03Counter-espionage in North America confirmed that the Soviet Union was seeking to acquire the key military 
technologies which the War had brought to the fore, above all the atomic bomb. To cite only the main 
discoveries , the interrogation of Igor Guzenko, a cipher clerk in the GRU residency in the Soviet Embassy in 
Ottawa who defected in September 1945, revealed that Soviet Intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project 
(xix, introduction to R. L. Benson & M. Warner (eds.), Venona). On the basis of Guzenko's information, the 
British scientist and GRU spy Allan Nunn May was arrested in 1946 in Montreal, where a British, French and 
Canadian team had been engaged in atomic research which formed part of the Manhattan Project (c. M. Andrew 
& O. Gordievsky, KGB: Th e Inside Story of its Foreigll Operationsjrolll Lenin to Gorbachev, p. 305). The 
ensuing investigation by a Canadian Royal Commission established that the GRU spy ring of which Nunn May 
had been a member had gathered 'information of the greatest importance' on radar, asdic (sonar), explosives, 
propellants and the VT fuse (c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, p. 258). The most 
significant breakthrough of all was the Americans ' decryption of Soviet cables. These decrypts, codenamed 
'Venona' , revealed that atomic and thermonuclear research at the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory had been deeply 
penetrated. In August 1949, an NKGB message was decrypted which brought Klaus Fuchs under suspicion (c. 
M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside StOl)" pp. 307-13). Between 1944 and 1946 he had worked at Los 
Alamos. In two meetings with his controller in the first half of 1945, Fuchs had provided the NKGB with a 
detailed description of the design of the plutonium bomb, including the complicated implosion method of 
detonation, which was to be tested at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in July 1945 (D. Holloway, Stalin and the 
BOII/b, pp. 107 & 222). The information he provided was detailed enough for an engineer to produce a blueprint 
of the bomb on the basis of it. The first Soviet atomic bomb, tested on 29 August 1949, was an exact copy of this 
plutonium weapon (D. Holloway, Stalin alld the BOII/b, p. 138). It is probable that intelligence provided by Fuchs 
of discussions at Los Alamos about whether and how a thermonuclear bomb could be made initiated the Soviet 
hydrogen bomb project (D. Holloway, Stalill and the BOII/b, pp. 295-7). When he confessed in January 1950, 
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German brain power and Russian resources may well prove to be the most important 
consequence of the occupation of Germany' .104 This arms build-up seemed 
particularly menacing when set against clear evidence of the Soviet leadership's 
hos.tility to the West. A buffer zone separating it from the West came into being in 
the years immediately after the War as Communist one-party states were established 
by force in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The British, observing 
political developments in the Soviet Zone, were hostile to the USSR by the spring of 
1946. 105 A key event, in the eyes of the British, was the 'forced unification', in April 
1946, of the SPD and the KPD to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). This seemed 
a decisive step in the suppression of democracy in East Germany and established that 
the Soviets had no interest in abiding by the Potsdam Agreement. 106 By the autumn 
of 1946, the British considered it probable that Germany would be divided and took 
measures to strengthen their Zone as a bulwark of liberal democracy and capitalist 
economics. 107 Their intelligence policy followed suit and from the end of 1946 
measures were taken to diminish the usefulness of East Germany to the Soviet arms 
build-up. 
Fuchs revealed the full extent of the information he had given the Soviets (D. Holloway, Stalill (/nd the Bomb, pp . 
107 & 296-7). Further 'Venona' decrypts indicated that there had been four more NKGB spies at Los Alamos , 
unmasked Donald Maclean, formerly a British representative at the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington 
DC, as a spy (codenamed ' Homer') , and led to the identification of the Rosenbergs as spies active in scientific 
intelligence-gathering (xix, xxv & xxvi, introduction to R. L. Benson & M. Warner (eds.), Vellolla) . One of the 
other spies identified at Los Alamos was the young physicist Theodore Hall , codenamed 'Mlad' , who had in fact 
given the NKGB information on the implosion method of detonation earlier than Fuchs (1. Albright & M. 
Kunstel , Bombshell: The Secret StOI)' of America's UllkllowlI Atomic Spy COllspiracy, pp. 122-7). 
100Paragraph 3, JIC(46)51 (0) dated 2 July 1946 and entitled, 'Russian Attempts to entice German scientists and 
technicians from the British Zone of Germany' , CAB 81/133. 
105pp. 81-90, A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groj3britallllien l/lld 
Ostdelltsch/and seit1918 (article by G. Heydemann on 'Ein deutsches Sowjetrul3land? Zur britischen Beurteilung 
der Entwicklung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone '). 
I~he British were fully aware that the Soviet Military Administration was driving the SPD into an unequal 
union with the KPD. When the SPD's leader in the Soviet Zone, Otto Grotewohl , visited the British Military 
Government in February 1946 to make clear to it the hopeless position of the Eastern SPD, he reinforced his point 
by saying that an ' Iron Curtain ' had fallen (A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with 
H. Wentker), Groj3britallllielllllld Ostdelllsch/alld seit1918 (Heydemann article), p. 87). 
107 A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groj3britalllliell IIl1d Ostdelltsch/and 
seit1918 (Heydemann article), pp. 91-2. 
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Worse still, the Soviets seemed to be establishing a position in East Germany so 
strong that it could be used as a base from which to impose their domination on West 
Germany. 108 It was clear to the JIC by 1947 that the Soviets would only permit a 
sin~le German state to be re-created if it were a Communist satellite of the USSR. 109 
Rivalries in Iran, Greece, Turkey and the Far East provided further evidence of 
Soviet expansionism. 110 The JIC, while it saw Stalin 's policy as concerned in the 
short term with ensuring Soviet security, nevertheless recognized that the long-term 
Soviet aim was the worldwide elimination of capitalism by Communism. I I I 
Soviet deportations of German scientists, engineers and skilled technicians 
There were two particularly significant deportations of German scientific workers to 
the USSR. The first occurred between May and November 1945, when scientists, 
engineers and technicians involved in the German atomic programme were taken to 
the USSR.112 The second, codenamed Operation 'Osoaviakhim', occurred in the 
night of 21-22 October 1946, when approximately 3,000 Germans working in a 
range of war-related industries were rounded up and taken East in ninety-two 
trains. 113 According to one estimate, approximately 84% of the German scientific 
108A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in collaboration with H. Wentker), Groflbritannien und Ostdeutsch/alld 
seit 1918 (Heydemann article), p. 88. The expression 'West Germany' refers to the three Western Zones between 
1945 and 1949 as well as to the Federal Republic thereafter; the expression 'East Germany' to the Soviet Zone as 
well as to the German Democratic Republic (or DDR). 
109Paragraphs 271 & 275, JlC(46)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and 
Capabilities ', CAB 158/\. This reflected the Foreign Office's view (A. M. Birke & G. Heydemann (eds., in 
collaboration with H. Wentker), Groflbritannienund Ostdeutsch/and seit 1918 (Heydemann article), p. 81). 
IIOA. Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Outbreak of the Cold War, 1945-50' (M. Phil. 
dissertation, Cambridge University, 1997), p. 39; V. Zubok & c. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: 
From Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 92-3. 
Illparagraph 145, JIC(47)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities ', 
CAB 158/\. 
112U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialisten, p. 176. 
113 A fuller account of this operation is given at pp. 220-8 of Naimark's The Russians in Germany. Estimates of 
how many scientific workers were deported vary. John Prados says 'some six thousand' (The Soviet Estimate: US 
Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 53). Albrecht, Heinemann-GrOder and Well mann consider 
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workers deported to the Soviet Union in the years after the War were taken in this 
operation. I 14 Factories from which particularly large numbers of scientific workers 
were taken were the Junkers factory at Dessau (aircraft and aero-engines), the BMW 
plant at StaBfurt (aircraft and aero-engines), the Askania works (radar, automatic 
piloting systems), the Oberspree works (radio transmitters, radar and high-frequency 
apparatus) and the GEM A institute (gyroscopic research, range finders and sights) in 
East Berlin. liS Specialists in aircraft or aero-engine construction made up the largest 
group of deportees; specialists in electronics and electrical engineering formed the 
second largest group.116 There was a third deportation of some thirty-to-forty 
scientists, mostly chemists and chemical engineers, between February 1947 and 
February 1948,117 but only one of these deportees, Dr. Bernd von Bock of the 
any estimate in excess of 3,500 impossible to document and suggest 3,000 as a justifiable figure (Die 
Spezialislen, pp. 177-8). This estimate accords with STIB's own figures. Early in 1954 STIB had news of the 
return of 1,890 deportees, which meant that, according to its information, 1,202 remained in the Soviet Union. 
Their total number was therefore 3,092 (handwritten note giving the state of affairs as at 10/2/54, DEFE 41/90). 
Most of this information will have come from intercepted letters. Ciesla's estimate of about 2,500 is therefore too 
low (p. 25, Ails Polilik und Zeilgeschichle, B 49-50/93, 3. Dezember 1993, pp. 24-31). Some scientific workers 
employed at Soviet-controlled factories or institutes managed to escape deportation and fled to the British, who 
acquired intelligence from them. Examples are intelligence on anti-aircraft rocket design contained in the report 
on the interrogation of Dip\. Ing. Hermann Zumpe on 7 November 1946 (FO 1031163) and intelligence on 
aircraft, aero-engine and torpedo developments at Junkers-Dessau contained in the Interrogation Report on Fritz 
Trouvain dated II January 1947 (FO 1031/64). The Foreign Office did not see this mass deportation coming. In 
paragraph 17 of the report dated 19 July 1946 and entitled ' Russian-controlled Research Activities in Berlin and 
the Soviet Zone' (FO 371/55906), it was remarked of the establishment by Soviet ministries of technical offices 
in the SOZ that, 'There appears to be no indication that these activities are a prelude to the subsequent transfer to 
Russia of the technicians employed by these organizations. On the contrary, it is probably more correct to regard 
them as an alternative solution to the problem of exploiting German technological development to the full '. 
114p. 24, 'Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR and seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ and DDR' , by B. Ciesla, 
Ails Polilik lind Zeilgeschichle , B 49-50193, 3. Dezember 1993 , pp. 24-3\. Ciesla uses as a basis for this 
percentage the figure of 2,370 scientific workers known by name to have worked in the USSR between 1945 and 
1959 which is given by Albrecht, Heinemann-Grlider & Well mann at p. 178 of Die Spezialislen . 
ll5List dated 14 November 1946 and FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No. 4 dated 28 October 1946, 
FO 1031/59; N. Naimark, The Rllssians in Germany, p. 222. It should be noted that the British later maintained 
that some of the German development teams deported in 'Osoaviakhim' were not able to carry out the tasks 
expected of them in the USSR because they lacked scientists, engineers and technicians who had been evacuated 
to the West by the British and others in 1945-6. Such operations had weakened the teams working for the Soviets 
and in a number of cases had even destroyed the development programmes entirely (STIB Director's notes for the 
MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference 1951, DEFE 411125). FIAT Forward's American intelligence officer, F. 
1. Biermann, expressed the view just after the operation that few scientists much sought-after by FIAT had been 
lost to it (FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No.4 dated 28 October 1946, FO 1031/59). 
116p. 26, ' Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR and seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ and DDR' , by B. Ciesla, 
Ails Polilik lind Zeilgeschichle, B 49-50193, 3. Dezember 1993 , pp. 24-31. 
l17U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-Grlider & A. Well mann, Die Spezialislen , p. 12. 
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Bunawerk-Schkopau, was of much intelligence interest. These deportations created 
precisely what the Western intelligence services lacked - an agent network in the 
USSR - and thus an opportunity for them. If the deportees were ever allowed to 
return to East Germany, they could be brought West and interrogated for their 
knowledge of the Soviet military-industrial complex. 
It was believed at the time that the chief motive for 'Osoaviakhim' was fear that the 
Western Allies would insist on Four-Power rights of inspection of war-related 
installations throughout Germany.118 The British, in the months leading up to the 
operation, were planning a diplomatic campaign against Soviet exploitation of 
German war-related_ science. Patrick Dean, Head of the German Section of the 
Foreign Office, wrote in August 1946 to Christopher Steel of Political Branch in 
Berlin, stating that some of the intelligence of Soviet armaments projects which had 
been sent to London would be useful in the 'gradual campaign which we intend to 
run about Russian breaches of the Potsdam Agreement' .119 It may well be that the 
Soviets' intelligence network gave them wind of these plans. In the spring and 
summer of 1946, war-related factories were dismantled and research institutes 
dissolved and their equipment shipped East. 120 Scientific workers at the plants were 
regarded as part of the equipment. 
II&rhat this was the chief motive for the operation was the view expressed by the American official Robert 
Murphy to the Secretary of State a few days afterwards (N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 225). 
119Letter dated 16 August 1946, FO 371/55906. 
120N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 168 & 183. 
42 
C. The policy of denial 
Operation 'Osoaviakhim' deprived British Intelligence of targets in the Soviet Zone. 
Most importantly, it ended almost all work on guided missiles l21 there and the 
development of aircraft and aero-engines. 122 But the operation otherwise played into 
the hands of the British. Throughout 1946 German scientists, engineers and 
technicians (and particularly the younger ones) had tended to accept employment in 
the Soviet Zone, or even in the USSR itself, because of the lack of work for them in 
the Western Zones. 123 The Soviets offered large salaries and other benefits to induce 
such people to work for them. The policy of the British and Americans of 
suppressing the war-related science and industry of their Zones prevented them from 
doing much to reverse the flow. However, the forcible deportation at dead of night of 
thousands of German scientific workers and their families to the USSR sent a wave 
of panic through those left working on war-related projects in the Soviet Zone. They 
now realized that working for the Soviets involved the risk of sudden and 
compulsory deportation, for an unknown period, to the USSR. In consequence, they 
were more willing to be evacuated West by the British. In the weeks immediately 
following 'Osoaviakhim', the FIAT Forward office in West Berlin was inundated 
with Germans working for the Soviets applying to be taken to the British Zone. 124 
Intelligence Division seized this opportunity and adopted a more aggressIve 
approach to denial of scientific workers to the Soviets. It launched an operation, 
121 Paragraph 82, Appendix D, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 411160. 
122paragraph 46, JIC(47)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', 
CAB 15811. 
123periodic Intelligence RepOI1s Nos. 2 (dated 6 August 1946) and 3 (dated 9 September 1946) to Chief FIAT 
(US), FO 1031/59. 
124Speciallntelligence Report No. 2 covering the period I October 1946 - 5 November 1946, FO 1031/59. 
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codenamed 'Matchbox', to bring to the British Zone German scientists, engineers 
and technicians who could add significantly to Soviet military capability. The 
operation drew on the experience of the British, since the War's end, of persuading 
scientific workers in the Soviet Zone to leave their jobs there and work in Britain. 
The offer of a job had been made either by coded letter or by telegram or, most 
commonly, by an agent who did not know for which country he was working. 125 For 
example, an unsuccessful attempt had been made by letter to entice Helmut Grottrup 
to leave his job as director of the Institut Rabe at Bleicherode and take up work in 
Britain. 126 But the main criterion for making an approach to scientific workers in the 
Eastern Zone prior to 'Matchbox' was that the target would be of scientific value to 
Britain. From 1945 until at least 1948, Britain, like the USSR, sought to exploit 
German science and, making offers of work, not only contacted scientific workers in 
the Western Zones but also sent agents and coded letters into the Soviet Zone. 127 
125 Appendix B2 to letter dated 18 December 1946, FO 1031/68. Whether the aim was to benefit British science 
or to deny scientific workers to the Soviets, until 1 September 1947 identifying, locating, contacting and 
extracting from the Soviet Zone targets of value were all tasks for the British section of FIAT's Enemy Personnel 
Exploitation Section (EPES, FIAT). Its denial operations it performed at STIB's direction. On 1 September 1947 
the intelligence functions (such as 'Matchbox ' work) performed by EPES, FIAT, were separated from its 
exploitation functions and handed over to the Berlin Intelligence Staff (memorandum dated 26 November 1947, 
FO 1031/68). But its exploitation of German science continued. Agents who did not know which country they 
were working for were called 'cut-outs'. 
126Letters dated 15 May 1946,24 May 1946,31 May 1946 and 29 July 1946, FO 1031/59. The approach was 
made by letter because Grottrup was so important that he would be closely watched. The attempt was 
unsuccessful because Grottrup told the MVD that he had been approached with an offer of work in the West and 
the MVD told him to arrange a meeting in Berlin with the enticer. Fearing a kidnap attempt , the FIAT Forward 
office decided to abandon its efforts to entice Grottrup West. He finally came West of his own accord in 
December 1953. 
127The main task of FIAT's EPES (Br) and EPES (US) was the exploitation of German science on behalf of their 
respective countries (Appendix B2 to letter dated 18 December 1946, FO 1031168). German scientists, engineers 
and technicians were sent to Britain to work pursuant to two British ministerial schemes (brief dated 14 August 
1946, FO 1031159). The DCOS (Deputy Chief of Staff's) scheme provided for the employment in Britain on war-
related research and development projects of scientific workers with valuable knowledge of military application. 
Obviously, the ministries (such as the Ministry of Supply and the Service Ministries) which sponsored the 
scheme and instructed EPES, FIAT (Br), to evacuate scientific workers with sought-after knowhow were seeking 
above all to develop the weapons which the War had brought to the fore. The other scheme was the Darwin Panel 
scheme, sponsored by the Board of Trade. The scientific workers taken to Britain under this scheme were 
intended to contribute to her general industrial progress. German scientists, engineers and technicians were also 
taken to Britain for short-term interrogations (this was the 'Bottleneck' scheme). Such evacuations, 
supplementing and adding to the effect of 'Matchbox' denial operations, lasted until 1948 at least. By August 
1946, EPES, FIAT, had accumulated 18,000 personality cards on German scientific workers (letter dated 10 
August 1946, FO 1031175). EPES, FIAT, was requested by the Ministry of Supply to acquire the services of 
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Such operations, carried out by FIAT's Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section 
(British), targeted an elite among Germany's scientists, engineers and technicians 
which could benefit either defence research or general industrial research in Britain. 
Of course, this was a denial policy of a sort, since such people would also be of value 
to the Soviets if they remained in their hands or accessible to them. Indeed, even 
before 'Matchbox' the need to deny scientists, engineers and technicians to the 
USSR gave a further spur to measures to exploit them. The FIAT Forward office in 
West Berlin evacuated from the city scientific workers who were under heavy 
pressure from the Soviets to work for them and who were important enough to be 
wanted for work in Britain or the United States. 128 'Osoaviakhim' spurred on FIAT 
Forward's evacuation measures still more. B y January 1947 its British section was 
evacuating all those scientific workers of importance who were in immediate danger 
of deportation and who wanted to come West. 129 
'Matchbox' was a systematic attempt to deny scientific workers to the USSR and so 
retard its military-industrial development as much as possible. In the course of this 
operation, war-potential scientists, engineers and technicians were evacuated West, 
provided with work and paid for it. Such people had to fall into one of three 
categories: scientific workers of genuine eminence, who would obviously be of 
considerable value to Soviet research and development programmes; those, not 
actually eminent, whose removal or denial would 'have a serious effect' on Soviet 
Helmut GrOttrup. His name was accordingly placed on the DCOS list of targets (letter dated 15 May 1946 and 
entitled 'Location of Enemy Personalities' , FO 1031/59). 
128Memorandum and brief dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/59. For example, just before Operation 
'Osoaviakhim', Air Intelligence pressed for radar specialists to be denied to the USSR. The Soviets had already 
put pressure on most to take up employment with them (letter dated 4 October 1946, FO 1031/59). An example of 
someone evacuated by the Americans was the chief engineer of the Askania works in Berlin (US Sector) , a Dr. 
Kronenberger, who was an expert on the V-2's automatic pilot and who had received repeated offers from the 
Soviets of a job in the Soviet Sector of the city. In this particular field, the Soviets had not been able to obtain the 
services of an engineer of Kronenberger's standing (EPES, FIAT report dated 30 July 1946, FO 1031/63). 
129Special Intelligence Report No.3 covering the period I January 1947 - 31 January 1947, FO 1031/60. 
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programmes; and those who, irrespective of their denial value, could provide the 
British with intelligence on Soviet-sponsored research and development. 130 Thus the 
first two categories related to denial value; the third embraced people of great 
intelligence value. The operation was essentially a denial operation, but it had an 
intelligence aspect and yielded an even greater intelligence benefit, for scientific 
workers evacuated on the ground of denial were also able to provide very useful and 
penetrating intelligence on Soviet war-related research and development. 131 
Although 'Osoaviakhim' did not initiate the enticement of scientific workers from 
the East, it gave the British a chance to evacuate some of the more important 
Germans working for the Soviets in their Occupation Zone. Some evacuations were 
carried out in the last few weeks of 1946, but 'Matchbox' itself formally came into 
being at the beginning of 1947. At the same time, greater measures were taken to 
prevent scientific workers who were living in the British Zone and had knowledge of 
military application from going over to the Soviets. 
130lnterim Report HQI0310111 I/Sec.E dated 12 April 1947, DEFE 411122. It should be noted that British 
companies, on their own initiative, enticed German scientists, engineers and technicians to leave the Soviet Zone 
and come to Britain to work for them (minutes of J1C (Germany) meeting on 8 November 1949, DEFE 41/64). I 
discussed 'Matchbox' briefly in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation, ' British Policy, the Soviet Union and Post-war 
Germany: the Role and Importance of Scientific Intelligence'. 
131 JIC(46) I 02(0) dated 16 November 1946 and entitled, 'Recruitment of Low-Grade Scientists in Germany for 
Intelligence Purposes' (CAB 811134) establishes that the J1C supported the launching of Operation ' Matchbox ' 
on the ground, not that it would deny scientific workers to the USSR, but that it would acquire sought-after 
intelligence. The report states that the fear of deportation among scientific workers in the Soviet Zone engendered 
by 'Osoaviakhim' had created 'an opportunity now to obtain high grade Intelligence from these men which will 
enable us to build up an almost complete picture of Russian scientific and technical activities in Germany, and so 
make it possible to forecast more accurately than we can at present, the progress of Russian development in 
modern weapons during future years ' (paragraph 2). The number of scientific workers from whom vital 
information could be obtained would be small: 'probably as few as 60 would suffice to cover all the important 
experimental establishments in the Russian Zone' (paragraph 5) . It is noteworthy that at least a consideration in 
deciding whether to evacuate a particular scientist in the East was the access he could give British Intelligence to 
the German scientific grapevine. For example, when STIB proposed to the JSIJTIC in 1949 that Dr. Watter, the 
Chief Chemist at the I. G. Farben plant in Bitterfeld, be evacuated, one of the reasons it gave was that he would 
assist its efforts to penetrate I. G. Farben circles. One of the benefits of this penetration was that it would allow 
STIB to gather intelligence of former I. G. Farben employees deported to the Soviet Union in 1946 (some were 
heavy water specialists, who, it was believed , might be working on the Soviet atomic project) (letter dated 19 
May 1949, DEFE 41/131). 
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Scientists, engineers and technicia'ns who met the above criteria were selected for 
evacuation for a number of years. Even though their flight was enticed, such 
'Matchbox' people were still refugees and the intelligence taken from them was 
mer~ly part of the intelligence benefit to the West of the flight of the late 1940s. 
Scientific workers tended to flee the Soviet Zone when the factory there in which 
they worked was dismantled and packed off to the USSR. 132 Most of those selected 
for evacuation under Operation 'Matchbox', together with their families, simply 
made their way to West Berlin and were then flown out to the British Zone, where a 
car picked them up and took them to the 'Transit Hotel' in Bad Hermannsborn. A 
Kurhaus in Bad Hermannsborn served as a 'Transit Hotel'; it could accommodate 
some 200 people. A second 'Transit Hotel' opened at Bad Driburg in October 
1947 133 and more opened subsequently. There the evacuees were screened for 
security and interrogated. The intelligence acquired from such interrogations 
concerned not just Soviet exploitation of scientific and technical knowhow in their 
Zone, but also developments in the USSR itself. Others were not enticed at all. They 
simply fled to West Germany, using British Intelligence to do so as easily and 
comfortably as possible. They contacted British Intelligence in West Berlin and 
handed over a 'Lebenslauf' (curriculum vitae). This CV was sent on to STIB in 
Herford. STIB forwarded it to the Joint Committees in London. If it was decided to 
evacuate the individual in question, he likewise simply made his way to West Berlin 
(with his family if he had one) and they were flown to the British Zone. 134 
I 32Letter dated 12 August 1948, DEFE 41/130, It is also stated in this letter that, when a factory was sent back to 
Germany from the USSR, this revealed to British Intelligence that it was of importance to the Soviets, with the 
result that it became a target for 'Matchbox ' evacuation operations , The author, C. R, S, Manders ofMII6 (the 
War Office's scientific intelligence section) concluded that, 'For deciding top useful factories and personnel we 
appear to be dependent upon Russian choice' . 
133Minutes of JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 20 October 1947, DEFE 41/68. 
134Minutes of STIB-Production Directorate liaison meeting on 21 August 1948, DEFE 41/82; memorandum 
dated 18 August 1949, DEFE41/48 , 
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The great majority of the evacuees were, on arrival at the 'Transit Hotel', accepted as 
'consultants' to the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) and usually 
elected to be accommodated, at least for a time, in the 'Transit Hotel'. The rest were 
helped to find accommodation in the Zone. It was sought to find employment for all 
the evacuees, whether accepted as consultants or not. As many as possible of the 
consultants were to be found jobs in Britain or her Dominions or the United States, 
no doubt to ensure that expertise in armaments flowed to these countries. The British 
authorities had not weakened their policy of suppressing war-related research, 
development and production in their Zone and a further aim was that the greatest 
possible number of the evacuees were to be found jobs in the civilian economy of the 
Zone. Acceptance as a 'Matchbox consultant' meant that, while a job was being 
found for the evacuee in question, he was paid a small salary for being available to 
the Control Commission for the performance of research tasks.135 A 'Matchbox 
consultancy' was therefore a research grant. The consultants' research became the 
property of the Control Commission. For as long as consultants stayed at the 'Transit 
Hotel', they received a monthly salary of 200 Marks. When they left the Hotel, they 
were paid 400 Marks per month until employment was found for them. Wherever 
consultants were accommodated, they were well-fed, being provided with the 
equivalent of a heavy worker's ration. They also received a specially-large ration of 
fuel. The consultancy arrangement and salary were meant to provide them with 
135The idea of keeping scientific workers in the Western Zones of Germany by retaining them as scientific and 
technical consultants may well first have been suggested by American officers attached to FIAT who had had 
experience of the difficulties of keeping in the West unemployed and unhappy scientists, engineers and 
technicians who had been evacuated from central Germany in June 1945. Such officers did indeed propose the 
establishment of a 'scientific and technical institute under FIAT auspices' , in memoranda in FO 1031/67 dated I 
March 1946 and 29 March 1946. BIOS also lobbied for the establishment of a 'scientific and technical 
exploitation centre' (letter dated 22 May 1946, FO 1031/75). 
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'employment at reasonable subsistepce level'. By 1949, the operation was being run 
down. It was pronounced dead in February 1951. 136 
The operation included within its ambit refugees who had fled the East quite 
independently of STIB: all refugees who entered the British Zone were referred to 
the nearest intelligence unit and there interrogated on the basis of a standard brief. 
All such interrogation reports were then assessed by STIB at the Headquarters of 
Intelligence Division and, if the refugees clearly had denial value, they might be 
made 'Matchbox consultants' to ensure that they did not go back East. If a scientific 
worker already working in the British Zone were known to be being induced to move 
to the Soviet Zone or the USSR, he could be made a consultant to keep him where he 
was. 137 An example of someone who in 1950 was kept in the BOZ as a 'Matchbox 
consultant' to save him from the jaws of the Soviets was Dr. Paul Schroder, the 
wartime chief of the ballistics department of the Heeresversuchsanstalt (Army 
Experimental Station) PeenemUnde and, in the opinion of a British scientist who 
advised the Joint Committees on his case, 'the greatest mathematical authority on 
rockets alive'. 138 Between 1945 and 1948 he had worked on rocket development in 
Britain. On his return to Germany, he had fallen on hard times, made worse by the 
introduction of the Deutsche Mark in 1948. In March 1950, it was decided to deny 
him to the Soviets for a further two years by making him a 'Matchbox consultant' .139 
136Minutes of He (Germany) meeting on 13 February 1951, DEFE 41/66. 
137Directive AHQ/3111/6/Sec.E dated 10 January 1947, DEFE 411122. 
1 38Report dated 10 March 1950, DEFE 41/132. Prof. Dr. Kurt Blome is another example of a significant scientist 
who was made a 'Matchbox' consultant to keep him in the West (in his case, because of his expertise in 
biological warfare) (,Matchbox ' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/600311917456 dated 31 
October 1950, DEFE 411132) . 
139Letter dated 27 March 1950, DEFE 411132. During the most important phase of the operation at least, the 
ratio of those evacuated from East Germany to those kept in West Germany was approximately 2: I. The Director 
of STIB, David Evans, reported to the German Section of the Foreign Office in April 1948 that 321 subjects had 
passed through the ' Matchbox ' machinery. Of these 321 people, about two-thirds had been evacuated from the 
East and about one-third were 'graded-list ' scientists and technicians living in West Germany, who, it was feared , 
might go and work for the Soviets in East Germany if they were not helped financially. 285 of these 321 had been 
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The Americans at that time also had a denial policy, but it only applied to those on 
their list of 1,000 Germans to be evacuated to the USA for employment there. 140 
This was Operation 'Overcast', later known as 'Paperclip' .141 But the list was fixed: 
the burden of evacuating those who applied for evacuation and were not listed as 
desired rested at the beginning of 1947 on the shoulders of the British. Both 
'Matchbox' and 'Paperclip' represented attempts at the technological containment of 
the USSR; they anticipated the political containment of the Truman Doctrine, set 
before Congress in March 1947, and the economic containment of the Marshall Plan, 
announced in June 1947.142 
The first few months of Operation 'Matchbox' were its most active phase. By April 
1947, 106 scientific workers had been assessed to determine whether they should be 
evacuated and some seventy-four, together with their dependents, had actually been 
brought over from the East. Entire specialist teams were evacuated: for example, the 
Schon group, which specialized in the manufacture of the V -2 rocket; the Stenger 
group, which also specialized in guided missiles; in January 1947 the Agfa colour 
film research development groupl43; and the fifteen-strong Technical Directorate of 
made 'Matchbox consultants ' (telegram dated 16 April 1948, FO 37 1170955). Those who had been kept in West 
Germany with the aid of 'Matchbox' funds included many specialists in aerodynamics, aircraft design and 
construction, remote control and ballistics who had worked on the RAF' s Yolkenrode project. This was probably 
a group of projects for research into, and development of, high-speed aircraft and guided missiles. However, later 
in the operation's life evacuees from the SOZ represented a larger proportion of the total. By November 1949, 
332 scientific workers had been evacuated from the Eastern Zone, while 'Matchbox' benefits had been extended 
to 103 in the British Zone (report on 'Matchbox' by JS/JTIC Chairman, attached to CH/JSJT/49/217 dated 6 
December 1949, DEFE41183). 
I~PES , FIAT report dated 9 January 1947, FO 1031167. 
141 K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headquarters GermallY: Die USA-Geheimdiellste ill Delllschialld, p. 29. The 
operation lasted until 1973, benefiting some 1,600 scientific workers. 
142M. Walker, The Cold War, pp. 49-51 . 
143The Agfa colour film group had had offers of work in the West before they left the Soviet Zone (letter dated 
19 May 1949, DEFE 411131). The most important members of the group had also long planned to flee the Soviet 
Zone and therefore merely used British Intelligence as their ark to the West. They seem to have made contact 
themselves with the FIAT Forward office in West Berlin (Special Intelligence Report No.3 covering the period I 
January 1947 - 31 January 1947, FO 1031/60). 
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the Bruckner-Kanis company, headed up by the celebrated engineer Paul Kanis. 
Kanis and his colleague Rudolf Friedrich both qualified as outstanding specialists. 
The Admiralty, which had requested the evacuation of the last group, considered that 
it had removed an important war-related industry from the Soviet Zone and that 
Soviet development of high-speed underwater propulsion turbines and of all kinds of 
naval machinery would probably be delayed for a considerable time. Within the 
second category of those whose evacuation would have a serious effect on Soviet 
armaments projects were people skilled in such technologies as rocketry, aircraft 
construction, optical equipment, electronics, radar, remote control for rockets, 
aircraft engines and other engines. 144 
The British targeted specific parts of East Germany's skills base with the purpose of 
frustrating the USSR's exploitation of its Zone and thus of retarding its military-
industrial development. For instance, machine tool designers were targeted, in the 
belief that the standard of skill of the Soviet industrial workforce was low.145 Soviet 
workers would therefore need German machine tools to make the machinery which 
would allow them to manufacture weaponry with the necessary precision. In 1947, 
learning that key machine tool designers were likely soon to be deported from 
Chemnitz to the Soviet Union, British Intelligence made contact with them and other 
such designers in Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and Plauen and offered to fly them to the 
British Zone if they left their jobs and came to West Berlin. The men originally 
targeted together made up a majority of the key machine tool designers in the Soviet 
Zone (they were some twenty designers, supported by forty-five staff). 146 The tools 
144lnterim Repo11 HQI031 OIIlI/Sec.E dated 12 April 1947, DEFE 411l22. It proved very difficult to find work 
for the Kanis team. They only left the Transit Hotel at Bad Driburg in July 1949, more than two years after their 
evacuation (,Matchbox State Chart as at 26 July 1949', DEFE 41/39). 
I 45Letter dated 28 April 1947, DEFE41/109. 
146Undated letter STIB17138 entitled, 'Comprehensive Evacuation of German Machine Tool Designers from the 
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they designed were intended for armament construction. 147 The considerable 
dependence of Soviet workers on machine tools with a high degree of automatic 
control caused Lt.-Comm. R. G. Pennell RN, the Staff Officer (Intelligence) to the 
Head.of the Naval Branch (Berlin), to conclude that, 'the removal of these men in the 
Russian Zone would have a strangling effect on the Russian War potential ' . 148 The 
operation, codenamed 'Top Hat', was carried out on 14 September 1947, earlier than 
planned, because 'a state of emergency ... arose during the first week of September 
1947' .149 It is unclear what the emergency was, but it may be that the MVD got wind 
of the operation. In the operation actually mounted only thirty-five men (plus their 
dependents) were targeted for evacuation, rather than the sixty-five originally 
contemplated. The reasons for this were to avoid causing too many people to move at 
once, which might attract the attention of Soviet Intelligence, and to give British 
Intelligence the opportunity of deciding whether the evacuation of the remainder 
would be worthwhile. ISO The operation itself was a great disappointment, since only 
fifteen of the targeted thirty-five arrived in the British Zone as planned. lSI Some of 
them were indeed imprisoned by the MVD.IS2 Many of the evacuees were found jobs 
with engineering or other companies in Britain.IS3 The following year, other machine 
tool designers at Chemnitz declared their willingness to be evacuated to the West. lS4 
At least one of these did indeed come West and was made a 'Matchbox consultant' . 
This was Herbert Biernatzki, who wanted to defect because his machine tool 
Russian Zone under Operation 'Matchbox', DEFE 411109. 
147Letter dated 2S April 1947, DEFE 411109. 
I48Letter dated 28 A pri I 1947, D EFE 41 II 09. 
149STIB report dated 23 October 1947, DEFE 411109. 
IS~etter dated 10 November 1947, DEFE 411109. 
151 Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 20 October 1947, DEFE 41/63; STIB report dated 23 October 1947, 
DEFE 411109. 
152Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 20 October 1947, DEFE 41/63. 
I 53Letter dated 31 December 1947, DEFE 411109. 
I~elegram dated 17 July 1948, DEFE 411110. 
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business in the Soviet Zone had been nationalized and he wanted to re-found it in 
West Germany. 155 
The British inevitably sought to diminish the Soviets' ability to use East German 
skill to acquire the 'ABC' weapons and guided missiles. In July 1948, STIB 
evacuated from the Soviet Zone Professor Erich Traub, 'the key man' at a 
microbiological research institute on Riems Island which was a 'high priority 
Intelligence target' .156 He was evacuated because the British feared that the institute 
was playing a role in the Soviet biological warfare programme. 157 He brought with 
him some of the viruses and serums which he had developing for the Soviets. 158 The 
aim of the evacuation was both to deny him to the USSR and to find out what was 
going on at the institute. However, when interrogated Traub maintained that it was 
purely a veterinary institute and that the Soviet scientists who had been transferred to 
it or had visited it were themselves only interested in veterinary science. As a result 
of this information, STIB was told that Scientific Intelligence in London no longer 
considered 'the Institute and its workers to be intelligence targets, and that its sole 
interest was in the future to be on the denial aspects' .159 Development groups 
working on guided missiles, such as Elektrobau Sondershausen and Technisches 
Buro 11, were also targeted. Some of the evacuees were agents-in-place III 
155'Matchbox' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/600311917456 dated 3 1 October 1950, 
DEFE 411132. 
156STIB/200 III dated 23 June 1948 and entitled 'Operation "Second Slip' '', DEFE 41/20. Contact with Traub 
was establ ished, and his defection arranged, by what the Director of STIB in this letter discreetly calls 'another 
agency' (i.e. MI6). 
157Confirmation that the British believed that bacteriological research on behalf of the Soviets might be going on 
at the Tierseucheninstitut (Animal Pests Institute) on Riems island is provided by STO/9/DE/48 , STIB Berlin 
Report No. 327, DEFE 411145. All the three 'professors' in charge of the institute (Traub being one) suddenly 
disappeared , the last in September 1948, shortly after Traub' s evacuation. Of the other two, one, the Institute ' s 
Director, Dr. Waldmann, certainly defected and was by June 1948 believed by STIB to be in South America 
(STIB /200 I 11 dated 23 June 1948 and entitled 'Operation "Second Slip' '' , DEFE 41/20). 
I 58STIB/200 III dated 23 June 1948 and entitled 'Operation "Second Slip" ' ; letter dated 3 July 1948 from STIB 
Director to Director of Production, DEFE 41/20. 
159Interrogation Report dated 28 July 1948 on Professor E. Traub, DEFE 411148. 
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installations in the Soviet Zone who had to be evacuated, presumably because they 
were no longer safe where they were. 160 
The largest number of applications to grant 'Matchbox' consultancies made by STIB 
in Germany to the Joint Committees in London concerned scientific workers 
experienced in the design or construction of naval craft or weaponry.161 However, 
these were only applications. Evacuations were a different matter and consultancies 
different again. Sometime either late in 1949 or early in 1950, the 'Matchbox' 
consultants were listed by profession. The largest group on the list of 317 people 
were stated to be 'machine-building engineers' (126 people, including such engineers 
as Paul Kanis). There were thirty-five 'ship and ship machine building engineers', 
twenty-six 'high-frequency and telecommunications' specialists and twenty-eight 
working in 'aerodynamics and aircraft construction ' . There were very few in other 
fields, in most cases the number of evacuees being in single figures (for example, 
only six 'tool machine building engineers' had been evacuated). 162 However, the 
large categories (such as 'machine building engineers') divided into a large number 
of specialities and the specialities of the evacuees covered a remarkably wide range 
of fields. By the autumn of 1950, when the operation'S life was nearing its end and 
461 'Matchbox' cases had passed through STIB' s hands, their combined expertise 
embraced the following fields: electronics (including the development of magnetrons 
and klystrons) and high-frequency techniques; dynamics (including aerodynamics 
and supersonic aerodynamics, hydrodynamics and ballistics); aeroplane construction 
(including that of jet fighters); U-boat and ship-building; submarine and destroyer 
I60In STIB17113IVol.IV dated II December 1948, DEFE 41/131 , David Evans reported that, since 1 July 1948, 
sixteen people had been admitted to the operation, of whom five were ' intelligence sources whom it became 
operationally necessary to evacuate'. 
161Memorandum dated 4 April 1949, DEFE 41/54. 
162Undated list of 'Matchbox' consultants by profession, DEFE 41153. 
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design; turbines; locomotive construction; helicopter design and development; 
speedboat design; rocketry; rocket and torpedo construction and steering (including 
those of the V -2); rocket fuels; remote control (including missile control systems); 
bi<?logical warfare; television development; telecommunications; radar; acoustics and 
underwater sounding techniques; machine, machine tool and precision machine tool 
design and construction; artillery; machine gunnery (including aircraft gunnery); 
proximity fuses; wind tunnels; navigational instruments; gas dynamics; the design 
and construction of mining and transport engines, diesel engines, turbo-jets and 
internal combustion engines; colour film production, and the design of machinery for 
it; efficiency; physics; mathematics; organic and inorganic chemistry; physical 
chemistry ; photo-chemistry; explosive chemistry; chemical engineering; metallurgy; 
fine mechanics and optics; meteorology and geophysics; electrical engineering; and 
electro-medical research. 163 
The operation was a small-scale one. It had to be, for it was difficult to find the 
evacuees jobs in the West. They had to be found work, otherwise they would simply 
return to the SOZ. That was no easy matter, since the Western Allies were still 
committed to the aim of suppressing the war-related industry of West Germany. 
Indeed, some of the evacuees were simply unemployable in Britain or West Germany 
in their field of expertise. For example, in the late 1940s those who specialized in 
warship construction were not wanted in Britain and were not allowed to practise 
their speciality in West Germany.l64 By July 1949, 399 scientific workers had 
benefited from the operation, of whom 241 had found jobs, most in West Germany. 
Sixty-three had found work outside Germany, most in Britain, the Commonwealth 
163'Matchbox' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/6003/1917456 dated 31 October 1950, 
DEFE 41/132, which mentions other, minor specialisms not referred to in the text above. 
164Extract from jS/JTIC(49) 18th meeting held on 1/6/49, DEFE 41/1 31. 
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and the USA.165 By the autumn of 1950, 461 scientists, engineers and technicians 
had passed through STIB' s hands as 'Matchbox' cases. Twenty-nine were still living 
in 'Matchbox' accommodation. Three hundred and nine were living in protected 
accommodation elsewhere in West Germany (if unemployed or only partially 
employed, they were still being paid consultancy fees). But most (344 out of 461) 
had found jobs. More than two-thirds of these 344 people were employed in West 
Germany, which indicates a lack of success in finding as many consultants as 
possible work in Britain, her Dominions or the USA. Only seventy-one seem to have 
found work in these countries. 166 
Despite the small scale of the operation, it succeeded in its aim of removing from the 
Soviet Zone, or denying to the Soviets, a considerable number of scientists, engineers 
and technicians with war-related knowledge and skills . How much damage it did the 
war economy of the Soviet Zone will never be clear, but it hampered the Soviets' 
drive to extract military benefit from the Zone and they made considerable efforts to 
stop the flow of workers to the West. 167 They reacted to the operation with an 
165JS/JTIC(49)57 dated 21 July 1949 and entitled 'Operation "Matchbox''', DEFE 41/150. 
166'Matchbox' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/600311917456 dated 31 October 1950, 
DEFE 411132. 
167JS/JTIC(49)57 on Operation 'Matchbox' dated 21 July 1949, DEFE 411150. That Intelligence Division chose 
the right targets for Operation 'Matchbox' is confirmed by the short life of the DDR aircraft manufacturing 
industry, founded in 1954 and closed down in 1961. 'Matchbox' had been aimed at leaders of research teams, 
who could train up younger and less skilled people. Brunolf Baade, the leading aircraft designer in the DDR, 
complained in 1954 that the industry faced grave difficulties because of its crippling lack of experienced technical 
personnel, which was holding back aircraft production. He contrasted the state of the DDR aircraft industry with 
the conditions which had faced such German firms as Junkers and Heinkel , which before 1945 had had factories 
in the East. Then, since the firms had disposed of large bodies of trained personnel, new and inexperienced 
workers had consistently formed a minority of the workforce and had been trained by the rest. However, the DDR 
faced the opposite situation: most of the workers lacked technical training. This unskilled majority had to be 
trained by a small minority of experienced workers, and these men had many other jobs to do as well, such as 
planning the development programme, supervising it and correcting mistakes in the work. In consequence of their 
many tasks, their skills were spread too thinly across the work of the factory . Baade remarked pessimistically, but 
accurately, 'It is impossible to expect that the tasks will actually be achieved with this tiny staff' (,Es ist 
unmoglich zu erwarten, daB mit diesem geringen Stab die Arbeiten tatsachlich geleistet werden') ('Ausziige aus 
einer Unterredung mit Prof. Baade (Tonbandaufnahme), attached to covering letter YL 460/55 dated 2711 0/55 , 
DY 30llY 2/202/56, SAPMO). Of course, 'Matchbox' only contributed to the depletion of a skills base greatly 
weakened by mass night. 
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enticement programme of their own, offering attractive rewards to scientists and 
engmeers who returned to their Zone. Those who stayed in East Germany were 
similarly rewarded. 168 Intelligence Division believed that the operation was very 
successful in disrupting research and development programmes in the Eastern Zone 
by removing key members of the teams concerned. For example, when, in 1947, the 
aerodynamicist Friedrich Keune was forced to defect to the British, STIB 
interrogated him about the aerodynamics institute in East Berlin at which he had 
worked, the Wissenschaftlich-Technisches B tiro (Gerate), and succeeded in 
identifying four key technicians in the very large R&D team there, whose induced 
defection would wreck the institute's whole planned development programme. 169 All 
in all, it was concluded that the operation had achieved 'to a satisfactory degree' its 
objectives of denying German scientific and technical skills to the USSR and of 
gathering intelligence on Soviet development projects. 170 The Joint Committees, 
reporting on 'Matchbox' in 1949, wrote that, 'we are satisfied that we have received 
a very large amount of information on Russian developments which could not have 
been obtained without the facilities afforded by the Operation' .171 
I 68Letter dated 19May 1949,DEFE41/131. 
169Minutes of JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 10 February 1948, DEFE 41/68. British 
Intelligence did not only try to wreck research and development projects in the Soviet Zone. It also tried to use 
' Matchbox' evacuations to disrupt projects in the USSR of which it had knowledge. For instance, an Ingenieur 
Wartenburg was evacuated from Dessau in August 1949. Operation 'Osoaviakhim ' had struck hard at Dessau, 
many aircraft workers having been deported from the Junkers factory. Technical personnel remaining in Dessau 
clearly performed development tasks connected with the projects being undertaken in the USSR by their deported 
colleagues. Wartenburg was evacuated because he headed up a Soviet-German liaison group at the Junkers 
factory in Dessau and was connected with the supply to the Soviet Union of parts for the Jumo-224 engine made 
by Junkers (STIB/6003/13/7934 dated 10 August 1949; ADI Tech/662/49 dated I September 1949, DEFE 
41/131). 
170JS/JTIC(49)57 on Operation ' Matchbox' dated 21 July 1949, DEFE 41/150. 
171 JS/JTIC(49)57 on Operation 'Matchbox' dated 21 July 1949, DEFE 41/150. The JS/JTIC minutes for the 
meeting on 15 December 1948 (DEFE 41/71) state the same view of the intelligence value of the operation: 
' Matchbox' w'as-, 'of definite intelligence value' . Likewise, George Turney, the Royal Navy' s Assistant Director 
of Intelligence (Science), wrote on behalf of the Joint Committees in 1947, 'During the last year it has been 
possible, thanks to Russian exploitation in Germany of German scientists and technicians, to make considerable 
penetrations of security at the development stage of the production of new weapons. The knowledge gained of 
Russian intentions will be of great value for some time, but the opportunities of acquiring more by similar 
methods will rapidly diminish as the work is removed to Russia, and what we have already will clearly gradually 
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The Penetration of Soviet Armaments Programmes 
The use of German scientists, engineers and technicians in the revival of war-related 
R&D and production in the Soviet Zone made the institutes and factories concerned 
vulnerable to penetration. As 'Matchbox' evacuations show, intelligence could be 
acquired by enticing the defection of a scientist or technician working on a Soviet 
armaments project. 172 If the 'Matchbox' candidate were an applicant for evacuation 
(for example, because he had learned he was going to be sent to the USSR to work), 
he would for a little while be an agent-in-place while his application was being 
considered. 173 If the candidate had been writing reports on his wartime work or on 
war-related scientific problems for the Soviets (which was true of many), he would 
hand these reports over to the British in support of his application for evacuation. 174 
Moreover, 'Matchbox' evacuations were not the only defections of German scientific 
and technical personnel which brought news of the Soviet arms build-up. 
Evacuations intended to exploit the scientific or technical knowledge of the defector 
become a wasting asset' (report dated 21 April 1947 and entitled 'The organisation of Scientific and Technical 
Intelligence', DEFE 40/26). 
InJt should be noted that 'Matchbox ' was an operation of Intelligence Division, not of MI6, and Soviet targets 
became the top priorities of Intelligence Division after they became the principal concerns of MI6. Until 1951 , 
the primary task of the Division , under its Chief's Charter, was the gathering of intelligence on affairs within 
Germany . From Janual}' 1951 , its primary task was the acquisition of intelligence on developments in the Soviet 
Zone of Germany, the satellites and on the Soviet Union itself (this had previously been its secondary task) 
(minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 2 January 1951 , DEFE 41/66). 
173Indeed, in the case of some, it was actually desired by the British that he remain there for some time so that he 
could act as a source. An example is Professor Binder, who was a professor in electrical machinery and high 
tension technique at the Technische Hochschule, Dresden. He was an important scientist , being also Vice-
President of the Academy of Sciences, the deputy head of the Research and Science Department of the Deutsche 
Wirtschaftskommission, and an important figure in industry, being a consultant at two key factories, the 
Sachsenwerk-Radeberg AG and Kommission Technisches Buro (letter dated 25 July 1949, DEFE 41/54). Since 
he was involved with so many intelligence targets in East Germany, there was inevitably a current of opinion that 
he should remain where he was and act as an agent-in-place (handwritten note dated 9/7/49 by Dr. W . 1. Stern , 
DEFE 41/54). It was decided not merely to offer Binder evacuation, but also to make him a 'Matchbox' 
consultant. In the event, however, he refused evacuation. 
174An example is Alexander Kromm, who gave the British papers on shock loads and 'ZAMM periodicals ' 
(letter dated 8 May 1948, DEFE41/54). 
58 
continued alongside 'Matchbox' . evacuations and likewise had an intelligence 
benefit. 175 
As the JIe had said they should be, 'Matchbox' evacuation operations were used to 
penetrate key intelligence targets in the SOZ. One of these was the MVD-run 
uranium-mining organization in the Erzgebirge, which was known as Wi smut AG. 
Prior to his flight Alfred Hertz had been employed in Wismut's headquarters at 
'Objekt 176'. Late in 1949 he was made a 'Matchbox consultant', having probably 
crossed into the British Zone as a refugee, without prompting from Intelligence 
Division. He then prepared an administrative survey of 'the whole of the Wismuth 
AG set-up' and a map of the region for STIB.176 He was one of four men formerly 
employed by the Wismut AG who had been made 'Matchbox' consultants by the 
autumn of 1950. Another key target was the Oberspreewerk, the great valve-
manufacturing factory which before its nationalization had belonged to AEG. At 
least two of the 'Matchbox' evacuees from the Oberspreewerk must have allowed the 
factory's work to be deeply penetrated since both were stated by STIB to be of 'high 
denial and intelligence value'. 177 They were a former laboratory director there, Josef 
Rudolf, and another well-placed informant, August Korte. Other evacuees who had 
held important positions at the factory were Dr. Hugo Bausenhart, a chief of 
department concerned with the development of radio antennae, Ing. Heinz Breuer, a 
'production chief' and Ing. Richard Magner, a 'chief of laboratory range' . Among 
I 75For example, Special Intelligence Reports No.6 (covering the period 1-3 1 April 1947) and No. 10 (covering 
the period 1-31 August 1947), FO 1031/61 , list evacuations from West Berlin both to Britain under the Darwin 
Panel scheme and to 'Matchbox' in the British Zone. 
I 76Letter dated 9 December 1949, DEFE 41/132. That the British had some success in recruiting agents 
connected with the Wismut AG is suggested by the evacuation of one Ernst Punge to West Germany in February 
1949. He was accommodated in the 'Transit Hotel' at Bad Hermannsborn. The reason for his evacuation was 
stated to be, 'Was evacuated because he was blown in Berlin. Intelligence interest (uranium), (undated list 
entitled, 'Persons still resident in the Transit Hotels ', DEFE 41/131). 
177Undated list entitled ' Unemployed Consultants resident in the Western Zones who have come from the East 
Zone and passed through the Transit Hote l', DEFE 411 131. 
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other important scientific and technical installations assisting the Soviet arms build-
up from which 'Matchbox' evacuees were taken and about which intelligence must 
therefore have been gathered were: the GEM A research and development institute in 
Berlin-Kopenick; the Wissenschaftlich-Technisches BUm (Gerate), also in Berlin, 
which conducted research into aerodynamics; Technisches BUro 11; the 
Elektrochemischeskombinat, Bitterfeld, which, among other products, made calcium 
for the Soviet atomic programme; the Junkers aircraft factory in Dessau and that of 
BMW in StaBfurt; the great chemical works, the Leunawerk, at Leuna near 
Merseburg; the glass manufacturing works, Carl-ZeiB, Jena; the telecommunications 
factories, the RFT -Arnstadt and the Sachsenwerk -Radeberg; the Askania Works, 
Berlin; Elektrobau Sondershausen and the celluloid works at Eilenberg. 178 
Moreover, a substantial amount of valuable information was acquired without 
evacuation, both before and after 'Osoaviakhim', from sources in place in Soviet-
controlled factories and research institutes or from scientific workers who had 
received Soviet offers of employment. FIAT Forward had many opportunities of 
forging links with German scientific workers. Many visited its office in West Berlin 
in an attempt to register their patents or to offer them to the Allied Powers for 
commercial exploitation. 179 Many applied there for work in the USA or Britain l80 
and were willing to discuss the offers of work at Soviet defence research 
establishments which they had received. Such men were often sympathetic to the 
West; perhaps more importantly, they were willing to give information to FIAT 
178'Matchbox ' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to STIB/600311917456 dated 31 October 1950, 
DEFE 411132. 
179pIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No.4 dated 28 October 1946, FO 1031/59. As a result of 
disagreements on the subject between the four Occupiers, there was then no Patent Office in Germany. The report 
states that about half of those who came to FIAT Forward's office in West Berlin did so with the aim of either 
registering their patents or of offering them for exploitation. 
180 Appendix B3 to letter dated 18 December 1946, FO 1031/68. 
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Forward's Intelligence Group so as to have the option of ajob in the Western Zones. 
Some of these informants were actual agents. By January 1947, the British section of 
the FIAT Forward office in West Berlin alone had an agent in 'most of the more 
important factories engaged in warlike production' in the Soviet Zone. 181 The 
Technical Sections of MI6 and Intelligence Division had their own networks of 
agents. 182 
FIAT Forward's network alone clearly yielded intelligence of considerable value on 
Soviet use of German scientific and technical knowhow. For example, one scientific 
worker whose expertise was in the field of V -2 missile manufacture and who in the 
summer of 1946 accepted a Soviet offer of work in Magnitogorsk told FIAT Forward 
that that was where V-2s were being manufactured. 183 In the same period, 
intelligence was gathered from the same type of source of the re-activation of war 
production at important factories in East Germany. Examples were the manufacture 
of missile motors at the Siebel factory in Halle, the production of range-finders and 
181Special Intelligence Report No.3 covering the period I January 1947 - 31 January 1947, Fa \031/60. This 
intelligence report, covering the period when Operation 'Matchbox ' was initiated, states that the main aim of the 
FIAT Forward (British) office in West Berlin at that time was to build up an 'Order of Battle' of factories and 
research and development groups of intelligence interest in the Soviet Zone. By that time, however, MI6 had 
already been very successful in acquiring Order-of-Battle intelligence on the Soviets' research and development 
efforts in the Eastern Zone. The Technical Coordinating Section of MI6 (its scientific intelligence unit) was then 
giving up its wartime role of compiling scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence and the Joint Committees thanked 
TCS for its work, which, they said, had 'been of the greatest value in building up a picture of Russian scientific 
and technical activities in Germany' (minutes of JSIJTIC meeting on 6 February 1947, DEFE 41171). Agents in 
factories in East Germany were also used to make contact with scientific workers the British were interested in 
evacuating. For example, in the mid-1950s British Intelligence had an agent at the great Chemische Werke Buna 
in Schkopau, before and during the War Germany' s biggest factory for the manufacture of artificial rubber. One 
of the scientists with whom this agent was in touch in 1955 was Dr. Herbert Stauffer, who had been sent back to 
Schkopau on the transport which had arrived in East Germany on 2 March 1954 (STIB/B/I/824 dated 2 June 
1955, DEFE 411144; JSJTISTO(49)62 dated 28 February 1949 (DEFE 411146) mentions a source on this factory 
called Lindemann). Another of the scientists on the same transport, who was also returned to the Bunawerke, 
from which he had been deported in 1948, was Dr. Bernd von Bock. He is discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. Since it 
was, apparently, the British who in 1955 evacuated von Bock, it may have been through this agent that they 
invited him to defect to the West. 
182Because the work of Intelligence Division 's Technical Section overlapped with that of FIAT Forward's 
Intelligence Group, in August 1946 an attempt was made to coordinate their activities so as to prevent duplication 
of effort (letter dated 21 August 1946, Fa 1031/59). 
I 83FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No. 2 dated 6 August 1946, Fa 1031/59. 
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periscopes at the Carl-ZeiB works -in Jena and the manufacture of aircraft engines and 
missile hulls and motors at the Junkers works in Dessau. l84 The informant on the 
further development of the V -1 motor at Junkers-Dessau was 'one of the leading V-I 
experts'. He told FIAT Forward that the Soviets had insisted that in actual flight the 
engines carry the weapon beyond a 'safety margin' of eighty kilometres; the 
informant believed that this was so that the V-I could carry an atomic warhead . 185 
Intelligence of other menacing development projects was acquired, for instance of 
remote control steering devices for longer versions of the V-2, apparently known as 
the V-3 and V-4, at the GEMA-Haus in Berlin-Kopenick. 186 Such sources naturally 
provided a great deal of information on which of their colleagues or acquaintances 
had accepted work in Soviet defence research establishments. In fact, most of the 
intelligence gathered of Soviet recruitment activities by the summer of 1946 had 
been acquired by FIAT Forward in Berlin. 187 The specialisms of these men indicated 
the weapons the Soviets were seeking to develop. Information on Soviet research and 
184FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No.2 dated 6 August 1946; FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence 
Report No.3 dated 9 September 1946, FO 1031/59. It was sometimes possible to evacuate, by force, to the 
British and American Zones German scientists and technicians who had been working in Soviet defence research 
establishments. In the West they could be questioned about Soviet R&D projects of which they had knowledge. 
In acquiring such intelligence, the British were assisted by the relative ease with which German scientific workers 
could move between the Soviet Zone and Berlin. For example, in the summer of 1946 information acquired from 
informers and from intercepted letters made known to the British both that the U-boat engineer Wilhelm Blume 
was working with the Sztateczny naval development team at Blankenburg in the Harz mountains and that he was 
about to visit his family in the British Sector of Berlin. When he arrived in the Sector, he was promptly arrested 
and interrogated about the work of the Sztateczny group. He was not allowed to return to Blankenburg, but 
instead was evacuated to the British Zone (letter dated 2 August 1946, FO 1031/59). His interrogation yielded 
valuable information on the Sztateczny team's efforts to develop propulsion units for submarines and missiles 
(brief dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/59). In the first place, he confirmed that the experimental engine for the 
Type XXVI submarine he had been working on was very similar to that used at the Waltherwerke in Kiel (report 
on interrogation of w. Blume on 12 October 1946, FO 1031/63). 
185FIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No.3 dated 9 September 1946, FO 1031/59. This is a good 
example of how FIAT Forward' s links with scientific workers employed on important Soviet research and 
development projects yielded up-to-date information on their progress. The informant remarked that the improved 
V-I engine would, in his opinion, not meet the Soviets' expectations and run continuously on the test bench for 
the fifty hours for which they wanted it to run. 
186pIAT Forward Periodic Intelligence Report No.2 dated 6 August 1946, FO 1031/59. 
187Brief dated 14 August 1946, FO 1031/59. 
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development establishments was 'also gleaned from letters written by employees 
which entered the British Zone or Sector. 188 
Aft~r 'Osoaviakhim' even more than before it, many German scientific workers 
employed on Soviet projects made contact with FIAT Forward with a view to being 
evacuated West. They gave the office penetrating and up-to-date information on the 
work their plants and bureaux were doing for the Soviets. 189 Just after 
'Osoaviakhim' important figures at the Oberspreewerk passed information to FIAT 
Forward on the work of their departments. 190 In 1947, there was a 'steady trickle of 
medium-grade technicians' to the FIAT Forward office from the Oberspreewerk. 
Although only very few of them were sufficiently well-qualified to be candidates for 
evacuation, the information they provided kept the office well-informed as to 
developments at the factory. 191 In the spring of 1947, intelligence was gathered from 
188For example, an intercepted letter mentioning the rations and wages paid to workers at the Institut Rabe is 
referred to in the report dated 6 September 1946 and entitled ' Russian-controlled Research Activities in Berlin 
and the Soviet Zone', FO 371/55906. 
189-rhose who called in at the FIAT Forward office were not only Germans who wanted to defect. On at least one 
occasion, on 10 September 1947, a Soviet army officer came by to ask to be evacuated to the West. He was First 
Lieutenant Fyodor Drobkin and he had, in fact , been enticed to ask for help in defecting. He had been quartered 
in the same house as a German physicist called Dr. Gustav Becker and in conversations with Becker he had 
expressed his hostility to Stalin's regime. Becker applied for evacuation in April 1947 after Soviet Intelligence 
made an attempt to recruit him as an agent. The following August, he was evacuated to Bremen. Before he was 
flown out, he clearly passed Drobkin a message from the FIAT Forward people, as a result of which the latter 
visited them. They would not evacuate him for nothing: as a token of his sincerity, he was told to call back with 
intelligence in documentary form, such as an organizational chart of the Soviet Military Administration in 
Germany stating the names and positions of its leading officers (Special Intelligence RepOlt No. II covering 
period I September - 31 October 1947, FO I 03l/61. Also Special Intelligence Reports No.6 covering the period 
1-31 April 1947 and No. 10 covering the period 1-31 August 1947). 
I9Op0r example, information concerning the work of the Tubes and Valves Department was given to FIAT 
Forward by a Dr. Behling, and information about the work of the Instruments Department was given by a Dr. 
Rudolf. This information is contained in Special Intelligence Report No.3 covering the period I January 1947 -
31 January 1947, FO 1031/60. Dr. Rudolf gave FIAT Forward a list of all his colleagues, all of whom , he said, 
would be willing to be evacuated to the West if they were reasonably sure of being given a job there. 
1915peciallntelligence Report No. 10 covering the period 1-31 August 1947, FO 103l/61. It is stated in this 
report that there had in that month been a significant increase in the number of applications for help, most coming 
from 'medium- and low-grade technicians' scattered throughout the Soviet Zone. Most of these people were not 
sufficiently well-qualified to be evacuated , but those who seemed as if they might be of use to the Soviets and 
who had connections with the Western Zone were sent there for a short period so that they could look for work 
there. If they found ajob in the West, an attempt was made to help them take their belongings there. Experience 
had shown that this was the best way to supplement Operation 'Matchbox', which was necessarily limited in its 
scope, with measures that would do further harm to the skills base of the Eastern Zone. 
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a well-placed source on the work of. the film department at the Agfa-Wolfen plant 
following 'Osoaviakhim' and the defection of the colour film development team the 
previous January. 192 An informant called Beust, an employee in the decimetre 
research department of the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg who also feared deportation, 
brought with him information on the progress of the development and production of 
radio and radar apparatus at this important factory and on its plans for the future. 193 
Those wanting to be evacuated greatly exceeded the room available for evacuees at 
the 'Transit Hotel' in Bad Hermannsborn. 194 Some scientific workers made contact 
with the FIAT Forward office in West Berlin to apply for evacuation to the West 
while on their way from one Soviet-controlled factory to another. Such people 
attracted considerable interest as possible agents. 195 
The great evacuation of October 1946 was selective. Many projects which did not 
enjoy the same priority as the development of guided missiles or advanced aircraft 
continued after 'Osoaviakhim' at research institutes and construction bureaux in the 
Soviet Zone. 196 One example is naval technology. Soviet naval research and 
development projects continued at Junker-JorgstraBe in Berlin-Karlshorst, in Berlin-
192This information, provided by a Dr. Rossbach, is contained in Special Intelligence Report No.6 covering the 
period 1-31 April 1947, FO 1031/61. Rossbach also told the office that many of his most highly-qualified 
colleagues were keen to leave the Soviet Zone. Rossbach was only one of a considerable number of scientific 
workers at the factory who were in touch with the FIAT Forward office. Some of the chemists at the Farbenfabrik 
Wolfen were so afraid of deportation that they fled the plant of their own accord. An example is Oscar Conrad, 
who was flown out of Berlin by the British and thoroughly interrogated. He provided complete information on the 
chemical research being carried out at the factory and a chart of its organization (STO/1I0E/48, STIB Berlin 
Report No. 324, OEFE 411145) . 
1935pecial Intelligence Report No.9 covering the period 1-31 July 1947, FO 1031/61. 
1945peciallntelligence Report No.9 covering the period 1-31 July 1947, FO 1031/61. 
19~he suggestion that such people be recruited as agents is made in an EPES , FIAT report dated 9 January 
1947, FO 1031/67. 
196p. 27, 'Oer Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR and seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ and OOR', by B. Ciesla, 
Alis Politik lind Zeitgeschichte, B 49-50/93, 3. Oezember 1993, pp. 24-31. Ciesla describes these research and 
development projects as 'weniger brisante' (of less significance). Most of the research institutes and construction 
bureaux in question belonged to Soviet-owned companies in East Germany. Academic institutions also continued 
to work for the Soviets, performing tasks allotted to them either by Soviet-owned companies or by USSR 
ministries. 
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Kopenick, in Blankenburg, in Mellensee, at the Riesa Iron and Steel Works and at 
Rostock and Warnemunde. All these projects were British intelligence targets in 
September 1947. 197 
A development centre for marine equipment which was certainly penetrated was that 
of the 'MSP' in Berlin-Kopenick ('MSP' were the German letters for the Soviet 
Ministry of Ship Production). Naval Intelligence had an informant on the staff of the 
MSP's Konstruktionsburo, whom it called 'Contact 1031'. At least one of his 
motives for giving the British information was a desire to be able to flee to the West 
if deportation loomed. One of the tasks he was given as a British agent was to obtain 
'the theoretical details of Projekt D 401 which is the task of his Group and is an 
acoustic direction finder for fitting in torpedoes. It is hoped to obtain from him the 
full data of his work .. .'.198 The Soviet Navy's principal centre for armament design 
in the Soviet Zone (i.e. its main Konstruktionsburo) was at 9-10, Junker-JorgstraBe, 
within the compound of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany in Berlin-
Karlshorst. 199 Three British intelligence units in West Berlin - Naval Intelligence, 
Air Intelligence and the Berlin Intelligence Staff - together achieved a penetrating 
insight into the organization, staff and work of this Konstruktionsburo. Most 
importantly, their sources made them aware of highly-prioritized projects for the 
development of naval technology. Among the weapons and war-related devices on 
which these informants provided information were a towed mine detector, a hand-
held version of the same apparatus, a wireless transmitter and receiver immune to 
enemy interference, a distance detector based on supersonic waves, a device for 
197J[C (Germany) Coordinating Committee agenda dated 2 September 1947, DEFE 41/68. 
198Undated memorandum to STIB from Lt.-Commander D. H. B. Barrett, RN, DEFE 41/48. 
I99Undated report STIB/PF.3763 entitled 'Research Department of the High Command of the Russian Navy for 
Armament Development (German Section) ' , DEFE 41148. 
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measuring the pressure of sound waves and a testing apparatus for registering bomb 
hits in bombing practice.2OO Some simply involved reconstructions of German 
projects; others required further development work. 
Workers at the Konstruktionsbtiro were willing to become informants for the British, 
because its planned dissolution by 1 January 1948 threatened a few with deportation 
to the USSR and many of the rest with unemployment. Evacuation to the British 
Zone in return for providing intelligence of the development projects carried out at 
the Konstruktionsbtiro and of its links with Soviet institutions therefore seemed an 
attractive option. The memory of 'Osoaviakhim' inspired fear of a further 
deportation for a long time afterwards. 201 At least three members of the staff, lng. 
Hermann Meincke202, Fraulein Ursula Stiller203 and 'Source No. 412'204 (a 
technician working on radar development), were evacuated to Bad Hermannsborn, 
partly in return for information. Ursula Stiller, a technical draughtswoman, was 
evacuated in August 1947 and Meincke in December 1947. Meincke was the head of 
the ballistics and artillery design section at 9-10, Junker-JorgstraBe, and when he 
heard that he, together with some of the other leading armaments designers at the 
200Air Intelligence Report dated 2 September 1947, DEFE 41/48. 
201 By January 1947, some 150 scientists, engineers and technicians had either applied for evacuation to the 
British Zone or for employment with the British Military Government (EPES, FIAT report dated 9 January 1947, 
FO 1031/67). Grigorii Tokaev, who defected to the British in Berlin in 1948 and was prior to that responsible for 
the exploitation of German aeronautics and rocketry, told Stalin himself in 1947 that 'Osoaviakhim' had struck 
fear into the whole population of the Soviet Zone and that Germans were afraid to work for the Soviet authorities 
(G. A. Tokaev, Stalill Mealls War, p. 116). 
202'Appendix C' dated II December 1947, DEFE 41/48. The source of this information was almost certainly 
Ing. Hermann Meincke, who was evacuated later in December 1947. Meincke seems, indeed, to have been 
providing intelligence before his evacuation. He is described on the card in STIB ' s card index (DEFE 43/1) 
which concerns a STIB source called Herbert Bulnheim as one of Bulnheim's 'principal sub-sources'. 
203Report dated 26 November 1946 and entitled 'Further information on organisation of Russian offices in 
Junker Georg Strasse' , DEFE 41/48. 
204Air Intelligence Report dated 24 July 1947 concerning 'Source No. 412'; Air Intelligence Report dated 16 
August 1947 concerning 'Source No. 412' , DEFE 41/48. Source No. 412 introduced Air Intelligence to another 
informant, Source No. 499, before he was flown out of Berlin to the British Zone (Intelligence Report dated 27 
January 1948, DEFE 41148). Source No. 499 was handed over to Naval Intelligence for exploitation, as the work 
of the institute was of more interest to the Royal Navy than to the RAF (memorandum dated 24 February 1948, 
DEFE 41/48). 
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Konstruktionsbiiro, would shortly be sent to Leningrad, he applied for evacuation. 
Among other weapons, he had worked on the development of superior armour-
piercing projectiles for an anti-tank gun and on the manufacture of high-velocity 
projectiles. The connection between the Konstruktionsbiiro in Junker-JorgstraBe and 
research and development in the USSR allowed him to provide information on 
Soviet work on projectiles. He revealed that Soviet designers were aiming to achieve 
projectile velocities of some 2,000 or 3,000 metres per second. Meincke had been 
told that Professor Andreev in Leningrad had already made propellants capable of 
giving an initial velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second. The guns used were 
smooth-bore guns; in the absence of rifling inside the gun, the projectiles stabilized 
themselves. To diminish the resistance of the projectile to the gun barrel, Meincke 
claimed to have devised a new casting process and, in support of his claim, produced 
a patent approval for the process from the Soviet government. In a pattern that would 
become more familiar to the British, Meincke did not know whether this 
improvement had actually been adopted by the Soviets, or whether their own 
experiments with high-velocity projectiles had been even more successful, for all 
prototypes were constructed in the USSR and all firing trials were held there. The 
German engineers in the Soviet Zone were never told the results of firing trials, but 
were merely informed of weaknesses which they should work on eradicating. 205 In 
May 1948, he was taken to London for interrogation at the Admiralty.206 
205Undated report STIB/PF.3763 entitled 'Research Department of the High Command of the Russian Navy for 
Armament Development (German Section)" DEFE 41/48. Meincke's claims about the guns which he was 
developing at the Konstruktionsbiiro were somewhat fantastic. He told the officers who handled his case that he 
and his team of technicians were trying to create pressure and temperature conditions similar to those produced in 
atomic explosions. Among other advanced weapons, they were constructing not only a '''gas cannon" capable of 
projecting a heat wave of so high a temperature that it would incinerate all objects in its path for a distance of 5 
kilometres ' but also a 'Russian death ray'. The 'gas cannon ' was intended as a weapon of mass destruction for the 
army. The Soviets did not tell Meincke what the death ray was for, but he believed that, 'the device is to be used 
to produce deathly rays by atomic transmutations of the air'. He thought that he would need twelve months to 
turn his research data into a weapon (memorandum dated 16 December 1947 prepared by HQ, CIC Region VIII, 
970th CIC Detachment, Berlin, DEFE 41/48). However fantastic his claims were - he was presumably desperate 
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Development of guidance and ~ontrol systems for surface-to-air missiles also 
continued in the Soviet Sector of Berlin after 'Osoaviakhim'. The Soviets had been 
quick to exploit the potential of these German research programmes. In July 1945 
they had taken over the premises in Berlin-Kopenick of the great electrical 
equipment company, the Gesellschaft fUr Elektro-akoutische und Mechanische 
Apparate (GEMA), and established a group of research and development teams there 
as the Institut Berlin (it was generally known as the 'GEMA-Haus'). One of its teams 
worked on developing designs for guidance and control systems for surface-to-air 
missiles into operational apparatuses. In mid- I946 the Soviets gave instructions that 
this team was to give priority to preparing drawings and putting together data on its 
work. This was a sign, not recognized at the time, that the main development work 
itself was to be done in the USSR and that deportation was looming for some of the 
team's members. In October 1946 some were indeed deported to the Soviet Union. 
The work of the GEMA-Haus had been to reconstruct the Schmetterling, Wasserfall 
and Rheintochter surface-to-air missiles, rather than to improve them, and by 
October 1946 its work had taken the Soviet Union to the same stage of development 
of these missiles as Germany had been at in 1945.207 Most of the remaining staff of 
the guidance and control team were moved to different premises, also in East Berlin; 
this new development team was called the SMAG's Technisches Bliro Nr. 11 
(Technical Bureau No. 11, or TB 11). Some of its members seem to have given the 
British and Americans information about its work, probably in the hope of being 
to avoid deportation to the USSR - he was an important engineer, having during the War been the head of the 
department of the Askania-Werke concerned with the design and stabilization of guided missiles. His denial value 
was therefore high and it is not surprising that the British were keen to take him from the Soviets. 
206Undated list (marked 7A) , DEFE 41/54. 
207Paragraph 75, Appendix F, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. Conclusions about the weapons the Soviets aimed to develop in the USSR with the 
help of the deportees could, of course, be drawn from the nature of the latter's expertise. The special expertise of 
those deported from the GEMA-Haus indicated that , at the very least, the Soviets were seeking to strengthen their 
air defence systems by developing two pieces of sophisticated missile control apparatus on which these Germans 
had been working during and after the War: the Tau Rechner and the parallax calculator. 
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evacuated to the West should deportation become likely. An intelligence report from 
1949 claims that information had been received from 'well-placed highly reliable 
internal sources within the organization' that TB 11 was making a relatively small 
number of control sets (110 pieces of airborne control apparatus and ground control 
sets) for the Wasserfall and Schmetterling missiles, together with appropriate testing 
equipment. Only 80% of these sets had been completed when the team was dissolved 
by the Soviets in August 1948.208 When the team was disbanded, its equipment was 
sent to the USSR, the destination being given as, 'NIL 88, Podlipki Station, 
Moscow' ,200 More will be said of NIL 88, the institute to which the equipment was 
sent, in Chapter 3, for German prisoners-of-war returning from the Soviet Union at 
about the same time had much to say about it. The British also received defectors 
from the Zentralwerk, the re-named Institut Rabe, which continued to manufacture 
guided missile apparatus after the great deportation of October 1946.2\0 
208Paragraphs 32-3, Appendix G, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. An example of such an informant is 'AH-9' (reliability evaluation: B-3) who 
provided the information contained in STOIl3/DE/48, STIB Berlin Report No. 326, DEFE 411145 . The main 
piece of intelligence in this report is news of the winding-up of the V -2 development project at the bureau. 
Unprompted defections of workers at such Soviet development centres in East Germany added to the flow of 
information on them. Such informants are discussed in the next chapter, but it is worth making the point here that 
TB II and the Soviet Navy Ministry' s Technical and Scientific Department at 9-10, Junker-JOrgstraBe, were 
among the centres about whose work the British learned from refugees. For instance, a technician called Alfons 
Ruppik who fled from East Berlin in December 1949 provided information on TB II's work on control 
equipment for the Wasserfall and Schmetterling anti -aircraft missiles. This information was out-of-date because 
Ruppik had been dismissed from TB II in August 1948. TB II ' s premises were then taken over by the Soviet 
Navy Ministry's Technical and Scientific Department. Ruppik's information about the centre' s work for this 
Department indicated that 'Matchbox' and its American counterpart-operation, 'Paperclip', had had some 
success. The centre tried to develop radar equipment, but had to abandon this effort because suitably-qualified 
personnel could not be found. Its main work on marine radio communication devices was also frustrated by the 
fact that 'suitable personnel for development work of this nature were only available in very small numbers, and 
it was desired to economise on the high cost of development, it was proposed to try to import apparatus of this 
type from the West Sector of Berlin or the West Zones, and to copy them .... In December 1949 two of the most 
recent types of all wave ships' receiving sets were procured .. . apparently from Siemens' (Interrogation Report 
No. 154 on Alfons Ruppik, DEFE 41194) . The TB II project to reconstruct the Wasserfall and Schmetterling 
missiles had likewise suffered severe damage when two of the four scientists who knew anything about them fled 
West. Of these two, one, Dr.-Ing. Erich Stegelmann, was made a ' Matchbox' consultant and so probably defected 
in response to a British invitation to do so ('Matchbox ' State Report as at 28 October 1950, attached to 
STIB/600311917456 dated 31 October 1950, DEFE 411132). 
209paragraph 39, Appendix G, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 411160. 
210 An example of such a defector is Georg Zeisshold, who had worked on the manufacture of a time switch for 
V -weapons and whose information is set out in STOll 4/DE/48 , DEFE 411145. 
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The Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade 
'Matchbox' was an attempt to deprive the Soviets of Germans who might increase 
their war-making capability. Of course, Western countries might themselves enhance 
that capability by selling weapons or goods of military significance to the Soviet 
Bloc. So the logical corollary of a policy of denial of scientific workers with 
knowledge of military application was an embargo on the sale of 'strategic goods' to 
the Soviet Bloc. Such a blockade was duly imposed on 22 November 1949, when the 
Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade ('CoCom') was brought into being, 
seven months after NATO's creation. CoCom was the policeman of the West's 
exports. In time, its membership became broadly coterminous with that of NATO. 
Japan, not a NATO member, added to its clout. Britain was a founding member, as 
was the United States. Indeed, CoCom was based at the US Embassy in Paris. It was 
given the task of deciding which technologies were significant for the capacity to 
make war and making lists of goods which should therefore be denied to the 
countries of the Soviet Bloc.211 The Committee's heyday was in the 1950s and 
1960s; it went into decline in the era of detente, when the policy which had given rise 
to it was, in substance, abandoned. 
211 J. Tuck , High-Tech Espial/age: HolV the KGB Smuggles NATO's Strategic Secrets to MoscolV, p. 186. It was, 
apparently, also sought to deny scientific and technical journals to the USSR. Hans Neumann, a radio engineer 
who had worked at the MGB ' s electrotechnical-research-institutes-cum-prison-camps at Kuchino and Marfino 
and was interrogated by STIB in the 1950s, mentioned the 'Western blockade' on technical literature. The ban on 
providing technical literature to the USSR, he said, had not prevented the Soviets from acquiring it. He 
commented that, 'Since the Western Powers introduced the technical literature blockade, single copies of the 
most important publications were bought by persons abroad, and sent to Moscow, and photostat copies were 
distributed to the Institutes. This full extent of availability of foreign literature in the past and at present is a great 
advantage for development work and is used to the full extent by all Institutes' (STIB Interview Report No. 170 
dated 16 June 1954 on Horst Lucius and Hans Neumann, DEFE 411115). 
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. CHAPTER 2 
THE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE IN GERMANY 
A. The Division of Germany 
The division of Germany created ideal conditions for the gathering from human 
sources of valuable intelligence on the Soviet Union and its Bloc. The Communist 
East made contact with the democratic West on German soil and the Germanies were 
easily penetrable, above all by one another. Both offered opportunities for making all 
sorts of contacts with the other side in the Cold War with the aim of gathering 
information. STIB used an extensive network of ideologically-motivated contacts to 
acquire much scientific and technical intelligence, amongst it information on the 
USSR. Since East Germany was in this period being Sovietized, links inevitably 
arose between East German and Soviet factories and research institutes. East German 
engineers who visited Soviet enterprises were able to report back to West German 
acquaintances on what they had seen. Many West Germans, politicized by the 
division of Germany and the Soviet threat to the Federal Republic, were willing to 
pass such information on to British Intelligence. Moreover, the Demarcation Line, 
though increasingly well-fortified, was not a secure border. It contained one gaping 
hole in particular: Berlin. Flight from the DDR was easy and millions fled 
(approximately 2,700,000 people between the DDR's foundation in October 1949 
and the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961).212 The Western intelligence 
services screened the refugees as they passed through the reception camps of West 
Berlin and West Germany, and interrogated many of them. Naturally, the vast 
212M. Wolf, Mall Without A Face, p. 103. 
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majority could only supply information on the DDR. However, given that the Soviets 
were thoroughly exploiting the industry and mineral resources of East Germany, 
many refugees shed light on the USSR's armaments build-up. The incorporation of 
East Germany into the Soviet Bloc also led to movements of people between the 
Soviet Union and the DDR, which ensured that the stream of refugees into West 
Germany contained some very exotic and sought-after fish. 
B. Refugees 
Refugees from the East were an essential source of intelligence. For example, 
immediately after 'Osoaviakhim' and the plant dismantlings that accompanied it, 
Intelligence Division interrogated all refugees from the Eastern Zone who might 
have worked in dismantled installations in an attempt to find out by how much the 
USSR's potential for war had been increased.213 The dismantlement programme 
would, of course, have destroyed the jobs of those who worked at the factories 
concerned and so have driven many to seek work in West Germany. 
As with the German prisoners-of-war returning from the USSR, preliminary 
interrogation was conducted in reception camps throughout West Germany. The 
most important of these was West Berlin's great Durchgangslager fUr Aussiedler und 
Zuwanderer (Transit Camp for Emigrants and Immigrants), which from August 1953 
was in the American Sector, at Marienfelde (before that it had been in the British 
Sector). As the economic and political prospects of ordinary people in the DDR 
seemed then to be worsening, flight was a mass phenomenon. Driven by the 
suppression of the workers' uprising in June 1953, some 300,000 people passed 
213HQ.lnt.Div/C2b/57 10/28 dated I November 1946, FO 1031/68. 
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through the camp at Marienfelde iI1 its first year of operation; approximately 150,000 
passed through it in succeeding years.214 Refugees with valuable intelligence were 
daily taken from the camp to the' Joint Allied Refugee Operations Center, Berlin', in 
Dahlem, also in the American Sector. Represented there were the intelligence 
services of all the Western Powers and, in time, of the Federal Republic. That was 
not the end of the refugees' exploitation: the Americans' main interrogation centre, 
to which every refugee from the DDR who might have intelligence of value was 
taken, was Camp King in Oberursel, previously the first home of the Gehlen 
Organization. Until the 1970s, a large proportion of East German refugees were 
interrogated in this camp.215 
The refugees were often bitterly hostile to Communism and the USSR and so were 
inclined to be sympathetic to the West. Some were even recruited as agents in Camp 
King. Many were very willing to provide intelligence. By interrogating them the 
Western intelligence services sought, in part, to build up their agent networks in East 
Germany. They sought information on the refugees' remaining connections in the 
places they had left. The refugees were asked to identify those they knew who might 
214-rhe British did not expect the mass flight which occurred. The life of Production Directorate, the branch of 
Intelligence Division responsible for interrogating refugees and others coming from the East, was continually 
being extended throughout the late I 940s and 1950s. The Directorate acquired its name because its task was the 
production of 'offensive intelligence' on the USSR and its Bloc. To do this job, the Directorate had charge of 
Friedland Camp, the nearby Special Interrogation Unit and similar bodies and Boundary Intelligence Teams. At 
the beginning of the 1950s, Production Directorate operated four Boundary Intelligence Teams strung along the 
border (address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(lnt)BAOR, to MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951, 
DEFE 411125). When the flow of Po Ws stopped in 1950, its main concern became refugees and other 'Iine-
crossers' . By 1955 it was part of the 'British Security Services Organization' (see the 'Production Questionnaire -
Eastern Germany, dated 24 June 1955', DEFE 411143). 
215K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headqllarters Gerlllany: Die USA-Geheillldienste in Delllschiand, pp. 206-8. 
Detention Center MISC Oberursel was the American replacement for 'Dustbin' (see footnote 46, Chapter I). Of 
course, mass emigration was a double-edged sword. Hidden among the refugees were the penetration agents of 
the MfS ' Hauptverwaltung Aufkli:irung and the MGB. The HV A owed many of its later achievements to such 
emigrants . Some of the agents were scientists or students of science and almost all of them were successful in 
finding work at companies, universities or research institutes of intelligence interest (M. Wolf, Man Withollt A 
Face, p. 70; pp. 206-7, A. Silver, 'Questions, Questions, Questions: Memories of Oberursel' , Intelligence & 
National Secllrity , Vol. 8, No.2 (April 1993), pp. 199-213). I made this point in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation. 
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be sympathetic or useful to the West, and refugees who had held positions of 
importance in the East became the CIA's 'usual source for new ... leads' to possible 
agents behind the Iron Curtain.216 A standard American ploy in hunting up those 
named by refugees was to have the refugee write a letter inviting someone he 
believed to be sympathetic to the West to meet him in West Berlin. He would give a 
telephone number so that the addressee could specify a place to meet. To defeat 
interception of the letter by the MfS, it would often be taken to the DDR by courier 
and there put in a postbox. The meeting would be attended by an intelligence officer 
well-supplied with cigarettes or dollars, who would try to make the recruitment. 217 
According to a former CIA officer who worked in Germany during this period, 
'scores' agreed to become agents.218 
Of course, among those the refugees named as people sympathetic to the West were 
scientific workers employed in key factories manufacturing armaments and devices 
of military application for the USSR or its forces in East Germany. Like the 
Americans, British Intelligence clearly sought to use refugees' information to recruit 
agents who worked in targeted installations in the East. For example, Ing. Paul 
Leuschke fled the DDR early in 1956. He had worked as a development engineer in 
the decimetre department of an important factory, the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg, where 
'John of the other Section' (presumably MI6 's Technical Section) was very keen to 
2160 . Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA liS. KGB in the Cold War, p. 351 . 
217K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headquarters Germany, p. 206. Such letters were known as 'Lockbriefe' (letters of 
inducement). 
218H. Rositzke, Th e CIA 's Secret Operations: Espionage, COllnter-espionage and Covert Action, p. 42. Rositzke, 
who was then an officer of the CIA's Office of Special Operations, relates that the CIA also recruited agents at 
scientific and technical targets by advertising in West Berlin newspapers for people with specified technical 
qualifications. East German applicants with jobs at targeted institutions were invited for interview. Many became 
agents in return for a promise of resettlement in West Germany in the future . Strong anti-Soviet feeling among 
them facilitated the recruitment. The Americans' targets , like those of the British, clearly included the principal 
enterprises in the DDR. For example, it is clear from JSJT/STO(49)59 dated 16 February 1949 (DEFE 411146) 
that US Intelligence had both German and Soviet informants at the Leunawerk . 
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have an agent. It is easy to see why John was keen to have an agent in this 
department, for the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg's decimetre department manufactured 
decimetre wavelength radio sets for the Soviet army (the factory had been, and 
perhaps still was, jointly owned by the USSR and the DDR). NATO's interest in the 
radio sets in service with the Soviet armed forces was then lively, for intelligence of 
the wavelengths on which Soviet radio sets operated would allow Soviet 
communications, in the event of war, to be jammed in one area of combat (most 
importantly, at the front) and intercepted in the rear where the Red Army's command 
and control headquarters were 10cated.219 Leuschke was therefore put in a safehouse 
and interrogated to find out whether he knew of any promising candidates for 
recruitment.22o Another factory at which the British sought to recruit agents, using 
leads provided by refugee scientific workers, was the EFEM works in Berlin-
Oberschoneweide.221 Inevitably, the Institute for Nuclear Physics in Dresden was 
also a target.222 The Oberspreewerk, the great valve works in Berlin-
Oberschoneweide which was quickly taken into Soviet ownership223, was a highly-
219 Address by Major Stoney, Signals 3, MilO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126. That 
the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg was Soviet-owned in 1949 is stated in Exhibit E, Appendix G, A Study of the Soviet 
Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 411160. Although the Soviet government 
diminished the scale of its exploitation of East Germany in the late I 940s, direct exploitation continued in the 
form of the 'Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften' (Soviet stock companies). These were companies conforming 
with German law and were established in June 1946. Being wholly owned by Soviet economic bodies, they 
perpetuated Soviet control over factories and mines and ensured the delivery of reparations in kind to the USSR. 
When the DDR was founded in October 1949, they became 'Sowjetisch-Deutsche Aktiengesellschaften'. From 
then on, although the Soviets continued to send the production of East German factories to the USSR as 
reparations, the East Germans were allowed to retain a part of this production. Almost all of these companies had 
been handed over to the DDR government by the mid-1950s, but a few of great strategic importance remained 
under Soviet control (chief among them the Wismut AG). Indirectly, much of the DDR's industry was exploited, 
since its production was geared to Soviet needs (N. Naimark, The RlIssialls ill GermallY, pp. 189-90). The 
Administration of Soviet Property in Germany, which administered the Soviet stock companies, was the 'key 
scientific-technical target' of the CIA's Berlin Operations Base (D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, 
Battlegrollnd Berlill, p. 109). 
220Berl i nil 202 dated 3 March 1956, DEFE 411136. 
221 Berlinll144 dated 8 February 1956, DEFE 411137. 'EFEM' stood for 'Entwicklung und Fabrikation 
Elektrischer MeBinstrumente' (development and manufacture of electrical measuring instruments). 
222Berlinll130 dated 27 January 1956, DEFE 411144. 
223p. 27, 'Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR and seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ and DDR' , by B. Ciesla, 
Ails Politik IIl1d Zeitgeschichte, B 49-50/93, 3. Dezember 1993, pp. 24-31. 
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I, 
prioritized target. The Berlin Intelligence Staff achieved 'very good coverage' of the 
research and development work carried on there and agents supplied some of this 
information. The intelligence gathered not only revealed to the British the uses the 
Soviets were making of the Oberspreewerk; it also allowed deductions to 'be made 
through the use of the German window to Russia' about the state of Soviet 
electronics.224 For instance, in 1949 a 'study of Russian activities at the 
Oberspreewerk' led to the conclusion that, to manufacture the electronic equipment 
they would need in a modern war, the Soviets needed greater manufacturing capacity 
and more sophisticated production and testing methods. 225 
Naturally, a mass of intelligence was acquired from the refugees. Much was political 
and economic intelligence. They provided information on the location and function 
of industrial and military installations in the Soviet Bloc and Order-of-Battle 
intelligence on the Soviet (and, later, Warsaw Pact) forces there. If there were points 
about which refugees were not sure or about which more information was sought, 
they often wrote to friends or relatives still living behind the Iron Curtain for 
confirmation or further information. 226 Many refugees, of course, were low-grade 
sources. Interrogators of such sources were given specialist briefings and became 
expert at making the best of the information they provided. As with the returning 
PoWs, well-briefed interrogation allowed significant conclusions on quite difficult 
224Memorandum dated 19 September 1949, DEFE 41/123. 
225NID LC Report No. I dated 17 August 1949 and entitled 'Russian Electronic Developments: The 
Oberspreewerk, Berlin ' , DEFE 41/151. The British had, for example, received reports that the valves being 
manufactured in the Soviet Union were 'not as consistent in performance as modern VHF techniques require' . 
226Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 20 September 1949, DEFE 41/64; Egan & Knott, Essays in TlVentieth-
Century AlIlerican Diplolllatic History Dedicated to Professor Dalliel M. SlIlith (article by 1. Erdmann on , 'The 
Wringer in Post-war Germany') , p. 166; K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headquarters GerlllallY, pp. 205-6. For an 
example of such intelligence, see STIB Interview Report No. 105 dated 26 January 1953 on Paul Seelig, DEFE 
41/99. 
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scientific issues to be made on the basis of information provided by low-grade 
refugee sources. 227 
But many of the refugees were not low-grade sources at all. The powerful recovery 
of the West German economy in the 1950s drew industrial workers from the DDR in 
huge numbers and so broke its 'Schwerpunkt-Betriebe' (key factories) open to the 
Western intelligence services . Examples of such factories are the Tewa concern in 
Neustadt, which manufactured fine wire mesh for the Soviet atomic project, 
Elektrochemischeskombinat-Bitterfeld228, which (among other products) made 
calcium for the Soviet atomic project, RFT -Kopenick229, RFT -Arnstadt230, VEB 
Jenapharm23 I , the Carl-ZeiB works in Jena232, the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg233, the 
EFEM factory in Berlin-Oberschoneweide234 and the Werk fUr Fernmeldewesen235 
227 According to the Director of STIB at the MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951 , DEFE 411125. 
228STIB Interview Report No. 112 dated 12 March 1953 on Dr. Rudolf Schulze, DEFE 41/99. Schulze is an 
example of an eminent scientist and high-grade source who took flight from the DDR and gave penetrating 
intelligence to his interrogators. However, he had not been engaged in scientific work of military application. 
Before his flight, he had been the Director of the Zentralforschungslaboratorium (Central Research Laboratory) at 
the Elektrochemischeskombinat. He fled early in 1953 when he was tipped off that he was about to be arrested. 
The British had a well-placed source, codenamed 'Bitter' , at this factory. His information was graded B-2 (A-I 
when it was in the form of documents) (JSJT/STO(49)54, DEFE 411146). From some source in the factory the 
British and Americans were successful in obtaining the specifications for the calcium produced there which the 
German management had been given by their Soviet chiefs. These specifications were so demanding that they 
established without doubt that the works were manufacturing calcium metal for the Soviet atomic programme. 
Production figures and detailed information on production processes were also obtained. It was concluded that, 
'The best evidence available indicates that from April 1946 to December 31 st 1947,337 tons of undistilled 
calcium were made and 112 tons of distilled calcium, of which approximately half came from the Cu.Ca process 
and would therefore have a reasonable satisfactory purity ' (report of Combined Anglo-American Intelligence 
Unit, 4 February 1948, DEFE 41/123). The Americans reacted to the discovery of the significance of this plant to 
the Soviet atomic project by stopping the supply to it by West German companies of a special steel and vacuum 
pumps, both of which it needed to manufacture pure calcium meta!. CoCom's embargo already applied to most 
such goods (D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin , p. 14). 
229STIB Interview Report No. 87 dated 24 October 1952 on Werner Noack, DEFE 41/98. 'RFf' was the East 
German short form for ' Rundfunk-und-Fernmeldetechnik' (radio and communications technology) . 
230STIB Interview Report No. 95 dated 3 November 1952 on Alfred Roehn, DEFE 41/98. 
231STIB Interview Report No. III dated 21 February 1953 on Rudolf Seidel, DEFE 41/99. 
232STIB Interview Report No. 121 dated 4 June 1953, DEFE 4111 00. 
233Berlinll202 dated 3 March 1956, DEFE 411136. 
234Berlinll144 dated 8 February 1956, DEFE 411137. 
235e.g. STIB Interrogation Report No. 302 dated 28 September 1951 on Dip!. Ing. Karl Martin, DEFE 21/41; 
STIB Interview Report No. 177 dated 26 July 1954 on Dip!. Phys. Kurt Steinfurt, DEFE 411115. 
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(the former Oberspreewerk). Refugees could provide information equivalent in value 
to that an agent, especially if, over time, there was a steady stream of them from a 
particular target. 'Matchbox' defectors, whether evacuated for their denial or for their 
intelligence value, were just particularly knowledgeable refugees. In 1948, MI16, the 
War Office's scientific intelligence section, made a list of the factories in the Eastern 
Zone to be targeted on its behalf. In all these cases, a 'steady trickle' of refugees 
would be more-or-Iess as good as the recruitment of an informant there. 236 
A perfect example of a high-grade refugee informant who provided very precise 
technical information, equivalent to that of a well-placed agent, on a key scientific-
technical target was Nikolai Treu, who was interrogated in January 1951. He was a 
Volksdeutscher from Lithuania (he could therefore speak Russian as well as German) 
and an expert on weaving who in 1950 was appointed by the Soviet Control 
Commission (as the SMAG had become) as its inspector at the Tewa factory at 
Neustadt, which made the finest wire mesh for it as reparations. Treu ' s job was to 
check the wire mesh before it was sent off to the USSR. Both British and US 
Intelligence were very interested in the mesh manufactured at the factory, for the 
finest wire mesh, containing millions of submicroscopic openings per square inch, 
was used to separate the isotopes of uranium and thus acquire uranium-235, which is 
fissionable. They had come by news of the factory's work before Treu's flight. To 
retard the Soviet atomic programme, the CIA's Berlin Operations Base organized the 
236Letter dated 12 August 1948 from C. R. S. Manders, MI 16, to the Chairman of the lSIJTIC, DEFE 411130. 
These factories were: all the Soviet research and development offices ('KTBs'); the Sachsische Serumwerke, 
Dresden; Zei/3 of lena, Gera (including its Chemical-Bacteriological Institute); Koch & Sterzel, Dresden; 
Siemens-Planiawerke, Berlin; Orgacid, Ammendorf; EFIM, Berlin-Friedrichsfelde; hydrogen peroxide factory , 
Eilenberg; and the Optische Forschungsinstitut. For MIl6's purposes, well-placed administrative personnel made 
the best sources . The letter makes the point that, in this period, there tended only to be a rush of scientific workers 
to the British Zone when the Soviets dismantled a factory in their Zone for despatch to the USSR. With regard to 
most of the targeted installations , Manders noted that, 'a small and steady trickle of people is desired but none if a 
suitable informant can be placed there' . 
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defection to the West of key workers at the factory. 237 Its agents even brought back 
samples of nickel wire mesh. 238 Treu fled the DDR when the MVD forced him to 
agree to spy for it. In interrogation, he recalled the total size of the deliveries made to 
the .USSR in 1951 - approximately 103,000 square metres of fine wire mesh with 
7,400 meshes per square centimetre, 85% of it Grade 1 in quality - and knew the 
deliveries to be made in the first six months of 1952, which added up to some 75,000 
square metres, 95% of it Grade 1. The agency in Moscow which placed these 
reparations orders was 'Rasno-import', the Berlin office of which instructed the 
reparations office of the Soviet Control Commission to arrange for the required 
quantity of mesh to be made. He gave details of the weaving process and the width 
and tolerance of the meshes specified by the Soviets. 239 The most important 
information he provided was that concerning the dimensions and technical 
characteristics of the wire mesh, for the likeliest use of such fine mesh was for 
isotope separation. Of course, this may well not have been the first intelligence 
237D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battlegrollnd Berlin, p. 14. The CIA's Berlin Operations Base 
learned of the manufacture of nickel wire mesh in the Eastern Zone from agents working at the Administration of 
Soviet Property in Germany. The British either had informants of their own in the Tewa factory or a similar plant, 
or they received intelligence on the subject from the Americans. [n the minutes of the STIB Technical Meeting on 
27 November 1951 (DEFE 4111 0) appears the following entry: 'Fine Gauze. Manufacture in the Eastern Zone 
continues and there have been extra security precautions. The specification continues to be 7000 mesh centimetre 
squared in pure nickel. It is unlikely that concentration is proceeding on any scale in the ROZ [Russian Occupied 
Zone)'. Earlier minutes record that, sometime in the spring or early summer of 1951 , eleven technicians working 
on the manufacture of fine gauze were evacuated from the Soviet Zone to the West and intelligence was taken 
from them. [t is likely that they were, in fact, evacuated by the Americans and that this intelligence was thereupon 
passed to the British; they may indeed have been the Tewa defectors evacuated by the CIA (minutes of STIB 
Technical Meeting on 1 June 1951 , DEFE 41110). 
238H. Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations, p. 43. According to Rositzke, agents also supplied vital 
information on activities at other key targets in the Soviet Zone, such as uranium production and transportation in 
the Erzgebirge and biological warfare testing on the island of RUgen. 
239STIB Berlin Report No. 744 dated 31 January 1952, DEFE 21 /44; STIB Interview Report No. 72 dated 20 
August 1952 on Nikolai Treu , DEFE 41/97. The latter report records Treu ' s statement that the defection of six 
skilled workers in the spring of 1951 had not had any significant impact on the factory ' s production. They had 
been replaced quickly by others trained to take over their jobs; this had caused two-to-three weeks interruption of 
production, but the factory had still achieved its production targets. Despite the mention of six defectors , Treu' s 
information may refer to the evacuation of the eleven technicians from the Tewa plant. The information indicates 
that this particular operation did not achieve its object. Nevertheless, Treu 's knowledge of the annual production 
figures of fine nickel wire mesh at the Tewa and Zeulenroda factories will have given the Ministry of Supply ' s 
Division of Atomic Energy an idea of the scale of the Soviet effort to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion of its 
isotopes. 
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acquired on the factory's work; the evacuations of 1951 from the Tewa plant show 
that it was already an intelligence target. That the Soviet Control Commission took 
such a close interest in the mesh was another indication of its importance. Treu 
informed the British that there was a Control Commission official attached to each of 
the wire-drawing factories, responsible for the quality and diameter of the wire and 
other matters of interest to the Soviets. He even told the British of experiments late in 
1951 to increase the number of meshes per square centimetre to 15,000 so as to allow 
an even more efficient isotope separation. 240 
Another example of a refugee who passed on intelligence of Soviet orders from a 
targeted factory was Kurt Steinfurt, who fled from the Werk fOr Fernmeldewesen. He 
told his interrogators of large Soviet orders for a particular series of metal-ceramic 
valves. He even handed over a list of valves which in January 1954 had reached the 
stage at which production samples had been constructed and he gave full technical 
details of these valves. This was important intelligence, for this was a time of 
revolutionary development in electronics and valves were in consequence devices of 
considerable intelligence interest. A valve is essentially a switch. Controlling the 
flow of electrons and thus enabling commands to be given, large numbers of valves 
formed a crucial part of early computers, missile guidance systems and proximity 
240STIB Berlin Report No. 746 dated 9 February 1952, DEFE 21/44. STIB had earlier made contact with an 
engineer who had been deprived by nationalization of his business in East Germany. This business (located, like 
the Tewa factory , in Neustadt) had manufactured weaving equipment for the manufacture of fine wire mesh. The 
contact expressed the view that the use of the mesh 'at present being produced in such large quantities in the 
Russian Zone could only be in connection with the Russian Atomic Programme. He himself had discussed with 
his various weaver colleagues the potentialities of gauze of this fineness made from pure nickel and all his weaver 
colleagues had stated somewhat categorically that , in their experience, no possible industrial use could be 
envisaged .... Contact was quite agreeable to approaching colleagues of his in the Eastern Zone with a view to 
determining additional information, and in fact voluntarily agreed to do so' (STIB Interview Report ('Kidney ') 
No.2 dated 31 July 1950, DEFE 41/88). This report implies that the contact was the former proprietor of the 
Neustadter Drahtweberei (previously known as Emil Jaeger), which specialized in 'the production of wire 
weaving equipment'. In all probability, among its customers was the nearby Tewa factory (previously known as 
the Drahtweberei Oskar Eilhauer). That this source was Jaeger himself is confirmed by the minutes of the STIB 
Technical Meetings on 7 July, I September and 24 November 1950, DEFE 4111 O. 
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fuses (among other military applic,ations). The invention in the United States in 
December 1947 of the transistor, which initiated the revolution in semiconductors 
which transformed electronics and gave birth to microelectronics, sounded the death 
knell of the valve. The transistor is a super-switch and rapidly replaced the valve in 
guidance systems and other technologies in the West. 241 It was essential to the 
emergence of the intercontinental ballistic missile as the key element in the strategic 
arsenals of the superpowers, because it allowed guidance systems to be developed 
which could direct warheads with great accuracy to their targets. 242 The transistor is 
smaller than the valve, more reliable and much more efficient. The modern 
semiconductor is made up of racks of closely-packed silicon transistors. Naturally, 
British Intelligence . in Germany sought information on East German attempts to 
develop the transistor, so as to determine how well the guidance systems of Soviet 
missiles and various other Soviet weapons and machines might function. With the 
same aims in mind, it also sought intelligence on valve production in the DDR. If the 
Soviet Bloc were still heavily reliant on valves, this would show that it was not 
keeping up with the electronics revolution in the West. Intelligence interest focused 
on research and development into silicon and germanium as detectors and transistors 
and on moves towards developing miniature and sub-miniature valves. 243 A mass of 
intelligence was gathered from contacts on valve production in the DDR and the 
efforts there to organize research into, and institute the development and production 
of, transistors and semiconductors. 244 More intelligence on East German valve and 
241G. Hartcup, The Silent Revolution; The Development of Conventional Weapons 1945-85, p, 23. 
242R. Amann, J. Cooper & R, W, Davies, Th e Technological Level of Sovietlndllstry (chapter by D. Holloway 
on 'Military Technology '), pp. 446-7. The other technological hreakthroughs which gave the ICBM its strategic 
pre-eminence were the development of liquid-propellant-powered rockets and the creation of nuclear weapons. 
243STI BIB 11242 dated 19 September 1955 , DEFE 411136, 
244Yarious reports on this subject are: OLB/BLl57/298 dated II March 1957; OLB/BLl57/302 dated 18 March 
1957; OLB/B/57/306 dated 26 March 1957; OLB/BLl57/320 dated 20 May 1957 and OLB/BLl571347 dated 5 
July 1957. All of these are in DEFE 411141. 
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transistor production was passed .to STIB by refugees from electronics factories in 
the DDR and, doubtless, by agents recruited there. 
Ing. Willy Liedtke, a skilled engineer and the director of the Magnetic Materials 
Laboratory at 'RFT/ZFL' in Berlin-Treptow, was a high-grade source, because 
among his various jobs prior to his flight had been the position of secretary of a 
specialist committee on magnetic materials which drew its members from all over 
the DDR and a position on the editorial board of the DDR publication 'Funktechnik'. 
In these capacities he had travelled all over the DDR and was therefore able to give 
the British much information about the principal electronics enterprises in East 
Germany, what they were making and who was running them. He also brought a 
great number of technical papers with him. Among the factories whose work he 
described were the Werk ftir Fernmeldewesen, the EFEM works and the 
Wissenschaftlich-Technisches Btiro in Berlin-Lichtenberg, all of them Sowjetisch-
Deutsche Aktiengesellschaften and, as companies directed and exploited for 
reparations by the Soviet Union, targets of British intelligence operations. Liedtke 
informed the British, for example, that the EFEM factory was meeting orders from 
Moscow for very accurate measuring instruments; it was also working on secret 
tasks, involving research into alloys, in collaboration with an iron research institute 
in Leningrad. His interrogator, clearly referring to the possibility of acquiring a 
source at the factory, then noted: 
ObeL Ing. Schierz of EFEM, who is said to be pro-West, works on Moscow 
orders for electro-magnetic test gear development. He told Liedtke that the 
Russians show particular interest in iron-cored moving coils of high 
sensitivity.245 
245STIB Interview Report No. I 17 dated 9 May 1953, DEFE 411114 (my italics). Observations about the 
political leanings of people in the East are consistently made in reports on interrogations of refugees and 
interviews with contacts. As far as the latter type of report is concerned, an example is provided by STIB 
Interview Report (' Kidney') No.2 dated 31 July 1950, DEFE 41/88 (mentioned in footnote 240 above), in which 
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The uranium mines in the Erzgebirge 
The uranium mines in the Erzgebirge, in the south of the Soviet Zone, which were 
worked by tens of thousands of miners under the control of the MVD, have been 
aptly described as 'a German Kolyma of sorts'.246 Most of the miners worked there 
only under duress. Tens of thousands of people, most without any experience of 
mining, were compulsorily selected for mining work in the cities of Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt and Thuringia, and sent to the Erzgebirge. Black marketeers, thieves and 
people who had been caught trying illegally to flee from the Soviet Zone were sent to 
the mines as punishment. With insufficient accommodation for them in the places to 
which they were sent, living conditions were very poor. But working conditions were 
even worse. Mining equipment was in very short supply, so for the most part they 
were required to excavate the shafts with pick-axes. The ore was put into crates, 
which were carried to the surface. There it was taken to a pithead, tested and 
separated according to grade. Then it was loaded on to trucks to be transported to a 
railway station. Some of the ore was taken by train to a processing and refining 
installation, some was shipped directly to the Soviet Union. No measures were taken 
to protect the health of the miners, who were exposed to radioactivity as well as to 
the severe and dangerous conditions of the mines. The work itself was very 
strenuous. Accidents were common and often fataP47 Unlike those of the MVD in 
the remark, 'Believed to be non-Russian in his sympathies', is made of a number of men working in targeted 
factories in the DDR. 
246N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 239. 
247Willi Lohmann, the source who provided the information contained in STO/22/NO/48 (DEFE 411145), 
estimated that, on average, twenty miners were killed in accidents every day, either because the Soviets failed to 
take elementary safety precautions or because the miners were too inexperienced to take care for their own safety. 
He recalled one occasion on which eighty miners had been drowned in a single accident. 
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Siberia, the labour camps of the Erzgebirge were close to a border with the West. 
The result of the terrible conditions in the mines was mass flight. 
These refugees were sources of first-hand intelligence on the Soviets ' drive to 
harness atomic energy to their defence effort. STIB in Germany interrogated very 
thoroughly, along lines laid down by the Division of Atomic Energy (D.At.En.) of 
the Ministry of Supply, miners who fled the mines and came to the British Zone. The 
Director of STIB remarked in a report of November 1949 that, 'The requirements of 
D.At.En. in this type of exploitation are considerable ... ' .248 The Division of Atomic 
Energy demanded information on the location of uranium mines in Central and 
Eastern Europe and their output of all grades of uranium mined, the efficiency of the 
processing plants in which low-grade ore was turned into concentrate and the 
throughput of the depots to which the crude ore and concentrate were taken for 
transportation to the USSR. What it thus sought to establish were the precise 
quantities of uranium ore and concentrate, and of their respective uranium contents, 
sent to the USSR. Samples of each grade of uranium were greatly prized. All the 
penetration of the mining and transportation organizations in the Soviet Bloc could 
achieve was an estimate of the amount of uranium transported East. It could not 
reveal how the Soviets planned to use it. However, information from German sources 
would provide some compensation for the lack of intelligence from the Soviet Union 
itself. It was believed that the USSR suffered from a serious shortage of uranium249 
248STIB/6009/1 dated 1 November 1949 and entitled, 'Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch: Review of 
Future Commitments', DEFE 41/83. 
249paragraph 57, JIC(47)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 on 'Soviet Interests , Intentions and Capabilities' , CAB 158/1 . 
The JIC also expressed the view here that a lack of industrial knowhow would prevent the Soviet bomb project 
from achieving quick success. It forecast (in paragraph 58) that by January 1952 the USSR 's stock of atomic 
bombs was unlikely to exceed five, though it might be as great as twenty-five. Two years later, the Joint 
Committees still held the view that, 'a shortage of uranium ore will be the governing factor in [the Soviets'] 
programme' (p. 5, Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee', DEFE 41/150). 
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and that a large part of its uranIUIU came from its satellites . Consequently, an 
estimate of the amount of uranium mined in the Soviet Bloc would help to establish 
how many bombs the Soviets might be able to make. Thus D.At.En. could answer 
the q~estion set it by the Chiefs of Staff: 'When would the Soviets have a stockpile 
of atomic bombs sufficient to justify the risk of open warfare?'250 
Refugee miners provided the British with penetrating intelligence on the progress 
and expansion of the mining work in the Erzgebirge. 251 They revealed the existence 
of the shafts in which they had worked, those shafts' yield of ore and the quality of 
that ore. An example of a source who could describe mineshafts in the Erzgebirge 
very precisely and give quantities of low- and high-grade ore mined is 'ECIC 
14/234', who had been made to transport ore from the Brtiderlichkeit shaft at 
Jachymov (over the border in Czechoslovakia) between September 1947 and May 
1948. He informed his interrogators that: 
Daily production, in three shifts, is 650 truckloads, i.e ., about 3,000 to 
4,000 kg of ore. The ore leaves the Breitenbach, Seify, Elias, Werner, 
Einigkeit and Schlackenwalde shafts for the ore dressing installations. 
About one of the shafts he said that: 
The Seify shaft is 250 m deep and has 5 galleries. Until April 1948, about 
80 PWs worked there on each shift. The shaft was closed in April 1948. 
About 12 to 15 sheet iron containers, each containing about 110 kg of low 
grade ore, were produced per shift. After segregation, about 150 to 170 kg of 
high quality ore remained. This was then transported to the Brtiderlichkeit 
shaft for dressing. There all high grade ore is again segregated and packed 
into crates 40 x 40 x 40 cm. Ore containing more than 0.30% pitchblende was 
crushed and loaded into sheet metal containers 50 cm high and 25 to 30 cm in 
250Address by Commander E. Welsh, D.At.En. , MilO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 
411126. To find out more - for example, what percentage of the uranium shipped to the Soviet Union was being 
refined into pure metal and what percentage was being refined into pure uranium salts - the Soviet atomic 
complex itself had to be penetrated. The ratio between these two figures would show the relative importance 
attached by the Soviets to plutonium production and to uranium-235 production. 
251 Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I September 1950, DEFE 411 I 0. Its file list in DEFE 41/29 
establishes that STIB held files on at least fifty-four separate 'Objekte' (mines) in the Erzgebirge or Jachymov 
mining areas. The 'G' list of files destroyed on I April 1955 (in DEFE 41130) refers to files on fifty-five mines. 
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diameter, each holding about 50 kg of ore .... Ore assaying between 0.05% 
and 0.30% is classified as low grade ore. Characteristics of ore classified as 
high grade ore are not known to source. The low grade ore, as well as the 
high grade ore, is shipped to the USSR in sealed RR cars. No information as 
to destination or length of trains was available to source.252 
During the six years between 1947 and his flight in the autumn of 1953, Hasso Spott 
had worked as an analyst in three successive analytical laboratories in Oberschlema 
and Chemnitz. This had given him wide experience of ore analysis in the Erzgebirge; 
particularly interesting to his interrogators were the three years (1947-50) he had 
spent as an analyst in laboratories engaged in the analysis of a complete range of 
concentrates and ores, first (1947-49) in the Central Uranium Laboratory at 
Oberschlema and then (1949-50) in a laboratory at Chemnitz. This work had ceased 
in 1950 because it had been ordained, as a security measure, that no Germans could 
work in the Chemnitz laboratory in which he was then employed and he was 
transferred to another laboratory in the city, 'Chemnitz 30', which formed part of the 
Objekt 37 complex. Spott's value as a source was all the greater since, during these 
years, he had specialized to an unusual extent in the analysis of uranium ores of high 
concentration . In consequence, he was very well-informed on the ranges of 
concentration of uranium within the ore mined and could provide reliable 
intelligence.253 Spott also gave his interrogators chapter and verse on the analysis 
procedure and on laboratories and personnel engaged in the work of ore analysis.254 
There were clearly many other valuable sources among the refugees. One source, 'H-
191', gave the production targets for September 1948 of six different mines in the 
Freiberg area. Since only 60-70% of the production quota was achieved, the source 
252ST0/411DE/48, DEFE 411145. This information was evaluated as 'C-3 ' in quality (because few such refugees 
could supply documentary proof of their accounts of the workings and yield of the Erzgebirge mines, the 
intelligence taken from them did not receive the highest levels of evaluation). 
253STIB Interview Report No. 132 dated 31 October 1953 on Hasso Spott, DEFE 41 II 00. 
254STIB Interview Report No. 157 dated 27 February 1954 on Hasso Spott, DEFE 4111 01. 
86 
estimated that some 2,300 tons of active ore had been mined in that month.255 Some 
miners brought samples of uranium with them.256 Valuable intelligence was acquired 
when the 'Deputy Chief' of Wismut AG defected in mid-1950. 257 British 
Intelligence was clearly not dependent only on refugees to keep it informed on the 
mining work in the Erzgebirge. It was also able - probably with the help of refugees -
to recruit agents in Wismut AG.258 The Soviets sought to improve the security of 
their uranium-mining operations by replacing German personnel with Soviet 
workers, at least in the packing plants.259 The security measures taken eventually 
made it 'virtually impossible' to recruit agents in the Wismut AG organization.260 
But the flow of refugees continued. 
Flight of miners from the Erzgebirge was genuinely mass flight. One intelligence 
report, based on information obtained in one week (16-23 October 1948) and 
concerning mines in ten different places, sets out the intelligence which had been 
255STO/40/DE/48 (evaluation: B-2), DEFE 411145. The Jachymov mines are sometimes known by their German 
name, Joachimstal. Other reports in this file which give figures for the yield of the mines and the quality of the 
ore are STO/22/NO/48, STO/6/DE/48 and STO/25/DEl48. Reports in DEFE 411146 on the same themes are 
JSJT/STO(49)21 dated 10 January 1949, JSJT/STO(49)53, JSJT/STO(49)58 dated 8 February 1949, 
JSJT/STO(49)59 dated 16 February 1949, JSJT/STO(49)74 and JSJT/STO(49)77 dated 2 March 1949. 
Intelligence was acquired from Czechoslovak refugees of uranium mining in Czechoslovakia: e.g. 
JSJT/STO(49)44, DEFE 411146. 
256STIB Berlin Report No. 306, contained in JSJT/STO(49)73 dated 21 February 1949, DEFE 411146. 
257Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting of 7 July 1950, DEFE 4111 O. This was almost certainly the logistics 
officer at the Wismut AG, with the rank of colonel, who defected to the Americans in June 1950. He was 
codenamed ' Icarus' and his information 'greatly expanded US knowledge of the Soviet atomic program in East 
Germany' (D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Balflegrollnd Berlin , p. 15). 
258For example, a source codenamed 'Courier' passed to the British photographs of documents on uranium 
mining at Annaberg in the Erzgebirge. These documents contained estimates of the amount of exploitable ore 
present in a rich shaft of one of the mines near Annaberg (JSJT/STO(49)65 dated II February 1949, DEFE 
411146. This information was graded' A-I' because it came from photographs of documents). Photographs of 
documents provided by 'Courier' also provided the information contained in JSJT/STO(49)73 dated 21 February 
1949 (STIB Berlin Report No. 305), DEFE 411146. The next document, STIB Berlin Report No. 306, mentions 
another source in the Erzgebirge, 'H-I 05' . The Americans acquired intelligence on shipments of East German 
uranium ore from radio communications about them, made deep within the USSR, which were intercepted (D. 
Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Balflegrollnd Berlin, pp. 14-15). 
259Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 25 January 1951 , DEFE 41110. 
2600 . Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battlegrollnd Berlin , p. 15. 
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acquired from no fewer than 250 miners who had fled West. 261 A year later, the 
stream of miners had diminished considerably. One STIB document from late in 
1949 records that, 'During the three months ended 30 Sept, 36 PWX [prisoners of 
war] were called in by advisers and 22 line crossers, mainly refugees via Berlin from 
the Uranium mines arrived, having been sent to Advisers as Special Procedure 
cases' .262 
Information from fleeing miners on the amounts of uranium ore yielded by the shafts 
in which they had worked gave D.At.En. figures to work with in estimating the total 
amount of uranium ore the Soviets were obtaining from the Erzgebirge and 
Jachymov mines. Using this estimate, an estimate of the number of atomic bombs the 
Soviets could produce was made.263 By 1949, intelligence on uranium-mining in the 
Soviet Zone had convinced the Joint Committees that, 'the Russians are obtaining 
more uranium from the Erzgebirge than was previously thought possible, but the 
scale of the effort which is being applied to extract the utmost from this area, where 
the average content is relatively low, is in line with the supposition that the Russians 
have no rich deposit within their territory' .264 
261 STO/30/DE/48 , STIB Berlin Report No. 312, DEFE 411145. That such sources were then numerous is 
confirmed by a minute of a meeting of the Control Committee of Intelligence Division Headquarters in October 
1948, in which appears the note, 'Berlin had asked Brit[ish] Zone to accept refugees from the uranium mines (140 
single men, and married families to a total of 30 persons per month) and up to 18 political refugees per month . 
Although nothing resolved at the meeting, STIB shd bear in mind the need to exploit the refugee miners ' (HQ Int. 
Div. Control Committee minutes, 7 October 1948, DEFE 41178). I touched on this topic in my 1996 M. Phil. 
dissertation. 
262Note dated 28 October 1949, DEFE 41/83 . Since these sources were 'Special Procedure' cases, they were 
clearly still being interrogated very carefully. 
263Minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 6 April 1949, DEFE 41172. The Joint Committees were informed at this 
meeting that , 'the estimated number of bombs which the Russians could produce was related to the amounts of 
Uranium ore likely to be available to them. The estimates of ore were derived partly from information contained 
in pre-war geological surveys and partly from intelligence reports on the Erzgebirge and Jachymov mining areas '. 
John Prados writes at p. 22 of The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces that, 
' information on the overall tonnage of fissionable material and on the characteristics of Soviet weapons tests were 
virtually the only raw data available to American analysts'. Much of the Americans' information on the amount 
of uranium available to the Soviets will have come from reports on the Erzgebirge and Jachymov mines. 
264p. 5, Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee', DEFE 411150. Despite the amount of uranium which 
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Subsequent intelligence from the Erzgebirge established that there were uranium 
deposits in the USSR. The uranium-mining operations in the Erzgebirge formed part 
of a gigantic search for uranium conducted by the MVD throughout Eastern Europe 
and the USSR. The resulting links between relatively easy intelligence targets in East 
Germany and much harder targets further East made British Intelligence aware of 
installations in Poland and even in parts of the Soviet Union which were involved in 
the Soviet atomic project. The reports on uranium-mining in the USSR rightly 
focused on Central Asia. Two reports were received from sources in the Erzgebirge 
in mid-1950 of a 'possible concentration plant near the Tibetan border' .265 STIB also 
received word of uranium-mining in the Fergana Valley, in Uzbekistan.266 Both 
pieces of information were entirely correct. Small-scale mining operations had 
started in and around the Fergana Valley during the War.267 One of the most 
important Soviet mines, that at Taboshary, lay in this region and mining there and 
elsewhere in Central Asia was extended after the War. At the west end of the 
Fergana Valley, at Chkalovsk in Tajikistan, lay the processing plant known as 
'Combine No. 6'.268 Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan lie close to Tibet. A report was 
received that uranium was mined further south in Tajikistan, at Stalinabad. 269 STIB 
even received news of the uranium-mining being undertaken in Vladivostok. 27o The 
was being mined in the Erzgebirge, the Joint Committees declared that, ' the Russian ore supply position, as 
known at the present time, is quite inadequate to maintain two piles in operation continuously at full power' . 
265Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting of 7 July 1950, OEFE 41110. 
266Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 8 March 1951 , OEFE 411 I O. 
267T . Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssiml B011lb: Fr011l Stalin to Yeltsill, p. 8. 
2680 . Holloway, Stalin and the B011lb: the Soviet Union alld At011lic Energy 1939-56, pp. 175-6. 
269Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 24 November 1950, OEFE 41110. 
270Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 8 March 1951 , OEFE 41110. That uranium was mined near 
Vladivostok is confirmed in the introduction by C. Spiering to V. Gubarev, Arsa11las-16: WissenselIC/ftler der 
gehei11len mssischen At011lstadt brechen das Selllveigen, p. II. 
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reports received of mining in Poland were also correct, for uranium-mining began in 
Lower Silesia in 1947. 271 
Thermonuclear tests: sources from further East 
The above are examples of Germans who fled from the East to the West of their 
country at a time when such 'Republikflucht ' (to use the SED's term) was a mass 
phenomenon. But Germany was of great value as an intelligence-gathering territory 
in the 1950s not only because flight to West Germany was a simple matter, but also 
because the USSR and the DDR were increasingly closely connected, with the result 
that Soviet citizens could be found in great numbers in East Germany. As a result, 
there were extraordinary finds in the refugee streams from the DDR, who gave the 
Western intelligence services an insight into goings-on deep within the USSR itself. 
One such find was a seventy-seven-year-old retired book-keeper called Alexander 
Koch, a Volksdeutscher born in Reval in Estonia. He had a Russian wife. The two 
were in Vienna when it was taken by Soviet forces . Koch's wife, like Soviet citizens 
elsewhere in conquered Eastern Europe, was forced to return to the USSR and Koch 
went with her. In July 1945 they were sent to a Volksdeutsche community at a place 
called Mikhailovka in the Altai region, north of Kazakhstan and not far from 
Mongolia. Unwilling to remain in the USSR, they made repeated applications for 
visas to return to Germany, writing to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov and Bulganin. The 
Soviets eventually gave way, making their return conditional on their paying for their 
fare and probably thinking that the Kochs would never be able to scrape such a large 
271 Minutes of STI B Technical Meeting on I September 1950; minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 24 
November 1950, DEFE 4 1110; D. Holloway , Stalill alld the Bomb, p. 177 . 
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sum of money together. However, by selling their house and using their savings, and 
with the help of gifts of money from others in the local community, the old couple 
raised more than 3,000 rubles and made their way back to Germany in April 1956. 
Arriving in Leipzig, they at once crossed over to Hannover, using a pass already 
procured by their daughter. They brought with them a fascinating piece of 
information. Koch told his interrogator that on a day in August or September 1955, 
between 11 a.m. and 12 noon, he and his wife had been in their living-room at home 
when the house was shaken by two terrific shocks, which were followed by a 
rumbling like that of an earthquake. The residents of Mikhailovka rushed out into the 
streets, their faces blackened by soot the blast had blown from their fireplaces. Some 
of the Volksdeutsche claimed to have seen a flash or fireball sear through the sky like 
a thunderbolt. The whole community came to believe that a nuclear weapon had been 
tested at a site located some 400 kilometres to the south of Mikhailovka. 272 This is 
fascinating information, for some 210 kilometres South-south-west of Mikhailovka 
lies the nuclear testing site known as Semipalatinsk (it is in Kazakhstan, 
approximately 160 kilometres West of the city of the same name).273 It is highly 
likely that what the Volksdeutsche community witnessed was indeed a 
thermonuclear test. On 2 August 1955 a fission bomb was tested at Semipalatinsk.274 
2720LB/B/57/287 dated 22 February 1957, OEFE 411141. The same information had been received from another 
informant, who had said that Koch had also witnessed the event in question. Koch was therefore interrogated for 
corroboration. Even though he lived in Mikhailovka for almost eleven years, this was the only nuclear test Koch 
had witnessed. The bomb must therefore have been a very powerful one. Koch was unsure about the month in 
which it took place, first saying either August or September, and then plumping for mid-September. However, 
there was no such test in mid-September 1955. On 22 November 1955 the Soviet Union's first two-stage 
thermonuclear bomb, its first true hydrogen bomb and counterpart to the Americans' Teller-Ulam bomb, was 
tested at S·emipalatinsk. This was the most powerful bomb yet tested in the USSR and, given its power and 
Koch's uncertainty as to the month in which the test took place, it may be that this was the test which he 
witnessed. 
273Plate 43, The Times Atlas of the World, Comprehensive Edition. Mikhailovka, in Altaiskii Krai , lies at 
51.48N 79.45E. See Appendix A for a photocopy of Plate 43. For the location of the Semipalatinsk test site, see 
T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the RlIssiall Bomb, p. II. 
2740. Holloway, Stalill (llId the Bomb, p. 323. 
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C. Defectors 
Among the refugees coming West were sources of particular value: Soviet defectors. 
Defection was a product of the Soviet system itself, a natural consequence of the 
disaffection with Communist totalitarianism and the wretchedness of life in Stalin's 
USSR, which contrasted ill even with war-shattered Germany. There had been inter-
war cases of defection, but the number grew as soon as, in 1945, the Soviet Union 
acquired a border with the West. The Occupation of Germany brought the armies of 
the USSR and the Western Powers within sight of one another. All Soviet soldiers 
had to do was run for the lines of the Western Allies. (Some even wandered over the 
Demarcation Line by mistake and were handed back, but not until any weapons or 
equipment they had brought with them had been carefully examined.) Desertion from 
the Soviet forces thus, for the first time, could have an intelligence benefit for the 
West. Indeed, the West discovered the defector in post-war Germany. 'Defector' 
became a term of art. In the eyes of HC (London), all refugees, whether deserters or 
not, had two hurdles to jump before they qualified as defectors. They had to be 'of 
considerable intelligence value' and they had to fall within specific categories which 
it had established as being of intelligence interest. These categories, clearly, included 
scientists and high-ranking deserters from the Soviet armed forces, but not non-
commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers.275 Defection was such an important 
source of intelligence for the Western Allies that, when they came in 1952 to re-
negotiate their intelligence-gathering powers with the government of the Federal 
Republic, they insisted on the concession to them of an exclusive right to handle 
275The JIC report in which a 'defector' was defined was JIC(49) 107, which is referred to and, in part , quoted in 
the minutes of the JIC (Germany) meeting on 4 April 1950, DEFE 41/65. The report also laid down the policy of 
inducing the defection of Soviet and satell ite representatives who fell within the categories of interest. 
Unfortunately, JIC(49)107, which shou ld be in CAB 158/8, is stated in that file to have been retained by the 
Cabinet Office under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1964. 
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Soviet and Eastern European defect()rs and a prior right to interrogate 'line-crossers', 
former prisoners-of-war and refugees. The West Germans seem to have conceded 
these rights.276 
The Soviet armed forces lost a considerable number of troops through desertion in 
the late 1940s. The former CIA officer, Harry Rositzke, claims that there were well 
over five hundred defections of Soviet soldiers and civilians to the West between 
1945 and 1951.277 It was reported to the Joint Intelligence Committee (Germany) in 
August 1948 that over the previous year sixty-five Soviet deserters had passed 
through British hands, twenty of them being officers and forty-five 'Other Ranks' .278 
Until 1949, scores of Soviet troops seem to have defected to the British every year. 
The Americans received more deserters than did the British. Since the British and 
Americans exchanged intelligence acquired from deserters, this was a beneficial 
arrangement for the British.279 
The main value of deserters from the Soviet armed forces lay in the Order-of-Battle 
intelligence that they provided.280 However, they were disappointing as sources of 
276Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 12 February 1952, DEFE 41/67. The term ' line-crosser' seems to have 
had two different meanings. The first was a very general one, applying to all those (refugees, commuters or 
others) who crossed the Demarcation Line. The second was a narrow one, applying to those who lived on one 
side of the Line and yet worked on the other. In this particular case, the term must refer only to the latter type of 
informant. 
277H. Rositzke, The CIA 's Secret Operatiolls, pp. 40-1. 
278Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 24 August 1948, DEFE 41/63. 
279Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 4 April 1950, DEFE 41/65. The French seem to have received fewer 
than either, because their Zone had no border with the Soviet Zone (though their Sector of Berlin had a very sh0I1 
frontier with the Soviet Sector of the city and the Soviet Zone). 
2801n October 1948, during the blockade of Berlin, the Coordinating Committee of JIC (Germany) was informed 
that there were two main sources of intelligence on the Soviet armed forces: deserters and 'Berlin ' (which 
probably meant agent networks run from West Berlin) (minutes of meeting of JlC (Germany) Coordinating 
Committee on 26 October 1948, DEFE 41/68). Such intelligence was of great importance during the Blockade, 
for it indicated that Stalin did not intend war. For example, information was taken from many deserters in the 
latter months of 1948, which established that non-cadre units were being maintained at only 65-70% of their full 
strength, that cadre units were also not being raised to their full complement and that there were two fewer 
mechanized divisions and two fewer tank divi sions than had been believed (minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting 
on 16 November 1948, DEFE 41/63). All twenty-two Soviet divisions in East Germany were below strength and 
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technical intelligence. Soviet troops tended to be taught less about their weapons than 
British or American troops and so had less knowledge to pass on. Inevitably, they 
had to rely largely on memory. Many were not technically-minded and had therefore 
made no effort to acquire knowledge which would have interested their interrogators. 
Such men obviously had no scientific intelligence to provide.281 Nevertheless, they 
clearly gave British Intelligence an insight into the weaponry and equipment they 
had handled.282 They revealed the existence of unknown weapons or pieces of 
equipment. For example, during the War forty-nine American SCR-584 radar sets 
only fourteen of them could be operational immediately (minutes of HC (Germany) meeting on 29 March 1949, 
DEFE 41/64). Even the probable reinforcement of the cadre units early in 1949 in all likelihood only increased 
their strength to 65-70% of their war establishment. Moreover, a deserting sergeant had said that these 
reinforcements had only received three months' training before being sent to Germany, with the result that they 
could not be battle-ready until they had had at least three more months' training (minutes of HC (Germany) 
meeting on 19 April 1949, DEFE 41/64). Defectors, whether Soviet or German, provided fodder for future 
intelligence operations by naming 'candidates for desertion' (see, for example, US Intelligence Report dated 27 
October 1948, DEFE 411148). Another important source of Order-of-Battle intelligence on the Warsaw Pact were 
SIGINT units in West Germany and above all in West Berlin (e.g. the reference to the 'noise listening' activities 
of the 365 SU in West Berlin in the minutes of the DSI/JTIC meeting on 3 February 1953, DEFE 41/76). 
281 Address of Major Irwin, G(lnt)BAOR, MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126. 
282Defectors from the armies of the satellites were a source of technical intelligence which continued to flow 
after the stream of Soviet defectors had more-or-Iess stopped. By the early 1950s refugees represented the 
dominant source of intelligence coming into the hands of the British in Austria. The flow of PoWs into the British 
Zone of Austria ended in March 1951. There were very few defections from the Soviet armed forces there after 
November 1948. However, there was a thin but steady stream into the Zone of refugees escaping the Communist 
regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In 1951 , 1,776 refugees entered the British Zone of Austria; in the first 
three months of 1952, 319 did so. They provided some 90% of the technical intelligence of value collected in 
Austria. All interrogation reports were exchanged with the Americans (address by Capt. W. E. Rees, Int. Org. 
BTA, MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1953, DEFE 411 126). From this stream of refugees the 
British fished sources who had worked in armaments factories and sources who had served in the fledgling 
armies of the newly-established Communist states. The value of the first group lay in the fact that the factories in 
which they had worked manufactured weapons at the direction of the Soviets, whose control of the factories was 
so close that they actually provided many with blueprints of the weapon or piece of equipment which was to be 
put into production. It followed that the weapons they were manufacturing were seen by the Soviet High 
Command as having a role to play in the arsenal of the Warsaw Pact. An example of a weapon which was in the 
early 1950s still clearly seen as having such a role to play was the American SCR-584 radar. Refugees had 
informed their interrogators in the British Zone of Austria that the Gamma factory in Budapest had received from 
Moscow blueprints of a very similar radar apparatus, which had been put into experimental production there. As 
regards the second group, in 1951 more than fifty Hungarian refugees were interrogated on the Soviet tanks, 
howitzers, artillery pieces, small arms and other weaponry and military equipment they had handled as soldiers 
back home. The result of the interrogation of this second type of source was that by 1952 British Intelligence in 
Austria had interrogated crew members of almost every significant weapon then in service in the Soviet army. 
There was only one piece of equipment worth mentioning of which no intelligence had been gathered from this 
source: the radar of the IS-3 tank. However, it was expected that in time a source would be fished from the 
refugee stream who had served in such a tank. Exploiting these sources, British Intelligence also gained an insight 
into the armies established in such satellites as Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the armaments factories which 
supplied their needs. The 'Soviet Army Training Manual' , with which all these soldiers on the run had been 
trained, yielded valuable information on how the armies they had left were meant to fight (address by Capt. C. H. 
Hallett, Int. Org. BTA, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126). 
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had been supplied to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease. It was natural to expect 
that the Soviets had copied the apparatus (perhaps having made some changes to it). 
Intelligence was acquired from at least one defector confirming this expectation. He 
described a radar set, which he called the Malakhit, which resembled the SCR-584 
and which, it was concluded, was quite possibly the Soviet copy of the apparatus.283 
One very interesting snippet of information, acquired in 1948 from a sergeant and 
chemical warfare instructor in a heavy tank regiment called Dovorov, was that new 
filters, specially designed to protect against tabun, had been fitted to gas masks issued 
to Soviet troops. Dovorov added that training in chemical warfare had been greatly 
increased during the course of 1948, indicating that the Soviet High Command gave 
greater importance to chemical warfare. 284 Another defector, Mikhail Fileonkin, 
without prompting mentioned tabun as a standard gas and said that it was likely to be 
used in a future war.285 
Grigorii Tokaev 
Grigorii Tokaev, who defected to the British in Berlin in 1948, was an unusual 
defector.286 Unlike almost all the other Soviet defectors in Germany, he brought with 
283 Address of Capt. Harding, MIl OC, to the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126. 
284STOIIO/NO/48, DEFE 411145. 
285JSJTISTO(49)61 dated JO February 1949, DEFE 411146. 
286He was from North Ossetia and Tokaev was a Russianized version of his actual surname, Tokaty, to which he 
reverted as a citizen of this country (meeting with Professor G. A. Tokaty). He will be called Tokaev in this thesis 
because that was the name by which he was known when he was interrogated by British Intelligence. His 
codename during his debriefing and thereafter was 'Excise'. That he and 'Excise' were one and the same is clear 
from DEFE 40/25, which contains four substantial reports collectively referred to as 'Excise Reports'. These 
reports give information, much of which is taken from DEFE 21140, which is clearly Tokaev's debriefing file 
(Tokaev, rather than being named in the file, is called 'a certain source ' or ' source', but he is identifi able from 
some of the documents, above all that entitled 'Notes (from memory) of discussions with Stalin'). The 'Excise 
Reports' contained in DEFE 40/25 were considered by the JS/JTIC and must have been widely circulated, since 
they were downgraded to 'Secret' . These four 'Excise Reports ' are numbered 301148, 302/48, 303/48 and 304/48. 
These papers are much referred to in the Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, in DEFE 411160. Tokaev, therefore, was a principal source of the intelligence contained in that 
important report. The Conference's assessment of Soviet guided missile capacity (Appendix Q to the report) is 
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him, not Order-of-Battle intelligence, but scientific and technical intelligence and 
information on Soviet policy towards weapons development. 287 He was also a high-
ranking Soviet officer. High-level scientific defectors were rare and the West would 
not receive another one until Oleg Pen'kovskii, a defector-in-place who did not 
manage to take flight. Prior to Tokaev's defection, he had worked in the Air Force 
Department of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany as its chief rocket 
scientist, and was therefore responsible for the exploitation of German rocketry .288 
He was therefore well-placed to explain to his interrogators the objectives of Soviet 
exploitation of German knowhow in rocketry. Naturally, having been a leading 
engineer before and during the War at the Zhukovskii Academy in Moscow, he 
provided much useful scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence on Soviet long-range 
rocket research. 289 He influenced the Joint Committees' view of the Soviet system of 
scientific management, encouraging in them the belief that surveillance of scientists, 
examination of their work for political incorrectness and the subordination of science 
to the Party's Plan for it inhibited originality of thought in research. Tokaev 
maintained that the insistence on the need to fulfil the Plan caused scientists to play 
stated (in paragraph 2) to depend very largely on AD! (Tech.) Papers 301/48, 302/48 and 303/48. 
287There is evidence of only one other Soviet defector to the British during the years of the Occupation who 
brought with him scientific intelligence. He was codenamed 'Gong' and defected late in 1949. Though not as 
knowledgeable as Tokaev, he had worked, almost entirely on crystallography, at a number of institutes of the 
Academy of Sciences in the USSR (minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 15 November 1949, DEFE 41173). He gave 
the British their ' first indication of how the Russians had attacked their atomic energy project', for late in 1946, 
he recounted, the Institute of Physical Chemistry had been ordered to carry out special research for the First Chief 
Directorate of the Council of Ministers. He was considered 'honest, but of relatively low scientific calibre' 
(minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 21 December 1949, DEFE 41173). With such a background he was obviously 
able to pass on some scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence, but no debriefing documents are available revealing 
what he said. His real name seems to have been Balashov (minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 15 March 1950, DEFE 
41174). 
28~okaev ' s career is summarized in an introduction (at p. 335) to an article by Tokaev in Space/ligh" Vol. 10, 
No. I 0 (October 1968), pp. 335-46. It is noteworthy that his career benefited greatly from Stalin 's purges. In July 
1938, when in his late twenties, after only nine years of formal education, Tokaev became Head of the Laboratory 
of Aerodynamics of the Zhukovskii Academy in Moscow. This was an important job and gave him close working 
relations with the aircraft industry and the USSR's principal aeronautical research and development 
establishments, such as the Central Hydro- and Aerodynamics Institute (TsAGI) and the Flight Testing Institute 
of the Air Force. In June 1945 he was sent to Germany to work for the SMAG's Air Force Department. 
289Debriefing note dated 9 December 1947 and entitled 'Russian Long-range Rocket Research', DEFE 21/40. 
The date, '9 December 1947' , must be a mistake, for Tokaev did not defect until 1948. This document was 
probably created on 9 December 1948 and records a debriefing interrogation of that date. 
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safe and keep the tasks allotted to them within the bounds of what they knew to be 
achievable. Sometimes they even withheld publication of research results so as to 
avoid being given further tasks.290 This was a theme which would be taken up by 
later intelligence. Tokaev also presented the police-harassed scientists of the Soviet 
Union as nervous wrecks. This was supported by another source (probably a British 
scientist who had worked in the USSR before 1945), who thought that the conditions 
in which they had to work reduced Soviet scientists' efficiency by some 50%. 
Influenced to some extent by Tokaev, the Joint Committees concluded in 1949 that: 
It seems certain ... that the scientific potential of the USSR, though immense 
in numbers, is in fact less formidable than it appears. It is perhaps a 
reasonable further deduction that, while much competent and original work is 
being and will continue to be done, Soviet scientists are unlikely to rise to the 
greatest heights of scientific thought and imagination, from which the major 
advances in human knowledge proceed. 291 
Tokaev was able to give British Intelligence some insight into the thinking behind 
the arms build-up ordered by the Soviet leadership. But from Berlin he had had a 
poor view of its intentions. As his responsibilities had been confined to Germany he 
was, crucially, unable to give his interrogators a telling insight into development 
work in the USSR itself or the policy behind it. This was the key flaw in the 
intelligence he provided. As far as it went, the information acquired from him on 
Soviet intentions was accurate. But it did not go far enough. This weakness was 
perceived by his interrogators, who described Tokaev's views of Soviet intentions as, 
'An unconfirmed opinion by a moderately well placed source as to the actual policy 
of the Politburo. This opinion ... is almost certainly incomplete, but is probably 
290p. 32, Annex to JSIJTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee', DEFE 41/150. 
291p. 34, Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' , DEFE 41/150. 
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accurate on a broad basis as far as it goes' .292 Nevertheless, he was the only source 
they had on the aims of Soviet guided missile development and, naturally, the 
intelligence taken from him was highly influential. In fact, he gave the British and 
Americans a distorted picture of Soviet intentions, one which greatly exaggerated the 
role that the German wartime missiles would play in the Soviet Union's policy 
towards rocketry. They foresaw that this might be the case, qualifying their forecasts 
with the words, 'the method of approach is indirect, speculative, and inherently liable 
to gross error, and its unsatisfactory nature is fully realised' .293 In addition to being 
obviously incomplete, his information suffered from two further weaknesses which 
caused it to be given a 'B' rating by his interrogators. First, some of it was not 
derived from his own experience, but had been passed on to him by others. Secondly, 
much of the information he provided was unconfirmed (indeed, some of it actually 
conflicted with intelligence already acquired).294 
Tokaev confirmed that a transformation of Soviet armaments had been launched. The 
War had shown the Soviet leadership the superiority of German aeroplanes and 
modern aircraft were to be put into service fast. 295 In 1946 a Long-Range Air Force 
had been created at the order of the Politburo itself, which therefore evidently aimed 
at the strategic use of large bombers. This air force became an important intelligence 
292paragraph 4(c), Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
293Paragraph 3, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
294-rhis assessment of the value of Tokaev' s intelligence is given in paragraph 5 of Paper 304/48, DEFE 40/25. 
However, he was still an influential source and was much prized by British Scientific Intelligence. Professor R. 
V. Jones remembered him well, even though he had not been in government service when Tokaev defected 
(interview with Professor Jones on 7 May 1996). He only returned to government service when he became 
Director of Scientific Intelligence in 1952. Moreover, as an important official of the SMAG, Tokaev had read 
high-level documents and informed his interrogators of the contents of some (for example, the minutes of a 
meeting of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party on 5 August 1947, which is one of the documents in a 
DSr file, DEFE 21/40, of information provided by Tokaev). 
295Paper 304/48 entitled, 'USSR - Notes on Aircraft Design and Production', DEFE 40/25. 
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target (by 1953 the Soviets had deployed approximately 1,000 of their copy of the B-
29, the Tu-4, and were manufacturing between ten and twenty-five a month).296 
Furthermore, the Soviet leadership was giving close attention to long-range missiles. 
The Soviet Union had carried out no development work on guided missiles until its 
forces overran the missile development and production facilities of Eastern Germany. 
There it found striking evidence of the superiority of German military technology. 
The Soviet leadership's overriding aim was to acquire such technology fast. Its 
emphasis on speed was partly motivated by the foreign policy imperative of being as 
strong as possible and partly by the propaganda value of putting such weapons 
quickly into service. Very influentially, Tokaev maintained that the immediate Soviet 
aim was to make, as quickly as possible, a Soviet version of the V-2 which was more 
accurate than the original German weapon. This accorded with the JIC's prediction 
in 1947.297 Concurrently, longer-term research was to proceed, with the aim of 
creating a guided rocket, probably winged, with a very much longer range. 298 Basing 
its conclusion to a significant extent on the intelligence Tokaev had provided, a Joint 
Anglo-American Conference consisting of four British and four American 
intelligence officers concluded in March 1949 that these were the aims of Soviet 
development of surface-to-surface missiles. 299 Tokaev's interrogator quoted him as 
saying that: 
296J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 39-40. 
297paragraph 66, JIC(47)7/2 Final dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and 
Capabilities', CAB 158/1. 
298Debriefing note dated 9 December 1947 and entitled 'Russian Long-range Rocket Research', DEFE 21/40. 
299paragraphs 3-4, Summary, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 411160. This report is based on consideration of four main sources of intelligence: the 
information provided by Tokaev; penetration of Soviet projects and activities in East Germany; reports of former 
prisoners-of-war on what they had observed when engaged in reconstruction work in the USSR; and intercepted 
letters sent by Germans in the Soviet Union. This constituted almost all the available intelligence on what was, or 
might be, happening in that country. To it the Conference members added their consideration of the resources 
available to the Soviet guided missiles programme. 
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The immediate aim of the Soviets is to get a selection of reasonably effective 
guided weapons into service as soon as possible .... To this end they are 
prepared to accept relatively unsatisfactory weapons which are available to-
day, rather than to wait for greatly improved designs which may not be ready 
for many years. 
The only way in which the Soviets could achieve this aim was by exploiting 
German weapons which were in operation or in an advanced stage of 
development at the end of the war. ... However, anxious as the Soviets were 
to achieve quick results, they did not consider that either of these weapons 
was acceptable as it stood, and they accordingly planned a development 
programme aimed at making such improvements to accuracy and range as 
would be possible in a relatively short time. Source is most insistent that the 
Soviets will go for modifications which show some improvement and can be 
achieved quickly rather than for those which promise the greatest dividends 
in theory. 
The Soviets also intend to carry out long-term research concurrently with the 
programme of immediate development. 3OO 
British and American intelligence analysts adopted this explanation of Soviet missile 
development policy, because it was consistent with their intelligence of Soviet 
exploitation of German missile knowhow and they had no other intelligence of 
Soviet intentions. 301 Nevertheless, Tokaev's knowledge was limited and he sent 
them down the wrong track. Although the manufacture of an improved V -2 was an 
immediate aim, it was not the Soviet leadership's main aim. This was that Soviet 
missile designers should make long-range missiles to defend the USSR against the 
new 'Glavnyi Protivnik' (Main Adversary), the USA. The development of long-
range missiles was the main aim of the plan for rocket development prepared at the 
end of 1946. Sergei Korolev, the leading Soviet missile designer, told his design 
team in March 1947 that they had been instructed to develop missiles 'with a range 
many times greater' than that of the V -2 (the maximum range of which was 
300Paragraphs 11-12. Appendix Q. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference. DEFE 411160. 
301 Paragraphs 12-13. Appendix Q. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference. DEFE 411160. 
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300 kilometres). Set such a demanding task, Korolev planned to explore novel 
designs - precisely what Tokaev had said Soviet missile designers would not do. 302 
It was natural that Tokaev should stress Soviet determination to develop the guided 
missiles they had found in Germany, since his post-war work had been concerned 
entirely with the exploitation of German knowhow. That was, of course, the only 
reason he was able to defect to the West at all. Nevertheless, the narrowness of the 
perspective he had been allowed on Soviet missile development meant that he could 
not reveal how high was the priority given to the acquisition of 'transatlantic' 
missiles (as Stalin called them) nor how quickly Soviet designers had been instructed 
to make them. All he could give the British was an indication that Stalin was seeking 
to develop long-range missiles to threaten the West, and above all the United States. 
Tokaev thus did make British Intelligence aware of the strategic importance of 
rocketry to the Soviet leadership as a means of offsetting American possession of 
strategic air power and the atomic bomb. Showing his interrogators how great were 
his former masters' ambitions, Tokaev told them of the matter he had been involved 
in which had most interested the Soviet leadership. In 1945 he and other Soviet 
engineers had discovered in Germany notes made by a scientist called Eugen Sanger 
for a supersonic, long-range, very-high-altitude, rocket-boosted bomber. Sanger had 
called his design the 'antipodal bomber' and, rather like the Space Shuttle today, it 
was a cross between a missile and an aeroplane. It had two rocket engines. Unlike the 
Space Shuttle's rockets, neither became detached from the craft in flight. A set of 
rocket boosters, with 1,345,000 pounds of thrust, took it out of the earth's 
atmosphere at 1,000 miles per hour. Unlike the Space Shuttle, it took off 
horizontally, travelling along a slightly-inclined ramp some three kilometres long. 
302D. Holloway, Stalill alld the BOII/b, pp. 246-7. 
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The bomber's own rocket engine, with 220,000 pounds of thrust, then powered it, at 
13,700 miles per hour, to its targets, which Stalin doubtless envisaged as being the 
cities of the United States. It would then drop its bomb load of six tons. The whole 
raid would take eighty minutes. 303 The Kremlin was very interested in this discovery, 
but Tokaev regarded the idea as 'semi-Utopian'. In a meeting with Malenkov and 
others in April 1947, it was made clear to him that the project was of interest to the 
Soviet leadership because it would give the USSR a weapon with which it could 
strike the United States. This meeting led to another the following day, this time with 
Stalin himself. According to Tokaev, Stalin bemoaned the loss of leading German 
scientists to the Western Allies, exclaiming, 'You see what we get. We smashed 
Germany but Von Braun, Lippisch, Sanger, Tank and many others are with the 
British, Americans and French. We must take the matter of specialists up seriously. 
Comrade [General Ivan] Serov, we need people who can create such aircraft as 
Sanger's. We shall then find it easier to talk to Mr. Truman and Mr. Bevin' .304 
British policy-makers will have taken particular note of Tokaev's portrayal of Stalin 
because they had come by no intelligence on Stalin's thinking on missiles from other 
sources. Stalin insisted that the construction of a rocket plane according to Sanger's 
design should be an 'immediate objective'. 305 According to Tokaev, Stalin even 
authorized from Moscow the kidnapping of German scientists whose knowledge he 
considered particularly valuable, such as the aeronautical engineer Kurt Tank. The 
303The technical details of the bomber are taken from W. von Braun & F. I. Ordway 1II , History of Rocketry alld 
Space Travel, p. 119, and F. I. Ordway 1II & M. R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team, p. 329. According to Wernher von 
Braun and Frederick Ordway, the idea stimulated other rocket development projects in both the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 
304Paragraph 60, 'Notes (from memory) of discussions with Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Voznesensky, 
Vershinin, Yakovlev, Mikoyan and other officials in the Kremlin in April 1947 and also with SVAG', DEFE 
2 1/40. He tells the same story in his book, Stalill Mealls War, pp. 116-17. Books published in the USSR in the 
1980s confirm that meetings on rocketry were held in the Kremlin in April 1947 (D . Holloway, Stalill alld the 
Bomb, p. 423 , note 183). I discussed Tokaev's defection and his information on Stalin ' s attitude to Sanger's 
'antipodal bomber' project in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation. 
305G. A. Tokaev, Stalill Mealls War, p. 115. 
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affair was an indication of the importance of long-range missiles to Stalin, but 
Tokaev, as an official in Germany charged only with briefing the dictator and his 
underlings on this one particular 'semi-Utopian' design, could not divine how else 
they planned to strike the United States. More fundamentally, he did not know what 
priority intercontinental missiles had been given in the plan for rocket development 
which had, in fact, been drawn up at the end of 1946. He does not seem to have been 
aware of the plan at all. 
He provided scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence on places of great interest. He 
named installations engaged in the design and manufacture of aircraft. He identified 
the leading centre, in Leningrad, for the production of gyros for missile guidance. It 
was he who first indicated to the British the approximate location of the great guided 
missile testing site, Kapustin Yar, which lies on the steppes beyond the Volga, some 
seventy-five miles east of Stalingrad.306 Tokaev had only heard that a testing site had 
been established, and could not give its precise location, but believed that it lay 'in 
the lower Volga area between Stalingrad and Astrakhan'. This information was 
consistent with reports that a convoy of Wasserfall equipment had been sent by road 
from Germany to a place north-east of Stalingrad and with a remark to Tokaev of a 
Major Baurov, who had supervised the despatch of V -2 transportation trains and 
Wasserfall equipment to the USSR, that he had been posted to a rocket range in the 
region of the Volga. Such a choice also made sense: this region had good railway and 
water links with the main industrial areas of the USSR, while to the east of it lay 
desert and the Caspian Sea, constituting a suitable wilderness for test-firing. 307 
306F. I. Ordway III & M. R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team, p. 331. 
307Paragraph 43, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. Baurov was reported by another source to have said that 'the Wasserfall convoy "and 
the missiles" [sic] were to rendezvous NE of Stalingrad' (paragraph 41, Appendix I to the Study). Tokaev 
suggested that the base from which missiles were test-fired was called Nikolskoe (see Appendix N of the Study). 
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The scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence Tokaev provided allowed the British-
American conference to estimate the rate of Soviet guided missile development. For 
he was their principal source on the facilities and resources available to Soviet 
missiles projects, which would act as constraints on them. To make rapid progress, 
the Soviet programmes would need a generous allocation of highly-skilled scientific 
and technical manpower; research and test facilities, such as supersonic wind 
tunnels; development facilities, such as measuring equipment and test sites; and 
industrial support sufficient to provide the projects with large quantities of precision-
manufactured equipment, including all the components of the missiles designed 
(unless these components were obtained from abroad). With regard to each of these 
factors, Tokaev provided intelligence of constraints which would hold Soviet 
missiles projects back. He rightly said that guided missile research enjoyed a high 
priority and that skilled manpower had therefore been transferred to it from general 
aeronautical research. But he indicated that these people retained their previous jobs, 
which would limit the amount of time they could devote to their new 
responsibilities. 308 Anyway, the USSR suffered from a shortage of engineers 
experienced in missile development. The highly bureaucratic nature of the Soviet 
system of management of science would prevent missiles projects from making 
quick progress; Tokaev was an early source of information on structural weaknesses 
It should be noted that this was a report written by both British and American representatives at the beginning of 
1949. It therefore follows that the Americans had access to Tokaev's information on the testing site, as well as to 
later ' Dragon Return ' intelligence on Kapustin Yar. Consequently, the account of how the Americans found out 
where Kapustin Yar was which is given by Jeffrey Richelson at p. 139 of his American Espionage and the Soviet 
Target and which puts the identification of the site down to the interception of telemetry signals from the area late 
in 1954 must be wrong. Further evidence of this is given in Chapters 5 and 6. J. Schecter & P. Deriabin assert at 
p. 70 of Th e Spy Who Saved the World: How A Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War that in 1961 
Oleg Pen ' kovskii identified Kapustin Yar as an important mi ssile testing site. This in formation came more than 
twelve years after first word of the site. 
308Paragraph 17, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
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in the Soviet system. Strict security measures would hinder the exchange of ideas 
between research workers in different institutes. The leading engineers would have to 
work in the morale-sapping conditions of strict secret police surveillance, with the 
ever-present risk of arrest for 'sabotage' if they failed to meet the planned targets for 
their projects. In general, the view of the British-American conference, derived in 
part from Tokaev ' s information, was that it was in the nature of Soviet research to 
proceed less quickly than counterpart Western research.309 As these men put it, ' ... 
the cumulative effect of these adverse factors cannot be ignored, and it suggests that 
man for man the output of Soviet research is likely to be somewhat below that of 
Western countries'.310 However, it was thought important not to be too smug and so 
the conference concluded more cautiously that, 'in general, considering the personnel 
situation only, the rate of Soviet progress is unlikely to exceed that of the West on an 
over-all basis'. 311 
Supersonic wind tunnels were essential to guided missile development; Tokaev told 
his interrogators that the USSR suffered from a severe lack of them.312 Such 
intelligence as there was on other essential equipment, such as large digital 
computers, indicated that in the years immediately after the War the Soviets were far 
behind the West. They were probably trying to catch up in these fields, but that 
would take time. It was therefore 'unlikely that the USSR is in a good position to 
undertake the design of radically new missiles at the present moment' .313 Just as 
309Paragraphs 20-4, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/1 60. 
3lOParagraph 23, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
31 I Paragraph 24, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
312Paragraph 27, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
313Paragraph 34, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
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crucial to progress was a testing site and measuring equipment to record the 
behaviour of the missile from launch to impact. Tokaev believed that small-scale 
test-firing had begun at the range in the lower Volga region in the summer of 1947. 
He was probably right: the first important set of test-firings was held there in October 
and November 1947. (Significantly, among those who test-fired the missiles and 
observed the tests were German rocket engineers deported to the Soviet Union in 
Operation 'Osoaviakhim' who would later return to Germany.314) The British-
American conference concluded that neither the test installations there nor the staff 
operating them could, as at March 1949, have reached the standard of efficiency 
attained at Peenemtinde. The Soviets might reach that standard later in 1949, but 
until they did the testing staff and range could only give limited support to the project 
of which they formed an essential part. 315 As far as industrial support for the 
programme was concerned, Soviet backwardness in the manufacture of valves meant 
that large-scale aircraft, ground radar and guided missiles development projects 
could not be concurrently sustained. 316 
Influenced by these considerations, the conference underestimated the speed of 
Soviet missile development. It suggested that an improved version of the V -2, with a 
range of 500 kilometres, might be ready for pilot production by 1952, at the 
earliest. 317 In fact, the R-l, which was just such a rocket, went into service with the 
Soviet Army in 1950, and the R-2, which had a range of 600 kilometres, was put into 
Conference. OEFE 411160. 
3140 . Holloway. Stalin and the Bomb. p. 247; F. 1. Ordway III & M. R. Sharpe. The Rocket Team. p. 331; N. 
Naimark. Th e Russians in GerJ/lan)'. p. 227. 
315Paragraph 49. Appendix Q. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference. OEFE 411160. 
316Paragraph 54. Appendix Q. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference. OEFE 411160. 
317paragraph 72. Appendix Q. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference. OEFE 411160. 
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service in 1951.318 The British and Americans considered that the longer-range, 
winged version of the V -2, the A-4b, could not be put into service until 1955, since 
its development demanded wind-tunnel facilities which did not exist in the USSR in 
19:1-7.319 Again, this was a grave underestimation of Sergei Korolev's abilities, for 
his R-5 missile went into service in 1953. Its design was strikingly different from the 
German wartime missiles and its range was four times that of the V -2. 320 
Valuable source though he was, Tokaev's information misled British and American 
analysts, because it was incomplete and they could supplement it with little other 
intelligence. PoWs allowed an idea of the function and production of only a very few 
installations connected with missile development to be guessed at and they were 
withdrawn from these experimental factories in mid-1948. In addition to them, 
intelligence analysts had only their knowledge of German achievements in rocketry 
and substantial information on Soviet exploitation of German knowhow and 
equipment. In short, in the spring of 1949 the British and Americans had available to 
them sources on Soviet rocketry which were inadequate both in quality and quantity. 
Moreover, their sources of information were waning. 321 
The enticement of defection 
Tokaev's defection made British Scientific Intelligence aware of the potential 
intelligence value of defectors and stimulated interest in enticing the defection of 
3180 . Holloway, Stalill (llld the Bomb, p. 248. 
319Paragraph 74, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, OEFE 411160. 
3200 . Holloway, Stalill (llld the Bomb, p. 249. 
321Paragraph 68, Appendix Q, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, OEFE 41/160. 
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Soviet officials. It had an immedi.ate impact on the gathering of intelligence on 
Soviet rocket development. It can be no coincidence that in May 1949, not long after 
Tokaev's defection, the Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee stated in a report on 
the study of the Soviet missile development project that, 'since the best information 
on Russian policy and intentions is likely to be obtained from defectors, a special 
brief should be prepared on individuals or types whose defection would be 
particularly valuable'. 322 Indeed, in a number of fields it seemed likely that enticing 
defections offered the best prospects of coming by information on the progress of 
Soviet war-related development projects. Up until that time, all the Soviet defectors 
who had come over to the British had done so entirely unprompted and a relatively 
small number of them had given intelligence which compared very well with that 
acquired from other sources.323 
British policy towards defection, which was coordinated with that of the 
Americans324, focused on the acquisition of scientific and Order-of-Battle 
intelligence (that is to say, information on the Soviet Union's current and future 
military strength). Two groups of 'foreign nationals' were targeted by MI6 in 
Germany with a view to inducing them to defect: scientists and 'high-grade Service 
defectors' .325 There was particular interest in Soviet scientists holding important 
322JS/JTIC(49)43 dated 16 May 1949, DEFE 411150. 
32J.rCS/441 dated 6 September 1949 from A. Lang-Brown (TCS) to R. D. Neville (JS/JTIC) , DEFE 40/26. 
324Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 22 January 1952, DEFE 41167. 
325Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 5 October 1948, DEFE 41163. It should be noted that efforts to entice 
Soviet scientists to defect were not confined to Germany. The minutes of the JSIJTIC meeting on 21 December 
1949 (DEFE 41173) record a discussion about whether the JSIJTIC should recommend to the JIC that Soviet 
scientists be allowed to attend a conference at Reading University. Allowing them to attend the conference 
obviously involved a security risk. The JSIJTIC had already given its view to the JIC that the intelligence benefits 
of allowing the visit were balanced by the security risks; therefore, it thought that no action should be taken to 
encourage or discourage the visit. The chief of the Royal Navy ' s scientific intelligence section, George Turney, 
criticized this stance, arguing that the need for defectors was so great that it outweighed the security risks. The 
JSIJTIC should therefore recommend that the Soviet scientists be allowed to attend. The discussion shows that 
the JSIJTIC then 'attached the utmost importance to getting scientific defectors ' (Dr. J. Lees) . Turney ' s view that 
Soviet scientists should be encouraged to come to Britain, without it becoming obvious to them that the hand of 
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positions in East German industry ancl. science. There were a number of such people, 
working, for example, as factory directors or in research institutes, and they would 
obviously be able to provide intelligence not only on projects underway in East 
Germ~ny, but also on Soviet research and development.326 MI6 coordinated such 
attempts to encourage defection. JIC (London) had adopted a policy of inducing 
defection by September 1948; at any rate, it was in that month that JIC (Germany) 
considered a paper from JIC (London) stating the categories of 'foreign nationals' 
who should be encouraged to defect. This may have been in response to Grigorii 
Tokaev's defection, which showed that even high-ranking Soviet officials might 
defect. A Working Party charged with considering how Soviet Bloc representatives 
might be induced to defect seems to have been set up at the same time. 327 A little 
later, JIC (London) gave authorization for such operations to proceed. 328 
Much of the work of the Western intelligence services in Germany between 1945 and 
1961 consisted simply of stimulating the flow of people into West Germany from the 
East. 329 The Americans sought to stimulate defection for the same reasons as the 
British. By the early 1950s the CIA acquired more information on the Soviet regime 
from Soviets who defected of their own accord than from any other source. 330 The 
natural response of the Soviet authorities in Germany was to take stricter security 
measures to stop the flow. As relations between the superpowers worsened as a result 
British Intelligence was behind the invitations, triumphed the following month. The JSIJTIC agreed that a 
recommendation should be sent to the JIC that a welcoming mat should be (subtly) laid out for Soviet scientists 
with a view to encouraging defection (minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on II January 1950, DEFE 41/74). 
326David Evans, Director of STIB , minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 17 April 1952, DEFE 41/67. 
327Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 24 September 1948, DEFE 4 1/63. 
328Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 5 October 1948, DEFE 41/63. 
329J[C (Germany) warmly approved of Article 16(2) of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic, 
which guaranteed asylum to all political refugees, on the ground that it encouraged Soviet Bloc representatives to 
defect (minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 23 October 1951, DEFE 41/66). 
330D. Murphy , S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Balliegrolilld Berlill , p. 238. 
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of the Berlin Blockade and the Koryan War, the CIA adopted a policy of enticing the 
defection of Soviet citizens, wherever in the world they might be. The operation was 
codenamed 'Redcap' and it had two prongs. The targeted Soviet would be asked to 
bec.ome an agent-in-place; only if he refused and insisted that he come West would 
the CIA help him defect. West Berlin was the great base from which defection 
operations were conducted. The Americans' position in the city was very valuable to 
this operation, since a mighty Soviet army was close by. Like the British, the CIA's 
Berlin Operations Base targeted scientists in East Germany (including atomic 
scientists)331, soldiers in all the main Soviet garrison areas, officials of the Soviet 
Control Commission332 and prominent intelligence officers such as Boris Nalivaiko. 
Nalivaiko had between 1947 and 1948 been deputy chief of the integrated Soviet 
Intelligence residency in Berlin (the Committee of Information residency) and had 
come to American notice as a possible defector because he claimed to have bought 
lots of Western securities. Indeed, he maintained that he had accumulated 
investments worth DM 80,000. A man so fond of money could not be happy in the 
Soviet Union and was naturally targeted for enticement to defect in 1955. However, 
he reported the approach to the KGB and the attempt to invite him to come over to 
the West ended in fiasco. 333 
The interrogation of refugees yielded the names of people in the DDR with access to 
Soviet citizens. The people named were almost always women who had some kind of 
liaison with a Soviet soldier. The women were generally prostitutes. They would 
331 0. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 255. 
3320. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 242. 
3330. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 249-51 . 
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then be invited to visit West Berlin. The Soviet response was predictable: their 
people were warned to keep clear of Germans of all kinds.334 
Shortly after British Intelligence adopted a policy of enticing the defection of 
specific and particularly valuable types of informant, it was forced into a general 
effort to entice Soviet soldiers to come over to the West. The hostility between East 
and West and the universal feeling that war might be near brought about by the 
Berlin Blockade caused the number of defections to the West from the Soviet armed 
forces to fall sharply. This decline began during the crisis and continued thereafter. 
By the beginning of 1949 it was obvious to the British that the crisis had greatly 
reduced the number of defections to them. 335 There was a fitful trickle of deserters in 
the spring and early summer of 1949. December 1949 was the first month in a period 
of two-and-a-half years in which not a single defection to the British Zone from the 
Soviet armed forces took place. 336 No defectors came over in the following two 
months either. 337 The position was the same in Austria. At the MIl 0 Technical 
Intelligence Conference of June 1952, it was reported that there had been only two 
defections from the Soviet army to the British Zone of Austria since November 
1948.338 The decline in defections left the British badly lacking intelligence of the 
troop strength of Soviet units339 and, presumably, technical intelligence. 
3340. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battiegrolllld Berlill , p. 239. 
335Minutes of JIC(Germany) meeting on 14 February 1949, OEFE 41/64. [n the minutes of the JlC (Germany) 
meeting on 4 March 1949 it was reported that there had been no desertions in the period since the previous 
meeting on 14 February; at the meeting on 10 May 1949 it was again reported that no desertions had taken place 
in the period since the previous meeting on 19 April (OEFE 41/64). According to a retired CIA interrogator who 
was working at that time at Camp King in Oberursel, the position was the same in the American Zone of 
Germany. The number of defectors from the intelligence services of the Soviet Bloc countries declined in the 
spring of 1948 to a rate of fewer than one a month. In the previous year, three such people, on average, had 
defected each month. This must have been connected with the intensifying blockade of Berlin, the first phase of 
which began in April 1948 (p. 212, A. Silver, 'Questions, Questions, Questions: Memories ofOberursel', 
Illtelligellce & Natiollal Secllrity , Vol. 8, No.2 (April 1993), pp. 199-213). 
336Minutes of J[C (Germany) meeting on 10 January 1950, OEFE 41/65. 
337Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 21 February 1950, OEFE 41/65. 
338Address by Capt. C. H. Hallett, [nt. Org. BTA, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, OEFE 
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The British reacted by trying to stimulate a flow of deserters from the Soviet forces 
in East Germany. They made use of one simple tool above all in doing so: radio. 
From 1949 the BBe stressed in its broadcasts to Germany that deserters from the 
Soviet armed forces who sought political asylum in the British Zone of Occupation 
would not be handed back, and people who had already deserted broadcast an 
approving view of life in Britain to their former comrades in the Soviet Zone.340 At 
one stage, broadcasts by Soviet defectors were going out at the rate of two a week.341 
The Russian Service of the BBe carried similar programmes for the benefit of any 
Soviet soldier in Germany who tuned into them.342 Deserters who had fled to the 
American Zone were lent to the British so that they could provide further material for 
the propaganda campaign. 343 Such broadcasts were intended flatly to contradict the 
Soviet propaganda then current, which was directed at their own people and put 
about the lie that the Western Allies handed back all Soviet citizens who deserted to 
their Zones. The BBC's programmes were relayed by Nordwest Deutscher Rundfunk 
and an Austrian radio network. The BBe even agreed to put together, twice a year, a 
pocket-sized Russian edition of its magazine, 'The Listener', which would present its 
best broadcasts. Those by defectors would feature prominently .344 This publication 
was put on sale in Berlin, Brussels, Paris and Ankara, and it was naturally hoped that 
it would find its way to the DDR. But the British propaganda campaign, managed by 
the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office and waged from 
411126. 
339Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 10 January 1950, DEFE 41/65. 
340Minutes of JIC(Germany) meeting on 18 October 1949, DEFE 41/64; minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 
10 January 1950; minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 17 July 1950, DEFE 41/65. 
341 Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 10 May 1950, DEFE 41/65. 
342Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 18 October 1949, DEFE 41/64. 
343Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 14 March 1950, DEFE41/65. 
344Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 25 April 1950, DEFE 41/65. 
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the early summer of 1949, made .use of all possible channels to put the message 
across. A publicity campaign was conducted in the press. Journalists closely involved 
with the IRD turned interviews with deserters into articles publicizing the policy of 
asylum. Articles on the theme were placed in the West German, Dutch and 
Scandinavian press, although the West German press was very reluctant to serve as a 
British propaganda organ in this respect. 345 That the British did not hand back 
deserters was made known throughout the Soviet Zone by means of the clandestine 
distribution there of pamphlets in Russian and the despatch of letters to particular 
people there.346 At the time almost no Soviet troops were deserting to the British at 
all,347 It soon became obvious that these broadcasts were having little effect. The 
importance of the operation was such that the British persisted with it despite 
consistent disappointment. 348 Pressure to entice desertions came from the High 
Commissioner himself. 349 Naturally, the Soviets took counter-measures to stop 
desertion.350 The British stepped up their campaign. On 1 September 1952 the BBC 
began to transmit a service in Russian to the Soviet Zone351 and even more leaflets 
than before, directly inciting Soviet soldiers to desert, were covertly distributed in the 
DDR. Despite such special measures, the period of the operation had by this time 
seen only a handful of defectors, most of whom returned to the USSR, and was 
abandoned. 352 Examination of the cases of defection showed that the majority had 
345Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 10 January 1950, DEFE 41/65. That the West German press was 
reluctant to accept articles on deserters is mentioned in the minutes of the meeting of JlC (Germany) on 17 July 
1950, DEFE41/65. 
346Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 10 May 1949, DEFE 41/64. 
347Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 9 August 1949, DEFE 41/64. The same theme is repeated in 
subsequent minutes, such as those of the meeting on 30 August (DEFE 41164) and those of the meeting on 19 
September 1950 (DEFE 41/65). 
348See, for example, minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 22 January 1952, DEFE 41/67. 
349Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 23 January 195 I, DEFE 41166. 
350Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 17 April 1951, DEFE 41/66. 
351 Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 2 I October 1952, DEFE 41/67. 
352Interview on 7 September 1997 with Sir Peter Wilkinson, former deputy head of the Information Research 
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only come over because they were in some kind of trouble. 353 However, secret 
approaches to high-grade sources - scientists and army and KGB officers - continued. 
D. Brixmis 
The Soviet Union and, indeed, most of the countries of the Soviet Bloc were very 
difficult to penetrate. The intelligence services of Britain and the United States 
therefore had to make use of such intelligence assets as they had behind the Iron 
Curtain . In most of these countries, this meant making military, naval and air 
attaches as effective as possible in their snooping for information. The special status 
of Germany as an occupied country gave each of the Occupiers a further asset there: 
the liaison staffs each maintained with the other Powers. The London Agreement of 
November 1944 provided that, as part of the arrangements for Allied government, 
each commander-in-chief in Germany would 'have attached to him military , naval 
and air representatives of the two [later three, when France signed the agreement] 
other commanders-in-chief for liaison duties' .354 The British and the Soviets put this 
agreement into effect in the autumn of 1946 in a liaison agreement concluded by the 
British Deputy Military Governor, Lt-Gen. Robertson, and Col-Gen. Malinin. 
Crucially, the Robertson-Malinin agreement recognized the right of the liaison staffs 
to travel around the Zone in question (with the exception of certain restricted areas). 
The British Mission (known as Brixmis) maintained a base in Potsdam, in Soviet-
held territory, from which journeys through East Germany were made. The Soviet 
Mission (Soxmis) made its home in Bunde.355 Although officially responsible for 
Department of the Foreign Office. 
353Minutes of JIe (Germany) meeting on 21 October 1952, DEFE 41/67. 
35"'r. Geraghty, Beyond the Frontline: The Untold E\ploits of Britain 's Most Daring Cold War Spy Mission , p. 
5, citing Article 2 of the Agreement. 
355r. Geraghty, Beyond the Frontline, p. 9. 
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liaison, the main work of both. these Missions (and those of the French and 
Americans) was intelligence-gathering. Brixmis gathered intelligence of Soviet 
weaponry, troop movements and army strength by driving around as much of East 
Germany as it was allowed to 'tour' , as the phrase went; the Soviets did the same in 
the British Zone, but went even further and ran agents from the Mission premises as 
well,356 Brixmis was an active intelligence-gathering unit until its dissolution in 
December 1990. By the early 1950s, it was the only accredited British military unit 
operating behind the Iron Curtain. What distinguished it from the military and other 
attaches in the various Soviet Bloc states was that it had considerable freedom of 
movement, albeit that its tours of East Germany took place under continual MfS and 
Soviet surveillance and harassment. Brixmis even had aircraft with which to overfly, 
or fly near, military targets; excellent photographs were taken of such targets. Under 
the Potsdam Agreement, the Mission's planes were permitted to fly in the air zone of 
Berlin itself and anywhere beyond it within a radius of twenty miles. This area 
contained a considerable showing of Soviet military force . Occasional careful 
trespassing beyond this permitted area on to the DDR's airspace yielded photographs 
of value. On one occasion, in 1959, after attempts to photograph the radar directing a 
new surface-to-air missile system from the ground had failed , one of the Mission ' s 
Chipmunks overflew the SAM site. The resulting photographs made known to Air 
Intelligence the capability of the missile system. Copies of the photographs were 
passed to the Americans and Brixmis was told that they were on President 
Eisenhower's desk within a week of being taken.357 By 1959 photographs of some 
85% of the front-line units of the Soviet 24th Air Force had been taken from these 
356r. Geraghty, Beyolld the Frolltlille, p. 38. 
357T. Geraghty, Beyolld the Frolltlill e, p. 90. 
115 
planes. 358 But most of Brixmis' spying work was done from cars. In the early 1950s, 
as a general rule, the Mission went on, at most, twenty-eight tours a month. 
Ministries in London specified targets which were to be observed and provided 
background information on them. Since it was a military staff in a frontline state, the 
intelligence tasks given to Brixmis to perform naturally related to NATO's military 
plans. The targets given it to scout out were, generally speaking, the military, naval 
and air forces of the Warsaw Pact in East Germany, together with their weaponry. 
Among the Mission's targets were vessels in the port of Rostock, beaches on the 
Baltic coast (to see whether, in the event of war, they were suitable for landings), the 
island of Rugen, which stood off the Baltic coast and was sealed off from Brixmis 
tours, the uranium mines in the Erzgebirge and artillery and tank training areas west 
of Berlin. The RAF pressed for intelligence of airfields in East Germany, and 
particularly of their runways, which it planned to destroy if war came. These were 
overflown, while in tours of the DDR Brixmis officers tried to get a closer look at 
them. After a Soviet military exercise had taken place, Brixmis would generally tour 
the area to search for any items of equipment or weaponry which had been left on the 
battlefield. From such intelligence, strategic conclusions could sometimes be 
drawn. 359 Word of Soviet military exercises in parts of East Germany sometimes 
came to the Mission from refugees . 360 Brixmis supplied a great deal of intelligence 
on the deployment, for the first time, of Soviet weapons in East Germany (for 
example, the T -54 tank was first photographed by a Brixmis officer in 1955 and the 
T -62 tank in 1962; an abandoned IS-2 tank was actually examined in 1949). It is 
claimed that intelligence Brixmis acquired on Soviet weaponry and military 
35&r. Geraghty, Beyond the Frontline, p. 88. 
359-r. Geraghty, Beyond the Frontline, p. 63. 
360Address by Major C. H. Hallett, MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1953, DEFE 411126. 
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equipment gave indications of the preparations being made by the Soviet armed 
forces for a nuclear or a chemical war. 361 But subjected to harassment, as they were, 
and with little time to observe any particular target, the Mission was most effective 
when checking information provided by agents in East Germany.362 Most 
observation and photography had to be done in seconds . Therefore, those principally 
responsible for the gathering of accurate technical intelligence in the DDR were 
secret agents. Nevertheless, despite these severe constraints, Brixmis acquired 
technical intelligence of real value during its lifetime. 
361T. Geraghty, Beyond the Frontline, pp. 291-4. In the case of chemical warfare, this claim is supported by the 
address by Capt. Hogwood, Mil OB , to the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference in June 1952 (DEFE 411126) , 
in which Hogwood discussed pieces of Soviet army equipment which had been issued to troops to prepare them 
for a chemical war and of which the British had acquired intelligence from deserters. Hogwood mentioned 
'chemically treated gloves' , which a Soviet defector had said had been issued to his anti-aircraft unit. It might be 
inferred from this that the troops in the unit were to be able to decontaminate themselves after a chemical attack 
and remain in their position. 
362Address by Major W. T. Sedgwick, Mil 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951 , DEFE 411125 . 
Geraghty reaches the same conclusion as Sedgwick, stating (at p. 291) that much of the intelligence gathered by 
the unit either confirmed or added further information to knowledge acquired from other sources. Yery little is 
known of the work of British secret agents in Soviet-occupied Eastern Germany. Nevertheless, it is clear that they 
were the most valuable source of technical intelligence. Other sources of information tended not to be as good. 
Deserters usually had to rely wholly on memory, returning pri soners-of-war generally provided vague 
information and 'line-crossers' were of very variable quality , only a few being able to provide information 
detailed enough to represent reliable technical intelligence. Some secret agents were able to gain access to 
workshops and so could examine military equipment closely. Sometimes they were able to photograph equipment 
or remove a handbook. By such means a number of manuals and pamphlets came into the hands of British 
Intelligence (address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G (lnt) BAOR, Mil 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 
1951 , DEFE 411125) . Other agents lived near airfields and reported on the aeroplanes and radar equipment in use 
there (e.g. Top Secret Intelligence Report from Air Intelligence (Berlin) to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff 
(Intelligence) dated 27 October 1949, DEFE 411117) . Agents were even sent into the Soviet Zone to photograph 
objects of interest there (letter dated 6 October 1949, DEFE 411128) . Conditions in occupied East Germany in the 
late 1940s favoured spying, since Soviet bases were actually situated close to settlements of people very 
unsympathetic to them. Agents cannot have been difficult to recruit, at least for the narrow purpose of gathering 
intelligence on Soviet military equipment. British Intelligence was probably particularly interested in recruiting 
people who actually worked at Soviet military establishments. It was noted in a report of 1953 that almost all 
Germans working at Soviet bases had by then been dismissed from their jobs (656111 CCS dated 20 April 1953, 
Increase in Soviet Readiness for War 1 March 1952 - 1 March 1953 , Soviet Forces in East Germany and Poland, 
DEFE 41/80). Agent operations against Soviet forces in East Germany were numerous and involved large 
numbers of people. In 1958, Erich Mielke, then Minister of State Security, reported to the DDR' s leader, Walter 
Ulbricht, that in the previous two years alone 800 agents had been arrested for spying on Soviet troops 
(YM289/58 dated 13/10/58 from Mielke to Ulbricht, DY 30llY 2/202162). 
117 
E. Contacts 
In late 1948 and early 1949 the British foresaw that their sources in Germany would 
soo~ dry up. One of their initiatives in response was to cultivate West German 
businessmen, engineers, technicians, scientists and other professional people as 
contacts with the aim of acquiring intelligence on scientific and technical 
developments in the Soviet Union.363 This operation was launched in 1949; it was 
initially known as 'Project Pat'; in January 1950 its codename became Operation 
'Kidney' and in March 1951 was changed to 'Judas' .364 It can be no accident that the 
operation was begun just as the Federal Republic was coming into being. British 
Intelligence now anticipated the economic revival of a reborn West German state and 
sought to profit from it. Tapping such sources was from the outset thought to promise 
significant results . With the revival of the West German economy, trading links 
between West Germany and the Soviet Union would proliferate, giving those 
working for West German companies intelligence of the technical needs of their 
Soviet trading partners. British Intelligence was particularly interested in the 
technical equipment Soviet purchasers were seeking to buy from the great West 
German engineering companies, such as AEG, Telefunken and Siemens. This would 
reveal the stage of technical development the USSR had reached, since the Soviets 
363Report dated I November 1949 on 'Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch: Review of Future 
Commitments', DEFE 41/83 . Some of these contacts in German industry and science were passed to Analysis 
Directorate, the secret intelligence unit of Intelligence Division for recruitment as agents (this is indicated by the 
system for transferring such contacts to Analysis proposed in memorandum 8681 dated 13 March 1954, DEFE 
411144). Secret Intelligence also built up contacts among German scientists in the hope of coming by intelligence 
of scientific developments in the DDR and further East, and particularly in the Soviet Union to which East 
German science was increasingly closely connected. For example, in 1955 STIB suggested that the DSI establish 
a relationship with a West German physicist, Prof. Dr. H. Klumb, with well-known pro-Soviet views (as a 
member of the German-Soviet Friendship Society he was trying to promote contacts between scientists in East 
and West as a way of encouraging better political understanding). The DSI decided not to approach Professor 
Klumb, on the ground that, 'TCS feel they have adequate relations with East German scientists already, and for 
our part we are somewhat worried about the prospect of blowing the cover of the few people who have outside 
cover (letter dated 19 April 1955, DEFE 41/104). 
364Memorandum dated 17 January 1950, DEFE 41/79. I mentioned this operation briefly in my 1996 M. Phil. 
dissertation. 
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would only seek abroad what they could not make themselves. Moreover, as East 
German science was Sovietized, West German scientists, with long-standing 
connections with their colleagues on the other side of the Demarcation Line, might 
come by information of developments in the USSR. 
By the mid-1950s, MI6 was very active in debriefing businessmen, academics and 
others who often travelled to the Soviet Union.365 A celebrated example of a 
businessman who, fatefully for himself and others, fell into MI6's net was Greville 
Wynne, a salesman who made frequent visits to the Soviet Bloc on behalf of British 
companies and through whom the GRU officer Oleg Pen'kovskii in 1961 offered to 
become a British spy. 366 The CIA's counterpart operation was codenamed 'Redskin'. 
STIB's work shows that British Intelligence was also successful in persuading 
Germans to share information with it. Likewise, the travellers interviewed in the 
context of 'Redskin' came not only from the USA, but also from a number of 
countries in Europe and elsewhere.367 
British Intelligence had a number of strong cards in its hand when it came to forming 
connections with Germans working in industry and science. In the first place, it had 
found jobs for many German scientists in the desperate post-war days (not only as 
part of Operation 'Matchbox', but also as part of Britain's own exploitation and 
365See, for example, STIB/P/l/305 dated 29 September 1955 (DEFE 411144) , in which it is stated that Propane 
Ltd ., a British chemicals company with a representative in West Berlin which traded with the Soviet Bloc, was 
connected with MI6 Germany. Confirmation of M16' s use of the expansion of trading links with the USSR which 
occurred under Khrushchev is provided at pp. 183-4 of G. Blake, No Other Choice. American interrogators at 
Camp King in Oberursel acquired evidence that the Soviet Army's intelligence service, the GRU, had much 
earlier moved to establish a network of agents with commercial cover in Western Europe. This information on 
' the Red-Bannered Danubian Flotilla' was obtained in 1947 from a defector, a GRU lieutenant, who had worked 
in the control centre in Budapest for this long-term operation (pp. 209-10, A. Silver, 'Questions, Questions, 
Questions: Memories of Oberursel' , Intelligence & National SeCllrit)' , Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 199-213). 
366J. Schecter & P. Deriabin , The Spy Who Saved the World, pp. 23-4. 
3671. Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, p. 53. 
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restoration of science in the British Zone). Moreover, British Intelligence had a high 
reputation among Germans. Its name was, in STIB' s experience, 'almost legendary 
in Germany'. 368 The division of Germany into two states strengthened the hand of 
the British, since it further stimulated anti-Soviet feeling among West German 
scientists and industrialists and a desire on their part to contribute to the defence of 
the West.369 Lastly, there was a similarity of interest between British Intelligence and 
West German business to the extent that both felt that they were engaged in a 
struggle with the MfS' Hauptverwaltung AufkHirung (HVA) and the KGB. The HVA 
menaced the great companies and universities of the Federal Republic, which it 
sought to penetrate.370 Big business in the Federal Republic also lost a great deal of 
property in the SED's nationalizations of industry in the East. From their 
headquarters in the West they hoped to recover it, for which the DDR's collapse was 
a precondition. These nationalizations also deprived many smaller industrialists in 
the DDR of property, with the result that they fled West, where some became 
contacts of British Intelligence. 371 The Soviet leadership's policy in Germany, and 
that of its SED clients, in splitting the country in two and victimizing certain social 
groups in particular, enlisted for the Western intelligence services legions of German 
auxiliaries which continued to supply information even after the Occupation of 
Germany ended in 1955. 372 
3680peration 'Kidney' Progress Report No. I, DEFE 41/87. As a result, STIB officers began their cultivation of 
prospective contacts by saying that they were representatives of British Intelligence. 
369DEFE 4311 contains the card index of STIB's contacts. The motive most commonly given on these cards for 
the contacts ' collaboration with British Intelligence is, ' ideological: unpaid'. 
370M. Wolf, Man Wit/will A Face, pp. 69-70. 
371 An example is the contact whose discussion of the manufacture of fine wire mesh in the DDR formed the 
subject of STIB Interview Report ('Kidney' ) No.2 dated 31 July 1950, DEFE 41/88 (see footnote 240 above). 
The company he owned and managed in East Germany, which seems from the report to have been the 'Emil 
Jaeger' company in Neustadt, was nationalized in July 1948. Understandably, the report states that the source 
'has a confirmed bias towards the West in view of his experiences under Russian occupation'. 
3720ne British Intelligence operation had by the beginning of the 1950s been delegated entirely to West German 
business. The powerful recovery of the West German economy after the War meant that there was no longer such 
a need for Operation 'Matchbox ' . West German business was capable itself of drawing well-qualified scientists, 
engineers and technicians from East Germany. 
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In building up contacts, STIB above all targeted West German companies and 'Old 
Boys' Networks' ,373 It was successful in building an extensive network of contacts 
in West German industry and science. Its list of files refers to institutions at which it 
had well-placed contacts. The companies mentioned are AEG; Auergesellschaft; 
Bayerwerk and other parts of the former I. G. Far'ben group (Hochst, for example); 
Blaupunkt; Dragerwerke in Lubeck; Dynamit; Gute Hoffnungshutte; Fernseh, 
Darmstadt; Henkel & Cie; Junkers; KlOckner-Humboldt-Deutz; Krupp, Essen; 
Kupferhutte, Duisburg; Mannesmann; Merck; Philips' German subsidiary in 
Hamburg; Rheinmetall-Borsig; Schering; the Siemens group; and ZeiB, Heidenheim. 
STIB also had contacts at professional associations such as the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
fUr Luftfahrttechnik, the Verein Deutscher Eisenhuttenleute and the Verein 
Deutscher Ingenieure, and at the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Such contacts gave it 
information on research and development in a number of industries in the East, 
electronics, engineering, mining, chemicals, iron and steel and aircraft manufacture 
being the main ones. To acquire intelligence of research at universities and research 
institutes, it built up a network of academic contacts. Examples of academic 
institutions at which it had well-placed sources are the Technische Hochschulen in 
Aachen, Braunschweig and Hannover, and the Technische Universittit, the 
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt and Robert Koch Institut in Berlin.374 One of 
STIB's contacts at the Robert Koch Institut was Professor Josef Fortner, the head of 
the institute's Veterinary Department, who provided it with information on animal 
3730peration 'Kidney' Progress Report No.1 , DEFE 41187 . 
374STIB file list, DEFE 41/29. 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft fOr Luftfahrttechnik' means 'Professional Society for 
Aeronautical Technology', 'Verein Deutscher EisenhOttenleute' means 'Union of German Ironfounders ' and 
'Verein Deutscher Ingenieure ' means 'Union of German Engineers ' . 'Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt ' 
means 'Federal Physical-Technical Institute'. 
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research institutes in the Soviet Zone.375 With the help of such veterinary contacts 
STIB could look for evidence of research into agents of biological warfare. As 
regards the weight of effort made to cultivate the various types of contact, an early 
progress report confirms that companies were the main targets. Scientists involved in 
industrial research and development and industrial managers represented 69% of 
those cultivated in the opening phase of the operation . Academics with strong 
industrial links represented 17% and academics pure and simple 11 %.376 STIB' s file 
list also mentions contacts in the Federal Government itself. 
These file-names refer only to organizations with which the British had strong 
connections, and not to all of those. STIB' s card index of contacts reveals that it had 
sources working for even more companies, academic institutions and technical 
journals. It also shows that among STIB's sources were actual agents in key 
positions in the industry of the Eastern Zone. An example is Peter Eich, whose 
codename was 'Esche'. Though he lived in the British Sector, he held no less a 
position than Head of the Oberspreewerk's Research Laboratory. 377 Werner Preuss, a 
development engineer at the factory, spied for the British (his codename was 
'Province'), as did an interpreter there called Olga Reimann (codenamed 'Anna').378 
Another agent at an important target in East Germany was 'Willy Boy', who was 
375Fortner's card in STIB 's card index of contacts in DEFE 43/1 is the source of this information. His motive 
was 'ideological: unpaid'. 
3760peration 'Kidney' Progress Report No. I, DEFE 41/87. Naturally, the HV A also acquired useful information 
on the development of advanced weapons from informal contacts among West German scientists (M. Wolf, Mall 
Without A Face, p. 70). 
377His card in STIB' s card index (in DEFE 43/1) is dated I November 1947. He was described as a source of 
STIB information on the Soviet Zone. His motive was stated to be, 'Pro-British attitude to combat communism; 
wants to work for British Intelligence as his uncle did during 1914/18'. It was commented that he was, 'very keen 
and efficient, suitable for high-grade work'. His controlling agency was, not STIB, but the Berlin Intelligence 
Staff. 
37~heir cards in STIB 's card index are the sources of this information. Preuss provided technical information on 
electronic matters. His motive was ideological and he was not paid. Olga Reimann 's motive is not stated. His 
controlling agency was STIB Berlin; hers was the Berlin Intelligence Staff. 
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employed at the Carl-ZeiB works 'in Jena.379 STIB penetrated even the embryonic 
government of the Soviet Zone itself, the Deutsche Wirtschaftskomrnission (German 
Economic Commission). In the late 1940s Dr. Hermann Luscher, Head of the Fine 
Mechanics and Optics Section of the DWK's Scientific and Technical Department, 
was its informant, codenamed 'Lullaby', on the fine mechanical and optical 
equipment produced in the Soviet Zone. 380 Charlotte Neumann, living in the Soviet 
Sector of Berlin, seems to have been a lower-grade agent. She was 'Housemaid to 
Nadeshda Novoszelskaja' .381 Some of the interpreters attached to Soviet trade 
delegations which visited industrial exhibitions in Germany in the rnid-1950s passed 
information to STIB on the delegations' members .382 One West German informant 
brought back from a conversation with an important East German electrical engineer 
the news of the subjects discussed at a recent meeting of COMECON's specialist 
Committee for Magnetic Materials. It was reported at the meeting that there had been 
no technical advances since the previous meeting five months before. 383 STIB' s 'best 
all-round source', at least in the late 1940s, was a woman called Ester Fessel, a 
manager at the electronics firm Rohde & Schwarz.384 
379STIB card index, DEFE 4311 . His motive was ' ideological: unpaid'. 
380His card in STIB' s card index of contacts is the source of this information. Though he had a code name and 
must have been an agent, since he was working for an institution created by the SMAG and functioning only in 
its Zone, his controlling agency was STIB Berlin, not the Berlin Intelligence Staff. He lived in the British Sector 
of the city. 
381 Her card in STIB' s card index is the source of this information. She spied for food and money. What 
information she obtained and who Nadezhda Novoszelskaya was are not stated on the card. 
382An example is provided by a gentleman called Sober, a former Yugoslav Consul in Germany, who acted as 
the official interpreter for Slavonic languages to the DUsseldorf Radio Exhibition. He is the subject of a report 
appended to STIB/B/l/1192 dated 16 September 1955, DEFE 411116. MI6' s use of interpreters who were 
attached to Soviet trade delegations visiting Britain in the same period is discussed in G. Blake, No Other Choice, 
on p. 185. Their job was to obtain as much information as possible on the work, character, failings and political 
outlook of the delegations' members. MI6 even set up its own interpreter agency to do this. 
3830LB(B)57.12.1O, DEFE411141. 
3~his quotation is from her card in STIB ' s card index. The card is dated I November 1947. She was a source 
of STIB information on the Soviet Zone and her motive was anti-Soviet feeling. 
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Contacts in West German industry and science served two intelligence functions 
above all. Firstly and obviously, they provided intelligence of scientific and technical 
developments, mainly in East Germany. Some were tapped for information on the 
Soviet Union as well. This often concerned former colleagues who were working 
there and the establishments at which they were employed. Secondly, 'Kidney' 
contacts put British Intelligence in touch with other sources who could provide such 
information. West German companies remained, in effect, all-German institutions in 
the years 1945-61, since refugees from East Germany found work with them. 
Contacts at these companies (often the Personnel Director or a factory director) put 
STIB in touch with those refugees who might have intelligence of value. 
'Old Boys' Networks' were groups of former employees of German companies 
which held reunions at which information could be picked up on, chiefly, where and 
for whom German scientists were working and what they were working on. One 
prized source of information was the 'Old Boys' Network' of I. G. Fat'ben, for it was 
an all-German network of informants. The chemicals company had had many plants 
in the East, for which, as factories owned by the people of the DDR, former I. G. 
Farben staff continued to work. It had been so huge a company that the Leunawerk, 
at least, had its own network, the 'Ex-Leuna Association', of which STIB made 
use. 385 Former I. G. Farben people who in the 1950s worked for its successor 
companies may have been used to make contact with returned scientific workers and 
encourage them to defect to the West. Former employees of Junkers and Carl-ZeiB 
were certainly used for this purpose. STIB also made use of the Gesellschaft 
Deutscher Chemiker in enticing defections from the East. 386 Other German 
385Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I September 1950, DEFE 41110. 
386In STIB/252/XI1445 dated II March 1955 (DEFE 41/92) , John Horner of STIB Berlin suggested that a 
contact at either Bayer (a successor company of I. G. Farben with which the British had close links) or Merck or 
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institutions which had existed before 1945 and which provided networks of ex-
employees which STIB exploited for information were the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt 
fi.ir Luftfahrt (DVL) and a body known as the 'LFA'.387 
Also willing to help the West were many of the scientists, engineers and technicians 
deported to the USSR after the War, who returned to Germany in the 1950s. They 
were known to STIB as 'Dragon Returners'. Their enticement to West Germany and 
interrogation was known as Operation 'Dragon Return' and it forms the subject of 
Chapters 4 and 5. The majority of these people remained in East Germany, where 
they were given good jobs in important factories and research institutes. Some may 
have been recruited as agents-in-place by MI6's Technical Section. Others came over 
to West Germany, many with the help of British or US Intelligence. There they took 
up positions in industry and science. 
A good example of a 'Dragon Returner ' who took up an important position in West 
German industry and was so embittered by his experience of captivity in the USSR 
that he became a valuable informant is Hans Kerschbaum. In interrogation on his 
return, he provided intelligence considered valuable across a wide area of interest.388 
Virulently anti-Soviet, he took his collaboration with the British further; within 
months of his return he was working as an intelligence contact. He must have been 
at the Gesellschaft Deutscher Chemiker (Society of German Chemists) could be used to approach two scientific 
workers who had recently returned to Germany from 'Postfach 693 Leningrad '. 
387STIB file list, DEFE 41/29 . 'Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fUr Luft fahrt ' means 'German Experimental Institute 
for Aeronautics' . 
388STIB17102/4619567 dated 24 October 1949, DEFE 4114. That is to say, it was given the rating ***. There 
were four levels of rating for the returners' intelligence: **** (outstandingly valuable); *** (valuable); ** 
(valuable in a narrow field); * (useful, including valuable confirmation or good negative information). This 
ranking is set out in the 'Dragon Return' report dated 9 February 1951 , DEFE 41/5. Kerschbaum' s card in STIB's 
card index of contacts in DEFE 43/1 gives his job as 'Managing Director of Siemens & Halske' , describes him as 
a source of STIB information on the Soviet Zone and the USSR and states his motive as being anti-Soviet feeling. 
He was unpaid. 
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an important one, for he was one of the few such contacts to be given a codename. 
He was known as 'Kingpin' and was one of the earliest 'Project Pat' contacts. The 
reason for his importance as a contact was that on his return he became the director 
responsible for research at Siemens & Halske. 389 He still sat on the supervisory 
board of the Siemens group in the early 1970s.390 He actively passed intelligence to 
the British on research and development work being done in East Germany and the 
USSR. It is likely that he obtained his information mainly from people in both parts 
of Germany who were either employed by Siemens or had been so. His company's 
links with colleagues and relatives the 'Osoaviakhim' deportees had left behind in 
Germany will have been his sources of information on them.391 Likewise, contacts 
with Carl-ZeiB personnel, past and present, were used to find out about the doings of 
that company's former employees in the Soviet Union. Other companies' grapevines 
were exploited in the same way. Moreover, Kerschbaum, like other influential 
company directors, was asked to find employment for scientists in whom the British 
had an intelligence interest, and particularly for scientific workers who had 
previously been employed by his company.392 Siemens was a natural ally of British 
Intelligence, for the group's headquarters, Siemensstadt, lay in the British Sector of 
Berlin. British Intelligence had many contacts in the Siemens group393 and, indeed, 
claimed to have a full' Siemens intelligence net' ,394 It is clear that several of these 
389STIB17102/46/283 dated 26 November 1949, DEFE 41/4; letter dated 28 July 1954, DEFE 21/14. 
39Or. C. Delius, UI/sere Siemel/s-Welt , p. 141. 'Dr. phil., Dr.-Ing. E. h. Hans Kerschbaum' , born in 1902, is here 
described as a 'Spezialist in del' Nachrichtentechnik' (expert on communications technology). 
391This is suggested by the minutes of the STIB Technical Meetings on 7 July 1950 and 25 January 1951, DEFE 
41110. 
392Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 7 July 1950, DEFE 4111 O. 
393Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I September 1950, DEFE 4111 O. 
394Report dated I November 1949 on 'Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch: Review of Future 
Commitments' , DEFE 41/83. Examples of members of this network, identified by cards in STIB ' s card index of 
contacts (DEFE 4311), are: Theodor Frenzel , director in charge of the Siemens & Halske factories in Berlin-
Siemensstadt, who provided information on 'Siemens & Halske personalities '; Dr. Walter Schlitzberger (the 
Personnel Director of Siemens & Halske in Berlin-Siemensstadt); Georg Albert Halske, the Personnel Manager 
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people were very well-placed to. pick up news of a number of former Siemens 
employees working for the Soviets, chief among them Max Steenbeck, who in the 
USSR did important work on uranium enrichment and therefore attracted 
co~siderable intelligence interest, and Gustav Hertz, who worked on isotope 
separation at Agudzeri on the Black Sea as head of the institute there. Under Hitler, 
Hertz had been the Director of Siemens' Research Laboratories.395 
The principal location of STIB's contacts was Berlin.396 This is natural, since 
contacts located in West Berlin would enjoy easy access to the Soviet Sector of the 
city and thus to sources with information on scientific and technical developments 
there and throughout East Germany. Until 1961, there were checkpoints only on the 
main streets and no checks were made on the Underground. 397 Nevertheless, 'Dragon 
Returners' who became contacts of the British were roving agents of considerable 
value. Since many could speak Russian, they could pump Soviet visitors for 
information at conferences and exhibitions throughout Germany. 398 'Dragon 
of Siemens & Halske; Dr. Eugen Maier, the assistant to the Vice-President of Siemens-Schuckert, Berlin (through 
him STIB had a number of sub-sources); and Ferdinand Muller (the Director of Production of Siemens-
Schuckert). 
395Note dated 5 January 1955, DEFE 21114. 
39~his is stated to be the case in an early report on the cultivation of contacts, Operation 'Kidney' Progress 
Report No. I, DEFE 41/87, and is confirmed by the STIB card index in DEFE 4311, which naturally states where 
the contacts were located. 
397G. Blake, No Other Choice, p. 166. 
398Conferences bringing together representatives of both East and West lent themselves to intelligence-
gathering. Computers and television are examples of important new technologies under discussion at conferences 
in Germany in the mid-1950s attended by STIB contacts (STIB's interest in computers is confirmed by STIB 
Report No. 258 dated 9 November 1955, DEFE 411116). East German delegations were sent to conferences 
abroad with strict instructions not to talk about their own work, but to concentrate on finding out what their 
Western counterparts were working on (e.g. OLB/B/56/73 dated 18 May 1956, DEFE 411159). One DDR 
scientist who was allowed to attend conferences abroad and who had no qualms about passing back what he heard 
there to his leaders was Manfred von Ardenne, who had been deported to Sukhumi to carry out research into 
isotope separation in 1945 and who was returned to East Germany in 1955. Conversations he had with the former 
head of radar development at Telefunken and talkative American electronicists at a conference on electron 
microscopy held in West Berlin in 1958 caused von Ardenne to write to Ulbricht setting out a possible way of 
making incoming guided missiles invisible to radar. The Americans at the conference had been particularly 
unreserved and had told von Ardenne that in a few years' time it would be possible to destroy incoming ballistic 
missiles with surface-to-air missiles. Long-range radar sets would detect the incoming ballistic missile and 
transmit data on its flight path to computers, which would, in fractions of a second, make all the calculations 
necessary to guide a defensive missile to it. Von Ardenne thought it reasonable to suppose that this revealed the 
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Returners' living in the West were 9bviously very well-placed to acquire intelligence 
from former deportees who had taken up jobs in East Germany. For example, an 
engineer and 'Dragon Returner' whom STIB called 'PF. 81177' attended a 
conference of television engineers in Hamburg in September 1955 organized by the 
Fernseh-Technische Gesellschaft. In conversation he obtained information on Soviet 
progress in developing television from both Soviet engineers and his fellow 'Dragon 
Returner', Dr. Ing. Peter Neidhardt, who on his return to the DDR had become the 
chief television development engineer at the Werk fur Fernmeldewesen in Berlin-
Oberschoneweide. In that capacity, he was the overseer of East German efforts to 
develop colour television. Just before the Hamburg convention, Neidhardt had been 
on a short trip to Moscow and Warsaw.399 Conversations with Soviet visitors during 
or after conferences or fairs revealed the location and production of particular 
factories in the USSR.400 
The main yield of STIB's extensive network of contacts was a great deal of 
information on research and development in the DDR. The technology of interest on 
which most intelligence was gathered in the 1950s was electronics. The Soviets, 
fearing the revival of German military power, were slow to allow research into 
atomic energy. From 1948 on, development work on guided missiles was 
insignificant. In the early 1950s, using, in part, their extensive network of scientific 
object which research and development in the United States was seeking to achieve and, in a short paper which 
anticipated Stealth technology by decades, suggested to Ulbricht that a missile could be given a covering which 
would shield it from radar detection. A screen would open up around the missile as soon as it left the earth's 
atmosphere. This screen would protect the missile throughout its journey through space by absorbing radar waves 
directed at the missile, thus making it invisible to the radar of the target country. Ulbricht sent this sophisticated 
piece of scientific intelligence from 'unser Professor Manfred von Ardenne' on to Khrushchev (letter dated 
25/9/1958 , DY 30/IV 2/202/28, SAPMO). 
399STIB Interview Report No. 239 dated 28 September 1955 , DEFE 41/116 . 
4OO0LB/BLlLl366 dated 9 September 1957, DEFE 41/141. Details of two factories in the USSR manufacturing 
cathode ray tubes were disclosed by Soviet fluorescent tube experts who worked there during a visit to a 
Telefunken factory which followed the 1957 Hannover trade fair. 
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and industrial contacts, the Britisb could not detect any biological research in the 
DDR which was not concerned with ordinary public health projects. Nor did they 
have any evidence of a chemical weapons programme. However, the Soviets did 
exploit the electronics potential of the DDR (which, in the DSI's view, exceeded that 
of all the other satellites combined). Certain development projects appeared to the 
British to form part of the Soviet military electronics programme. There were two 
groups of electronics enterprises of particular interest. The first was, of course, made 
up of those electronics enterprises of which the Soviets had assumed ownership, such 
as the Werk fUr Fernmeldewesen (the former Oberspreewerk) and the Sachsenwerk-
Radeberg. Of the rest, more than twenty had been brought together in a single 
organization which also worked on the Soviets' behalf. Research tasks these latter 
enterprises were to perform were laid down in Moscow and allocated by an East 
German central planning agency to those which were best suited to the tasks in 
question. In the early 1950s, leading enterprises in both groups were engaged in 
development work which paralleled that being conducted in the West. But the 
Soviets, well-aware of the security risks attending research and development, were 
careful about the tasks they distributed in the DDR. Much of the development work 
being carried out by these two groups of enterprises was the manufacture of 
prototype measuring equipment. Exploiting the DDR's electronics capability in this 
way allowed the Soviets to make use of the East Germans ' proven skill in 
manufacturing high-precision equipment, while simultaneously concealing from the 
West the purpose behind the development programme of which this work formed a 
part. 401 
401 DS! Memorandum No. 15 dated 17 May 1952 and entitled ,'Science in the German Democratic Republic', 
DEFE 411153. 
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However, of one fact at least contacts and refugees made STIB fully aware . This was 
that the value to the Soviet Union of East German electronic knowhow was 
diminishing, because the SED regime was failing to establish a high-technology 
el~ctronics industry. The reason for this was the mass flight of skilled personnel to 
the West.402 Dr. Karl Steimel was one of STIB's most important contacts. He probed 
Dr. Kurt Richter, his fellow-returner from NIl. 160 at Fryazino, near Moscow, for 
information. Richter had become the chief valve development engineer at the Werk 
ftir Fernmeldewesen.403 Having no intention of staying in East Germany once his 
parents had died, Richter had little incentive to be discreet. On one occasion he gave 
Steimel the names of the Soviet scientists with whom he was then working (adding 
to the DSI's Order of Battle of Soviet science as he did so) and revealed the fields of 
development involved in this collaboration. 404 More significantly, he revealed the 
damage being done to East German electronics development by mass flight to the 
West. Richter explained candidly that the loss of scientific workers to the West had 
led to crippling skills shortages which prevented new developments from being made 
in the valve field. No new development was taking place at his factory.405 The 
British received information to the same effect from Steimel's superior, Dr. 
4020f course, by no means all the scientific and technical intelligence gathered on East Germany concerned 
electronics. For example, a well-placed source codenamed 'Peter' provided information on the volume and nature 
of the output of penicillin from four factories in the Soviet Zone and one in the British Sector of Berlin which 
sold some of its production to the SOZ (STO/6/NO/48, DEFE 41/145, and JSJT/STO(49)4 dated 3 January 1949, 
DEFE 411146). Confirmation that the British had sources in East German penicillin production facilities is 
provided by the minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 7 July 1950, DEFE 4111 O. Knowledge of penicillin 
production methods in the Eastern Zone, of course, helped to determine whether the East Germans (and therefore, 
by extension, the Soviets) possessed the necessary methods for making biological warfare agents. 
403Richter had, in fact, returned to East Berlin from the Soviet Union in the same transport as Steimel 
(STIB/252/X/I 41 0 dated 22 April 1952, DEFE 41/92). The 'YEB Werk fOr Fernmeldewesen (HF)' was known 
familiarly as the Werk 'HF' and the 'WF'. 'HF' stood for 'Hochfrequenz' (high frequency). It was owned for a 
period by the Soviet 'Isolator' company (STOIl9/DEl48, DEFE 41/145). Intelligence on the companies in the 
'Isolator' group and on reparations production was acquired from an evacuee from the Soviet Zone who had 
worked for one of the companies in the group, a man called von Bahder (JSJT/STO(49)30 dated 14 January 1949, 
DEFE 411146). 
404STIB /252/X/I 402 dated 4 May 1955, DEFE 411136 . 
405STIB/252/X/l 055 dated 22 September 1955, DEFE 411136. 
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Wiegand, the director of all Telefunken's valve factories. He received job 
applications from refugees from all the DDR's valve factories and, when 
interviewing the candidates, heard all about valve development on the other side of 
the pemarcation Line. In the autumn of 1955, he painted a picture of an industry in 
crisis. All transistor development in the DDR had been terminated, save that at one 
factory (Dralowid), where development work was to be concentrated. 406 At the 
beginning of 1954, the DDR authorities had abandoned the idea of original 
development of miniature and sub-miniature valves and East German enterprises 
were simply copying British, Dutch and West German valves. Any new Telefunken 
valve appeared within six months as a valve manufactured in the DDR. East German 
research into the use of silicon and germanium as detectors and transistors was well 
behind that taking place in the West and he offered the names of two new employees 
at Telefunken who could provide further information on the subject. 407 These two 
technicians, Wolfgang Schafer and Hans Bendig, had before their defection been 
working on transistor development at the Werk ftir Fernmeldewesen.408 
Dr. Richter, who was responsible for the production of valves, semiconductors and 
diodes at the Werk ftir Fernmeldewesen, told a STIB contact (perhaps Steimel) in 
1957 that the factory was producing approximately 5,000 germanium diodes per 
month; ultimately , it would have enough capacity to manufacture 50,000 diodes per 
month. The government had asked the factory to undertake the mass production of 
germanium transistors, but it had refused to do so until the middle of 1958. The 
reason for this, inevitably, was a severe lack of experienced engineers and suitably-
406STIB/252/XII450 dated IS September 1955, DEFE 4111 36. 
407STIB/252/XII415 dated II October 1955, DEFE 411136. 
408STIS/252/XIIIOO dated 13 January 1956, DEFE 411136. 
131 
skilled workers. Dr. Falter, the director of all transistor development in the DDR, was 
developing 'thin-Iayer-transistors'.409 Three months later, a source described as 'the 
leading engineer of the Werk flir Fernmeldewesen' (and therefore surely Richter) 
t~ld a STIB contact that the factory had finally refused to undertake the manufacture 
of transistors, the main reason being the shortage of skilled personnel. The only 
source of transistors in East Germany was therefore the Werk ftir Bauelemente del' 
Nachrichtentechnik in Teltow, which could manufacture no more than 4,000 per 
month. Work had at one time begun on the construction of a transistor factory in 
Berlin-Weissensee, but the project had been suspended because it seemed foolish to 
build such a factory so close to West Berlin, to which a significant proportion of the 
workforce would . therefore probably flee. As regards diodes, the government had 
demanded that the Werk flir Fernmeldewesen manufacture two million germanium 
diodes in the following year, but it was unlikely that the factory would produce more 
than 1.2 million.410 An informant who talked to technicians at the Werk flir 
Bauelemente der Nachrichtentechnik was told that the factory was unable to mass-
produce any semiconductor. It followed that, as Richter had implied, there was no 
mass production of semiconductors in the DDR.411 
West German contacts were able to acquire information on technological progress in 
the USSR itself. This they achieved in three ways: from East German acquaintances 
with knowledge of developments in the Soviet Union ; from their own knowledge of 
Soviet purchases of technical equipment from their companies; and in the course of 
visits to Soviet factories and institutes. At the very least, STIB acquired confirmation 
4090LB/BLl57/362 dated 30 August 1957, DEFE 411141. 
4100LB(B)57.11.l9.3, DEFE411141. 
4110LB/BLl57/376 dated 24 September 1957, DEFE 411141. 
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from such sources that the Sovjet economy suffered from severe structural 
weaknesses which were frustrating its efforts to manufacture the high-technology 
goods made in the West. 
An example of intelligence which the operation was above all designed to acquire is 
a report on Soviet work on magnetic materials. The information was given to the 
British by a West German contact who had at a convention met an East German 
acquaintance. This source had a few months before been a member of a delegation 
which had visited Soviet institutes and factories concerned with research into, and 
manufacture of, magnetic materials. In addition to Order-of-Battle information - all 
research was done in institutes in the western part of Leningrad, the principal 
factories were in Moscow and were organized on Western European lines - the 
source provided evidence of swift Soviet progress in ferrite development and 
manufacture.412 The visitors were all agreed that the 'Krasnajar' factory in Leningrad 
manufactured hard and soft fen'ites in greater quantity and of better quality than 
those manufactured by the Hescho-Hermsdorf works in Thuringia. This had military 
significance. The 'Krasnajar' factory had recently supplied fen'ites it had developed 
and manufactured to factories producing electronic components for military use. 
Near the 'Krasnajar' factory was an institute for research into soft fen'ites which was 
conducting research into high-efficiency ring-cores for electronic computets and 
control apparatus. This was a high-priority task being carried out under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Telecommunications. 
Of course, STIB was not dependent on West Germans who were in contact with 
knowledgeable East Germans. It had informants in place in East German institutions. 
4120LB(B)57.12.6.3, DEFE 41/14 1. 
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One was the Research Institute of Solid State Physics in Berlin. Its informant was a 
leading figure at this important institute and had seen Soviet publications on 
semiconductor research. He told the British in 1957 that these indicated that Soviet 
scientists had not yet achieved Germany's level of development in this field.413 
Companies which passed information to the British on their dealings with and 
exports to the Soviet Bloc, or on inquiries from such countries about products for 
export, included AEG414, Askania415, Deutsche Elektronik.416, Siemens & Halske417, 
Telefunken418, KlOckner-Humboldt-Deutz419, Farbenfabrik Bayer (one of the 
successor companies to I. G. Farben)420 and probably Rohde & Schwarz421 . In the 
case of the Siemens .group, board directors of the whole group provided information 
on approaches made to all the group's companies (its main subsidiaries being 
Siemens & Halske, Siemens-Schuckert and Siemens-Reiniger) by or on behalf of the 
Soviet Union and its satellites. 422 The exports concerned were of such electronic 
4130LB/BLl57/359 dated 20 August 1957, DEFE 411141. This report states that the informant 'holds a senior 
position at the institute'. 
414STIB Report No. 260 dated 15 November 1955, DEFE 411116; Berlin/1417 dated 3 February 1956, DEFE 
411136; Berlinll213 dated 14 February 1956, DEFE 411136. 
415STIB/252/X/II17 dated 12 December 1955, DEFE 411136; OLB/BLl57/279 dated I February 1957, DEFE 
411141. 
416STIB Interview Report No. 241 dated 8 October 1955, DEFE 41 /11 6. 
417STIB/252/X/1210 dated 29 December 1955 , DEFE 411136. 
418STIB Report No. 259 dated 15 November 1955, DEFE 411116; OLB/BLl56175 dated 18 May 1956, DEFE 
411159. 
4190LB(C)57.11.18, DEFE 411141. 
4200LB/B/57/368 dated 13 September 1957, DEFE 41/141. The motive for Bayer' s cooperation with the British 
was political. The leading figures at Bayer were very anti-Soviet and alarmed at the scientific potential of the 
USSR. They gave the British confidential information about their own dealings with the Soviets which they 
would never have given to a competitor. Among the information they handed over on this occasion, referred to in 
this report, was a list of the names of all Soviet visitors to Bayer headquarters since May 1955. Nevertheless, the 
British had to discount some of the information received from Bayer, whose representatives tended to sneer at the 
Soviets. In a 1957 report on a visit by Bayer representatives to a dye works and some research institutes in the 
USSR it is stated that, 'The German reporting team, although of high technical quality, are evidently too 
conscious of Herrenvolk tradition to be entirely objective' (OLB/B/57/360 dated 23 August 1957, DEFE 41114 1). 
4210LB(B)57.11.21 (DEFE 411141) contains information on Soviet orders from Rohde & Schwarz, but the 
informant was not stated. He was probably a representative of the Rohde & Schwarz Sales Department. 
422ST1B Interview Report No. 240 dated 8 October 1955, DEFE 411116. 
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products as broadcast valves and ultra-sonic equipment. There was considerable 
demand for heavy machinery, such as motors, hydro-electric generators, turbo-
electric generators, electrical equipment for large rolling mills, rolling mill motors, 
high-voltage switch gear, high- and low-power transmitters, television transmitters, 
large transformers and electric goods locomotives. Approaches were even made for 
entire power stations. Other items in which there was strong Soviet interest were air-
cooled diesel engines and conveyors for the mining industry.423 Contacts kept STIB 
informed about Soviet approaches to West German companies about goods which 
were subject to the embargo.424 
Telefunken was STIB's firmest friend. A copy of its in-house journal was sent to 
STIB Berlin.425 The British had a number of contacts in leading positions in the 
company. For a time the most helpful of them was the 'Dragon Returner' Karl 
Steimel, who on his return to Germany in 1952 immediately defected to the West and 
became Head of Research at Telefunken. 426 Unfortunately, Steimel fell out with his 
boss, Hans Heyne, and left Telefunken in 1956 in consequence.427 Thus the British 
lost a star contact at a prize target. This was a blow, but no disaster, because they had 
other very helpful and well-placed contacts at the company. Wiegand was one. 
Others were Dr. Rothe (head of the valve research and development departments) , 
Dr. Runge (head of the transmitter research and development departments) and 
Director Muller (head of all Telefunken ' s production).428 Dr. Zickermann was 
4230LB(C)57 .11 .25, DEFE 411141. The informant was a representative of a number of West German 
companies. 
424e.g. OLB/BLl571300 dated 14 March 1957, DEFE 41/141. 
425STIB/252/XI1438 dated 3 August 1955, DEFE 41/136. 
426STIB Interview Report No. 64 dated 9 July 1952 on Dr. Karl Steimel, DEFE 41/97 . 
427BeriiniI 125 dated 10 February 1956, DEFE 41/136. 
428Letter dated 7 December 1951, DEFE 41/2. 
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another important contact. He, like . a number of other West German businessmen, 
passed very interesting intelligence to the British. When representatives of Soviet or 
other Soviet Bloc trading organizations visited West German enterprises, the 
companies concerned made reports of the visit, recording what the Soviets had been 
shown and what they had said and shown interest in. Zickermann (like others) passed 
photostats of these reports to the SnB team in West Berlin.429 Telefunken's parent, 
AEG, was also a good friend of the British. Contacts at AEG informed snB when, 
for example, Poles were going to visit a particular factory. The British would then 
brief the contact on what information was sought (generally, who the visitors were 
and what they showed interest in).43o They would also coach him how to elicit this 
information. Such contacts were no mere informants. They actually performed 
intelligence-gathering tasks, and did so successfully. For example, when a Soviet 
trade delegation visited Telefunken in West Berlin in 1955, questions were put to it 
which elicited the following figures for the production of television transmitters in 
the Soviet Union: 630,000 (1954) and 800,000 (1955). The Soviet representatives 
also stated where television transmitter stations had been established or were 
planned; these were in such places as Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, 
Gor'kii and Kiev.431 
Sometimes the British were given copies of other internal reports (for example, 
reports on the visit of the Soviet delegation to the Telefunken stand at various 
industrial exhibitions, noting the interest of the visitors in each of the devices on 
429 An example of an intelligence report based on internal Telefunken reports which had been shown to John 
Horner of STIB Berlin is OLB/BLl571369 dated 13 September 1957, DEFE 4 II 141 . The Soviet visitors 
concerned had shown interest in a wide range of electronic equipment, particularly transmission devices and 
measuring instruments for communications engineering. 
430Duty Book STIB/252/X/0900 dated 18 November 1955, DEFE 411 144. The contact's resulting information is 
given in Duty Book STIB/252/XIIIOO dated 21 November 1955, DEFE 411144. 
431STIB Report No. 259 dated 15 November 1955, DEFE411116. 
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display).432 These reports also contained the names of the Soviet representatives who 
had visited the Telefunken stand at the exhibition in question. 433 Other companies 
which passed similar information, or reports on the exhibitions themselves, to British 
In~elligence were the German subsidiary of Philips434, Siemens & Halske435, Rohde 
& Schwarz436, Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz437 and quite possibly Siemens-Schuckert 
as we1l438. Such intelligence was often highly thought-of, since, again, it revealed 
what technologies the Soviets were interested in acquiring.439 
In the mid-1950s a number of senior figures at AEG gave information to the British. 
One big wheel at the company who kept STIB informed of arrivals at his factory of 
scientific workers from the East (including some who had worked in the Soviet 
Union) and who put it in touch with these sources was Nienstedt, the director of 
AEG's factory in Brunnenstral3e in West Berlin.440 These were useful pieces of 
information, because intercepts would not have revealed the identity of every 
German in the USSR and many were not detected in the refugee streams flooding in 
from the East. One of a number of contacts who informed STIB of new employees of 
intelligence interest, Soviet visits to their factories and the interests the visitors had 
expressed was the Personnel Director of Siemens & Halske, Dr. Schlitzberger.441 
432STIB/252/XIII15 dated 13 September 1955, DEFE 41/136. 
433STIB/252/XII225 dated 29 September 1955, DEFE 41/136. 
434STIB/252/X/0915 dated 18 October 1955, DEFE 411136. 
435STIB/252/XII500 dated 9 December 1955, DEFE 411137; STIB Report No. 265 dated 12 January 1956, 
DEFE411116. 
436STIB/252/XII230 dated 12 December 1955, DEFE 411137 . 
437STIB Interview Report No. 94 dated 31 October 1952 on Hans Bosch, DEFE 41/98. 
4380LB/BLl57/384 dated 17 October 1957 (DEFE 411141) contains information provided by board members of 
some of the companies a Soviet delegation had recently visited. The companies concerned were Siemens-
Schuckert, AEG, Telefunken and others. It is not stated from which of these companies the information came, but 
it is probable that a representative of each of them provided information. 
439STIB/252/X/0912 dated 10 November 1955; STIB/G/I/448 dated 15 November 1955, DEFE 41/136. 
44OSTIB/252/XI1530 dated 7 June 1955, DE FE 411136. 
44ISTIB/252/X/0940 dated 19 October 1955, DEFE 411136. 
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Some contacts reported visits by employees to the USSR442 or visits there by 
acquaintances working in East German factories. 443 
The USSR recognized the Federal Republic in 1955. Trade missions were soon 
afterwards exchanged between the two countries. The West German delegations 
contained informants willing to share their impressions of what they had seen in the 
Soviet Union with STIB officers. They passed on a great deal of information about 
the factories and atomic plants they had seen. Like the 'Dragon Returners', they were 
expert observers and the information they gave STIB contained points of real interest 
which confirmed important strands of 'Dragon Return' intelligence. For instance, 
they made the British aware of the lower productivity of Soviet factories. Despite 
having dismantled and shipped home a very large part of the East German machine 
tool industry in the 1940s, the Soviets were by the mid-1950s very keen to buy West 
German machine tools and in 1957 invited a delegation from the Verband Deutscher 
Werkzeugmaschinen Fabriken (Federation of German Machine Tool Works) to visit 
the USSR. The delegation was told in Moscow that the Soviet machine tool industry 
could then only manufacture half of the machine tools needed to meet domestic 
needs and to provide the satellites with that proportion of their needs which the 
USSR had agreed to provide. The delegation was asked to lobby for the lifting of the 
embargo on the export of heavy machine tools to the Soviet Bloc. From their visits to 
machine tool factories, the delegation formed the rough estimate that some 5,000 
Soviet workers could manufacture approximately the same quantity of machine tools 
as a modern West German factory employing 2,000 workers.444 Another Soviet 
442STIB/252/X11440 dated 13 June 1955, DEFE 411136. 
4430L8/8L156/29 dated 24 April 1956, DEFE 411159. 
4440L8/8/57/353 dated 16 August 1957, DEFE 411141. Machine tools were of considerable military 
significance. Dismantlings in 1945-6 deprived East Germany of some 80% of its productive capacity in machine 
tools (N . Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 187). Nevertheless, the Soviet Union remained consistently 
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industry which, it was conceded .officially to a group of visiting German experts, 
could only supply half the USSR's needs (which included deliveries to satellite 
countries) was the instruments industry.445 A group of representatives of West 
German steel companies, on its return from a visit to Soviet steel works, 
metallurgical plants and rolling mills late in 1956, handed a copy of its 158-page 
report to the British. The group maintained that both the technology and workforce 
of Western works were superior to those of the Soviet Union.446 Representatives of 
West German companies manufacturing measuring instruments visited the USSR in 
1957 and, on their return, maintained that Soviet designs were generally of German 
or American origin and the products were of inferior quality to German measuring 
instruments. They added that lack of competition held back the development of 
Soviet skill in this field. Competition caused the technological standard of goods 
manufactured to rise and their price to fall; the absence of competition in the USSR 
meant that measuring instruments there were inappropriate to the tasks they had to 
perform and extremely expensive. The visitors were of the view that pressure to 
produce goods in quantity caused their quality to deteriorate. They had come across a 
measuring instruments factory in Leningrad which had learned from Honeywell-
Brown during the War how to design and manufacture recording potentiometers. The 
factory was in 1957 still producing the same obsolete models in large quantities. 447 
This intelligence is consistent with later studies of the backwardness of Soviet high-
backward in machine-tool manufacture. Its backwardness in manufacturing precision-grinding and cutting 
machinery held back its development of inertial guidance systems capable of guiding missi les with great accuracy 
to thei r targets and of multiple missile warheads (R. Amann, J. Cooper & R. W. Davies, The Technological Level 
o.f SovietinduslI)' (chapter by D. Holloway on 'Military Technology'), pp. 472 & 477). In 1961 , President 
Kennedy refused to sell American high-precision ball-bearing grinders to the USSR on the ground that they 
would be used to make components for missile guidance systems. But, to the benefit of Soviet missile 
technology, the US government approved the sale of such grinders to the USSR in 1972 as part of moves towards 
detente (J. Tuck, High-Tech Espionage: How the KGB SI/luggles NATO's Strategic Secrets to Moscow, pp. 111-
12). 
4450LB/BLl57/367 dated 12 September 1957, DEFE 411141. 
4460LB/BLl57/319 dated 16 May 1957, DEFE 411141. 
4470LB/BLl57/390 dated 31 October 1957, DEFE 411141. 
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technology products. Representatives of West German machine tool companies who 
visited machine tool works in Moscow, Leningrad and Sverdlovsk in 1957 formed 
exactly the same view. Quantity was considered more important than quality in the 
Soviet Union and the Plan target had to be achieved. This affected quality for the 
worse. Moreover, owing to a shortage of skilled workers, productivity per worker in 
the Soviet machine tool industry was about one-third that in West Germany.448 A 
high-powered group, including important directors of a number of great electrical 
engineering companies, such as Siemens-Schuckert, Telefunken and AEG, visited 
the USSR late in 1957 and were shown round valve factories, metal works, factories 
manufacturing electrical equipment and power stations. They made documents 
available to the British, from which a report containing their impressions of the 
places they visited was compiled.449 It is impossible to say what the DSI450 made of 
such intelligence. What is clear is that much telling information was gathered from 
'Kidney' contacts and it covered a wide range of fields. 
4480LB(C)57.11.1, DEFE41!l41. 
4490LB(B)57.12.13, DEFE41!l41. 
450By this time the Division of Scientific Intelligence of the Joint Intelligence Bureau at the Ministry of Defence. 
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F. Intercepted letters and monitored telecommunications 
Germany's value as an intelligence-gathering territory was increased by the 
extraordinary powers possessed by her Occupiers. They could intercept all letters 
circulating, and all telephone calls and other telecommunications made, within their 
Zones, and all letters and telecommunications arriving in their Zones from the other 
Zones and from the outside world . A very broad range of intelligence and counter-
intelligence was derived from intercepted letters and monitored 
telecommunications. 451 Most importantly, the British could intercept all letters and 
telephone calls coming from the East. Every East German who wrote a letter, or 
made a telephone call, to West Germany, was an informant, as was every deported 
German languishing in the USSR who wrote a letter home. During the years of the 
Occupation at least, almost all the letters passing between the Soviet Union and the 
British Zone of Germany were examined for suspect correspondence and, in the 
summer of 1948, of every ninety letters, one was intercepted.452 Intercepts were in 
45 lCounter-intelligence work in Germany during the Occupation had a scientific and technical aspect. 
Intercepted letters first brought to the attention of the British the Gehlen Organization 's rival operation to acquire 
intelligence of war-related scientific developments from deported German scientists, engineers and technicians 
about to return from the Soviet Union. In February 1950, a German PoW called Hermann Wuest passed through 
Friedland Camp, was transferred to the Special Interrogation Unit and there interrogated. He had been imprisoned 
in the great camp 702711 at Krasnogorsk, near Moscow, and provided intelligence on scientists and technicians 
held there. He took up residence in the British Zone and started to write letters to German scientific workers still 
in the Soviet Union. These letters were intercepted by the British and showed that Wuest was trying to locate 
deportees in the USSR and find out more about what they were doing there. It soon transpired that he was part of 
a bigger espionage ring. Gehlen' s Organization, though US-controlled, had no power of its own to intercept 
letters. Consequently , it had to start a letter-writing campaign with the aim of acquiring intelligence from its own 
correspondence with deportees in the USSR. A letter from one of Gehlen's case officers, a man called Franz 
Kirch, was intercepted, giving instructions to Wuest and mentioning a 'Dr. D' as the boss of the ring. Other 
letters sent to Wuest provided him with information on scientific workers in the USSR and increased British 
concern that they had a competitor in their very Zone. Some of Wuest's correspondents in West Germany were 
interrogated to find out more about him and his work; these confirmed that he was strongly anti -Soviet and 
working for an espionage organization of some sort (undated note on censorship intercepts entitled, ' Dip!. Ing. 
Franz Kirsch of Gau-Algesheim-am-Rhein' , DEFE 41 111). 
452Minutes of llC (Germany) meeting on 3 August 1948, DEFE 41/63 . 
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1952 the main source of all intelUgence, providing about 70% of the low-grade 
intelligence obtained by the British in Germany.453 
The vast bulk of the intercepted letters and monitored telecommunications did not 
yield scientific and technical intelligence.454 Nevertheless , they did yield some 
scientific intelligence455 and were in other ways crucial to scientific and technical 
intelligence-gathering. As Chapter 4 will relate, they were the principal means of 
coming by news of the scientific workers deported in Operation 'Osoaviakhim'. 
Using this information, STIB prepared the deportees' exploitation for scientific 
intelligence. Intercepted letters written by the deportees gave their location; their 
specialisms gave strong indications as to the work of the factories and institutes in 
which they were employed. Intercepts also gave notice of the deportees' return to 
Germany. Many of the deportees were Berliners and the interception of letters 
arriving in West Berlin from the USSR was particularly important. Initially, the 
British authorities in West Berlin intercepted all letters arriving in their Sector. Then, 
since post from the Soviet Union arrived first at a post office in the American Sector, 
to avoid delay and double handling it was agreed that the Americans would open 
letters addressed to the British Sector and pass copies of them to the British. By the 
mid-1950s cooperation had become closer, for the Americans were making three 
photostat copies of all letters arriving in West Berlin (for all the three Sectors there) 
from the USSR. These letters were passed to the British authorities' Communications 
453Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 12 February 1952, DEFE 41167. 
454Most of the information acquired from these intercepts was economic intelligence, and therefore of interest to 
the loint Intelligence Bureau (address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(lnt)BAOR, to the MIlO Technical Intelligence 
Conference, June 1951 , DEFE 411125). Much information relevant to counter-intelligence work was gathered. In 
1952, intercepted letters and monitored telecommunications provided about 90% of all the intelligence gathered 
by the British on extreme right-wing and militaristic German movements. Security Directorate of Intelligence 
Division, to which these intercepts were passed, seems to have targeted (among other groups) associations of 
former soldiers and former members of the German wartime General Staff (minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 
30 December 1952, DEFE 41/67). 
455Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 15 November 1951 , DEFE 41/66. 
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Section for sorting. The Section kept one copy of each letter and returned the other 
two to the Americans' REG for sending on to Frankfurt-am-Main.456 Although there 
was a brief experiment with a different system in the summer of 1955, that outlined 
was soon restored. 457 Letters being sent from West Berlin also passed through the 
hands of the Americans, who made copies of them for the British.458 
Intercepted letters revealed scientists and engineers who were unhappy with their lot 
in the Eastern Zone and so who might be receptive to an offer to take them West or 
to a request for information on the factory or institute at which they worked. 459 They 
allowed the movements around Europe and the wider world of the scientists, 
engineers and technicians who had worked in Nazi Germany's war industries and 
laboratories to be followed, for numerous intercepts revealed approaches to German 
scientific workers by representatives of such countries as the Soviet Union, France, 
Yugoslavia, Argentina, Peru and India. Almost every Power left on its feet after the 
Second World War was in the business of enticing German scientists, engineers and 
technicians to work for it and the consequent movement of German scientific 
knowhow throughout the world was of great concern, since it presaged the 
proliferation of military power. Letters which revealed that the writer had received an 
offer of work in the Soviet Bloc or elsewhere were very common.460 Letters 
456Duty Book dated 21 July 1955 from STIB Cologne to STIB Bonn; STIB/P/III 04 dated 28 July 1955 from 
STIB Director to STIB Berlin, DEFE 411144. REG (,Returnees Exploitation Group') was an American 
intelligence agency set up in 1951 to arrange, on their return in the 1950s, the defection from the DDR and 
interrogation of scientific workers deported to the USSR some years earlier (letter dated 10 August 1951 , DEFE 
4112). 
457Duty Book dated 21 July 1955; Duty Book dated 4 August 1955; STIB/P/lll42 dated 8 August 1955; Duty 
Book dated 9 August 1955 , DEFE 411144. The CIA agreed for a certain time to make three sets of photostats, 
passing one to the British (Duty Book dated 25 August 1955, DEFE 411144). In fact, since each American agency 
in West Berlin demanded a set, six sets would have to be prepared (one each for the CIA, its Office of Scientific 
Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, REG and the British) (Duty Book dated 5 September 1955, 
DEFE 411144). 
458Record of meeting entitled 'S/61' and dated 1417155 , DEFE 411142. 
459STIB/PF.438 118983 dated 19 September 1949; CHIJSJT/491145 dated 12 October 1949, DEFE 411131 . 
460Minutes of meeting of HQ. Int. Div. Control Committee on 14 October 1948, DEFE 41178. 
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intercepted in 1946, for example, . revealed that the Soviets were making strenuous 
efforts to reverse the effect of the evacuations carried out by the Americans in 
Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt in the summer of 1945, before the region was 
handed over to the Soviet armed forces, by enticing the evacuees back to their 
Zone. 461 Intercepts established that the Soviets used the KPD to contact scientists in 
the British Zone and persuade them to work on armaments projects. 462 Letters 
mentioning the kidnap or deportation of scientific workers were intercepted. 463 The 
British even managed to monitor telephone conversations within the Soviet Zone 
from which intelligence of Soviet recruitment of scientific personnel was 
acquired.464 Also active in the recruitment of German scientific workers with 
knowledge of military application was France. Since the Americans passed intercepts 
of interest to the British, the latter's net was all the wider in its scope. 
Many German scientific workers did not need to be enticed anywhere. In the years 
immediately after the War, a flood of letters passed through the hands of the British, 
in which their authors, scientists, engineers and technicians in the British Zone, 
applied for jobs in foreign countries or offered to sell inventions to foreign 
461 Periodic Intelligence Report No.3, dated 9 September 1946, to Chief FIAT (US) through Chief FIAT (US) 
Forward (from F. 1. Biermann, 1st Lt. MI , Chief, Scientific Section), Fa 1031/59. 
462Intercepted letter dated 31/8/46 from Helmut Reichstein of Dusseldorf to Karl Hortnagel of Steinachlam 
Brenner in OsterreichlTirol, Fa 1031165. 
463DEFE 41125 contains a few examples of such communications. One is the telephone call made within the US 
Zone on 26 March 1947 by Fraulein Spiess of Wiesbaden to Herr Neumann of Russelsheim, mentioning the 
kidnap and deportation by the Soviets at the Leipzig Fair of an engineer called Deubner. The Americans must 
have passed the record of this conversation to the British, since it is headed, 'US Civil Censorship Submission '. 
Another is a letter dated II May 1947 from a Professor at lena University, in the Soviet Zone, to a Professor at 
Gottingen, in the British Zone, recommending that the latter accept an offer of work on aerodynamics for a team 
in Berlin supervised by Tokaev. That method of approach, using connections between Germans, was very 
common, as a letter dated 15 April 1947 to STIB from the British Liaison Officer at HQ EUCOM (DEFE 41/25) 
confirms. . 
464An example is the telephone call in Russian made by H. Krasnopolskis, in Leipzig, to Major Komarov, in 
Berlin (and surely in the Soviet Sector of the city) on 10 April 1947. It was reported in the course of the 
conversation that 300 German scientific workers willing to go to the USSR had been recruited in Leipzig. 
Krasnopolskis added that, 'Our agents are searching for specialists in all the scientific branches'. The record of 
this conversation is in DEFE 41125. 
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companies or asked friends abroad to register patents on their behalf. 465 In these 
letters they often gave details of inventions they had made, thus giving Censorship 
Branch of Intelligence Division an idea of what technology a foreign Power might be 
about to acquire and providing it with valuable intelligence of scientific and technical 
advances to boot. 
Scientists, engineers and technicians trying to make a living were not the only 
unconscious informants of British Intelligence. Opening their letters and listening to 
their telephone calls turned the entire population of the British Zone into a network 
of informants. News (often simple rumours) of Soviet activities in their Zone often 
passed by post or phone call to the British Zone. An important example is the 
MVD's search for uranium. East Germans wrote to correspondents in the West of the 
upheavals caused by uranium-mining and in so doing gave the British sought-after 
intelligence. Their letters named places where much uranium was later mined. The 
Knauer family, of Aue in Saxony, wrote to their friends, the Korte family of Hamm 
in Westphalia, in late December 1946 that: 
We shall not be very happy in the Russian Sector, especially in our 
neighbourhood, as more and more Russians are taking up their abode here 
and are opening up new experimental mines, where they suppose the ore for 
atom-bombs to be, and to a certain extent are finding it. 466 
465Many such letters are held in FO 1031116 and FO 1031/24. As was mentioned in Chapter I, disagreements 
between the Occupiers frustrated the establishment of a Patent Office in post-war Germany. Furthermore, as a 
reparations measure the victorious Allies assumed ownership of German patents registered between 3 September 
1938 and 31 December 1945. Information taken from intercepted letters was used in drawing up a shortlist of 
German scientists, engineers and technicians who had invented devices which might contribute to Britain's 
prosperity. Their names and details of their inventions were passed to the British Intelligence Objectives Sub-
committee, which was responsible for the exploitation of German science. One such shortlist is attached to a 
letterdated2July 1947,FO 1031/24. 
466Letter postmarked 27 December 1946, FO 1031116. A letter containing similar information is that postmarked 
11 January 1947, FO 1031116. Likewise, in a letter postmarked 4 January 1947 (FO 1031116) a ski-ing 
instructress at Annaberg in the Erzgebirge wrote to a correspondent in Westphalia that uranium had been 
discovered in Himlisch. 
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Intercepts shed some light on how Pluch ore was being found in mines hafts in the 
Erzgebirge.467 They also established that some war-production factories were being 
started up again in the Soviet Zone and that others had been dismantled and 
transported to the USSR. One plant which, it was clear from intercepts, was back in 
operation was the ZeiB works in Jena. A letter-writer called Anneliese Osten wrote 
that blackboard notices and newspapers were advertising for 1,000 young workers as 
production was being greatly increased for the Soviet Military Administration.468 In 
another intercepted letter, the writer told of the dismantling of the armaments factory, 
belonging to Sauer & Sohn, in which she had worked. All its machinery had been 
transported to the Soviet Union. Every day freight trains packed with machinery 
were setting off for the East.469 Partly by drawing on information in intercepted 
letters, a list was made in November 1948 of all the known radio installations 
(transmitters, broadcasting stations and so on) in the Soviet Zone and the USSR 
itself. Other information came from refugees and 'line-crossers' .470 
Intercepted communications allowed West German compliance with the embargo on 
the export of strategic goods to be monitored. For instance, when in 1950 an 
employee of Schering in Hamburg phoned a colleague working for the company's 
Berlin operation, he mentioned that medical supplies exported by Schering to Hong 
Kong were, in his view, being smuggled over the border to China, now Communist. 
Therefore, there existed the possibility, alarming to the British, that such supplies, 
467These intercepted letters are referred to in STO/25/DEl48 , DEFE 411145. 
468Intercepted letter dated 8 August 1946 from Anneliese Osten (or Olten) of Halberstadt to Dr. Osten (or Olten) 
of Budenich (Kreis Moers), FO 1031/65. 
469Intercepted letter dated 10 August 46 from Anneliese Kutschenbauer of Suhl to Albert Schatz, 
HolzheimlNeuss, FO 1031/65. 
470STO/29/DE/48 , DEFE 411145. The 'Iine-crossers ' here referred to are people who lived on one side of the 
Demarcation Line and yet worked on the other. 
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and perhaps scientific instruments. as well, were being obtained by the Soviet Union 
through its Chinese satellite.471 
Internal censorship - the interception of communications within West Germany - was 
abandoned in 1952. However, censorship of post and telecommunications emanating 
from the USSR and its satellites was maintained by the Western Occupiers, with the 
agreement of the West Germans, until the end of the Cold War. The interception 
rights which Britain, France and the United States retained after the Occupation of 
Germany ended were among the matters recorded in a Contractual Agreement with 
the government of the Federal Republic.472 Little is known either about the 
negotiations leading up to this Agreement or about its provisions. The three Western 
Occupiers seem to have demanded the right to intercept all mail and monitor all 
telecommunications, but the Federal Government put up a fight over some of these 
powers, which it regarded as violations of Article 10 of the Basic Law (so long as the 
interception of letters and monitoring of telecommunications were not made lawful 
by a specific enactment of the Bundestag).473 The parties appear to have 
compromised by agreeing that the Western Allies would continue to intercept letters 
and monitor telecommunications arriving in West Germany and West Berlin from 
the Soviet Bloc, but that they would lose their right to intercept communications 
made within West Germany itself. The High Commissioners of the three Powers 
agreed to the cessation of 'internal censorship' in the early summer of 1952, though 
this did not apply to mail circulating within Berlin, which was a special case. 474 In 
471 Letter dated 2 October 1950, DEFE 41/152. 
472This 'Contractual Agreement' is referred to in the minutes of the JIC (Germany) meeting on II September 
1951 (DEFE 41/66); the minutes of the meeting on 15 November 1951 (DEFE 41/66); the minutes of the meeting 
on 7 December 1951 (DEFE 41/66); and the minutes of the meeting on 12 February 1952 (DEFE 41/67). 
473Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 12 February 1952, DEFE 41 /67. 
474Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 6 May 1952, DEFE 41/67. 
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return, Adenauer conceded that interception of external mail and telecommunications 
should continue. The legal form this would take was that Article IV of the 
Contractual Agreement, by giving to the Western Powers certain rights to allow them 
to ensure the security of their forces in West Germany, would, in very general terms, 
provide them with cover for their intelligence activities. Specific legal power to 
continue to examine external communications would be conceded by a 
Memorandum of Understanding (i.e. a secret protocol), which would be signed by 
Adenauer, as Federal Chancellor, at the same time as the Agreement. However, that 
this was going to happen was leaked to the West German press. Giving Germany's 
conquerors the right to continue to open letters written to Germans was such political 
dynamite that Adenauer no longer dared to sign the 'Memorandum of 
Understanding' as he had agreed to do. Instead, the State Secretary of the Federal 
Chancellery, Dr. Lenz, signed the document towards the end of May 1952. Of 
course, that was not enough for the Western Powers, who insisted that Adenauer, in a 
separate document, give written consent to the continued interception by the three of 
them of external mail and telecommunications.475 The Contractual Agreement itself 
was signed in June 1952.476 
It is clear that all letters and telecommunications circulating in Berlin were still to be 
intercepted by the Western Allies and that all 'external mail and communications' 
arriving in West Germany from the Soviet Bloc countries were too. However, two 
475Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 27 May 1952; minutes of the meeting on 17 June 1952; and minutes of 
the meeting on 6 May 1952, DEFE 41/67. Indeed, Adenauer may even have lied and said that he had no intention 
of signing any such Agreement. The minutes of the JlC (Germany) meeting on 27 May 1952 record that, 'An 
unfortunate incident had occurred in the previous week when certain members of the press had learnt of the 
existence of a secret agreement, and an extremely delicate situation had arisen as the Federal Chancellor could 
not now sign the memorandum'. 
476Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 17 June 1952, DEFE 41/67. The British were soon calling the 
Contractual Agreement the 'Bonn Convention ' (minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 19 August 1952, DEFE 
41/67). 
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uncertainties remain. The first is ,how 'external mail and telecommunications ' were 
actually defined. This was a much-disputed issue. The West Germans thought that 
only letters and telecommunications arriving in West Germany and West Berlin from 
the Soviet Bloc should be intercepted; the Western Powers wanted to continue to 
intercept those arriving in the Federal Republic from the whole of the world, and 
above all from neutral states like Switzerland, of which Soviet Intelligence would 
make use if there was a loophole in the interception arrangements which allowed it to 
do so. It is not clear from the minutes of the meetings of HC (Germany) in this 
period how this issue was resolved. Nor it is clear whether Adenauer himself ever 
gave the Western Powers the written assurance they sought from him. If he did sign 
such a document, he seems to have given them rights they could not lawfully 
possess, for interception of communications was contrary to the Federal Republic's 
Basic Law. Thus his action will itself have been unconstitutional. However, it is 
certain that the intelligence agencies in Germany of Britain, France and the United 
States continued to intercept letters and monitor telecommunications throughout the 
Cold War. From 1945 the Americans maintained two units in West Germany for 
intercepting such letters and telephone calls: Unit JJ in West Berlin and Unit WW in 
Munich. The MfS' foreign intelligence service learned much about the work of these 
units and on the basis of the information obtained two former HV A officers claim 
that the former Occupiers' powers of interception related to all letters going from 
East to West across the German-German border, and even those going from West to 
East, and to all telephone calls between the Federal Republic (including West Berlin) 
and the DDR, and between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. It appears from 
this that Adenauer prevailed in 1952 and that the Western Allies ' powers of 
interception related to letters and telephone calls to and from the Soviet Bloc, rather 
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than the wider world. These powers they possessed from the time of their advance 
into Germany in early 1945 until 1990.477 
477K. Eichner & A. Dabbert, Headquarters GermallY, pp. 201-4. 
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· CHAPTER 3 
THE PRISONERS-OF-WAR COME HOME 
A. Flushing at Friedland 
The foregoing chapters have chiefly concerned the acquisition of scientific and 
technical intelligence by the British from German sources who were working, or had 
worked, directly or indirectly, for the Soviets in East Germany. The next three 
chapters concern an even more valuable type of informant: those Germans exploited 
for their labour or knowhow in the Soviet Union itself. The War showed the Soviet 
leaders that their country was backward in military technology, particularly with 
regard to Germany and the USA. As soon as it ended, Stalin set the USSR the aim of 
catching up with the West in the most crucial military technologies. The highest 
priority was given to the making of an atomic bomb. The First Chief Directorate of 
the Council of Ministers, directed by the Munitions Minister, Boris Vannikov, and 
responsible to Lavrentii Beria, was created in August 1945 to organize the USSR's 
atomic project.478 Another weapon to which high priority was given was the surface-
to-surface missile (and, from 1950, the surface-to-air missile, for use in air 
defence).479 Another supraministerial organization was created, again subordinate to 
the Council of Ministers, to supervise the development of guided missiles. It set up a 
number of research institutes and design bureaux to carry forward missile 
development, led by such outstanding designers as S. P. Korolev, M. K. langel', V. 
4780 . Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-56, p. 129. When it was 
created on 20 August 1945 by a decree of the State Defence Committee, it was known as the First Chief 
Directorate of the Council of People's Commissars. In 1946, the People's Commissariats became known as 
Ministries. 
479V. Zubok & c. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War: From Stalin to Khmshchev, pp. 141-2. 
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P. Glushko and G. N. Babakin.480 In the years between the War's end and his death 
Stalin also initiated projects to develop radar and jet propulsion.481 The first post-war 
Five Year Plan gave priority to these four technologies.482 German scientific workers 
were involved in the development of all of them. 
The War left the Western USSR in ruins. The country also suffered from a crippling 
lack of manpower. Of its twenty-seven million or so war dead, most had been men 
between the ages of eighteen and thirty.483 Because of the desperate shortage of able-
bodied men, German prisoners-of-war were used to build a substantial number of 
war-related factories, research institutes and other installations. The first penetration 
of the Soviet military-industrial complex was achieved, on their return to their 
homeland, with the help of these men.484 That the Soviets handed over such a 
valuable source of information to the West caused bewilderment.485 If not a godsend, 
the prisoners-of-war were, at the very least, a Stalinsend (so a demi-godsend). They 
were an extraordinary human source of intelligence which came when most needed. 
When the PoWs returned to Germany, flights by foreign aircraft over the USSR were 
not permitted. In the diplomatic flights to Moscow which were occasionally made the 
Soviet pilots took care not to fly over cities. The Military Attaches in Moscow of the 
Western Powers were confined to the capital and its environs, generally being denied 
passports to visit other parts of the Soviet Union. The other demi-godsend to arrive 
4800. Ball & J. Richelson, Strategic Nile/ear Targeting (article by w. Lee on 'Soviet Nuclear Targeting'), p. 94. 
481 0. Holloway, Stalill and the BOlllb, p. 365. 
4820. Holloway, Stalill alld the BOlllb, pp. 144-9. 
483V. Zubok & c. Pleshakov,llIside the Krellllill's Cold War, p. 6. 
484It is true that the ' Apple Pie' exploitation of German intelligence knowleoge of the USSR yielded information 
on military and industrial installations, but after the Second World War the Soviet government founded whole 
new military industries (above all, the atomic industry) in its bid to catch up with the West in the new key 
military technologies. The PoWs brought home with them up-to-date knowledge of the USSR's post-war 
military-industrial complex. 
485See, for example, paragraph 58, Appendix L, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-
American Conference, OEFE 41/160. 
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back in Germany in the 1950s, the German scientists and technicians deported in 
1945-8, were too few in number to provide as broad a perspective on developments 
in the USSR as the PoWs, and they only began to return in any numbers in 1950. 
Trade with the USSR was minimal at the end of the 1940s, with the result that 
commercial links could not be exploited for intelligence as profitably as they later 
could.486 The Chief of Intelligence Division, Major-General Haydon, paid tribute to 
the intelligence value of the returning PoWs when he told the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (Germany) late in 1949: 
There was no doubt that returning prisoners-of-war formed one of the most 
fruitful and steady sources of information on Russia available in Germany, 
and it was impossible to over-estimate either the value of the information 
obtained or the loss that would be experienced when the flow ceased' .487 
In identifying numerous targets not just for a possible bombing offensive but also for 
later aerial and satellite reconnaissance operations, the PoWs quite literally got the 
Cold War intelligence struggle off the ground. 
In 1948 and 1949 there was a great flow of prisoners-of-war from the USSR to the 
West. The Soviets regularly brought to the Demarcation Line transports of PoWs 
returning to the British Zone. They were met by the British and taken to nearby 
Friedland Camp, not far from Gottingen. There the PoWs' particulars were recorded 
486c. Egan & A. Knott, Essays in TIVentieth-Centlll )' Alllerican Diplolllatic History Dedicated to Professor 
Daniel M. SlIIith (article by 1. Erdmann on 'The Wringer in Postwar Germany '), p. 165. 
487Minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 20 September 1949, DEFE 41/64. Since Haydon certainly knew what 
he was talking about, the statement of the former CIA officer, Harry Rositzke, that information obtained in the 
late 1940s in Germany, Austria and Korea from returning German PoWs, defectors from the Soviet armed forces , 
Soviet and Eastern European refugees and unrepatriated Soviet PoWs did not much diminish Western ignorance 
of the Soviet Union is clearly wrong. The claim is made at p. 19 of The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, 
COllnter-espionage and Covert Action . Rositzke goes on to say of this intelligence that, 'Most of it was trivial, 
much of it spotty, garbled or out-of-date'. This chapter will make two points in rebuttal. First, a significant 
proportion of that intelligence was of considerable value. Secondly, the purpose of the systematic interrogation of 
the returning prisoners-of-war was to put together many pieces of intelligence on specific targets, each piece 
perhaps of little importance by itself, but the whole representing information of genuine value. This approach 
yielded significant results. 
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and those who might have valuable intelligence, whatever its nature, were 'flushed' 
(separated) from the body of returners. Those with technical intelligence formed 
approximately 5% of the whole; they were generally interrogated at Friedland by a 
specially-briefed interrogator.488 Sources with technical intelligence of real value 
were sent on to the nearby Special Interrogation Unit for specialist interrogation. 
Realizing the significance of post-war reconstruction, Scientific Intelligence in 
London instructed interrogators at Friedland to pay particular attention to PoWs who 
had been engaged in construction work.489 Others were flushed from the PoW stream 
because letters they had written from the USSR had indicated that they might have 
information of scientific or technical interest.49o 
The model for this operation was the work of an American unit in Austria, the 
'Military Intelligence Service Austria' (MISA), which interrogated 'Displaced 
Persons' (DPs) and PoWs entering Austria from the East.491 The DPs were people 
who had been taken to the USSR during the War. They entered Austria as they made 
their way along escape routes running from Central Asia to the Balkans. Most of 
these people were Jews trying to reach the Mediterranean (they were clearly 
Holocaust survivors). The intelligence gathered from these sources was generally 
low-grade, but valuable since it confirmed information already obtained. 492 MISA's 
work was also the inspiration for the great operation of PoW interrogation 
undertaken by the United States Air Force in Germany, codenamed Operation 
488Address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(lnt)BAOR, to MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 195 I, 
DEFE411125. 
489Letter from Chairman JSIJTIC to Director STIB dated 6 July 1948 and entitled 'Briefing of interrogators at 
Friedland', DEFE 411123. 
490Memorandum dated 31 May 1949; letter dated 12 July 1949; STIB/LR17 1 02146/9060 dated 22 September 
1949, DEFE41/4. 
491 Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 4 November 1947, DEFE 41/63. 
492Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 10 September 1947, DEFE 41/63 . 
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'Wringer'. The USAFE Air Intelligence Directorate was keen to interrogate PoWs 
returning to Germany because many of those interrogated by MISA had been put to 
work in or near cities listed as its priority targets. Very many had built or rebuilt 
fac.tories in the Soviet Union, including war-related factories, and some had even 
worked in them.493 
Operation 'Wringer' began later than British interrogation of the returning PoWs. 
Authority for it was given late in 1948 by Major-General Charles Cabell, the 
USAFE's Director of Intelligence, and interrogation began in Wiesbaden in June 
1949. The purpose of Operation 'Wringer' was far more ambitious than that behind 
the counterpart British operation and the operation itself was a bigger one. The 
USAFE's aim was to acquire precise target intelligence which would allow the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC), if war came, to carry out an effective atomic strike 
on the Soviet Union. 494 The PoWs' return to West Germany coincided with 
Lieutenant-General Curtis LeMay's appointment (in October 1948) as commanding 
general of the SAC. LeMay set himself the task of making his command capable of 
carrying out an effective first strike on the USSR. His aim was to make the SAC 
capable of delivering at least 80% of the USA's atomic stockpile in a single strike. 
From December 1948 the SAC's strike was accepted by the USAF's high command 
to be its principal mission and the SAC's budgetary and programming requirements 
were given top priority.495 The aim of the SAC's strike would be to destroy the 
493c. Egan & A. Knott, Essays in Twentieth-Celltlll), American Diplomatic History (Erdmann article), p. 166. 
Operation 'Wringer' was so called because its purpose was to wring the last drop of inFormation out of the PoWs. 
Astutely, the Americans used the Germans of the Gehlen Organization to carry out their own interrogation of the 
returning prisoners-oF-war, presumably in the belieF that the PoWs would open up beFore Former comrades-in-
arms. This operation was codenamed 'Hermes' (K. Eichner & A. Dobbert , Hei:ulqllarters Germany: Die USA-
Geheimdiellste il/ Delltschlal/d, p. 51). 
494c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays il/ Twentieth-Centlll), Americal/ Diplomatic History, (Erdmann article) , p. 174; 
K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headqllarters Germal/Y, p. 205. 
4950. Ball & 1. Richelson, Strategic Nile/ear Targetil/g (article by D. A. Rosenberg on 'US Nuclear War 
Planning 1945-1960'), p. 39. 
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USSR's war-making capability in all its aspects: atomic, conventional and military-
industrial. The chief intelligence resource available to assist in planning this 
knockout blow was the body of German PoWs flooding into the US Zone of 
Germany. When 'Wringer' began, ignorance of the Soviet Union was profound. The 
Americans lacked even basic information on, for instance, the Soviet Union's cities 
and transport networks, the placing of its airfields and the location and production of 
its factories.496 The only information the USAF (like the RAF) had on targets in the 
USSR was supplied by pre-war (and even Tsarist-era) maps and out-of-date 
photographs taken on Luftwaffe reconnaissance missions over Soviet targets in the 
years 1941-4.497 The teams of interrogators stationed in the main cities of the US 
Zone, officially called 'USAF Historical Research' teams, were originally instructed 
to acquire information on fifty cities in the USSR (this number soon grew to 403).498 
The Americans maintained no central interrogation camp through which the 
incoming PoW tide was directed. Screening officers in the reception camps of the US 
Zone recorded the names and details of prospective sources, who were then invited 
for interview by the city-based interrogation teams . In the period 1949-53 the 
returning PoWs provided, in the words of one historian, 'the bulk of air force basic 
intelligence on the USSR' .499 They identified and located numerous targets for an 
496H. Rositzke, Th e CIA 's Secret Operations, p. 19. 
497These films had been seized from the Berlin headquarters of the Luftwaffe in 1945 and taken for storage to an 
RAF airfield in Britain (c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays in Twentieth-Centllry Alllerican Diplolllatic History, 
(Erdmann article), pp. 165 & 187 footnote 9). 
498c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays in Twentieth-Centllry Alllerican Diplolllatic History (Erdmann article), pp. 175-6 
& 187 footnote 8. 
4990 . Ball & 1. Richelson, Strategic Nllclear Targeting (Rosenberg article) , p. 40. From August 1950, in 
response to the first Soviet atomic test, US military planning awarded first priority in an atomic strike on the 
Soviet Union to the 'destruction of known targets affecting the Soviet capability to deliver atomic bombs'. This 
was to 'blunt' a Soviet atomic attack and the category of targets was accordingly codenamed BRA YO. Attacking 
targets which facilitated the movement of Soviet ground forces into Western Europe had second priority. This 
was to retard a Soviet attack and the category of targets was accordingly codenamed ROMEO. Given third 
priority were attacks on Soviet liquid fue l, electric power and atomic energy installations, all of which were 
crucial to the USSR's capacity to make war. This was to disrupt or destroy the Soviet Union's war-making 
capacity and the category of targets was accordingly codenamed DELTA. This categorization was amended over 
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atomic strike; they provided descriptions of the lay-out of cities and military and 
industrial installations; and they gave accounts of the state of these targets' defences 
against air attack.500 The Americans also benefited from the British interrogation 
programme. Six copies of every PoW interrogation were sent to the US European 
Command through the channel of the US Liaison Officer at British military 
headquarters. 501 This included all scientific and technical intelligence gathered from 
the PoWs, with the exception of intelligence acquired on atomic energy, which the 
Americans received from D.At.En .. 502 
Britain did not have a nuclear strike force capable of attacking the USSR until late in 
1956, when the Vulcan series of V -bombers came into service. 503 Nevertheless, the 
interrogation of the PoW s evidently yielded intelligence directly relevant to Britain's 
emerging post-war defence strategy. The RAF was very active in tracking down 
returned PoWs who could provide information on the USSR. As part of British-
American intelligence collaboration, USAFE interrogation teams were by the early 
1950s stationed in the British Zone, where the RAF had already built up a card index 
relating to 50,000 returned PoWs.504 Using this card index, the RAF carried out an 
the years that followed (and, in particular, the category of industrial targets was broadened as increasing emphasis 
was placed on it), but it provided the basic structure of the targeting of the US nuclear strike force for most of the 
1950s. Under LeMay's influence, governmental control centres and less well-defined 'urban industrial 
concentrations' became the primary targets. 
500c. Egan & A. Knott, Essays ill Twentieth-Centllry AII/erican Diplomatic History (Erdmann article), pp. 159 & 
178. 
501 Minutes of JIC (Germany) meeting on 20 November 1950, DEFE 41/65. The Americans also received six 
copies of all reports of refugee interrogations. Five copies of each interrogation of a deserter from the Soviet 
armed forces were passed to them. STIB also passed to them copies of its interrogations with German scientists, 
engineers and technicians who had returned to Germany from the USSR and then defected to the West. David 
Evans of STIB complained at this meeting of receiving less from the Americans than he gave them. The minutes 
of JIC (Germany) meeting on 29 August 1950 (DEFE 41/65) show that the Americans also received copies of 
British reports on post received in the Zone from the USSR which had been intercepted. 
502See Chapter 4, footnote 664. 
503D. Ball & J. Richelson, Strategic Nliclear Targeting (article by L. Freedman on 'British Nuclear Targeting'), 
p. 113. 
504c. Egan & A. Knott, Essays in Twentieth-Centlll)' American Diplomatic History (Erdmann article), p. 181 . 
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active programme of re-interrogation. The intelligence gathered will likewise have 
allowed the RAF to plan an air offensive on the cities of the USSR, if war came. In 
1949, the lIC insisted that, if an atomic attack on the Soviet Union had to be made, 
the best targets would be its hundred largest cities, containing 'the centres of 
political, economic and administrative control'. Thus the machinery of government 
would be destroyed. 505 
The British interrogation operation began at some point after September 1947. There 
was then a considerable flow of migrants into the British Zone from the East. 
Certainly by the beginning of 1948 the systematic interrogation of returning German 
prisoners-of-war, with the object of penetrating the Soviet Bloc, had begun at 
Friedland Camp.506 The great majority of these PoWs had been imprisoned in the 
USSR, but some were sent to Friedland from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
and Albania. Large-scale interrogation seems to have lasted until May 1950, when 
the Soviets announced through the TASS news agency in Frankfurt-am-Main that the 
repatriation of prisoners-of-war had ceased. Quite a number continued to cross into 
the British Zone, having been repatriated to homes in the Soviet Zone and having 
decided not to remain there. They were also interrogated at Friedland. The Soviets 
claimed in their announcement that they had returned 1,939,163 PoW s and had none 
left to return. This led to furious protests from the West German government, which 
505Paragraph 10, JIC(48) 116 dated 4 August 1949 and entitled, 'The Use of Atomic Bombs in a War against the 
Soviet Union', CAB 158/5. 
506Minutes of JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 29 September 1947, DEFE 41/68. At this 
meeting it was reported that, according to unconfirmed information, in one border crossing-place alone there 
were approximately 2,000 'line-crossers' every night, of whom only about sixty were interrogated. The 
intelligence potential of sources of information arriving from the East was obvious and the priority given to 
finding out more about the Soviet Bloc was so high that a greater effort to exploit this opportunity had to be 
made. A counterpart operation was carried out in Austria under the codename, 'Heimkehrer' (Homecomer). In 
the period 1947 - March 1951 Austrian prisoners-of-war were returned in great numbers to the British Zone of 
Austria and there interrogated. At the very least, this operation yielded intelligence on weaponry and military 
equipment in service with the Soviet army and in production in armaments factories in the USSR (address by 
Capt. C. H. Hallett, Int. Org. BTA, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126). 
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in response sent a commission to the UN that same year to ask for help in finding out 
what had become of 1,156,663 members of the 'former German armed forces 
missing in the Eastern Theater of war'. Among this number were 118,507 PoWs 
known by name to be in Soviet hands.507 
In the course of this operation, between 230,000 and 287,000 prisoners-of-war were 
'screened' (i.e. given an initial interrogation) at Friedland Camp in the years 1948-
51. Since efforts were made to acquire intelligence from those who managed to avoid 
being screened at Friedland, the true number of PoWs who passed through the hands 
of British Intelligence will have been higher. The figure of approximately a quarter 
of a million is broadly in line with the number of PoWs actually interrogated by the 
Americans . Between 1949 and 1955, 'Wringer' interrogation units questioned 
between 300,000 and 400,000 prisoners-of-war and wrote over a million intelligence 
reports.508 The number of PoWs who passed through Friedland Camp is difficult to 
establish, in part because of the uncertainty over when exactly the operation started. 
507c. Egan & A. Knott, Essays in Twentieth-Century American Diplomatic History (Erdmann article), pp. 167-8. 
508K. Eichner & A. Dobbert, Headquarters Germany, pp. 204-5; C. Egan & A. Knott , Essays in Twentieth-
CenllIry American Diplomatic History (Erdmann article), p. 159. James Erdmann states (at p. 159) that 'over 
300,000' former PoWs were interrogated, but Eichner & Dobbert 's estimate of 300,000-400,000 is the more 
appropriate, since Erdmann (at p. 176) mentions that the register of PoW sources eventually contained nearly 
400,000 names . The British, by contrast, were perennially short of manpower. This shortage meant that in 
November 1949, at the instruction of the HC, British Intelligence had to adopt a policy of interrogating only those 
likely to have valuable information. Priority in interrogation was given to two specific categories of returned 
PoWs: those who had only just returned (i.e. after I November 1949) and could therefore supply the most up-to-
date information; and officers and 'technical other ranks and ratings '. These two groups of source were 
interrogated regardless of the camps from which they had come. With regard to the rest, rank-and-file PoWs 
without any technical training who had been repatriated before I November 1949, the known camps in the USSR 
were divided among the intelligence sections of the different regions of the BOZ so that each region's section 
interrogated only those PoWs in this category who had been held in Soviet camps allocated to it, camps on the 
overriding list and then-unknown camps (JSIJTIC(49)87 dated 3 October 1949 and entitled, 'Returning PoWs: 
Proposals for reducing numbers of backlog requiring interrogation' , DEFE 41/151). STIB 's overriding list of 250 
camps was sent to all the regions of the BOZ for compulsory use (minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 10 
January 1950, DEFE 41/65). However, lack of manpower seems to have caused the overriding list to be 
abandoned (this was, at least, the JSIJTIC's recommendation). By these means, a cross-section of the PoWs 
repatriated before I November 1949, amounting to approximately one-third to one-quarter of the total number, 
would be interrogated and a fair cross-section of the information they possessed would be obtained. Crucially, all 
PoWs returning after 1 November 1949 and all those returning from then-unknown camps would be screened. 
(JS/JTIC(50)3 dated 15 February 1950 and entitled, 'Measures to improve the state of intelligence available on 
Russian Intentions and Preparedness for War', DEFE 41/152). 
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At the meetings of the committee which supervised it, the Coordinating Committee 
of HC (Germany), figures for the number of those who had arrived at the camp in the 
previous month or since the previous meeting were not always given. The number of 
th9se who passed through Friedland Camp in 1948 is as follows509: 
Month 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
1-20 August 
21 August - 12 September 
Number of PoWs who arrived 
not stated 
It was first reported that two batches of 
650 PoWs arrived each week (1,300 each 
week; therefore 5,200 during the month). 
But it was later stated that the batches of 
PoWs who arrived during February were 
in fact not less than 650 and in some 
cases were as large as 1,200. 
Consequently, the figure of 5,200 is too 
small. At a guess, the true figure may 
have been as high as 7,000 - 8,000. 
not stated 
not stated 
not stated 
18,345 
8,293 
7,750 
3,800 
5l»rhe information in this table is taken from the minutes of the meetings of the Coordinating Committee of JIC 
(Germany) in i 948 , which are to be found in DEFE 41/68. 
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13 September - 3 October 
4 October - 23 October 
24 October - 14 November 
15 November - first few days of 
December 
Most of December 
3,800 
3,949 
5,600 
13,266 
not stated 
Consequently, the number of German PoWs who passed through Friedland in 1948 
cannot have been less than 70,003. Since a higher figure than 5,200 should be given 
for February, the true figure for seven of the twelve months of 1948 should be 
approximately 72,000. That yields an average of 10,286 PoWs per month. Assuming 
(which may not be the case) that the five remaining months for which no figure is 
given saw an average number of PoWs pass through Friedland, it follows that 
123,430 of them arrived at the camp in 1948. 
In 1949, the Soviets returned some 147,000 PoWs to the British Zone. After 1949, 
the number of those returning waned substantially, l7 ,000 being transported to the 
BOZ in 1950. Only 421 seem to have entered the British Zone and been interrogated 
in the first four months of 1951. 510 The total minimum number of German PoWs to 
pass through Friedland between the beginning of 1948 and the early months of 1951 
was therefore 236,421. The maximum figure (or thereabouts) for the same period is 
287,851. This figure, of course, does not include those many PoWs who had returned 
510Address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(lnt)BAOR, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951, DEFE 
411125. From the Soviet announcement of May 1950 the PoWs who passed through the hands of the British 
tended to have returned to the Soviet Zone and then to have decided to cross over to the British Zone. For 
example, in the period 16 May - 4 June 1950 a total of 188 PoWs arrived at Friedland, of whom 100 had been 
imprisoned in the USSR. Nearly all of these 100 had been released in the Soviet Zone and had crossed illegally to 
the British Zone, where they had been directed to Friedland Camp. On interrogation, they provided intelligence of 
very high quality (minutes of JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 6 June 1950, DEFE 41/69). 
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to the British Zone before interrogations began at Friedland, nor those who were not 
returned to the BOZ by the Soviets, but entered it from the US or French Zones. 
These men, together with PoWs who only received a short interrogation at Friedland 
because they were then considered unimportant and PoWs who missed interrogation 
owing to sickness, were known as 'the backlog' .511 Efforts were made to acquire 
information from them. In late 1949, it was estimated that there was a backlog of 
200,000 uninterrogated PoWs; by late 1950 this number had been reduced to 
100,000.512 These efforts will have increased the number of PoWs questioned by 
British Intelligence far beyond 230,000-287,000. 
B. The Intelligence Yield 
Much more remains to be discovered about the intelligence yield of the interrogation 
of the returning prisoners-of-war. Information is scarce. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the PoWs were an early and valuable source of intelligence on the topography, 
industry, military installations and growing military-industrial complex of the USSR. 
They also stated where deported German scientists, engineers and technicians were 
511 JS/JTIC(49)87 dated 3 October 1949 and entitled, 'Returning PoWs: Proposals for reducing numbers of 
backlog requiring interrogation' , DEFE 41/151. A high proportion of the PoWs were ill when they arrived at 
Friedland and had to be sent to hospital at once. For instance, towards the end of October 1948, of the PoWs who 
had passed through Friedland in the previous three weeks, malnutrition, cardiac diseases and tuberculosis 
accounted for 82% of those sent to hospital. In those three weeks of October 1948, the proportion of sick had 
been unusually high (34%), but it was often around 20% (minutes of JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee 
meeting on 26 October 1948, DEFE 41/68). 
512Minutes of meeting of ACAS(I) and Production Directorate, Intelligence Division, held at the Air Ministry on 
2 November 1950, DEFE 41/91 . This was a good year's work, for Intelligence Division's plan had been for 
50,000 to be flushed by regional intelligence staffs in 1950. To give an idea of how much scientific and technical 
intelligence was acquired as a rule from the PoWs, from these 50,000 Intelligence Division expected to flush 
10,000 whose information justified the issue of an intelligence report. Of these 10,000 reports, some 2,000 (i.e. 
some 4% of the whole, but representing 20% of the intelligence gathered) would contain intelligence of war-
related scientific research and development in the USSR (report dated I November 1949 on 'Scientific and 
Technical Intelligence Branch: Review of Future Commitments', DEFE 41/83). This supports the figure of 5% 
given by Major Birch at the 1951 MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference (see footnote 488). 
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at work.Sl3 The quality of the intelligence they provided was consistently very high. 
Very significantly for the Cold War intelligence struggle, they identified key 
installations in the Soviet military-industrial complex, some of which remain 
important to Russia's defence capability today. Although particular individuals who 
provided intelligence of outstanding importance can be identified, it is clear that a 
great number of the PoWs had acquired information of value, since the quantity of 
valuable intelligence increased as the intake of PoWs into the camp increased.Sl4 A 
'Special Interrogation Unit' (SIU) was set up at Bad Driburg, not far from Friedland, 
to which those (comparatively few) PoWs with important scientific and technical 
information to impart were taken for specialist interrogation.SIS Thus in April 1949 
the number of PoWs transferred from Friedland to the SIU was 307 PoWs (which 
was a high figure).SI6 The figure for May was 343s17and that for June 273.S18 
Valuable scientific and technical intelligence was gathered from the PoWs, in part 
SI30ne example (among many) is a group of deportees from the Leunawerk, led by Dr. Paul Herold, who were 
placed by PoWs at Lisskhimstroi in the Ukraine (see reports in DEFE 41124 such as STlB/SOll/6/S239D dated 8 
April 1949, No. 8S17 dated 27 October 1949 and SIU/R/PWR/497 dated 29 November 1949). The Americans 
also acquired such information from PoWs (c. Egan & A. Knott, Essays ill Twelltieth-Celltllry Americall 
Diplomatic History (Erdmann article), p. 178). 
SI4Minutes of JlC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 20 September 1949, DEFE 41/69. 
DSIIJTIC(SO)6 dated I November 1950 and entitled, 'Places of Interest to DSIIJTIC in the USSR' (DEFE 
4111S2) consists of a very long list of war-related installations of many types in the Soviet Union. Many of these 
places were identified by PoWs. Information on others (Magnitogorsk, for example, which is here stated to be of 
interest for 'suspected guided weapon activities, e.g. component factories, factories, etc. ') came from scientific 
workers in Germany who accepted employment in the USSR (see Chapter I). Further information (on Shikhani, 
for example, which is here described as a 'highly important chemical warfare research station') came from 
exploited German intelligence documents. Nikolskoe, described as a 'guided weapons range', was where Tokaev 
thought guided missiles were to be test-fired from. 
SISMinutes of JlC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 8 April 1949, DEFE 41/69. Some of the 
German scientific workers evacuated from the Soviet Zone under Operation ' Matchbox ' were employed as 
interrogators at the SIU. In July 1949, no fewer than twenty-seven 'Matchbox' evacuees and residents of the 
'Transit Hotel' were working at the SIU in this capacity (JS/JTIC(49)60 dated 2 July 1949 and entitled, 
'Examination of Expanded State Report - Operation "Matchbox" ', DEFE 411150). 
SI6Minutes of JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 10 May 1949, DEFE 41169 . 
SI7Minutes of JlC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 7 June 1949, DEFE 41169. 
SI8Minutes of JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 30 June 1949, DEFE 41/69. However, the 
number of valuable informants was clearly significantly higher, for not all those with useful information were 
sent to the SIU at Bad Driburg: in August 1949 it was noted at a meeting of the Coordinating Committee that, 
'The information obtained, both from Friedland and the SIU, remained at a very high standard' (minutes of 
JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 9 August 1949, DEFE 41/69). Of course, this comment 
related to intelligence of all sorts, and not only to scientific and technical intelligence. 
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because, even in connection with quite complicated scientific matters, specialist 
interrogation allowed the information provided by these low-grade (because 
inexpert) sources to be turned into firm conclusions. Indeed, the PoW intelligence 
affected by it was generally confirmed by later intelligence gathered from more 
expert sources, the scientific workers deported in 1945-8. 519 This is consistent with 
the Americans' experience, for Operation 'Wringer' yielded information on such 
varied subjects as missile development, aircraft and jet-engine development, the 
military use of television, synthetic fuel plants and water storage facilities in Soviet 
cities. In their case too, only small percentages of the total number of reports 
contained information on technologies of interest. For instance, only 8% concerned 
weaponry, only 5% aircraft developments and only 5% propulsion units.520 
The depth of the penetration of the USSR effected by this operation, and the variety 
and secrecy of the activities concerned, remain unclear. However, indications of the 
nature of the intelligence the PoWs provided can be gained from the reactions of the 
various branches of British Intelligence to it. In the early days it seems that the 
information of value taken from the PoWs was largely economic intelligence and 
scientific and technical intelligence. 521 But the information gathered came to cover a 
wide field. It is clear that some of those PoW s interrogated at the SIU provided 
519In the notes of the Director of STIB 's address to the MI 10 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951 , 
appears the comment that , 'the success of prisoner of war exploitation on scientific and tech . intelligence had 
been demonstrated by the later and more accurate information we have had', DEFE 411125. 
520C. Egan & A. Knott, Essays ill Twentieth-Century Diplomatic History (Erdmann article) , pp. 178-9. 
521 At the meeting of the JIC(Germany) Coordinating Committee on 27 ApriLl948 it was stated that a 
considerable amount of useful information was being obtained and that, ' JIB and MilO and MIl6 were the 
agencies who probably benefited most from the operation' (DEFE 41/68). JIB was responsible for economic 
intelligence. MI16 was the scientific intelligence section of the War Office (report dated 6 September 1949 and 
entitled ' Background Notes on JS/JTIC', DEFE 40/26) . It grew Ollt of MIlO (the War Office's technical 
intelligence section), owing to a need for intelligence on weapons in the research stage (address by D. Gater to 
MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951 , DEFE 411125). 
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intelligence on research and development underway in the USSR. 522 The intelligence 
branch of the Rhine Army consistently maintained that military intelligence of 
considerable value was taken from the PoWs. This intelligence related both to 
military equipment and the Soviet Order of Battle. 523 However, all the Services were 
represented at the SIU and the Admiralty rated highly the information obtained from 
the prisoners-of-war. In autumn 1949, the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence 
(Technical) considered that, from the point of view of technical intelligence of naval 
developments in the USSR, there were places about which nothing more could be 
learned, unless the sources were very highly-skilled technicians who had been 
engaged in actual development work or had been at those places very recently. 
Examples he gave of such places were the shipyards on the Black Sea and the 
torpedo factory at Makhachkala on the Caspian Sea. 524 The Ministry of Supply's 
Division of Atomic Energy sent experts to Friedland Camp to instruct the 
interrogators there on how to acquire information of value on this crucial subject.525 
The Royal Air Force set such store by the intelligence gathered that it carried out a 
programme of re-interrogation. 526 
Given the scarcity of information, only examples can be given of important Soviet 
war-related factories and other installations, the location and significance of which 
were revealed to British Intelligence by returning PoW s. It is likely that these 
522According to David Evans. the Director of STIB. at a meeting of the JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee 
on 4 March 1949. DEFE 41/69. 
523 According to the G(lnt)BAOR representative on the J1C (Germany) Coordinating Committee. meeting on 19 
ApriI1949.DEFE41/69. 
524JS/JTIC(49)82 dated 24 September 1949. DEFE 4111 51. The benefit derived by the Navy and by the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau from the operation is confirmed by the note in the minute'S of the JIC (Germany) 
Coordinating Committee meeting on 25 January 1949 that both Commander Courtney (CaNIS representative) 
and Walker (JIB representative) had said that they were obtaining information of great value from interrogations 
at the Special Interrogation Unit. DEFE 41/69 . 
525Minutes of JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 5 October 1948. DEFE 41/68. 
526Minutes of JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 30 August 1949. DEFE 41/69. 
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examples indicate reliably the character of the installations, the existence of which 
the PoW s revealed, and how the PoW s had acquired their know ledge. The PoW shad 
been used to reconstruct or repair important factories, airfields and research 
institutes. In some cases, they had even worked in the installations concerned. 
The PoW s excelled at identifying airfields. The nc, in a report of 1949, set out what 
was known of the Soviet Union's airfields and war industries. It was aware of no 
fewer than 224 airfields lying in the vicinity of twenty-five Soviet cities, thirty in the 
Moscow region alone. 527 Such intelligence was to become very significant. Long-
range bomber and other airfields were overflown by U-2 spyplanes in the latter half 
of the 1950s and the photographs taken put an end to the fear that the USSR might 
have more such bombers (the 'bomber gap').528 To cite only a few identifiable 
examples, PoWs located airfields near Monino, not far from Moscow; near 
Gorlovka, on the railway line from Khar'kov to Stalino; at Konstantinovka, some 
eighty kilometres east of Stalino; near Karachev, some fifty kilometres SSE of 
Bryansk; at Marinsk; and some thirty kilometres east of Saratov.529 PoWs forced to 
work at Podberez'ye, some 120 kilometres south of Moscow, identified an airfield a 
little further south at Kletina.530 Such sources probably gave the location of many 
527 Appendix H, entitled 'Vulnerability of the Soviet Air Force to Atomic Bomb Attack in 1957', to JlC(48) 116 
dated 4 August 1949 and entitled, 'The Use of Atomic Bombs in a War against the Soviet Union', CAB 158/5. 
The sources of the information contained in this appendix are not stated. Nevertheless, since the same figures for 
the numbers of aircraft and aero-engine factories in the USSR are given in this appendix as are given in Appendix 
E, which is stated to be based in part on PoWs' information, it is likely that the information in Appendix H was 
derived, at least in part, from the same source. 
528See Chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of overflight and the 'bomber gap'. 
5291nterrogation reports on Franz Graetz, Theo Thelosen, Jakob Deselaers, Walter Holzhauer, Georg Kattau and 
Wilhelm Sieburg in DEFE 411117. There are in DEFE 41/21 and DEFE 41/22 other examples of identification of 
airfields and aircraft factories in the USSR. 
530Letter dated 12 October 1950, DEFE 41191 . All these were identifications of airfields deep within the USSR. 
Some German PoWs, however, had worked at or near airfields in other parts of the Soviet Bloc. Johannes 
Jannsen was employed between 1946 and 1948 on ground-levelling and trench-digging for a new airfield some 
six kilometres west of Warsaw in Poland. It had been rumoured among the work teams that the airfield, called 
Bema airfield, would, when completed, be the largest airfield in Europe (see Jannsen 's Interrogation Report in 
DEFE 411117). It was a military airfield throughout the Cold War. 
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more airfields. Evidence for this is the fact that in October 1950, when its Operation 
'Wringer' was in full swing and German PoWs were its main source of intelligence, 
the USAF pressed for photographic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union by balloon. 
Its reason for doing so was that it wanted photographs to confirm reports of airfields 
in the USSR (as well as of other targets, such as atomic plants, new industrial 
installations and new railyards).531 
Rochus von Poncet identified, not an airfield, but a factory making four-engined 
bombers at Kazan' .532 By 1949, the He had received information, some of it from 
prisoners-of-war returning to Germany, on thirty-four Soviet aircraft and fourteen 
aero-engine factories.533 An indication that many of the PoWs identified aircraft 
factories is that STIB' s file list refers to many files held on such factories in the 
USSR. Almost all the files concerned are dated' August 1949'. 1949 was, of course, 
one of the two peak years of PoW interrogation.534 Moreover, there is evidence that 
pilots of U-2 spyplanes in the latter part of the 1950s were given very precise 
information on aircraft factories in the USSR which they were instructed to 
5311. Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, p. 129. This was the 'Genetrix' programme, under 
which balloons equipped with high-altitude cameras were released in Europe and sent drifting over the USSR to 
Japan. See Chapter 6 for further discussion of the targets of aerial reconnaissance. 
532Interrogation Report on Rochus von Poncet, DEFE 411117. 
533 Appendix E, entitled 'Review of the War Economy of the Soviet Union in 1957', to JIC(48) 116 dated 4 
August 1949 and entitled, 'The Use of Atomic Bombs in a War against the Soviet Union', CAB 158/5. Appendix 
E is stated to be based on intelligence obtained from 'captured documents, Russian publications, Prisoners of War 
and German photographic intelligence' (paragraph 3). 
534,C' series list of STIB files , DEFE 41130. The factories were in Kazan'; Khimki ; Kiev; Kimry; Kirov ; 
Kuibyshev; the Leningrad and Moscow regions; Novosibirsk; Riga; Rybinsk; Saratov; Taganrog; Tiflis; Tushino; 
Voronezh; and Zaporozh'ye. Many of these places are mentioned as places of aircraft or aero-engine manufacture 
in paragraph 18 of Appendix H to J1C(48) 116 dated 4 August 1949, CAB 158/5. STIB's file list also indicates 
that, by some means, Order-of-Battle intelligence was gathered on Soviet research into biological warfare. The 
'A' and 'c' series of files refer to files on 'BW Research Lab, Kaliningrad, I Jan 1951 ' , 'Vitebsk - Serum 
Factory, I Jan 1951' , ' Bacteriogical Institutes' on Lake Seliger, 'Turimsky - Bacteriological Factory, 15 Dec 
1949', 'Russian BW Research Institutes - General, April 1950' (DEFE 41130). Given the dates of these files, it is 
likely that this information came chiefly from German intelligence documents, returning German prisoners-of-
war, 'Matchbox' informants or Soviet publications. There are other examples of intelligence gathered by the 
British in Germany which may well have come from PoWs. For example, by late 1950 reports had been received 
of twin jet-engine manufacture in Ulan-Bator; given the year, it may be that this intelligence was acquired from 
returning PoWs (minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 24 November 1950, DEFE 41110). 
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photograph. Much of the briefing jnformation must have come from German PoWs 
who had either been employed in the factories themselves or had carried out 
construction work nearby. 
Plants which, as a result of PoW interrogations, came under suspicion of 
manufacturing heavy water for the Soviet atomic project were a plant at 
Dneprodzerzhinsk in the Ukraine; an electrolysis plant at Kirovakhan in Armenia; a 
plant at Yerevan, also in Armenia; and the Ural Chemical Engineering Factory, some 
sixteen kilometres SE of Sverdlovsk.535 In most of these cases, what caused 
Scientific Intelligence in London to suspect that the plants were involved in heavy 
water manufacture was either the nature of the plant's equipment or of its products. 
Hundreds of German prisoners-of-war had worked on the construction of the 
Electrochemical Works at Kirovakhan. The most valuable of a number of identifiable 
sources on it was Werner Fiegert, a qualified engineer. The electrolysis apparatuses 
he described and drew were very similar to electrolysers used for the production of 
heavy water by electrolysis. 536 Such information made the plant a high-priority 
atomic target.537 Unfortunately, it is not certain whether it or any of the other 
suspected heavy water plants was in fact involved in the Soviet atomic project. Its 
heavy water pilot plant was at Chirchik in Tajikistan.538 
535STIB Liaison Letter No. 8, April 1950, OEFE 41124. An example of PoW information on the Ural Chemical 
Engineering Factory at Sverdlovsk is SIU/F/PWR/GTIl91 dated 9 May 1949, OEFE 41/24. The Ural Chemical 
Engineering Factory should not be confused with the important atomic installation codenamed Sverdlovsk-44, the 
official name of which was the Urals Electrochemical Plant. It was known as Sverdlovsk-44, because it lay not 
far from the city of Sverdlovsk. 
536SIUlF/PWRl349 dated 15 October 1949, OEFE 41/24. That Fiegert's and another source's information, both 
accompanied by reasonable drawings, indicated that at the factory electrolysers were in use which were very 
similar to those used for heavy water manufacture is stated in ST1B/50111611602 dated 25 January 1950, OEFE 
41124. Fiegert's report indicates that the USSR was suffering from a severe lack of manpower. Thirty-five of the 
forty skilled workers who installed the plant's chemical apparatus were women. Many PoW interrogation reports, 
also contained in OEFE 41/24, were received on the construction of this factory . 
537STIB /5011/611602 dated 25 January 1950, OEFE 41/24. 
5380. Holloway, Stalill alld the BOlllb, p. 189. 
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The PoWs identified war gas departments at a number of chemical plants, such as the 
chemical works at Dzerzhinsk, near Gor' kii 539 and a plant, heavily guarded by MVD 
troops, at Yerevan in Armenia. 540 A number of PoWs talked of a war gas factory, 
Zavod (,Factory') 91, at Beketovka, just south of Stalingrad, which some said was 
manufacturing nerve gases.541 This seemed to be reliable information, because other 
PoWs maintained that the dismantled nerve gas manufacturing plant at Dyhernfurth 
had been brought to Beketovka. Bombs and shells were filled at the works with the 
gases and explosives manufactured there .542 One source was able to provide a 
detailed description of the new plant.543 To find out what equipment the Soviets had 
laid their hands on, the Americans contacted all the companies which had supplied 
equipment to Dyhernfurth. They also studied files of wartime correspondence with 
the plant at Dyhernfurth; copies were passed to the British. 544 Some PoWs named a 
German scientist who was working at Beketovka. This name made the plant a 
highly-prioritized intelligence target in the USSR, for the man in question was Dr. 
Bernd von Bock, the only nerve gas manufacturing expert to fall into Soviet hands 
after the War. As the former head of production at the Dyhernfurth factory near 
539STO/2/DE/48 , DEFE 411145. Another report containing information about war gas production at this factory 
and the installation of plant from the Leunawerk there is JSJT/STO(49)3I , DEFE 411146. The information 
concerned was provided by a returning PoW called Hans Papenberg, who had been employed, like his fellow 
PoWs, on drainage and decontamination work and who believed that lewisite and mustard gas were manufactured 
at the works. These are only examples. STIB ' s 'A' and 'C' series of files for disposal (in DEFE 41/30) refer to 
more chemical plants which had been identified in the USSR by former PoWs. 
540ST0I1I/NO/48; STO/25/NO/48 , DEFE 411145. 
54IST0I16/NO/48, DEFE 411145; JSJT/STO(49) II, DEFE 411146. Some PoWs were shown photographs of 
German chemical weapons factories, to find out whether chemical works at which they had worked in the USSR 
resembled them (a resemblance would be expected, since, of course, the nerve gas plants at Dyhernfurth and 
Falkenhagen had been dismantled and transported to the Soviet Union). For example, Bruno Schiller, who had 
worked at Beketovka, was shown photographs of a war gas factory at MUnster and saw clear similarities between 
it and the plant at Beketovka (JSJT/STO(49)26, DEFE 411146). If a prisoner-of-war could not remember the 
name of a German scientist or technician who had been working at a particular plant, then he would be shown 
any available photographs of likely candidates or people of most interest. For instance, Johan Matz, a PoW who 
had been employed at the Savostroi Works not far from Gor'kii, was shown photographs of deported German 
technicians believed to be living in the area, but did not recognize any of the faces shown to him 
(JSJT/STO(49)2, DEFE 411146). 
542JSJT/STO(49)29 , DEFE 411146. 
543Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 8 March 1951, DEFE 41110. 
544Minutes of STI B Technical Meeting on 25 January 1951, DEFE 4111 O. 
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Breslau in Silesia, he was a specialist in the manufacture of tabun. He also knew the 
formula for sarin. The link between Beketovka and Soviet development of a 
chemical warfare capability seemed to be firmly established by the fact, established 
during exploitation of German wartime intelligence reports, that before the War 
Beketovka had been an important factory for the manufacture of poison gases. 545 The 
PoWs' information that von Bock was at Beketovka and that the Dyhernfurth 
manufacturing equipment had been transported there was the crucial intelligence 
which convinced the Joint Committees that the Soviets would soon be capable of 
manufacturing at least one of the nerve gases. Until then, though aware that shells 
filled with tabun had fallen into Soviet hands, they had not been sure whether the 
Soviets had the knowhow to manufacture any of the nerve gases themselves. Von 
Bock was a one-man tabun manufacturing plant and his knowledge would inevitably 
become available to Soviet chemists. So the Joint Committees concluded in 1949 that 
the quantity production of at least one of the nerve gases, probably tabun, was 
intended at Beketovka. Comparison with the timescale of the Germany's move from 
laboratory production to quantity production led to the conclusion that the Soviets 
could not be in full production of any of the nerve gases until 1951 or 1952.546 
PoW sources gave indications of where in the Soviet Union uranium was being 
found. A Wehrmacht medical officer, Hans Deinzer, forced to serve as Camp 
Medical Officer in Camp 533, Sverdlovsk, naturally treated not only the prisoners 
but their guards as well. From August 1948 onwards, he was told by all of the MVD 
545See Chapter I. 
546JS/JTIC(49)63 dated 4 August 1949, DEFE 41/150. It is clear from this report that the PoWs had given 
British Intelligence far more information on the factory than has been indicated above. However, their 
understanding of what was going on there was limited. The main conclusions of this JS/JTIC report were adopted 
by the HC in its report JIC(49)75 dated 3 September 1949 and entitled, 'Russian Chemical Warfare' (CAB 
158/5). 
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officers in the camp that they feared that they would be sent to the Kamchatka 
peninsula, where deposits of uranium ore had recently been found. 547 Wilhelm 
Weber, re-interrogated in 1952 when the Americans asked for permission to question 
him,had helped to mine an open-cast uranium mine about twenty kilometres west of 
Aldan in north-eastern Siberia. Mining for uranium had begun there in December 
1948. The mine covered a large area and Weber talked of veins of almost pure 
uranium beneath the topsoil. The mine was clearly a productive one, since it kept two 
ore-washing stations busy from May 1949. The penal labourers made to work it 
worked in groups of five and each group was expected to mine five sacks of ore a 
day. The authorities clearly had high hopes for the mine, for Weber observed a 
surveying team at work there.548 
C. Cheliabinsk-40, NIl. 88 and Khimki 
The prisoners-of-war made the British and Americans aware of key installations in 
the Soviet post-war military-industrial complex. Three examples are given here, one 
the Soviet Union's first plutonium production reactor, the other two important 
complexes for the development and experimental production of guided missiles and 
their engines. Before the War, Peter Blumenkamp had been a machine-fitter in 
DUsseldorf. When taken prisoner, he was an Unteroffizier in the Wehrmacht. From 
May 1943 until January 1945 he was interned, with three hundred or so others, in a 
camp at Kyshtym, which lay behind the Urals, north-west of Cheliabinsk. He was put 
547JSJT/STO(49)43, DEFE 411146. As an informant, Deinzer was considered reliable. 
548STIB Interview Report No. 86 dated 13 October 1952 on Wilhelm Weber, DEFE 41/98. Weber had passed 
through Friedland Camp in 1950 and had been flushed, but had said nothing to interest his interrogators. The 
coordinates of the mine were N 58° 36' E 125° 22'. That uranium from the mine was used in the Soviet atomic 
project is confirmed in the introduction by C. Spiering to V. Gubarev, Arsamas-J6: Wissenschaftler del' geheimen 
/'l/ssischen Atomstadt brechen das SchlVeigen , p. II. 
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to work in the town loading vegetables on to trucks. In 1944 he travelled several 
times on trucks laden with vegetables along the rough road leading to the nearby 
town of Kazli. The road ran through a site which was being cleared for building 
work. The site was out of the ordinary in that not only were barracks being built in 
one corner, but a new branch railway line was being laid from the main line at 
Kyshtym to the cleared area. The whole site was approximately thirty kilometres 
square. In January 1945 he was moved to another camp, but returned to Kyshtym in 
May 1947 to work there as a machine-fitter in a workshop in the town. His second 
stay there lasted only five months, but he discovered from prisoners-of-war who had 
been there during his absence that in March 1946 the area he had seen being cleared 
had been closed and the road to Kazli which had run through it had been diverted 
round the site. Neither German prisoners-of-war nor Russians without express 
authority were now allowed to approach the site, which was guarded by a strong 
MVD force. 
Blumenkamp kept his eyes open. He observed that three or four goods trains, 
generally guarded by soldiers, were now travelling daily to the site and returned 
empty of their cargo eight hours later. He could not tell what most of the wagons of 
these trains contained, since they tended to be closed, but he noticed that those that 
were open carried construction materials: sand, cement and steel girders. A building 
of some importance was obviously being constructed. Interested, he asked a Russian 
who was working with him in the fitting shop in Kyshtym what was being built on 
the road to Kazli, and received the remarkable reply that an atomic plant was being 
put up, most of the factories of which lay underground. His colleague added that only 
troops and the political prisoners building the plant were allowed on to the site. The 
prisoners were not allowed to leave it. 
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That is the story that Blumenkamp was told and which he passed on to his 
interrogators when he was interrogated at Friedland Camp on 16 October 1948, a 
year after he had left Kyshtym.549 The comment was added to the report made on the 
interrogation: 'Informant made a very good impression, and his information is 
considered reliable'. He was not actually the first German to provide intelligence of 
this atomic reactor, but he is the first who can be identified. First word of the reactor 
reached the British at Friedland in August 1948. These Germans had exceeded all 
their expectations of the intelligence benefit of interrogating returning PoWs: they 
had revealed the whereabouts of Cheliabinsk-40, the first plutonium production 
reactor constructed in the Soviet Union, and its counterpart to Hanford Engineering 
Works in the USA. 
Blumenkamp sketched a crude map of the secret site, on which he showed it as being 
near Kyshtym and showed Kyshtym as being not far from Cheliabinsk, lying NNW 
of this industrial city and SSE of Sverdlovsk. The reactor was indeed built about 
fifteen kilometres east of Kyshtym, and about eighty kilometres NW of Cheliabinsk. 
The site was chosen by General A vraamii Pavlovich Zaveniagin of the First Chief 
Directorate late in 1945. In that location, two nearby lakes, Irtiash and Kyzyltash, 
would supply the great quantities of water needed to cool the reactor. Moreover, this 
region of the USSR just behind the Urals had experienced breakneck 
industrialization during the Stalinist hyper-industrialization campaign of the late 
1920s and 1930s. As a highly industrial area which had not been fought over during 
549STOll8/NO/48, DEFE 411145. Concerning the month in which Blumenkamp passed through the camp, it was 
commented by the Committee supervising the operation that, 'The intelligence value of Friedland Camp had 
increased considerably and the information obtained was satisfactory both in quantity and quality' (minutes of 
JIC (Germany) Coordinating Committee meeting on 26 October 1948, DEFE 41168). First news of the reactor at 
Kyshtym was received in August 1948 from three different prisoners-of-war (minutes of JTC (Germany) 
Coordinating Committee meeting on 24 August 1948, DEFE 41168). 
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the War, it had the best electricity supply network in a country reduced to ruins. The 
region was also well supplied with serviceable railways and roads, along which raw 
materials could be sent to the plant, and nearby were such industrial centres as 
Cheliabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Magnitogorsk, which could provide many of the 
materials needed for construction. Finally, lying deep in Russia the site would be 
difficult for foreign air forces to attack and foreign spies or listening devices to reach. 
The wonder is that a German destined to return to his country was allowed anywhere 
near it. The acceptance of such a security risk by a government obsessed with 
security can only reflect the desperate need for manpower of a country only 
beginning slowly to reconstruct itself after a war in which many millions of its able-
bodied men had been killed. 
Not merely does Blumenkamp's location of the reactor tally with its actual location, 
his account of its construction dovetails perfectly with that of David Holloway in his 
book, Stalin and the Bomb.550 Holloway writes that, 'In the early months of 1946 
roads were laid and the site was prepared for construction; digging of the foundations 
began in the summer'. Blumenkamp was told by his fellow prisoners-of-war that the 
site had been closed off in March 1946. Holloway writes that Cheliabinsk-40 was 
built by prisoners, with as many as 70,000 working on the project at one time; 
Blumenkamp heard the same from his Russian colleague in the machine-fitting shop 
in Kyshtym in 1947. The construction of the reactor itself began in early March 1948 
and was complete by the end of May. Holloway is able to give fuller and more 
precise information about the construction work than Blumenkamp's Russian co-
worker was able to provide, but he makes the same basic point: the reactor was 
indeed built underground, in a concrete shaft with walls three metres thick. Tanks of 
550pp. 184_5. 
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water surrounded these mighty waUs, acting as a sheath round the reactor. In the first 
few days of June 1948 water was let into the pipes, and uranium slugs were inserted 
into the thousand-and-more fuel channels of the core, and on 7 June the reactor, 
known as 'Annushka', went critical. On 22 June the reactor achieved the design level 
of 100,000 kilowatts. In July it was put to its intended use of plutonium 
production. 55 I In August, British Intelligence at Friedland received news of its 
existence and location. A high priority at once came to be to find out more about this 
secret plant. 552 
Cheliabinsk-40 began to produce plutonium early in 1949. The plutonium core of the 
Soviet Union's first atomic bomb, tested on 29 August 1949, was manufactured at 
the complex. 553 New production reactors were built on the site in the early 1950s: in 
September 1950 a second uranium-graphite system was completed; two similar 
reactors followed in April 1951 and September 1952; in January 1952 a smaller 
reactor for isotope production became operational and at about the same time a heavy 
551 D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 186-7. 
552There was at least one instance of PoW information yielding a lead to another German source - a Dr. Rinteln, 
a deportee working at Sukhumi - who might have intelligence on Kyshtym, with the result that hi s letters to 
Germany were intercepted (minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I June 1950, DEFE 4111 0). Information taken 
from the PoWs almost certainly helped British Intelligence to locate other atomic installations in the USSR. This 
is suggested by the fact that by the start of 1950, when the PoW interrogation operation was winding down, 
British Intelligence had been so successful in discovering the location of atomic energy installations in the Soviet 
Union that intelligence operations against them took up a disproportionately large part of the resources of MI6 in 
Germany. Evidence for this is that, in January 1950, Dr. Fereday, the representative of the Technical 
Coordinating Section, informed the Joint Committees that he had looked into, 'the reasons for the concentration 
of resources of MI6 in Germany on atomic energy intelligence. It was because that subject presented more 
opportunities, whilst efforts on other subjects, e.g. hydrogen-peroxide, were largely handicapped by the lack of 
knowledge of targets . He also confirmed that atomic energy and certain other subjects were given equal priority' 
(minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on II January 1950, DEFE 41174). Since East Germany' s atomic-energy-related and 
hydrogen peroxide manufacturing installations had been dismantled, the only targets Fereday can have been 
referring to were targets in the USSR. 
55~. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin , p. 49. 
175 
water reactor was built. 554 The complex is still in operation, although it ceased 
producing plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1990. 555 
It is likely that the Americans acquired similar information from prisoners-of-war 
they were interrogating at the same time. Circumstantial evidence for this is that, in 
April 1950, they made a forecast 'based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities' 
and using figures representing 'the production capabilities of known or deducible 
Soviet plants ' that by 1954 the USSR would have a stockpile of 200 atomic 
bombs.556 The 'Wringer' programme probably revealed the existence of at least one 
further atomic reactor in the USSR. In 1949, 'The Voice of America' announced: 'in 
the environs of Tomsk near the village of Belaya Boroda an atomic factory is being 
built'. This was entirely correct. Five graphite-moderated plutonium production 
reactors were built at Tomsk -7, some fifteen kilometres NW of Tomsk, as well as a 
uranium enrichment plant.557 The date of this information suggests a PoW source. It 
is difficult to see how else intelligence could have been acquired of a plutonium 
production complex under construction deep in Siberia. Circumstantial evidence that 
this was PoW information is provided by the fact that among the interested agencies 
to which 'Wringer' intelligence was distributed was, 'The Voice of America' .558 
The news of the plant at Kyshtym convinced the Joint Committees that , ' the 
Russians have adopted a pile programme aiming at the production of plutonium' .559 
5540 , Holloway, Stalin and the BOlllb, p. 189. 
555-r. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssim/ BOlllb, p. 74. The complex was later given the 
codename 'Cheliabinsk-65' and is now known as Ozersk. 
556L. Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 65. The fo~ecast referred to is NSC-68. 
557T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the RlIssiall BOlllb , p. 137. 
558c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays ill Twentieth-Celltllry Alll ericall Diplolllatic HistOlY (Erdmann article), p. 182. 
559p. 5, Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee', DEFE 4111 50. On the basis of this information , it 
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They may well have inferred this from such descriptions of the reactor as PoWs were 
able to provide. The presence nearby, visible on a map, of Lakes Irtiash and 
Kyzyltash, pointed to plutonium production. A plutonium reactor needs to be close to 
a vast amount of water, so that the reactor can be cooled (whereas Cheliabinsk-40 
stood next to two great lakes, the water of the Tom River was used to cool the first 
reactor of Tomsk-7). Or, much less likely, an agent may have been sent to take a look 
at the reactor. A mere look at Cheliabinsk-40 from the outside would have given the 
observer valuable information. It would have revealed whether the plant's purpose 
was uranium enrichment or plutonium manufacture, for the two types of plant look 
very different. A uranium-235 production plant would be supplied, not with water, 
but with a great deal of electrical power. It would likely be attached to the electricity 
grid in several places so as to avoid any interruption in the power supply. A look at it 
would also indicate the method of uranium enrichment in use. If gaseous diffusion 
were the chosen method, then the plant would have to be a very big building, big 
enough to house an immense cascade of separation apparatuses, though it might be 
only one storey high. 
Even if agents were not sent to take a look at Cheliabinsk -40 in 1948 or 1949, it may 
well be that some were later asked to examine atomic factories deep inside the 
USSR. It was essential to know what type of fissionable material the Soviets were 
manufacturing and the size, efficiency and consequently the output of their plants. 
Using this information, the rate of production of fissionable material and the 
was stated that the earliest possible date by which the Soviets could have an atomic bomb was mid-1950. The 
probable date for their first bomb was mid-1953. Interestingly , before the British acquired intelligence at 
Friedland of the reactor at Kyshtym, the CIA had made exactly the same forecast. In July 1948 it informed 
President Truman that the USSR was likely to make a bomb only in mid-1953. The earliest date by which it was 
' remotely possible ' that the Soviet project could achieve success was mid-1950 (c. M. Andrew, For the 
Presidellt 's Eyes Dilly, p. 177). Perhaps the Americans had received news of this reactor before the British and 
independently of them, and based their estimate on it. 
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consequent size of the Soviet Union's atomic stockpile could be estimated. With the 
aid of these estimates intelligence analysts could answer the question the Chiefs of 
Staff had set them, and which was at the heart of Britain's defence planning: when 
would this atomic stockpile be big enough for the USSR to be willing to risk war?560 
Accordingly, the CIA in this period sent agents deep into the USSR to find out more 
about particular installations of interest, among them atomic plants. 561 British 
Intelligence may have done the same. Evidence of this is provided by the minutes of 
a meeting of the JSIJTIC in August 1949, in which appears the remark, ' ... the Joint 
Committees had taken note that when any major operation for deep penetration was 
being planned, TCS would ask the interested working party for an ad-hoc brief' .562 
Attempts were madein the late 1940s and early 1950s to infiltrate agents into the 
USSR. During his time as Director of Scientific Intelligence (from September 1952 
to December 1953), R. V. Jones attended a meeting with 'C' (then Sir John Sinclair), 
who said that he had sent thirty agents into the USSR and none had come back.563 
From what is known of British attempts to infiltrate agents into the USSR, most 
560Address by Commander Eric Welsh of D.At.En. to the MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, 
DEFE 411126. Welsh revealed that it was suspected that the Soviets were enriching uranium by gaseous 
diffusion. He said that D.At.En. had 'reason to think' that the Soviets might have built long (perhaps 400 metres 
long), large, narrow enrichment plants, with 'very large numbers of gas compressors or blowers' inside. He was 
here describing a gaseous diffusion plant. The great size of the cascade was the reason for the length of the 
building. The cascade had to be made up of several thousand successive stages, because there is very little 
difference in mass between the hexafluoride of U-235 and that of U-238. It was on this difference in mass that the 
enrichment method depended (see R. Rhodes ' history of the Manhattan Project, The Makil/g of the Atolllic BOlllb , 
p. 492). The intelligence acquired in Germany of Soviet manufacture and purchase of fine wire mesh , supported 
by Alfons Konik 's intelligence, discussed below, of high-security shipments of fluorspar within the USSR 
(perhaps for the fluorination of uranium) would have given D.At.En. its reason to suspect that gaseous diffusion 
was an enrichment method chosen by the Soviets. This will have come as no surprise, since uranium was 
enriched by this method for the Manhattan Project. 
561 D. Ball & 1. Richelson, Strategic Nllclear Targetil/g (Rosenberg article), p. 40. Jeffrey Richelson also writes 
(at pp. 46-8 of AlIlerical/ Espiol/age al/d the Soviet Target) that the CIA sent agents on deep penetration missions 
into the Soviet Union, sometimes simply to examine a particular installation. Atomic energy installations had top 
priority, alongside early-warning targets. His source for this information was the former CIA officer, Harry 
Rositzke, who makes the same claim at p. 28 of his book, The CIA's Secret Operatiol/s. 
562 Minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 31 August 1949, DEFE 41/73. At a meeting shortly before, the Joint 
Committees had written to TCS stressing the importance of certain chemical warfare targets in the USSR 
(minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 3 August 1949, DEFE 41/73). It may be that agents were sent to examine these. 
563Interview with Professor Jones on 7 May 1996. 
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p 
made their way in through border territories such as the Baltic states and the 
Ukraine. 564 In 1954, an agent in a KGB-controlled Latvian network was instructed to 
go to the region to the East of the Urals and take a sample of water from the Tobol 
river, on which a reactor was (wrongly) believed to stand.565 It may be that another 
agent was sent to the same region to take a look at Cheliabinsk-40 or one of the other 
atomic installations situated there. 
One point can be reinforced. British Intelligence knew full well that the industrial 
region around Sverdlovsk might be important to the Soviet atomic project. 
Blumenkamp alerted them to the significance of the region; his information was 
supplemented by that provided by another prisoner-of-war, Alfons Konik, who had 
been interned from January to April 1948 in Camp 7504/4 near Nizhnyi-Tagil, some 
120 kilometres NNW of Sverdlovsk. He had been made to work at a nearby military 
airfield, loading cases filled with what the Russians called 'ore' on to aeroplanes and 
unloading the empty cases after the planes returned. The deliveries of 'ore' took 
place under heavy MVD guard and were obviously important. Konik saw the 'ore' 
once when a case fell and broke open. His interrogator commented: 
4 . ... Informant described it as being heavy, very dark yellowish-green in 
colour, and in rough pieces the approximate size of a tennis ball. It was soft, 
with a texture like rock-sulphur, greasy, without smell and having a slight 
glisten on a newly cut surface similar to phosphorous [sic]. The material had 
no apparent effect on the skin .... 
7. The aircraft used were Ju-52s. Eight only were in operation. Each of the 
aircraft made regular journeys every other day carrying 1112 tons of the 
material. When schedule was interrupted by bad flying weather the over-all 
564p. Lashmar at pp . 133-4 of his book, Spy Flights of the Cold War , gives examples of agents being landed by 
U-boat on the Latvian coast and dropped from an aeroplane into the Ukraine (both in 1951). 
565T. Bower, The Red Web: MI6 alld the KGB Master Coup, p. 170. Although Bower writes that the information 
that a reactor was located on the Tobol, not far from Chadrusk, was wrong, it is interesting that the river runs 
through the region East of the Urals, where Cheliabinsk-40, Sverdlovsk-44, Sverdlovsk-45 and other atomic 
installations also lie. The river lies only some 350 kilometres East of Sverdlovsk, running North-north-east to 
South-south-west. 
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schedule was maintained ,by additional flights on later dates. They flew 
together exactly due West, taking off at 7 a.m. and returning with the empty 
cases at 5.30 p.m. without exception. 566 
Konik's description was consistent with the appearance of fluorspar and one 
possibility was that this 'ore' was fluorspar being used to fluorinate uranium, 
producing uranium hexafluoride.567 The hexafluoride of uranium-235 could then be 
enriched until it was pure U-235. If the fluorspar was indeed being used to make 
uranium hexafluoride, then it followed that the Soviets had to be enriching uranium 
using either the gaseous diffusion or the gas centrifugation method, or both. For the 
key characteristic of uranium hexafluoride is that, in gaseous form, it is a uniquely 
suitable feed for uranium enrichment apparatuses operating according to these two 
methods. 568 These were indeed the methods in which the Soviets consistently 
showed most interest, as later intelligence (discussed in Chapter 5) established. Other 
PoWs seem to have provided further information on military industrialization in this 
region, as the map at Appendix B shows. The map, entitled 'Position of Main 
Russian Industrial and Development Areas in relation to Allied Air Bases', displays 
the areas of industrial reconstruction of which the HC had knowledge in 1949. One 
of these areas was the Urals region, encompassing such cities as Sverdlovsk and 
Cheliabinsk, and returning German PoWs constituted one of the principal sources of 
566ST0I13/NO/48, DEFE 411145. Konik was thought intelligent and sincere; his information was considered 
reliable. 
567JSJT177/49 dated 31 January 1949 (DEFE 41/23) commenting on report STO/13/NO/48 (DEFE 41/145). 
Another possibility was that the fluorspar was being used to produce fluorine for use in the manufacture of agents 
of chemical warfare (sarin, for example). George Turney, then the Chairman of the JS/JTIC, remarked in 
JSJT177/49: ' 3. It is known that fluorspar comes to Sverdlovsk from the Kara Sea and from the Chita District and 
that it is made into Cryolite, to be used as a flux in the manufacture of aluminium, at two plants in the Sverdlovsk 
Neighbourhood (Polevskoye 38 miles South and Revda 28 miles NE) . 4. Two .other Cryolite Plants are known in 
the USSR, one at Kirovabad in Transcaucasia and one at the Dnieper Works.' This intelligence of factories in the 
USSR is just the kind of intelligence which one would expect to have been gathered from returning PoWs. 
56~. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssian BOII/b, p. 182. Konik 's information was consistent 
with intelligence being acquired in Germany (and discussed in Chapter 2) that the Soviets were manufacturing the 
very finest wire mesh in their Zone and procuring more in the West, for this mesh was so fine that it could form 
the filter in the barriers (or 'd iaphragms' or 'membranes ') contained in a gaseous diffusion apparatus. 
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the information contained in the ,map.569 The PoWs may have identified further 
atomic installations in the area around Sverdlovsk. If not, Konik's information that 
the region was of importance to the Soviet atomic project was itself valuable. For key 
atomic installations lay in this area. The Urals Electrochemical Plant, codenamed 
Sverdlovsk-44, began uranium enrichment early in 1949; its location is some fifty 
kilometres NW of Sverdlovsk. It was the first plant built for the enrichment of 
uranium by gaseous diffusion in the USSR. It is still in operation. 570 In the early days 
of the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear projects, the huge complex at Sverdlovsk-45 
(some 200 kilometres north of Sverdlovsk) also made highly-enriched uranium; now 
it is concerned with warhead assembly.571 It can be no accident that it was near 
Sverdlovsk that the U-2 of the unfortunate Gary Powers was shot down on 1 May 
1960.572 
In the late 1940s, British and US Intelligence had three sources of information on 
guided missile development in the Soviet Union. All of these sources were German. 
They were: letters from deportees working at missile development centres which 
entered the Western Zone or West Berlin, informants in development institutes in the 
Soviet Zone who reported on the dismantling of their institutes and the destinations 
in the USSR to which their equipment was shipped, and prisoners-of-war returning to 
West Germany. These sources revealed the location of a number of research and 
development centres, in such places as Noginsk (near Moscow), Ostashkov , 
569-rhe original map is one of two air force target maps appended to JIC(48) 116 dated 4 August 1949 (CAB 
158/5), showing areas of concentration of industrial targets which were to be destroyed in an American atomic 
strike on the Soviet Union. Appendix E to the report, entitled, 'Review of the War Economy of the Soviet Union 
in 1957', is stated to be based on intelligence obtained from 'captured documents, Russian publications, Pri soners 
of War and German photographic intelligence' (paragraph 3), 
57Or. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the RlIssiall Bomb, pp. 183 & 186. 
571T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the RlIssiall Bomb , pp. 33,49-50 & 184. 
572c. Pocock, Dragoll Lady: The History oIthe U-2 Spyplalle, p. 48. 
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Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk.573 Harry Rositzke, an officer of the CIA's Office of 
Special Operations based in Germany in this period, recalls that the PoWs 'provided 
the first hard information on Soviet guided missile production and testing'. 574 
However, he does not recount what intelligence was acquired from them. They were 
the main source of information on Soviet work on guided missiles. Most 
significantly, they revealed to their interrogators the location and function of two key 
installations in the Soviet missile development programme. These were NIL 88, the 
USSR's principal rocket research institute, where Sergei Korolev developed his 
designs, and GDL-OKB, the rocket engine design bureau at Khimki of Valentin 
Glushk0575, in which the liquid-propellant motors which powered most Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missiles were designed. 576 The British and Americans 
rightly concluded from their examination of the PoWs' information that the function 
of the NIl . 88 complex was research, development and experimental production, 
rather than mass production, and that the nearby Khimki complex supplied it with 
propulsion units. German PoWs were used from around January 1947 to January 
1948 to convert Zavod 88, in Podlipki (some twenty-three kilometres NE of 
Moscow) into a factory for guided missile production. Until then it had been 
concerned with the manufacture of anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery weapons. In 
January 1948 all of them were removed from Podlipki. Intelligence provided by them 
established that during 1947 the factory had been re-equipped with machinery for V-
573The centres at Noginsk , Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk were minor ones. Their work, and that of other minor 
rocket development centres, are discussed in Appendix N, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: 
loint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
574H. Rositzke, The CIA 's Secret Operatiolls, p. 19. 
575U. Albrecht , A. Hei nemann-GrOder & A. Wellmann, Die Spezialistell: Delltsche Natllrlvissellschaftler IIl1d 
Teclllliker ill der SOIvj etllllioll lIach 1945, p. 97 . 'GDL-OKB ' stands for 'Gas' Dynamics Laboratory -
Experimental Design Bureau'. 
5760 . Holloway, The Soviet Ullioll alld the Arms Race , p. 151 . The Grottrup rocket science group was also taken 
in 1946 to NIL 88. According to Grigorii Tokaev, this was careless, for the region north-east of Moscow in which 
the complex lay was 'a region of concentration of the most secret state defence (air force) es tablishments ' (p. 344, 
'Foundations of Soviet Cosmonautics', Spaceflight , Vol. 10, No. 10 (October 1968), pp. 335-46). 
182 
2 assembly and the production of V -2 components. Most of this machinery came 
from Germany, and probably from the dismantled Mittelwerk in Nordhausen and 
Zentralwerk in Bleicherode. The PoWs' information suggested that the total number 
of Soviet workers at the factory as at January 1948 was only 4,000-5 ,000 
(supplemented by about forty-to-fifty German technicians) . An indication of how 
badly the USSR then lacked manpower is that some 30-40% of the workforce were 
women. Such a workforce, using German wartime V-2 production rates, could make 
150 V-2s per month. Since the Soviets were believed to suffer from a lack of skilled 
technicians experienced in production, the conclusion was reached that the workforce 
at Zavod 88, as at January 1949, would not be able to make more than twenty-five V-
2s per month. Such a level of production would permit only a development 
programme and limited operational training. A factory producing on an operational 
scale would need to be bigger (at least 130,000 metres square, whereas the PoWs 
indicated that Zavod 88 was only about 100,000 metres sq.) and would need to work 
around the clock. But such a factory, undertaking manufacture on an operational 
scale, had not then been located in the USSR. Zavod 88 had therefore to be a pilot 
plant for the production of any missile required in considerable numbers for 
experiment or development. However, since the capacity of the factory could be as 
great as 700 missiles monthly, it could maintain a very active experimentation 
programme.577 The factory was clearly manufacturing V -2s so that the suitability of 
this missile as a weapon could be tested. However, as a factory probably controlled 
by the Ministry of Armaments, it was presumably meant to manufacture, not only V-
2s, but all those missiles which fell within the responsibility of the Soviet Army (i.e. 
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, but not air-launched missiles). This 
577paragraph 18, DSIIJTIC(50) 19 dated 19 October 1950 and entitled, 'USSR - Production of Guided Missiles 
(V-I and V-2 Types)' , DEFE4I/152. 
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intelligence fitted well with information obtained from a source in East Berlin, which 
indicated that an adjoining institute (NIL 88 itself) was engaged in a rocket research 
and development programme far broader than experimentation with surface-to-
surface missiles such as the V-2. When the SMAG's Technisches Btiro Nr. 11, 
situated in Berlin, was dissolved in 1948, its equipment was sent to the USSR. This 
equipment consisted of parts and test instruments for the Wasserfall and 
Schmetterling anti-aircraft missiles. A source reported the address he had seen on 
some of the packing cases in the spring and summer of 1948. This address was, 
'Moscow, Podlipki Station, Yaroslav Railway, NIl. 88'. 'NIl' was known to stand 
for 'Nauchno-Ispitatelnyi Institut' (Scientific Testing or Research Institute). The 
consignees were either Silnilschikov or Rashkov, individuals known to have been 
involved in the development in Berlin of these German surface-to-air missiles. The 
information was thought to be good because it was very unlikely that this highly 
inexpert source could have thought up such an address.578 The fact that Zavod 88 
formed part of the same complex as a rocket research institute and a 'Construction 
Design Bureau' further indicated that the complex was intended for design and 
experimental work rather than large-scale production.579 
No PoW had been able to name any Soviet rocket scientist working at the institute, 
but a secret source had informed Air Intelligence that in June 1947 the institute was 
headed up by an officer called 'Kurilov, former supervising officer at Nordhausen'. 
This is an identification of Korolev, who in 1945-6 had been the chief Soviet 
578paragraphs 38-9, Appendix K, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 41/160. 
579paragraph 14, DSI/JTIC(50) 19 dated 19 October 1950 and entitled, ' USSR - Production of Guided Missiles 
(V-l and V -2 Types)' , DEFE 41/152. The dissolution of Technisches Bliro Nr. II is mentioned towards the end 
of Chapter I . 
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scientist at the Institut Rabe in Blei~herode, and who no doubt had often supervised 
work at the nearby Institut Nordhausen. 580 
The PoWs also identified a research, development and experimental production 
complex at Khirnki (about twenty kilometres north of Moscow), consisting of three 
factories and a research institute. They provided a certain amount of information 
about it, which allowed its role to be accurately guessed at. Machinery from 
Niedersachswerfen, near Nordhausen, had been installed in the factories at Khimki. 
Early in 1948 the PoWs were withdrawn from the principal factory at Khirnki and 
shortly afterwards proper production norms were introduced there. There was firm 
evidence that the complex was to manufacture V -2-type combustion units, which 
were probably to be sent to nearby Zavod 88 for installation in the missiles 
assembled there. 581 It was concluded that one of the main functions of the research 
group working at Khirnki was to develop and test propulsion units of all sorts: guided 
missile power plants, turbo-jets, assisted take-off units and boost units. It was also 
believed to be researching into rocket fuel. 582 This seems to have been an accurate 
assessment of the work of GDL-OKB, which had in 1946 turned from the 
development of rocket boosters for aircraft to that of powerful liquid-propellant 
engines for long-range missiles.583 The activities of the two complexes, at Podlipki 
and at Khimki, together represented an extensive experimental and development 
580paragraph 51 , Appendix K, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 411160; STlB Interview Report No. 97 dated 19 January 1953 on Fritz Matheis, DEFE 41198 . 
Matheis in this report also identified Korolev as having been in charge of firing preparations at Podlipki. That the 
British realized that 'Kurilov' might well be Korolev is clear from a Guided Weapons Working Party Note dated 
II September 1953, DEFE 411124. 
581 Paragraphs II , 12, 17 & 20, DSIIJTIC(50) 19 dated 19 October 1950 and entitled, 'USSR - Production of 
Guided Missiles (V -I and V -2 Types)', DEFE 411152. 
582paragraphs 64-5 , Appendix L, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missi le Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, DEFE 411160. 
583R. Amann, J. Cooper & R. W. Davies, The Technological Level of Soviet!ndllstry (chapter by D. Holloway 
on 'Military Technology'), p. 457. 
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programme which indicated that the suitability of putting the V -2 into service with 
the Soviet armed forces was being thoroughly investigated. 584 
584paragraph 20, DSIIJTIC(50) 19 dated 19 October 1950 and entitled, 'USSR - Production of Guided Missiles 
(V-I and V -2 Types)' , DEFE 411152. 
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. CHAPTER 4 
OPERATION 'DRAGON RETURN' 
A. The 'Spezialistenaktionen' and the art of preventing defection 
The German scientists, engineers and technicians deported to the Soviet Union in the 
years 1945-8 were returned to their homeland between 1949 and 1958 in a series of 
transports which the SED officials who met them called the 'Spezialistenaktionen' 
(Specialists Operations). Until September 1950 they returned only in dribs and drabs . 
On 19 September 1950 the first great rail transport arrived at Frankfurt-an-der-
Oder. 585 Most of the deportees were sent back to East Germany; it was only towards 
the end of this period that the Soviets allowed members of the guided missile team 
known to STIB as the 'Postfach 126 Sukhumi' group to choose to be returned to the 
Federal Republic. These men were forced to spend a particularly long time in 
quarantine in Sukhumi forgetting what they knew about the projects on which they 
had worked.586 
585Report dated 21/911950 and entitled, ' Ubernahme eines Sondertransportes mit 216 deutschen Spezialisten aus 
der UdSSR' , DY 30llY 2113/389. 
586rhis group of scientific workers , previously known as the 'Postfach 908 Moscow ' group, was one of the last 
three groups to be sent back to Germany . The other two were the ' 1037(P) Moscow' group of atomic scientists 
and the aeronautical research and development group under Brunolf Baade, long based at Podberez ' ye, which 
was put into quarantine in Savelovo, sometimes known as Kimry (minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 26 May 1954, 
DEFE 41/76). Despite the importance of the 'Postfach 126 Sukhumi ' group, they will only receive brief mention 
in this thesis, because reports on the intelligence taken from them are not available to historians. Arend Well mann 
writes at p. 118 of Die Speziaiislell that the group, which he knows as the Hoch-Moller group, worked principally 
on remote control and flight stabilization problems connected with the development of a surface-to-air missile 
based on the Wasserfall. He presumes, but is not certain, that this work formed part of the development project 
which resulted in an improved version of the Wasserfall, the R-113 . By using the Germans to solve specific 
problems, the Soviets, as usual, denied them a perspective on the whole project, which will have limited their 
intelligence value. The R-113 was put into service in 1954. The ' Postfach 908 Moscow' group was in the autumn 
of 1955 moved to Sukhumi to 'cool off' (i.e. forget what they knew of Soviet weapons development) and was 
known to STIB from then on by its new postal address of 'Postfach 126 Sukhumi ' . This was the very last group 
of German scientific workers to be sent back to Germany . This will have diminished their intelligence value, but 
indicates that the Soviets regarded them as important, both as scientists and as potential informants for the West. 
They were given the choice of returning either to the DDR or to the West (the Federal Republic or Austria) . 
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The East German government sought with good jobs, various benefits and energetic 
propaganda to keep the returning scientific workers in the DDR. These were 
collectively called 'BetreuungsmaBnahmen' by the responsible agency, the Abteilung 
Bevolkerungspolitik (Department for Population Policy) of the Interior Ministry.587 
Just as it tried to buy the returners' loyalty, the British and Americans sought to 
entice them West. The growing division of Germany can be seen in the scramble for 
the 'Dragon Returners'. All were provided with work on their return to East 
Germany, most in 'Schwerpunktbetriebe' (key factories).588 STIB had by 1952 
Those who elected to return to the DDR were sent back first , in the last few months of 1956. Some of these 
defected to the West, almost certainly prompted by the British, the Americans or the Bundesnachrichtendienst. 
Some were soon interrogated by the Americans and the BND (OLBIB/1766 dated 18 December 1956, DEFE 
41/138) . The twenty-eight who insisted on being returned to the West made their way there in two transports of 8 
and 10 February 1958. Thereafter, the only German scientific workers remaining in the Soviet Union were those 
who had either taken Soviet citizenship or had chosen to continue to work there (U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-
GrOder & A. Well mann, Die Speziaiislell , pp. 121-2). It can be no coincidence that the remnant of STIB, the 
Overseas Liaison Branch, was dissolved at about that time (introduction to DEFE 41 index) . 
587The 'Betreuung' of the 'Spezialisten ' (the East Germans adopted the Russi an term, 'specialists' , for the 
returners) was the specific provision made for their well-being by the 'Abteilung Bevblkerungspolitik der 
Hauptabteilung Innere Angelegenheiten des Ministeriums des Innern der DDR', by the ministries which provided 
the returners with jobs and, in very important cases, probably by other state institutions as well. The Abteilung 
Bevblkerungspolitik' s full name means ' Department of Population Policy of the Main Department for Internal 
Affairs of the GDR Interior Ministry' . Among its files at the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde containing details 
of the advantages gi ven to the returners are the following : DO lIMdI/34,O/HA Innere Angelegenheiten17045, 
8268, 8269, 8270, 8271 , 8715, 8716 and 8717 (BA) . Further details are contained in DF4/40483 (BA) and in 
DY 30llY 2/13/389, a file from the archive of the Abteilung Staat und Recht of the SED's Central Committee 
(SAPMO). A defector in March 1956 from the Referat fOr Bevblkerungspolitik of the Berlin city government, 
Kurt Schulz, told STIB that the Soviets made no real effort themselves to prevent defection ; if they made such an 
effort, it was through the DDR government and consisted of giving capable people good jobs (STIB/B/l/847 
dated 4 April 1956, DEFE 41/137). 
588For evidence that returners were placed in key factories , see, for example, the letter dated 6 January 1951 , DY 
30llY 2/13/389, which concerns an early transport of electronics specialists. Of those who had returned to East 
Berlin , most were to be given jobs in the former Oberspreewerk and the 'RFT' (almost certainly the RFT-
Arnstadt). Chemists who returned in 1951 were given jobs at the Farbenfabrik Wolfen , the Leunawerk and the 
Elektrochemischeskombinat Bitterfeld (report dated 8/1 0/51 , DY 30llY 2/13/389) . Many of the chemists who 
returned in the transport of 2 March 1954 found work at the same factories (letter dated 16/1 2/54, DY 30llY 
2/13/389). Nikolaus Riehl was given a job at the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, as were fifteen other 
atomic scientists who returned to Germany in the first half of 1955. Of the 'Postfach 126 Sukhumi' group, the 
Abteilung Bevblkerungspolitik planned, at least, to give Bruno Golecki a job at the 'WTB ' (almost certainly the 
Wissenschaftlich-Technisches BOro (Gerate) in Berlin) (list of returners from Sukhumi attached to letter dated 
25/5/1955, DO I/MdI/34,0/HA Innere AngeI./8715). Some returners were used to establish new factories. For 
example, returners originally deported from ZeiS-Jena were sent back , not to that factory , but to Weimar, where 
they were needed for the establishment of a fine mechanical and optical works (WTO Hausmitteilung dated 12 
January 1952, DF4/40483). The returners were highly valued by the DDR authorities. A document dated 28/6/52 
and entitled , ' Betr. Betreuung heimkehrender Spezialisten aus der SU' (DF4/40483) , notes that , 'The proper 
employment of the specialists [is] of great significance for the achievement of the goals of the Five Year Plan' 
(,Der richtige Einsatz dieser Spezialisten wr ErfOllung der Ziele des FOnfjahrplanes von hervorragender 
Bedeutung ' ). 
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acquired evidence, not merely of ,exceptionally high salaries being offered, but of 
unusually good living and working conditions being promised, including freedom 
from interference .589 Particularly high salaries were paid to the leading atomic 
scientists who returned to East Germany in 1955.590 Homes were made available to 
the returning Germans by the Party organizations of the districts in which they 
settled.591 If their home or furniture required repair, loans were made to them for this 
purpose, and sometimes they were even given money. They were given the ration 
allocation of a heavy worker, which provided them with extra food, and an 
entitlement to extra coal. Their absence from Germany was disregarded 10 
determining their entitlement to welfare benefits.592 They were told to turn with all 
their worries and needs to the local office of the Abteilung Bevolkerungspolitik, the 
Referat Bevolkerungspolitik of the government of the province in which they 
lived.593 The skills of many sent back in the transports suited them only to war-
related production. It may be for this reason that the period of the 
'Spezialistenaktionen' saw the launch of war-related research and development 
589STIB17003/6263 dated 20 May 1952, DEFE 41192. For example, Dr. Schwabe, who was imposed on YEB 
Jenapharm, a state enterprise for the manufacture of antibiotics, was reputed among his co-workers to receive a 
larger salary than anyone else (STIB Interview Report No. 110, DEFE 41199). That unusually high salaries were 
paid to the returned 'Spezialisten' is confirmed at p. 28, 'Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR und seine 
Auswirkungen in der SBZ und DDR' , by B. Ciesla, Ails Politik IIl1d Zeitgeschichte, B 49-50193, 3. Dezember 
1993. Some of STIB's information on the SED's handling of the returners was acquired from intercepted 
telephone conversations between government officials in the DDR (see Communications Intercept dated 22/4/52, 
DEFE 41/92, in which the Amt fiir Arbeit was told by the Potsdam regional government that returners destined 
for 'priority industries' were not to be given communal accommodation and were to have special treatment at 
work). 
590Support for this statement is provided by the minutes (,Protokoll ' ) of the meeting on 13 July 1955 of the 
Secretariat of the SED's Central Committee (DY 30/J IY/2/3/479, SAPMO). The Secretariat decided to award a 
salary of DM 12,000 to Nikolaus Riehl and one of DM 8,000 to Heinz Barwich. Other leading 'I 037(P), atomic 
scientists, such as Fritz Bernhardt, Ludwig Ziehl, Hans Born, Henry Ortmann, Walter Herrmann, Justus 
Miihlenpfordt and Herbert Thieme were also awarded large salaries. The highest salary of all (DM 15,000) was 
awarded to another returned atomic scientist, Max Yolmer. 
591 Six letters in similar form and dated 28/6/1951, DY 30llY 2/13/389, SAPMO. 
592See, for example, a letter from Jenny Matern of the Hauptverwaltung Arbeit und Sozialfiirsorge 
(Sozialversicherung) of the Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission (DO IIMdI/34,0/HA Innere AngeI.17045), in which 
she instructs that specialists in the USSR were not to lose their entitlement to welfare benefits. Account was to be 
taken of their time in the USSR in calculating the pension to which they were entitled; their dependents in the 
DDR were not to be deprived of other benefits because of the specialists' absence. 
593Report dated 8/1 0/1 951, DY 30llY 2/13/389 , SAPMO. 
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projects by the DDR government,. to supplement those taking place in East Germany 
under Soviet control. STIB observed this initiative in 1952 and thought that the 
Soviets might have consented to these projects so as to give employment to the 
re~urning scientific workers and so deny them to the West. 594 
The provision made for the most important of the returning scientists was lavish. 
Brunolf Baade, who returned to the DDR in November 1953 to become the overlord 
of its nascent aircraft industry, demanded a splendid home by one of the lakes south 
of Berlin as part of the price of his collaboration with the SED. A handwritten note, 
presumably written by Baade himself, set out his requirements for the house. For a 
citizen of the DDR, the accommodation he demanded represented sheer luxury. The 
house was to be for eight people (Baade had five children), with a minimum of eight 
rooms and a maximum of ten. It absolutely had to be at the water's edge and was to 
be a 
New house, from about 1930. Large windows, light large rooms, fine 
bathroom and kitchen, provision with water, gas and electricity, terrace 
giving on to the lake, garage (if possible for two cars), the garage to be 
centrally heated if possible, garden of 5-10,000 square metres, lots of fruit 
trees desired, large lawn, a landing-stage or boathouse if possible. 595 
The DDR authorities did favours for Baade's family during his time in Russia. 596 He 
was very well taken care of there too. 597 Manfred, Baron von Ardenne, was allowed 
594STIB/D711323 dated 24 March 1953, DEFE 41/80. 
595Handwritten and undated note entitled 'Wohnhaus Baade' ('Baade residence' ), DOI/Mdl/34,O/HA Innere 
Ange1./8270. In German, the above quotation reads as follows: 'neues Haus , mit alter 1930. GroSe Fenster, helle 
graSe Raume, schanes Badezimmer und KOche, Wasser, Gas und elektr. Yersorgung, Terasse zur See-Seite, 
Garage, magI. f. 2 Maschinen. Zentral-Heizung magI. auch Garage. Garten. maglichst groSe Garten 5-10,000 m, 
erwOnscht viele Obstbaumen, groSe Rasenflachen, maglichst Bootsteg od. Bbotshaus'. 
596Letter dated 8/4/53 from 'KaSner, Abteilungsleiter', to 'Ministerium fOr Transportmittel und 
Landmaschinenbau' , DO IIMdl/34,O/HA Innere Ange1./8270. 
597STIB Interview Report No. 158 dated 16 March 1954 on Horst Bahr (DEFE 21142) contains an account by 
someone who worked with Baade in Russia of his close and warm relations with the Soviet authorities. He 
boasted to his German colleagues about his Soviet 'connections'. There seemed to be plenty of substance to the 
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to establish a private research institute in Dresden, which became the largest private 
employer in the DDR.598 The SED's First Secretary, Walter Ulbricht, himself visited 
the institute on the day after von Ardenne's arrival there. This visit gave the institute 
financial security, for Ulbricht agreed that a certain number of research tasks would 
be allocated every year to it by the state, thus allowing it quickly to expand its 
work. 599 The SED leadership hoped to keep the institute's scientific staff from 
defecting to the West by guaranteeing them gainful employment. Ulbricht knew that 
von Ardenne himself had no commitment to Socialism. Research into his 
background had established that he had paid financial contributions to the Nazi Party, 
had had connections with Himmler, Goring and Goebbels and had maintained a bank 
account in West Germany throughout his time in the USSR (into which the 
Americans had made payments in respect of his patents and property of his which 
they had rented). When the War ended, he had intended to work for the Americans 
and had offered his services to the Soviets only because they were quicker into 
Berlin. In short, he was nothing but an opportunist. But it was felt that he would be 
very susceptible to bribery and flattery because von Ardenne was seen as being very 
greedy and horribly vain.600 Honours were piled on him. In 1958 he was given the 
DDR's highest award for science, the National Prize First Class. 601 
claim, since he went frequently to Moscow for meetings at the Air Ministry. Allegedly, he even started to call 
himself a 'Russian' designer. British Intelligence targeted Baade, as is established by 'Dragon Return ' Progress 
Report dated 24 August 1953 (DEFE 41/90), which lists him under the heading 'Contact, selected for contact or 
lead available'. Technical Section prepared an approach to him via Heinz and Hannelore UhI. The latter was a 
friend of Baade's wife Angelica. John Horner of STIB Berlin looked into the possibility of approaching him 
through his uncle, Erich Trautmann, who lived in Berlin (list of 'Possible Contacts to key men at Zavod I, OKB 
I', DEFE 41/92). However, in the light of his support for the SED, it is unlikely that Baade was approached and 
invited to defect. He remained in the DDR and was even raised to the SED's Central Committee (for proof of the 
latter point, see the minutes of the meeting of the Secretariat of the SED's Central Committee on 27 August 1958 
(DY 30/J IV 12/3/611), at which it was decided to permit Baade, described as a candidate member of the Central 
Committee, to attend the Farnborough Air Show in Britain). 
5980bituary, The Tim es, 3 June 1997. Von Ardenne died in Dresden on 26 May 1997 at the grand old age of 
ninety. 
599M. von Ardenne, Sechzig lahrefiir Forscllllllg //lId Forlschrill , p. 271. 
6OOReport dated 31112/54 and entitled, 'Ober die zuriickkehrenden SU-Spezialisten', DY 30llV 2/202/56, 
SAPMO. In this report, it is stated that MfS surveillance of seven members of von Ardenne's 'Kollektiv' 
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The Soviets had a high opinion of von Ardenne's scientific ability. But he did not 
belong to the elite group which they most wished to remain in the DDR after its 
return to Germany. This was a group of eighteen scientists who had carried out 
imI?ortant research tasks during their time in the USSR. The eighteen were as 
follows: 602 
Schimor (misspelled: actually Schimohr) Schilling 
Barwich Born 
Mtihlenfort (misspelled: actually Ziel (misspelled: actually Ziehl) 
Mtihlenpfordt) 
Schmidt 
Wirts (misspelled: actually Wirths) 
Kirst 
Toppin 
Katsch (misspelled: actually Catsch) 
Ztihlke 
Lange 
Riehl 
Thieme 
Siewert 
Zimmer 
Schibilla (misspelled: actually Przybilla) 
(returning research group) was necessary. The reasons were variously, 'suspicion of espionage, anti-Soviet 
feeling, connection with the Gestapo and anti-Communism' (,Spionageverdacht, antisowjetische Einstellung, 
Yerbindung zur Gestapo und antidemokratische Einstellung'). The ground of suspicion of espionage is 
fascinating: it opens up the prospect that a Western intelligence service had managed to make contact with and 
recruit a scientific worker at Sukhumi. The only imaginable means of attempting such a recruitment would have 
been in code in a letter from a politically-sympathetic relative in West Berlin or West Germany. 
601M. von Ardenne, Sechzig lahrefiir Forscllllllg lI1ld Forlschrill, p. 295. 
602Report dated 3111211954 and entitled, 'Uber die zurUckkehrenden SU-Spezialisten', DY 30llY 2/202/56, 
SAPMO. More than one scientific worker bearing the name 'Lange' was deported to the USSR in Operation 
'Osoaviakhim' and so it is difficult to establish who is meant by that name. A 'Willi Lange' who returned to East 
Germany in 1955 fled to the West soon afterwards and the DDR authorities took control of his bank account in 
consequence (list of closed bank accounts, dated 14111/55, in DO I/MdII34,0/HA Innere Angel.17045). He is 
probably the 'Lange' referred to in the list of eighteen scientists to be kept in the DDR. As he returned in 1955, he 
must have been an atomic scientist. Since, as this report states, atomic scientists were considered to have acquired 
knowledge of value to the West, it is remarkable that, at least according to a sJatement made by one of Bernd von 
Bock's interrogators in his interrogation in August 1955, those who had worked on atomic projects were not 
required to swear to keep their knowledge secret after their return to the DDR. By contrast, von Bock, who had 
worked on chemical tasks, most of them unimportant , was required to make such an oath (p. 87, transcript of 
interview (annexed to report no. 235) with Dr. von Bock, DEFE 21143). It should be noted that Riehl, Wirths and 
other atomic scientists on this list were being interrogated in the West at exactly the same time as von Bock - in 
the summer of 1955. 
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Misspellings complicate the task of establishing to whom these surnames refer. The 
list may record a telephone conversation. Nevertheless, it is certain that almost all of 
those listed were atomic scientists. In fact, they had probably all worked on atomic 
projects. In STIB's terminology, they were the leading members of the' 1037(P) 
Moscow' group. The list is dominated by the Riehl Group. Of the eighteen, at least 
eight had been members: Riehl himself, Wirths, Thieme, Kirst, Catsch, Born, 
Zimmer and Przybilla. It may be that 'Toppin' refers to Tobien, also of the Riehl 
Group, and 'Schmidt' to Schmitz, the Riehl Group's young technician, who worked 
not only at the uranium purification plant at Elektrostal' but also at Sungul in the 
Urals, which lay not far from the plutonium production reactor Cheliabinsk-40. STIB 
placed an 'Ingrid Schilling' at Elektrostal'. 603 Barwich, MUhlenpfordt and ZUhlke 
worked at the Hertz institute at Agudzeri on atomic tasks. Schimohr, Ziehl and 
Siewert worked at the von Ardenne institute at Sinop, also on atomic projects. The 
reason given for trying to keep these people in the DDR was that they had done 
important work in the Soviet Union. However, that is not true of all those listed. 
Some of them, such as Zimmer and Catsch, did not regard themselves as having done 
important work at all, and it is likely that they were put on the list because they had 
visited or learned of places of intelligence interest. Of course, the list contains the 
names of atomic scientists because it was obviously made in anticipation of the 
return of the atomic research groups. (Anyway, at the end of 1954 those who 
remained in the USSR were largely people who had been engaged in atomic and 
rocket research.) However, those who had been sent back earlier were not as 
603STIB171 02112 entitled. 'Moscow Hauptpostamt I 037(P),. DEFE 411135. If STIB was right. Schilling was 
also a member of the Riehl Group. However. STIB may have been wrong to place her there. 
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important, as scientists or as sourc~s for the West, as those still held in the USSR. 
The most important and intelligence-rich were sent back last. 604 
Some of those on this A-list fled to the West. Among them were such Riehl Group 
members as Gunther Wirths, Karl Zimmer and Alexander Catsch. The West's 
biggest catch was the star of the A-list, the man seen by the SED and the Soviets as 
'die bedeutendste Person unter den ubrigen Wissenschaftlern' ('the most significant 
of the remaining scientists'), a Hero of Socialist Labour and winner of a Stalin Prize 
First Class (worth 200,000 rubles), Dr. Nikolaus Riehl. Even before his return to the 
DDR there was evidence that he planned to defect from it. Bribery and flattery were 
the means by which the SED hoped to keep him in East Germany, but Riehl was 
clearly more resistant to them than von Ardenne, because, shortly after his return to 
the DDR in April 1955, he fled to West Germany. British Intelligence probably had a 
hand in Riehl's flight.605 The SED report notes that: 
604p. 29, 'Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR und seine Auswirkungen in del' SBZ und DDR', by B. Ciesla, 
Ails Polilik lind Zeilgeschichle, B49-50193, 3. Dezember 1993. For evidence of this, see a letter dated 18 July 
1952, entitled 'Betreuung der Spezialisten, die aus der Sowjetunion zurOckkehren ' and written by Prof. Dr. W. 
Lange to the Deputy Chairman of the State Commission (DY 30llY 2113/389). Lange made the point that, at the 
time of writing, the most important German scientists were still in the Soviet Union. In German, his words are: 
'Seit Oktober 1950 sind laufend ROcktransporte von Teilen dieser Kollektive in der DDR eingetroffen, doch sind 
die befahigsten Spezialisten, vor all em die FOhrungskafte, meist noch nicht zurOckgekehrt ' . 
605This is the most natural inference to draw from the telegram sent by David Evans of STIB to Hugh Young at 
the Ministry of Defence in June 1955: ' Dr. Nikolaus Riehl ex 1037 now in West under British auspices' 
(STIB/P/I/843 dated 2 June 1955, DEFE 411142). The British had had time to contact Riehl and invite him to 
defect, for he had returned to Germany on 4 April 1955 (list of returners from Sukhumi attached to letter dated 
25/5/1955 , DO IIMdI/34,O/HA Innere AngeI./8715). A list of bank accounts over which the state was to take 
control indicates that the depositors in question had fled illegally to West Germany. These depositors included 
Willi Lange (a returner in 1955), Alfred Schimohr (who also returned in 1955), Wirths and Catsch (this list, dated 
14/11/55, is in DOI/MdI/34,O/HA Innere Angel.17045) . It appears from Wirths ' interrogation report that, at the 
very least, he and his family were flown out of Berlin by the British. Money may well have been paid to him to 
encourage him to defect. In April 1955, at the time of Wirths' return to Germany, REG 's head office in Frankfurt 
authorized its representative in Berlin to make avai lable to John Horner DM 12,000 (which was in addition to the 
same amount which STIB was providing) to be offered to Wirths as an inducement to defect (record of meetings 
entit led 'P/200. Wirths, Dr. Guenther (PF.8 I 259/DR ), and dated 30/4/55, DEFE 41/142). It follows from this that 
Wirths was probably induced to defect and by STIB , the approach having beep organized by Horner. Moreover, 
Josef Michel, who ran a furniture removal business from the British Sector and, using permits acquired by 
bribery, arranged the illegal removal from the Soviet Sector of the furniture of 'Dragon Returners ' , admitted 
when arrested and interrogated by the MfS late in 1955 that he had collected 70,000 Ostmarks from East Berlin 
on behalf of Dr. Wirths (STIB/252/X/l53 dated 13 October 1955, DE FE 411142). The British probably had a 
hand in von Bock's defection to West Germany. He was certainly targeted to be invited to come West. At the 
MilO Technical Intelligence Conference for Assistant Military Attaches, it was said of von Bock that, 'he would 
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It is known that the Americans and West Germany, for scientific and political 
reasons, are very interested in him and will try, using all possible means, to 
induce him to leave the DDR.606 
The Soviets made no bones about Riehl's potential intelligence value to the West: 
In the opinion of our friends [i.e. the Soviets], it is unquestionably necessary 
to keep him in the DDR. He is well-informed about a number of 
developments in the USSR. fJJ7 
The SED's 'BetreuungsmaBnahmen' succeeded similar Soviet measures. Most of the 
deportees were well-treated in the USSR. In general, the Germans' housing and food 
were good and they received reasonable rates of pay. Technicians tended to receive 
1,500-2,000 rubles a month. More important people received more, very often 3,000 
be worth his weight in gold to us on Russian CW intelligence and ... the matter is under full control' (address by 
Capt. Hogwood, MI lOB, MIl 0 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, DEFE 411126). In July 1955 Evans 
sent Young another telegram: 'Von Bock ex Beketovka now permanently in West under British arrangements' 
(STIB/E/I/98 dated 27 July 1955, DEFE 411142). In von Bock's interrogation report, his ' final reselliemell!' is 
stated to be the result of 'protracted and involved casework' (STIB Interview Report No. 235 dated 22 November 
1955 on Dr. Bernd von Bock, DEFE 411105 . My italics). 
606Report dated 31112/1954 and entitled, 'Uber die zurOckkehrenden SU-Spezialisten', DY 30/IV 2/202/56, 
SAPMO. In German, the above quotation reads as follows: 'Es ist bekannt, daB die Amerikaner sowie 
Westdeutschland an ihm aus wissenschaftlichen und politischen GrOnden groBes Interesse haben und versuchen 
werden, ihn mit allen Mitteln zum Verlassen der DDR zu bewegen ' . 
fJJ7Report dated 3111211954 and entitled, 'Uber die zurOckkehrenden SU-Spezialisten', DY 30/IV 2/202/56, 
SAPMO. In German, the above quotation reads as follows: 'Nach Meinung der Freunde ist es unbedingt 
notwendig, ihn in der DDR zu halten. Er ist Ober einige Entwicklungsthemen in der UdSSR gut informiert' . Just 
as there was an A-list of people possessed of information the West would find valuable, so in the same report 
there was a blacklist of scientists who had to be placed under surveillance as security risks. The names of some 
atomic scientists appeared on both lists; that of Heinz Barwich is an example. It is surprising that he was 
considered a security risk, for he and his wife were both ardent Communists and remained for a long time in the 
DDR. Barwich became Director of the Central Institute of Nuclear Physics in Dresden (OLB/B/571370 dated 19 
September 1957, DEFE 411141). He and his wife managed to defect to the West in the summer of 1964 (U. 
Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Wellmann, Die Speziaiistell , p. 66, footnote 48). The other names on this 
blacklist were those of Helmut Bumm, Gerhard Siewert, Henry Ortmann, Walter Herrmann, Werner Hartmann, 
Werner Schtitze, Heinz Frohlich, Werner Kirst , Fritz Bernhardt and Karl Sille. The reason the MfS was to place 
them under surveillance was that: 'These people are connected with secret services , were formerly in the service 
of the Gestapo, displayed a hostile attitude at their place of work and have interesting connections with people in 
the capitalist world' ('Diese Person en haben Verbindungen zu Geheimdiensten, waren ehem. Abwehrbeauftragte 
der Gestapo, traten an ihrer Arbeitsstelle feindlich in Erscheinigung und haben interessante Verbindungen zu 
Personen im kapitalistischen Ausland ' ). All those on this list too were atomic scientists. Some of them made their 
way to West Germany on their return to the DDR (for example, Dr. Heinz Frohlich, although he seems from 
correspondence in DOI/MdI/34,0/HA Innere Angel.17045 to have done so legally). Others remained in the DDR 
and rose to high positions. Examples are Barwich and Dr. Werner Hartmann, who became a Professor and the 
Director of one of the most important factories in the DDR, the VEB RFT MeBelektronik Dresden (M . von 
Ardenne, Sechzig Jahre /iiI' Forschllllg IIlld Fortschrill, p. 273). 
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rubles, but sometimes more and even as much as 8,000. Their Russian colleagues 
tended to receive only half as much. 608 Electronics specialists at research institutes at 
Gor' kii, Fryazino and Leningrad were paid between three and four times the salary 
of their Soviet counterparts so that they could maintain a Western standard of living. 
Some highly-valued Germans were paid even more. During his two years as 
Scientific Director of the Sungul Radiological Laboratory, Nikolaus Riehl is alleged 
to have been paid 25,000 rubles a month.609 Stalin prizes increased further the 
income of a small elite. Some of the Germans were so flattered by their treatment 
that there were instances of reluctance to return to Germany; many of those who did 
return identified themselves with the Communist Bloc.6lO The Germans were 
allowed to convert a specific percentage of their income into East German currency 
at a favourable exchange rate (how large the percentage was depended on their field 
of work). 611 The Soviets took one last precaution before sending the Germans home; 
they forced most to undertake to reveal nothing of their work in the USSR.612 
However, life was harder for some. The rocket research group under Helmut 
Grottrup had to endure primitive living conditions on the island of Gorodomlia (in 
Lake Seliger, about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad), to which it was taken 
in 1948. Moreover, though many Germans' cage was a comfortable one, it was still a 
cage. Some Germans passionately resented the tight restrictions on their movements 
and the constant surveillance they had to endure. 
608U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Wellmann, Die Spezialistell, pp. 151-2. 
609STIB Interview Report No. 224 dated 5 May 1955 on Dr. Wilhelm Menke, DEFE 21143. 
6IOAddress (and supporting notes) by STIB Director to the MI 10 Technical Intelligence Conference 1951, DEFE 
411125. 
611 Letter dated 231 II 1 1951 from DDR Ministerium der Finanzen, Devisenverwaltung, to FbrderungsausschuB, 
DO I/MdI/34,O/HA Innere Ange1./7045. 
612See, for example, DSIIJTIC(51)6 dated 27 April 1951 (DEFE 41/153), which refers to a declaration signed by 
electronicists who had worked at Fryazino, Leningrad and Gor'kii that they would reveal nothing of the projects 
on which they had worked. 
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B. Operation 'Dragon' and the art of enticing defection 
The British intelligence operation to tap the knowledge of Soviet war-related 
research and development of German scientific workers who had worked in the 
USSR was codenamed 'Dragon Return' . This was the culmination of a three-part 
operation. The first part involved using the mUlti-purpose intelligence tool which 
served the Occupying Powers so well that they kept hold of it throughout the Cold 
War: opening up letters from the East. Under Operation 'Dragon' (initially 'Lister'), 
all means were used to find out where deported scientists, engineers and technicians 
were working in the USSR and what projects they were employed on, but this 
information was generally taken from intercepted letters. 613 All letters sent to the 
USSR from the British Zone, and all arriving from there, were intercepted; the 
codename given to this aspect of Operation 'Dragon' was 'Dragon Star' .614 
It was not until 1951 that regular correspondence with relatives and friends was 
permitted to all German scientific workers in the Soviet Union615, but there was 
sufficient correspondence even in the late 1940s for a great deal of intelligence to be 
gathered. Important scientists like Manfred von Ardenne were by 1946 permitted to 
write letters home. His letters to relatives and friends in Berlin were delivered by 
courier from an office in Berlin-GrOnau of the MVD's Ninth Directorate (responsible 
for the surveillance of all the Germans working on atomic problems in the USSR); to 
613Memorandum dated 13 January 1950, DEFE 41179; report dated I November 1949 and entitled, 'Scientific 
and Technical Intelligence Branch: Review of Future Commitments', DEFE 41/83. 
614Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 7 July 1950, DEFE 4111 0; STIB171 02112 entitled, 'Moscow 
Hauptpostamt 1037(P)" DEFE41/135 . 
615 A. Parry, Russia's Rockets alld Missiles, p. 123. The Soviets clearly had the security of some of their 
development projects in mind in not permitting the Germans working at some installations to write home. For 
example, the Germans who worked on a remote control device for a target-seeking missile for Lavrentii Beria 's 
son Sergo at 'Construction Bureau 1323 ' at 228, Leningrad Chaussee, Moscow, were not allowed to write to their 
families in Germany until I April 1949, when they had completed the main part of their work. 
197 
reply, they sent their letters to the same office. Other scientists who sent letters from 
the USSR to 'Colonel Elyan, Wassersportallee 46, Berlin-GrOnau' (until early 1949) 
were the members of the Riehl Group. The return address was' 1037(P) Moscow' 
and it was by this address that STIB knew this, the group of German scientists it was 
more interested in interrogating than any other. Letters they both received and sent 
were much censored. 616 Since the letters were delivered by special courier, they 
could not be intercepted. But at least one of von Ardenne's correspondents was 
clearly sympathetic to the West and showed von Ardenne's letters to an Allied 
intelligence officer, the energetic American Lt. F. J. Biermann. The letters of such 
scientists were not so thoroughly censored that Western intelligence officers could 
not come by usefulpieces of information when shown the letters. 617 By late 1949 
about 1,600 Germans had been located, scattered among approximately one hundred 
centres of war-related research and development, and their backgrounds had been 
investigated to see whether, on their return to Germany, they would prove responsive 
to an approach to provide intelligence. 618 By mid-1951, a little under 2,000 German 
616STIB Interview Report No. 221 dated 19 July 1955 on Dr. Karl Zimmer, DEFE 21/43 . Examination of 
intercepted letters, reports on Pow interrogations and early 'Dragon Return ' reports established in 1950 that the 
'1037(P), address referred chiefly to three locations: the institute under Gustav Hertz at Sukhumi on the Black 
Sea (in the suburb of Agudzeri) , the institute under Manfred von Ardenne at Sukhumi (in the suburb of Sinop) 
and a factory at Elektrostal', near Moscow (see STIB171 02/12 entitled, 'Moscow Hauptpostamt 1 037(P), , DEFE 
41/135). In making this examination, STIB was seeking above all to answer three questions: how many places 
(and which places) were covered by the address; how many and which scientific workers were at work there; and, 
by reference to the skills of these people, what was the work of these places? For answers to the latter two 
questions , see footnote 623 below. 
617periodic Intelligence RepOIt No.1 dated 2 August 1946, FO 1031/59. Von Ardenne' s letters clearly gave 
some insight into what he was working on at Sukhumi . For example, von Ardenne wrote in a letter of February 
1946, 'Compared to Lichterfelde the institute here is somewhat increased. The spectroscope has been somewhat 
improved here or rather been newly constructed for much higher measuring exactness (20,000 V anode tension). 
Major Boutschbrugewitsch is my personal Russian co-worker. ... In the long run we and our work have good 
prospects in this country' . This may well have been a quotation from a letter sent to von Ardenne's sister, 
Magdalena Hartmann, who is listed in this intelligence report as one of those who received letters from him. Her 
husband, Otto Hartmann, is listed in STIB's card index of contacts (in DEFE 43/1) as a source of information 
acquired from letters sent by von Ardenne from Sukhumi. Hartmann was the Managing Director of 'AEG Radio 
Fabrik' in the French Sector of Berlin; he lived in the US Sector of the city. OLB/BLl56/24 dated 24 April 1956 
(DEFE 41/159) establishes that a close relative of von Ardenne's, also a scientist and perhaps Hartmann, did 
indeed pass information on him to the British. OLB/BLl56/24 contains a sample of this information. In the report, 
the informant is described as, ' reliable, known to OLB, Berlin, for some considerable time '. 
618Report dated I November 1949 and entitled, 'Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch: Review of Future 
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scientists, engineers and technicians had been identified and located, working at 
about 125 installations on a wide range of technologies. 1,939 letters had been 
intercepted from Kuibyshev alone, identifying 394 scientific workers. 619 Counting 
their families as well, some 7,000 Germans had been located, of approximately 
15,000 deported. By that time the flow of correspondence from the USSR had 
become great enough for there to be about 20,000 people in West Germany with 
whom these 7,000 deportees were in touch.620 
This letter-opening operation yielded information about a considerable number of 
military-industrial installations and made a significant contribution to the Order of 
Battle of Soviet science. 621 Intercepted letters revealed the existence of war-related 
research and development centres, such as those at Putilovo and Sverdlovsk, which 
were involved in guided missile development. 622 Moreover, from the specialisms of 
the Germans working at a particular installation its work could be guessed at. The 
specialist knowledge of those working at Elektrostal' indicated that its function was 
the manufacture of uranium metal. That of those employed at the Hertz and von 
Ardenne institutes at Sukhumi, on the Black Sea, indicated that they were engaged in 
isotope separation. 623 Likewise, the employment, betrayed by intercepted letters 
Commitments', DEFE 41/83. 
6190peration 'Dragon Return' Results List, Vol. 5, DEFE 21/39. 
620 Address by STIB Director to MI I 0 Technical Intelligence Conference 1951 , DEFE 41/125. 
621Memorandum dated 6 August 1948, DEFE 41182. 
622Appendix N, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, DEFE 
411160. 
623Among the scientific workers stated in Amendments (List No.2) to Operation 'Lister' Results List dated 15 
August 1949 (DEFE 411134) to be both specialists in isotope separation and members of the 'Postfach 1037(P) 
Moscow' group are Gustav Hertz, Heinz Barwich and Werner SchUtze. The same list identifies Nikolaus Riehl , 
GUnther Wirths and Heinrich Ortmann as both specialists in the production of uranium metal and further 
members of the' 1037(P)' group. In STIB17102112 entitled, 'Moscow Hauptpostamt 1037(P), (DEFE 411135) and 
apparently dating from 1950, Hertz, Barwich and SchUtze are all rightly presumed to be at the institute in 
Agudzeri , and Riehl, Wirths and Ortmann are all rightly presumed to be at Elektrostal' . Such scientists as von 
Ardenne and Bernhardt are correctly presumed to be at the institute in Sinop. These presumptions were based on 
information obtained from intercepted letters, PoWs and early 'Dragon Returners ' (see footnote 616 above). It 
was known by 1946 that von Ardenne had from 1943 worked on isotope separation and that he had taken an 
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from them, of thirteen German sci.entific workers in the Khimki area, was consistent 
with PoW information that the Khimki complex was engaged in the development and 
testing of propulsion units . For, of the thirteen, all but one had previously been 
employed at the Montaniawerke in Nordhausen, where there had been facilities for 
the design and manufacture of guided missile propulsion units .624 
Intercepted letters initiated operations to contact targeted 'Dragons' and acquire 
information from them, for they gave early warning that batches of deportees were 
shortly to return home. Indeed, it was the big increase in the summer of 1948 in the 
number of letters which mentioned the possibility of being sent home which caused 
Operation 'Dragon Return' to be launched. The hope of return was expressed in 
letters sent from R&D establishments scattered throughout the USSR, between 
which there could be no contact. Therefore, there had to be some truth to the story.625 
Once confirmation of the first reports of return had been received, Major-General 
Charles Haydon, the Chief of Intelligence Division, ordered that overt approaches 
should be made to scientific workers whose return was permanent and who had 
severed all connection with the Soviet authorities and semi-overt or covert 
approaches to those who were only returning on leave or who, though back for good, 
retained a connection with the Soviets. 626 Although many approaches were overt, 
they were discreet. Responsibility for covert approaches lay with MI6.627 However, 
'isotope separator' with him to Sukhumi (see Periodic Intelligence Report No. 1 dated 2 August 1946, FO 
1031/59). In this report, the two institutes are called 'the Chemical and Atom research station at Suchum Kale, a 
place situated in the Eastern shore of the Black Sea'. 
624paragraph 55, Appendix L, A Study of the Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference, 
DEFE 411160. 
625STIB1712717/607 dated 26 August 1948, DEFE 411133. The same hope was expressed in letters intercepted 
early in 1949 (memorandum dated 23 February 1949, DEFE 41/83). 
626HQ.Int.Div/Secretariatl7113114 'Lister Return' Instruction No. I dated II April 1949, DEFE 411134. 
Operation 'Lister Return' was later called 'Dragon Return '. 
627STIB17127171607 dated 26 August 1948, DEFE 411133. 'No. 1 P & EU', which is mentioned in this document 
as being involved in contacting the 'Dragon Returners ', stands for 'No. 1 Planning and Evaluation Unit' and was 
the cover-name for MI6 in Germany until 1949. The name was still in use in the 1950s. 
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many deportees erred on the side.of optimism in forecasting the date of their return 
home, thus unwittingly unleashing intelligence operations in West Berlin. For 
example, a network of contacts was quickly established in 1950 when the physicist 
Ludwig Bewilogua, a '1037(P), case deported from the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut ftir-
Physik in Berlin in 1945 (where he had been head of the low-temperature physics 
section and had had charge of the experimental uranium pile), seemed to be about to 
return to Berlin to take up a position at a university in the Soviet Sector. In fact, 
Bewilogua arrived back in Germany in March 1954.628 Letters home did not simply 
give notice that particular scientific workers of interest were shortly to return to 
Germany. They also gave STrn indications as to whether the writers, on their return, 
would defect to West Germany. For instance, intercepted letters from the 'Postfach 
126 Sukhumi' group had established by early 1956 that many intended to come 
West. 629 
STIB built up a network of contacts to acquire information on the deportees . Since 
many of the deportees had worked for great German companies such as Siemens, 
628List, headed 'Bezirk Halle' , of returners in the transport of 2/3/54, DY 30llY 2/13/389, SAPMO. It was, in 
fact, quite common for 'Dragons' to forecast their return much too early. The acoustics specialist Kurt John, then 
working at a torpedo and sea-mine research centre in Leningrad, caused excitement early in 1950 when he wrote 
home to say that he would probably be returning to Berlin in July. In fact, he returned home in February 1954. 
Dr. Karl Smeykal returned in the same transport as Bewilogua. His case had been handed over to Technical 
Section in 1950, again in the belief that his return was imminent. Herbert Mummert, the head of a computer 
development team, returned to East Berlin in February 1954 and fled to the West the following month . Contacts 
had been built up four years earlier with the aim of coming by news of his return and of approaching him, again 
in the mistaken belief, based on intercepted letters, that his return was near (STIB Interview Report No. 213 dated 
5 May 1955 on Herbert Mummert, DEFE 41/1 04). A 'net' was also laid in Berlin in 1950 for a group of scientists 
who, in view of their eminence, the British believed likely to have been thoroughly exploited for their scientific 
knowledge in the USSR and so likely to prove outstandingly valuable sources of information. This was the group 
of chemists deported from the Heeresgasschutzlaboratorium in Berlin-Spandau at the War's end and led , by 
virtue of seniority and personal authority, by Professor Dr. Gerhard Jung, the former head of the HGL's research 
laboratory, Department F-3. Not only was the net laid far too early (for the Jung Group only returned to Germany 
in December 1953), but it was laid in fal se anticipation of the value of the group. Its members , under Jung' s 
leadership, had consistently refused to give up their prisoner-of-war status and work for the Soviets. They had 
throughout their stay in the USSR been a headache for the MYD and the intercepts which had shown them being 
moved from one location to another had not, in fact, pointed to their thorough exploitation by the Soviets, but 
rather to the inability of successive officials to endure their obstinacy any more (STIB Interview Report No. 140 
dated 28 January 1954 on the Jung Group, DEFE 21142). 
629STIB/B/l/847 dated 4 April 1956, DEFE 41/137 . 
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Telefunken, Askania and Junkers, commercial contacts represented a valuable 
grapevine which passed news to the British. Contacts were also cultivated with 
deportees' relatives and friends, who proved willing to show STIB officers letters 
received from the USSR and to pass on news of them. 630 Not all of the deportees had 
taken their immediate family with them to the USSR, and more distant relatives and 
friends of many were within the reach of British Intelligence. Many such people 
were willing to act as 'leads' to the deportees, because they were keen to see their 
deported child, relative or friend safely in the West.631 Such contacts were plied with 
coffee, tea, cigarettes and cognac. The Germans are sticklers for good coffee and 
some of the recipients complained about the quality of the gifts.632 Contacts enabled 
STIB to come by news of the deportees from other letters than those passing between 
West Germany and West Berlin, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. 
Some relatives of deported scientific workers lived under Soviet rule and crossed 
over to British-occupied territory to give STIB representatives the news they had 
received in letters from their loved ones. For instance, the parents of Horst Kuhfeld, a 
member of the targeted 'Postfach 908 Moscow' rocket development team, lived in 
East Berlin and made their way to Kuhfeld's aunt's house in the western part of the 
630STIB17002/6099 dated 19 August 1950, DEFE 411135. 
631 Here, too, STIB' s commercial contacts were a great asset, for they held out to the relatives of some of the 
deportees the prospect that, on the latter's return to Germany, they would be given jobs with their old companies 
in West Germany. For example, Kurt Berner, another member of the 'Postfach 908 Moscow' group, had worked 
for Siemens & Halske in Siemensstadt (in the British Sector of Berlin) during the War, with the result that there 
were a number of people who could act as British ' leads' to him. One of them was the aunt of Berner's late wife, 
who was looking after the couple's children during their father's exile in the USSR. She had received letters from 
him and thought that he wanted to rejoin Siemens & Halske when he returned to Germany: could the British fix 
this with their 'friends at Siemens'? (STIB/252/X/0941 dated 18 January 1956, DEFE411136). 
632Berlinl1240, DEFE 411137. The accumulation of contacts among the correspondents in West Germany of the 
deported scientific workers had another purpose, codenamed ' Dragon Continuation' . This was to insure against 
the day the West Germans regained full control of their post. If the British lost their power to open up letters from 
the East, they would need a way of finding out which deportees were going to come home next and when they 
would be arriving. Their 'many thousands ' of contacts among the deportees' correspondents in the Western 
Zones gave them this (report dated I November 1949 and entitled, 'Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch: 
Review of Future Commitments', DEFE 41/83). Of course, this day did not come. 
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city to make contact with STIB officers.633 Scientists and engineers in East Germany 
received letters from deported colleagues and passed on news to STIB.634 
This network of family and professional contacts enabled the British to make a 
discreet approach to the targeted scientist, engineer or technician on his return to 
Germany.635 When intercepted letters home brought STIB news that the German 
aircraft technicians at Podberez'ye, in the Moscow region, had been told on 18 
August 1950 that their return would take place in a series of transports beginning on 
15 September 1950 and lasting until 1 June 1952, it put a well-chosen contact to 
work. The returners from the aircraft manufacturing centres of Kuibyshev and 
Podberez'ye had, prior to their deportation, worked either for Junkers in Dessau or 
for BMW in Stal3furt. So the British agent who made contact with the seven chosen 
targets in the first wave of returners was, naturally, 'a former high official of Junkers 
now in the British Zone', who visited 'the associates or families of these men, using 
his Junkers' connection to obtain news of them and to arrange a meeting to be 
notified if they should visit the West, or possibly to arrange meetings in Berlin' .636 
Approaches to the targeted people were not, it seems, made in letters, since it was 
presumed that all letters to the returners would, at least for a time, be intercepted by 
Soviet Intelligence, as would letters from them. 
633STIB /252/X/0850 dated 17 August 1955, DEFE 41/136. Harry Rositzke goes so far as to suggest that the CIA 
used these relatives to pass messages to deported rocket engineers in the USSR. He writes at p. 43 of The CIA 's 
Secret Operations: Espionage, COl/nter-espionage and Covert Action that, 'Indirect contact was also made with 
German rocket specialists in the Soviet Union who were allowed to correspond with families they had left behind 
in East Germany' . 
634Letterdated 27 July 1950, DEFE41/132. 
635STIB/252/X/0005 dated 22 July 1955, DEFE 411136. 
636Report dated 27 September 1950 and entitled 'Operation "Dragon Return", Return of Technicians from 
Kuibyshev and Podberez'ye', DEFE 41191. The same contact network offered scope for a simultaneous 'Kidney ' 
operation. Another former employee of Junkers, once an important figure in the company, who was still in close 
touch with the management of Junkers in Dessau, went to Dessau and StaBfurt to find out what view was held 
there of the work done by the deported Germans in Kuibyshev and Podberez'ye. 
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Well-placed contacts in great West German companies, universities and the Federal 
Government were crucial to persuading 'Dragon Returners' to defect to the West. 637 
The returners were provided with good jobs and homes in the DDR. They would not 
take the risk of coming West unless they were sure that there was a job there for 
them. For the better-known of them - scientists of note like Nikolaus Riehl, Werner 
Buschbeck and Karl Steimel - finding a job would not be a problem. But for others it 
was more difficult, since their professional experience was chiefly in war-related 
fields of science. To find jobs for them, STIB drew on the experience of the 
'Employment Agency' set up to place 'Matchbox' evacuees in work. 638 Connections 
with the companies for which the 'Dragon Returners' had worked before and during 
the War were particularly valuable in finding work for them. The returners were 
often keen to rejoin their old companies, where they had established pension rights. 
This was a particularly weighty consideration for the older ones. The commercial 
contacts of most use were naturally in West Berlin, since the deportees had been 
taken from East Berlin and East Germany and many had connections with people and 
637Some West German companies, indeed, did not bother to collaborate with an intelligence service, but 
themselves arranged the evacuation of sought-after scientific and technical personnel from the Soviet Zone 
(STIB17003/3/3316 dated 28 December 1951, DEFE 41 /92). The case the letter concerns is that of a 'Dragon 
Returner' called Hissbach . 
638Some, in fact, were given a 'Matchbox' -style consultancy (i .e. instead of a job, they received a research 
grant) . Among these were Werner Baum, Hans Eckoldt, Alois Gemassmer, Walter Klages, Fritz Matheis and 
Walter Schmidt (see various documents from the years 1951-3 in DEFE 41/38). From 1953 there was a German 
body which sought to help the British find work in West Germany for ' Dragon Returners'. This was the von 
Dellingshausen Committee, set up as a result of British lobbying, which liaised with British Intelligence and 
functioned 'as a sort of higher employment exchange where career possibilities can be discussed ' 
(STIB17003/2457 dated 3 June 1953, DEFE 41/92). It would only take up the cases of people for whom the 
British could not find jobs or whom they wanted to place in government bodies . A leading member of the 
committee was a former 'Dragon Returner ' who had passed through STIB's hands, Theo Maas. Its Chairman was 
Ewert von Dellingshausen, of the Ministerium fUr Gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Ministry for All-German Issues). This 
ministry also helped East Germans to defect, as appears from STIB/252/XIl132 dated 16 June 1954 (DEFE 
41/92), concerning Dr. Karl Pagel, the Berlin head of its 'Cultural Relations' Department'. His responsibilities 
included finding work for East German academic defectors working in non-scientific fields . STIB also gave some 
German scientific workers, like Gerhard Dobbrack, Friedrich Keune and Werner Baum, resettlement grants . Like 
some 'Matchbox' evacuees, many of the targeted 'Dragon Returners ' were reluctant to leave their furniture 
behind and STIB made efforts to smuggle it to West Berlin, as STIB/252/X/0901 dated 7 January 1954 (DEFE 
41/38) shows . 
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companies based in West Berlin. from 1947 the British scientific intelligence team 
in West Berlin was the STIB section of the Berlin Intelligence Staff, led by John 
Horner. Intercepted letters and intelligence acquired from earlier returners built up 
his catalogue of German scientists, engineers and technicians in the USSR; he then 
turned to the company for which they had previously worked to see if they would re-
employ the scientific workers in question. If they agreed to do so, there was a good 
chance of drawing the target West, and the British would acquire intelligence from 
him as a sort of commission on the deal. Among the companies at which he built up 
contacts and which took from his catalogue some of the goods he had to offer were 
Askania639, Telefunken and the Siemens group. In February 1952, for instance, 
shortly before the departure for Germany of a transport of electronics specialists, 
Telefunken gave Horner the names of former employees whom it definitely wished 
to re-employ.640 By the mid-1950s, the Germans left in the USSR tended to be 
highly-qualified people. In May 1955, Telefunken informed STIB Berlin that it 
wished to speak to all its former employees when they returned to Germany, and 
would offer jobs to most. In the case of Werner Buschbeck, the company would 'pay 
any price' to prevail on him to rejoin it. 641 
A powerful inducement to some of the 'Dragon Returners' was the offer of a job 
outside Germany. In June 1951, the JIe (London) sub-committee on defectors noted 
that there had been cases in which the promise of a job outside Germany had helped 
to persuade targeted 'Dragon Returners' to defect. Australia had accepted many 
German scientific defectors who had been through the hands of the British, as well as 
639ST1 B/252/XI1441 dated 19July 1955. DEFE411136. 
640Letter dated 4 February 1952. DEFE 41/2. Late in March 1952 STIB received word that telegrams had been 
sent by two of the deportees to relatives in East Berlin telling them that the transport would leave the USSR on 30 
March (letter dated 26 March 1952. DEFE 41/2). 
64ISTIB/252/XI1419 dated 17 May 1955. DEFE 41/136. 
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many Soviet defectors and refugees.642 Others insisted on a job in Germany.643 Most 
'Matchbox' and 'Dragon Return' defectors found employment in West Germany, 
generally with a private company. The provision of such people with work as part of 
th~ deal which prompted them to defect was, of course, simply a continuation of the 
'Matchbox' procedure. If the targets, on their return to the DDR, agreed to come 
West, standard procedure was for them to come to Berlin and make their way to the 
British Sector. They were then flown to the British Zone. This was also just a 
continuation of the 'Matchbox' way of working. In the summer of 1951, in the early 
days of 'Dragon Return', the figures concerning the disposal of both 'Matchbox' and 
'Dragon Return' defectors were as follows: 
Cases handled Cases resettled Cases outstanding 
'Matchbox' 479 437 42 (difficult to 
settle for reasons of 
age, over-
specialization, 
health etc.) 
'Dragon Return' 55 50 5 
Total 534 487 (412 in 47 
Germany and 75 
overseas, most to 
Australia) 
642Minutes of meeting of HC (London) sub-committee on defectors on 5 July 1951 , DEFE 41170. 
643Minutes of meeting of HC (London) sub-committee on defectors on 12 June 1951, DEFE 41170. 
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The majority of scientists who had come to the West in the course of Operation 
'Dragon Return' had done so because they had either received a promise of 
employment or hoped to receive one. The ability to be able to promise the targeted 
men at least that work would be found for them was therefore critical. The most 
successful 'Dragon Return' cases had been those in which suitable and permanent 
employment had been organized before bringing the targeted scientist, engineer or 
technician over to the West.644 Of the twenty-seven most recent cases645: 
Reason for defection 
Previously negotiated specific 
employment (for example, with his old 
company) 
General guarantee of employment or 
financial betterment and resettlement 
Family reasons 
Escape from legal process 
Ideological reasons 
12 
4 
5 
2 
4 
644Minutes of meeting of JIC (London) sub-committee on defectors on 5 July 1951, DEFE 41170. 
645Minutes of meeting of JIC (London) sub-committee on defectors on 21 July 1951, DEFE 41170. This table 
appeared in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation, in which [ also briefly discussed the workings of Operation ' Dragon 
Return' , although not its intelligence yield (see next chapter) . That the British did offer jobs to some of the 
'Dragon Returners ' is suggested by the minutes of the meeting of JIC (Germany) on 10 July 1951 (DEFE 41166) , 
which record a discussion about whether these people could qualify as 'defectors ', given that they came over 
quite willingly and did not fear persecution in the DDR. To this point, 'Mr. Wilkinson [of the IRD] said that if a 
scientist defected as the direct result of a promise being made concerning his future resettlement then there was a 
moral commitment. If, however, a scientist came across without any promise being given he would be excluded 
from the benefits of the scheme' . Major-General Kirkman, the Chief of Intelligence Division, said in a letter 
dated 16 January 1951 (DEFE 21113) that quite a few of the 'Dragon Returners ' who returned to Germany in the 
early transports of September 1950 - January 1951 and then came over to the West had to be encouraged to 
defect. 
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All these efforts culminated in Op~ration 'Dragon Return', which was the evacuation 
and interrogation of the targets. Most were evacuated to West Germany, where they 
were interrogated and took up jobs. Some chose to stay in East Germany, but were 
nevertheless willing to give STIB information. The Americans followed the British 
example and in 1951 created a counterpart organization to STIB, the 'Returnees 
Exploitation Group' (REG), to implement their counterpart operation, which was 
codenamed 'Project Prodigal'.646 British policy regarding the exploitation of these 
sources was that the 'minimum essential flow' of such people to the West should be 
stimulated; that is to say, as few as possible were to be invited to come West, so as 
not to cause the Soviets to stop allowing the 'Dragons' to return to Germany.647 
Particularly in the early years of the operation, STIB and REG were very careful to 
make as few approaches for information as possible so as to maintain the security of 
the operation and give the Soviets no reason to stop the flow of returners home. 
Obviously, they hoped that transports in future years would bring more important 
informants within their reach.648 Contrary to John Prados' assertion that, 'an 
overwhelming majority of the German scientists and engineers who had been taken 
to Russia after the war later returned to the West'649, only a minority of the 'Dragon 
Returners' defected. By the summer of 1953, STIB knew of the return of 1,823 
'Dragon Returners'. Of these, the number brought over to West Germany was 209 
646Letter dated 10 August 1951 , DEFE 4112. In the early days at least, the British tended to call their targets the 
'returners ' or 'Dragon Returners ', though the American term, 'returnee', later caught on. The term 'Dragon 
Returner' is adopted in this thesis for the deported scientists, engineers and technicians who in the years 1949-58 
returned to their homeland from the USSR. 
647Minutes of meeting of JIC (London) Sub-committee on defectors on 21 July 1951, DEFE 41170. David Evans 
made the same point at a meeting of the DSIIJTIC on 25 April 1951 (DSIIJTIC(51)7 dated 28 April 1951 , DEFE 
411153). Despite British caution, the operation certainly did not remain secret from the DDR authorities. 
Evidence for this is that the SED's newspaper, 'Neues Deutschland' , on 29 January 1956 published an article 
claiming that two returners had reported that approaches had been made to their relatives and friends, and 
inquiries made about them, before their return from the USSR (Berlinll122 dated 30 January 1956, DEFE 
411136). 
648Letter dated 27 September 1950 from David Evans to Lt.-Col. H. H. Rogers, Intelligence Division, Scientific 
& Technical Section, APO 403, Heidelberg, DEFE 41/91. 
649The Soviet Estilllate: US Intelligence Analysis and So viet Strategic Forces , p. 25 . 
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(11.5%). The British-American intelligence alliance was in contact with, or had 
prepared an approach to, a further seventy-five (4.1%). No measures had been taken 
in respect of the remaining 1,539.650 This percentage of 11.5% is consistent with that 
indicated by an examination of the card index maintained by the Abteilung 
Bevolkerungspolitik to help it with its 'BetreuungsmaBnahmen'. Approximately 11 % 
of the returned scientific workers are stated on their cards in this index to have fled 
the DDR for the West. However, the true figure may well be higher - Burghard 
Ciesla suggests 20 or 25% at least - because the index does not include cards on all 
the returners and not all the cards were kept up-to-date.651 
Indeed, since 'Dragon Returners ' were given important jobs in key factories in the 
DDR, Analysis Directorate (Intelligence Division ' s secret intelligence unit) and 
MI6's Technical Section (Analysis' big brother) pressed for some not to be 
evacuated but recruited as agents and left in place in these targeted factories. 
Evidence of this is to be found in the fact that late in 1954, in the course of the return 
(in instalments) of the' 1037(P), group of atomic scientists, STIB and REG ordered a 
'slowdown' in operations, during which no offers to evacuate returners were made. 
The reason was that the returners were expected to take up jobs in the DDR's nuclear 
industry, which was an intelligence target. The 'slowdown' was needed to decide 
650'Dragon Return' Progress Report dated 24 August 1953 for the period up to 31 July 1953, DEFE 41/90. At a 
meeting of the DSIJJTIC a few months earlier, David Evans had given slightly different figures. He reported in 
April 1953 that 16%-or-so of the 'Dragon Returners' had come over to West Germany. More had been 
interrogated in place in the DDR, largely by the Americans (minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 28 April 1953, 
DEFE 41/76). The discrepancy may well be explained by the fact that although by July 1953 the British and 
Americans had only evacuated 11.5% of the total number of returners, more (enough to bring the percentage up 
to approximately 16%) had fled of their own accord to West Germany. 
651 pp. 25 & 29, 'Der Spezialistentransfer in die UdSSR und seine Auswirkungen in der SBZ und DDR', by B. 
Ciesla, Alls Polirik lllld Zeilgeschichle, B49-50/93, 3. Dezember 1993. The index, known as the 
'Spezialistenkartei ' , of the Abteilung Bevblkerungspolitik, contains cards on 2,401 returners. However, it does 
not contain cards on all of the scientific workers who returned from the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s. In 
particular, there are no cards on certain important scientists , for whom, in view of their eminence, provision was 
presumably made by other state institutions. The index was only begun in 1950. Details missing from 
approximately 12% of the cards indicate that they were not kept up-to-date. From 1956, the registration made of 
the returners was patchy. 
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which returners should be evacuat~d at once - the D.At.En. insisted that this happen 
in the case of a 'few high-priority targets' - and which should be approached with a 
view to recruitment as agents .652 An atomic specialist who fell into the latter 
category was Albrecht Boehne. A 1955 communication from STm Berlin to STm 
Bonn, referring to MI6's Technical Section, states that, 'John of the other Section has 
informed us that he is attempting to recruit Albrecht Boehne, who returned from 
Suchumi with the last transport. He asked us to take no action on Boehne, in view of 
this, and we agreed to this' .653 Interest in the 'Dragon Returners' was not limited to 
atomic scientists . In May 1952, two returners from Podberez'ye (an aircraft 
development centre) and a former Siemens employee repatriated from Leningrad 
were described as 'current Tech. Sec. "Dragon Return" cases' .654 The recruitment of 
agents in important positions in the DDR had priority over the inducement of 
defection. Analysis Directorate demanded in 1952 that, before any attempt was made 
to entice them to defect, repatriated scientific workers who had either been given or 
probably would be given a job at one of a small number of key targets in the DDR be 
invited to become agents. The suggested targets were the VEB Mechanik Askania, 
Berlin-Teltow; any part of the State Planning Commission (for example, ZAFT or 
WTZ); the Chemisches Werk 'Walter Ulbricht', Leuna; the VEB 
Elektrochemischeskombinat, Bitterfeld; the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg, near Dresden; 
652Memorandum dated 24 November 1954 from Chief, Estimates Branch, C & E Division, US Army, to 
Director STIB, DEFE 41/92. 
653STIB/252/XI1200 dated 20 September 1955, DEFE 411136. 
654Memorandum dated 22 May 1952, DEFE 41 /92. The two from Postfach 6 Podberez'ye were Franz Henkel 
and a man called Schreiber. The returner from Postfach 249 Leningrad was a man called Ahrens. These were the 
only three Tech. Sec. ' Dragon Return ' cases at that time. That Podberez' ye was an aircraft development centre 
and that 'Postfach 249 Leningrad' referred to a group of ex-Siemens technicians are established by 
STlB11017/288 dated 4 June 1951, enclosing ' Dragon Return ' Analysis as at 28 May 1951, together with 
STIBI1 0 171773 dated 4 June 1951, enclosing the 'Dragon Return' Progress Report for 5 April - 28 May 1951 
(DEFE 41/6) . Technical Section was also interested simply in obtaining information from the returners . This 
information included political intelligence. For example, it sought information from them on Soviet citizens who 
were opposed to the Communist Party's rule or listened to Western radio broadcasts (see Rl700/0636 dated 17 
January 1951 , DEFE41/92). 
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any reasonably responsible position in either the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (presumably because Analysis wanted to intercept post 
circulating and telecommunications made in the DDR) or the Ministry of Forests and 
Agriculture; and possibly the Geological Commission (presumably to discover how 
much uranium was available to the Soviets in East Germany).655 Analysis proposed 
that any returner who was given a job at one of these targets should be interviewed 
first by an officer of MI6's Technical Section. Only if he concluded that the returner 
could not be recruited as a long-term agent in the DDR, or if the attempted 
recruitment failed, would the returner be handed over to STIB to become a defection 
case. STIB thought that the proposal reflected current practice, though it did not 
accept the shortlist of targeted factories, believing that each case should be examined 
on its merits.656 Of course, any agents recruited by MI6 might supply intelligence on 
Soviet scientific progress, since, as big wheels in DDR industry, they might well be 
invited to visit factories and research institutes in the Soviet Union.657 
Returners were selected for targeting with great care. Intercepts or other intelligence 
established which were the returners who should be targeted first. When one of them 
came over to the West, information was acquired from him on the other Germans 
who had worked at the plant or institute concerned. On the basis of this intelligence, 
further returners were targeted for enticement West, on the ground either that they 
6553488711217565 dated 9 September 1952, DEFE 41/92. 
656STIB17003/84 I 8 dated 4 October 1952, DEFE 41/92. 
657The KGB and MfS saw this danger. In 1958, the Minister for State Security, Erich Mielke, reported to the 
SED's First Secretary Walter Ulbricht on the extent of Soviet oversight of the MfS' operations. He stated that 
among the KGB liaison officers serving in the MfS was one responsible for the Line within the Ministry which 
was concerned with the defence of industry. 'Industry' meant not just factories but research institutes too. Since 
hundreds of DDR factories supplied the Soviet armed forces, their security was naturally a matter of interest to 
the USSR. The officer performed another important security function for the KGB: Mielke stated that the 
officer's responsibilities included, 'approval of all DDR representatives working in industry who travel to the 
USSR' ('die Abstimmung aller aus dem Gebiet del' Industrie in die UdSSR reisenden Yertreter der DDR'). In 
other words, the officer was on the lookout for East German agents of Western intelligence services (YM289/58 
dated 1311 0/58, DY 30llY 2/202/62, SAPMO). 
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would provide the best intellige~ce or that they would help STIB put together a 
picture of the whole work of the installation. 658 Many returning scientific workers 
did not wait for a British or American invitation to defect, but fled to West Germany 
soon after their return to the DDR. They were sifted from the refugee streams passing 
through West German reception camps, and especially that in Berlin-Marienfelde. 
c. Intelligence collaboration 
The movement towards Cold War encouraged the British to collaborate with others 
in gathering and analysing intelligence on the Communist Bloc. This cooperation 
embraced the Commonwealth as well as the United States. 659 The great COMINT 
successes of the Second World War ensured that this was early an area of 
collaboration. The UKUSA agreement to cooperate in the gathering of 
communications intelligence, concluded between the USA, Britain, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand in 1948, had as one of its main aims the gathering of 
scientific and technical intelligence. 66O 
In Germany, where the Soviet threat was most immediate, collaboration between 
British and American scientific intelligence organizations was close. For the most 
part, it took the form of document exchange, but there was operational coordination 
658Report dated 27 September 1950 and entitled 'Operation "Dragon Return" , Return of Technicians from 
Kuibyshev and Podberez'ye', DEFE 41191; minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on I June 1951 , DEFE 4111 O. 
65~he Joint Intelligence Bureau , to which much intelligence gathered in Germany was sent, was established in 
London in 1946 and, at the urging of the British, counterparts to it were created in Ottawa, Melbourne and 
Wellington (see pp. 225-6, C. M. Andrew, 'The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-
American Connection', Intelligence & National Security , Vol. 4 , No.2 (April 1989), pp. 213-56) . The function of 
these bureaux was to bring together and extend defence intelligence work. 
66OH. Peake & S. Halpern (eds.), In the Nallle of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheilller (article by 
C. M. Andrew on 'The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance'), pp. 104-6. When, in September 1945, 
the US Secretaries of State, War and the Navy recommended to President Truman that collaboration with Britain 
in this field continue, they gave their reason as , ' the necessity of keeping informed of technical developments and 
possible hostile intentions of foreign nations'. I made this point in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation. 
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as well. With the exception of (eports concerning atomic energy, it was general 
practice for British and American intelligence agencies in Germany to exchange all 
intelligence reports. Thus the British Liaison Officer at Heidelberg sometimes 
received as much as a hundredweight of paper a day (more than fifty kilograms) for 
transmission to Intelligence Division. 661 The exchange of intelligence between STIB 
and its American counterpart bodies was almost total soon after the Branch's 
creation. 662 There was full exchange of intelligence on biological and chemical 
warfare663, but exchange of atomic intelligence was chiefly a matter for the 
intelligence unit of the Ministry of Supply's Division of Atomic Energy.664 
661 Address by Major D. W. H. Birch, G(lnt)BAOR, to MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference 1951, DEFE 
411l25. Consistently with this, General Kirkman, the Chief of Intelligence Division, told JIC (Germany) that the 
Americans sent Intelligence Division some five hundredweights of paper per week (annex 'A' to minutes of llC 
(Germany) meeting on 15 November 1951 , DEFE 41/66). 
662Memorandum dated 19 September 1947, DEFE 41/81. This closeness to the Americans contrasted sharply 
with policy towards exchange of information with other Western European countries, which was kept to a 
minimum. This was above all true of policy towards the French (memorandum dated 19 September 1947, DEFE 
41/81). The reason for this is probably that France was, after the Soviet Union and its satellites, the Power most 
responsible for enticement of German scientific workers from the British Zone (memorandum dated 26 
November 1947, DEFE41/81). 
663Letter dated 19 October 1949, DEFE 41/83. 
~his is demonstrated by an issue which arose in the context of Operation 'Dragon Return ' . One early, though 
brief, restriction on sharing intelligence with the Americans in the course of this operation concerned atomic 
intelligence. Their specialisms or the character of the installations at which they were working made it likely that 
some of the 'Dragons' located in the USSR would come by knowledge of Soviet progress in atomic science. As 
part of its letter-opening operation to establish the identities and whereabouts of German scientific workers in the 
USSR, STlB compiled lists of finds, which it passed on to London and to US intelligence agencies in Germany. 
At the insistence of the Division of Atomic Energy ' s intelligence unit, STIB omitted from the lists sent to 
counterpart American agencies in Germany the names of any 'Dragons ' who might be able to provide 
intelligence on atomic energy. But atomic intelligence was passed to Washington DC by D.At.En.lnt. itself and 
similar information was received in return , as D.At.En.Int.'s chief, Cdr. Eric Welsh, stated in a letter to David 
Evans of STIB forbidding him to pass to the Americans the names of 'Dragons' who might be useful sources on 
Soviet atomic developments. Welsh wrote: ' I quite appreciate that it will greatly help you in your liaison with 
Americans in the field if we can remove the guard classification from as many of these names as possible. At the 
same time, I have to reconcile your point of view with my own instructions that atomic energy intelligence must 
not be exchanged directly through the American and British field agencies, but only through D.At.En.lnt. and 
their American equivalent in Washington' (letter 5411 dated 9 October 1950, DEFE 411l35). Thus it appears 
from this letter that atomic intelligence was exchanged, but only between London and Washington DC. Welsh 
also made it clear in his letter to Evans that he did not intend to pass the names of such possible sources to the 
Americans; the Americans would only be informed of them if, in interrogation, it transpired that they had no 
atomic intelligence of significance. This ruling, of course, undermined the security of Operation 'Dragon Return', 
for it opened up the possibility of American approaches to returners whom the British were also planning to 
contact. This restraint on the effectiveness of British-American cooperation, together with the desire of the 
Directorate of Scientific Intelligence to establish a closer relationship with the CIA's Office of Scientific 
Intelligence, led to a reversal of the ruling in the autumn of 1950; thereafter both EUCOM (military intelligence) 
and USAFE (air intelligence) received 'Dragon Return' intelligence on all areas of scientific activity, including 
the development of atomic energy (DSII3/50/85 dated 26 October 1950, DEFE 411l35; see also DSI/50/363 dated 
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Close collaboration was important to the success of Operation 'Dragon Return' . By 
July 1949, soon after the operation had begun, STIB was giving EUCOM (US 
military intelligence) a full summary of 'Dragon Return' and details of the 
individuals 10cated.665 The British and Americans exchanged their records of 
German scientific workers in the Soviet Union and created composite lists. The 
operation necessitated actual operational collaboration between the two countries' 
intelligence services. The 'Dragon Returners' promised to be valuable informants 
and too many flies buzzing around this particular honeypot would risk alerting Soviet 
Intelligence or the MfS to the value to the West of the returners' information.666 
Consequently, the Director of STIB, David Evans, met very often with his American 
counterparts for discussions on intelligence operations. There was particular 
discussion of operations in Berlin.667 Neither EUCOM nor the USAFE (air 
intelligence) took action to approach a returner and take intelligence from him 
without consulting the British first.66S The British and Americans agreed which 
scientific workers should be invited to defect and shared out targets between them.669 
In the early years of the operation, the British seem to have contacted and 
interrogated far more scientific workers than the Americans. In 1951, John Horner, 
S September 1950, which mentions that there was already one American scientific intelligence officer working at 
the DSI, and there might soon be more). That the ruling was reversed and that EUCOM and USAFE both agreed 
not to make an approach to any possible source without first consulting the British is confirmed by 
STIB11017/S122 dated 9 December 1950, DEFE 41/5. 
665Letterdated 12July 1949, DEFE41/4 . 
666lncreasing the risk of a stampede in pursuit of the returners which the MfS could not fail to notice, a number 
of US intelligence agencies were interested in them. Competition between these agencies was fierce and relations 
between them were often strained (STIB170031111 242 dated 20 July 1951 , DEFE 41/6). 
667David Evans, STIB Director, addressing the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951 , DEFE 
411125. 
66SSTIBII 017/S122 dated 9 December 1950, DEFE 41/5. Confirmation of the British-American arrangement 
that there would be prior agreement on the potential sources who were to be approached is contained in 
STIB170031111242 dated 20 July 1951 (DEFE 41/6) and a draft report marked 14A and entitled , 'Dip!. Ing. Franz 
Kirch ' (DEFE 41111) . 
669STIB170031111242 dated 20 July 1951 , DEFE 41/6; Progress Report No. 5, '90S Group' , dated 21 March 
1955, DEFE41113S. 
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the head of the STIB unit in Berlin, claimed that for every returner the Americans 
had interrogated, the British had interrogated nine or ten. The reason he gave for this 
was that the Americans were much less adept at making contact with the returners.670 
Although 'leads' (i.e. means of making an approach) to all the returners were 
established separately, many of the returners were interrogated jointly.671 The 
Gehlen Organization was brought into the alliance of Western intelligence services 
implementing Operation 'Dragon Return'. It seems that the Organization was treated 
as part of US Intelligence and particular cases were allocated to it if it managed to 
create 'leads' to them. 672 
Directing agencies in London and Washington DC also exchanged scientific and 
technical information. Relations between British and American intelligence bodies 
seem to have been of varying closeness, which affected the degree of exchange 
670MI 10/DO/KS dated 25 July 1951 , DEFE 41/6. This was in response to an American charge that STIB had 
evacuated some 100 low-grade scientists, whereas the Americans had only evacuated about twenty. This disparity 
was despite the fact that STIB, with its staff of ten officers, was a minnow by comparison with the US scientific 
intelligence organizations and was in consequence 'an extremely junior partner' of the Americans, as its Director 
himself conceded. However, the Americans were not well-organized in Germany. They had not one, but a 
number of scientific and technical intelligence organizations, since not only did each of the Services maintain 
such a staff in Germany, but so did the US Military Government. In consequence, Evans, as STIB Director, had 
no fewer than four opposite numbers (address by David Evans, STIB Director, to the MIlO Technical Intelligence 
Conference, June 1951, DEFE 411125) . REG, which seems to have been established towards the autumn of 1951 
(its creation is referred to in a letter in DEFE 41/2 dated 10 August 1951), was presumably set up to remedy this 
situation. 
671 Most importantly, it seems from STIB/P/l/484 dated 25 March 1955 (DEFE 41/142) that the exploitation of 
the' 1037(P), cases was conducted 'virtually' on a joint basis. 
672This is indicated by a record of meetings in DEFE 411142, entitled 'P/26 I ' and dated 20/5/55. This document 
states that the Americans had conceded prior access to 'I 037(P) Moscow' returners to the Gehlen Organization in 
all cases developed by it. That the Organization formed part of the alliance targeting the returners is indicated by 
the umbrage taken by STIB when Gehlen' s men put it about among scientific workers returning to Germany that 
they could not take up a job in West German industry until they had been interrogated by the Organization 
(STIB/252/XII140 dated 8 September 1955, DEFE 411144). STIB was angered by these tactics, because the story 
was not then true (though, of course, it might become so when the Organization was free of American control). 
But it had been agreed by the governments concerned that no source should be prejudiced by the fact that he had 
given assistance to the intelligence service of a party to the alliance, with the result that the Gehlen Organization 
had then no right to insist that returners be interrogated by it and by it alone before taking up employment 
(STIB/P/l/260 dated 14 September 1955, DEFE 411144). The Gehlen Organization's counterpart operation to 
Operation 'Dragon' was called Projekt 'Hermes' (as was its interrogation of returning German PoWs). Gehlen 's 
people thought that 'a major object [of the operation) was to establish good reporting links as a purely covert 
affair on both sides' (i.e. to recruit secret agents in the DDR and not to induce defections) (STIB/p/In8 dated 18 
July 1955, DEFE 411142). 
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which was made. The exchange o,f liaison officers between them made cooperation 
between British and American Air Intelligence particularly close. 673 Scientific 
intelligence was exchanged by the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence on a 'quid 
pro quo' basis.674 The DSI sent three copies of all suitable documents to the CIA, 
which distributed them among US scientific intelligence agencies. 675 The McMahon 
Act, enacted in the USA in 1946 and prohibiting the exchange with other countries of 
information on the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes,676 affected the 
exchange of atomic intelligence as well. It was hesitant and limited in the late 
1940s. 677 However, joint estimates of Soviet atomic progress were made. For 
example, in 1949 the CIA's Nuclear Energy Group and D.At.En.'s intelligence unit 
prepared a joint report entitled 'Estimate of Russian Atomic Weapons, Programme 
and Timetable'.678 To produce a joint report, the British and the Americans must 
673p, 338, R, J. Aldrich, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold 
War', Review of Illternatiollal Studies , Vol. 24, No, 3 (July 1998), pp, 331-51, By the early 1950s, there was full 
exchange between the two services of all raw intelligence, In addition, there were frequent consultations on how 
that raw intelligence was to be assessed. Liaison officers were posted in one another's intelligence sections: the 
result was that there was full exchange of perceptions of the Soviet Air Force and its capabilities (address of 
Wing Commander P. H. Cribb, Assistant Director of Technical Intelligence at the Air Ministry, to the MilO 
Technical Intelligence Conference 1952, DEFE 411126), John Prados claims both that the British gave the 
Americans all their information on Soviet guided missile development and that this was a field in which 
intelligence collaboration between the two countries was closest. They even prepared joint estimates (The Soviet 
Estimate, p, 57). The 'Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American Conference' 
(DEFE 41/160) bears him out, for it is just such a joint estimate. 
674Minutes of JSIJTIC meeting on 27 January 1947, DEFE 41171. 
675Minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 12 December 1950, DEFE 41174, The Joint Committees, and later 
presumably the DSI, sent lists of the scientific workers located in the USSR to Winston Scott, Chief of the 
Liaison Section at the US Embassy in London, for transmission to the CIA in Washington DC. This is established 
by, among other documents, CH/JSJT/49/37 dated I March 1949, DEFE 41/134. Anthony Cavendish writes at p. 
45 of Illside Illtelligellce that Scott was then the CIA Liaison Officer with M16. 
676J. Helmreich, Gatherillg Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Urallium Acquisitioll 1943-54, p, 81. 
677pp. 540-1, R, J. Aldrich & M. Coleman, 'The Cold War, the JlC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948' , 
Intelligellce & Natiollal Security, Vol. 4, No.3 (October 1989), pp. 535-49. 
678Minutes of JS/JTIC meeting on 2 February 1949, DEFE 41172, The Department of Atomic Energy (D,At.En.) 
was a department of the Ministry of Supply (see the introduction to the DEFE 41 file at the Public Record 
Office). That it had an intelligence unit is confirmed by an undated report inDEFE 40/26, entitled 'Organisation 
of Scientific Intelligence: Deficiencies of the Present Organisation ' . This unit was known as D,At.En.lnt., or just 
D,At.En. in intelligence circles . By 1950 it had become the Ministry of Supply's Division of Atomic Energy. The 
report in DEFE 40/26 reviews the organization of British scientific intelligence and comments that the 
Department of Atomic Energy's intelligence unit had a special relationship with its American counterpart. That 
was the link with the Americans to which D.At.En,lnt.'s director, Eric Welsh, referred in the letter quoted at 
footnote 664 above. This is not the only example of a joint British-American report on the Soviet atomic project 
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have pooled some of their data., The exchange of atomic intelligence was more 
substantial in the 1950s.679 
in the late I 940s. The report dated 4 February 1948 in DEFE 411123 on calcium metal production at Bitterfeld, 
referred to at footnote 228 above, is entitled, 'Report of Combined Anglo-American Intelligence Unit'. 
679p. 541, R, l. Aldrich & M. Coleman, 'The Cold War, the lIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948', 
Illtelligellce & Natiollal Security, Vol. 4, No, 3 (October 1989), pp, 535-49, 
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CHAPTERS 
THE INTELLIGENCE YIELD OF 'DRAGON RETURN' 
A. The Intelligence Yield 
There are very few indications as to what the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence 
and Joint Technical Intelligence Committee actually thought of the intelligence 
gathered in Germany and sent on to them.680 The information provided by the 
'Dragon Returners' seems to have been of four types. Much information of little or 
no consequence was acquired because the Germans in question were employed on 
work of no scientific difficulty or defence significance. Also gathered was much 
information on war-related projects which might have been very significant had it 
been received earlier, but, being out-of-date, was of 'historical value'. Such 
intelligence was of value, but only because it enabled analysts to guess at the rate of 
Soviet progress.681 (In this respect, it was very different from intelligence gathered of 
Soviet development projects in their Zone of Germany, which was acquired 
contemporaneously with those projects and so must have given the British an idea of 
the general level of Soviet military technology. Although it would not be known 
whether the Soviets actually intended to put the apparatus or weapon designed into 
service, they would not waste resources by commissioning the development of an 
680rhere is no official, authoritative and expert assessment of the value of the intelligence yielded by Operation 
'Dragon Return'. I have had to organize the information and assess its value myself, using indications contained 
in the official documents I have studied. This has been a difficult task and my assessment of this intelligence may 
be regarded as subjective and the conclusions I reach, though confidently made and supported by substantial 
evidence, are obviously not definitive. 
681That it was used for this purpose is indicated by the following remark in the report on the interrogation of 
Siegfried GUnter, which concerns aircraft and aero-engine development in the USSR: 'The importance of certain 
information in this report in relation to the time scale of Russian progress was considered [so] critical that the 
greatest care has been taken to check the reliability, access and judgement of the informant' (STIB Interview 
Report No. 182 dated 3 September 1954 on Dip\. Ing. Siegfried GUnter, DEFE 4111 02). 
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apparatus or weapon they already had or considered of no use.) Some 'Dragon 
Return' intelligence was gathered which was of value because it indicated designs, 
lines of research and production methods which the Soviets either had, or might 
have, adopted. These they might either still be using or, during the sources' 'cooling-
off' period, have developed to completion. The 'Dragon Returners' provided much 
information on people, factories and research institutes of the Soviet military-
industrial complex, some of them important installations. 
The really valuable intelligence acquired was therefore that in the third and fourth 
categories. However, the third category did not represent hard scientific or technical 
intelligence. This was so for two reasons. In the first place, the scientific process 
developed or apparatus or weapon designed might not have been adopted by the 
Soviets . Even if the process had been adopted or the apparatus or weapon 
incorporated into the Soviet arsenal, it might have been superseded by a later 
process, apparatus or weapon. Thus, insofar as the operation yielded scientific and 
technical intelligence (as distinct from scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence), this 
was not hard intelligence.682 Rather, it constituted possibilities as to what might be 
happening in the USSR. Some pieces of intelligence, particularly when added to 
others, may well have become probabilities. Intelligence of Soviet interest in a 
682At the outset, at least, the operation certainly gave the British the impression that they were acquiring hard 
scientific and technical intelligence. A 'Dragon Return Progress Report ' prepared in the early months of the 
operation comments that: 'A little hard intelligence of considerable value has been gained. This value is enhanced 
because it is expert information from people who know what they are talking about. Thus, the confirmation of the 
sintering of uranium metal at a given location was an individual item probably not obtainable in any other way. 
Similarly the Christian turbo-prop designs are technically precise. The major value so far has been in scientific 
order of battle information and in invaluable and essential background for study and later exploitation' 
(STIB171 02/46/3189 dated 6 April 1950, DEFE 41/4). On this report General Haydon, the Chief of Intelligence 
Division, wrote that, 'We must go ahead and give this operation the best chance we can of developing into a more 
than good offset to the PWX source. We must expect disappointments and labour which brings in no adequate 
return but that will not matter so long as we achieve the occasional "flash" which is probably unobtainable in any 
other way.' Manfred Christian's aero-engine development project, referred to in the report, is a good example of 
intelligence which turned out to be of disappointingly small value. The Soviets actually terminated this project 
because the engine did not meet their expectations. 
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separable missile warhead and 1):1 uranium enrichment by gas centrifugation are 
examples. 
The intelligence gathered, whether constituting mere possibilities or something more 
than that, covered many technologies of interest.683 It included information on 
research and development into atomic energy; guided missiles and related 
technology; electronics; torpedoes and mines; artificial fibres; radio technology; 
optical glass; armaments design;684 and fuels. The operation also produced whispers 
of other weapons, such as a 'television bomb' .685 
B. The exploitation of German scientific workers in the USSR 
The value of the information obtained was diminished by two factors: the tendency 
of the Soviet system to bad organization, and the security measures taken to prevent 
the deported Germans acquiring intelligence of value to the West. Bad organization 
meant that little productive use was made of many of the Germans. The predominant 
view among the 'Dragon Returners' was that their time in the USSR had been 
wasted.686 The Soviets frequently made little or no use of the Germans or the work 
683Thus when John Prados writes that, ' Intelligence had a fair amount of knowledge of progress in Russian 
laboratory research and some technical information on Soviet missile tests ', it is probably to 'Dragon Return ' 
information that he is chiefly referring (The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic 
Forces, p. 60) . The remark at p. 65 of L. Freedman's, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, that, 'By 
1953 Air Force intelligence had quite good information on Soviet technology and laboratory research ... ', 
probably refers to the same source. 
684Report dated 9 February 1951 , DEFE 41/5. 
685Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 8 March 1951, DEFE 41110. 
68~he interrogator of the first significant scientist of the Riehl Group to defect to the West, the biological 
physicist Dr. Karl Zimmer, noted that, 'The Informant, like most other "Dragon" returners, considers that his 
period of exile has been an utter waste ... ' (STIB Interview Report No. 221 dated 19 July 1955 on Dr. Karl 
Zimmer, DEFE 21/43). Dr. Wilhelm Menke felt that the work given to his biological department of the Sungul 
laboratory, when he was transferred there from Sinop in August 1949, 'very childish' and, indeed, useless (STIB 
Interview Report No. 224 dated 5 May 1955 on Dr. Wilhelm Menke, DEFE 21143). Ernst Hildebrandt worked on 
torpedo design as part of the Gloede Group in Leningrad and likewise felt that he had wasted his time there (STIB 
Interview Report No. 174 dated 26 July 1954 on Ernst Hildebrandt, DEFE 21142) . Many of the German groups 
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they produced. For instance, Dr. Bernd von Bock was, on the face of it, something of 
a catch for them: the only nerve gas production expert to fall into their hands. 687 Yet 
he was seldom consulted on problems of nerve gas production. He was given 
mundane chemical tasks to keep him busy.688 Six German engineers and scientists 
who returned from electronics institutes in the USSR late in 1950 felt that very poor 
use had been made of their skills, since they had been made to work on subjects on 
which they were not experts . For the first few months of their stay, they had been 
given no work to do at all (a common refrain). They noticed an unwillingness on the 
part of those in charge of the institutes to give them work, perhaps because it was felt 
that Soviet scientific personnel were perfectly capable of doing the research and 
development work concerned. One of them, Otto Biersack, was at one point told to 
write voluminous reports on condenser manufacture. He deliberately put ridiculous 
numerical values into the reports and since these values were never questioned he 
assumed that the reports were never read. He and his fellow Germans deliberately 
diminished the benefit the Soviets derived from them by refusing to work hard, 
working at what they estimated to be only 30% efficiency. 689 The reports written by 
the Menke biological group at the institute in Sinop were put in a safe and never 
examined. 690 If work was given to the deportees, it tended, even in important cases 
(like that of von Bock), to be occasional and of little significance. The Herold heavy 
water group did not, in the end, work on heavy water at all. Far from being engaged 
were reduced to a training function. These included the atomic teams at Sungul, Obninsk and Sukhumi, the 
missile research group at Ostashkov, the missile control development group at 228, Leningrad Chaussee, 
Moscow, and the torpedo propulsion group at Lomonosov. 
687Letter dated 29 September 1950, DEFE 411132. 
688STIB Interview Report No. 235 dated 22 November 1955 on Dr. Bernd von Bock, DEFE 411105 . 
689DSI/JTIC(51)6 dated 27 April 1951. DEFE411153. 
690STIB Interview Report No. 204 dated 4 February 1955 on Dr. med. Gunther Fuchs and Dip!. Chem. Viktor 
Winkler. DEFE 21143. 
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in research and development work, they were retained in an advisory capacity.691 
With the exception of one scientist, Dr. Bode, the Germans were principally required 
to write papers and rewrite German scientific publications, adding their explanations 
of the articles in them and commenting on the points made. These scientists believed 
that their work appeared in a spate of Soviet scientific publications, presented as the 
work of Soviet scientists. Bode was sent motors and mechanical instruments to 
examine and comment on. 692 It may well be that, once they had complete data on the 
German processes of manufacturing heavy water, as well as the dismantled plants 
themselves, the Soviets felt that they did not need Germans actually working on 
research and development in this field. Their own plant at Chirchik was by 1947 
producing large quantities of heavy water. 693 
Stringent security measures were taken in respect of most of the Germans. In all 
cases, they had to endure a 'cooling off' period before being allowed to return to 
Germany. During this period (which could last for a year or two and in some cases 
lasted even longer) they were not allowed to do any work of significance. 
Consequently, when they arrived in the West their information would usually be out-
of-date. 
Just as importantly, even while they were doing responsible work for the Soviets, the 
perspective they were allowed to gain on the research or development project on 
which they were working was very severely restricted. Most of the Germans were 
691 Indeed, Dr. Herold, formerly the Director of the Research and Development Laboratory for all the 
Leunawerk's work on organic chemistry, was initially employed as a laboratory assistant (STIB Berlin Report 
No. 301, ST0I14/NO/40, DEFE 411145). 
692S IU/R/PWR/497 dated 29 November 1949, DEFE 41/24. 
6930. Holloway, Stalin and the BOlllb: the Soviet Union and Atolllic Energy, 1939-56, p. 189. 
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not told how the work they were doing was going to be used. 694 They saw part of the 
picture - the report on German techniques they were writing, for example, or that part 
of a weapon which they were designing and constructing - but were not allowed to 
see the whole. In consequence, the British almost always discovered in interrogation 
that the 'Dragon Returners' did not know whether the work they had done had been 
turned into a weapon in service, an apparatus in use or an operational scientific 
process. Indeed, when a German worked at an important installation, he was 
generally not permitted to work in (or, often, even enter) the key premises at their 
heart. Thus the aerodynamicist Professor Gunther Bock worked for seven years at 
TsAGI (the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute, which was the institute at the 
centre of Soviet aeronautical research), without acquiring any intelligence of 
significance on what research was being done there.695 For the most part, he himself 
suggested the topics of the papers he wrote, very few suggestions being made by the 
Soviets from which their interests could be inferred. Likewise, Bernd von Bock was 
not allowed to set foot in Department 22 of the plant at Beketovka, where nerve gas 
production was taking place. He had to infer that sarin was the gas in which the 
Soviets were chiefly interested, there being no clear indications of their plans. 
Indeed, he made this inference in part simply because sarin was superior to tabun as 
a poison gas. He also believed that the plant was making sarin because of the greater 
interest in the gas shown by his various interrogators. Even though he was in the 
USSR for six years, the only work of significance which he did there he did in the 
first ten days . It consisted of writing up reports of nerve gas production at 
Dyhernfurth. Therefore, he could neither state with certainty what gases were being 
694e.g. OS! Report 88, April 1956, entitled 'Abstract of Acoustic Research at NIl . 400, Leningrad , USSR, during 
1946-54' , OEFE 4411 2. 
695Note dated 28 March 1956, OEFE 21114. 
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produced at Beketovka, nor could he name any other factories manufacturing nerve 
gases, nor could he state what Soviet intentions were with regard to the development 
of chemical weapons.696 
Surveillance was oppressIve. In the atomic research institutes at Sukhumi the 
security measures taken were so strict that the research groups constituted 'watertight 
cells'.697 Sukhumi was the DDR in miniature: full of Germans, all under strict secret 
police surveillance, none of whom wanted to be there. Max Steenbeck was in the 
autumn of 1952 transferred from Sukhumi to Leningrad.698 The purpose of the move 
was to enable him to provide expert assistance as the centrifuge he had designed at 
Sukhumi was put into production. Despite this, he found that security measures were 
taken which separated him completely from the production process and so placed 
severe restrictions on his work. These measures were expressly taken to protect him 
from foreign secret services, which, it was felt, had more opportunities in a large port 
than in Sukhumi. He had no contact either with the Central Construction Bureau 
which actually manufactured the centrifuge, or with the testing centre which 
subjected it to trials. He could never talk problems through with these offices, which 
liaised only with Soviet colleagues of his.699 Very few Germans, indeed, were 
allowed to attend trials of the weapons or devices they assisted in developingJoo Dr. 
696STIB Interview Report No. 235 dated 22 November 1955 on Dr. Bernd von Bock, DEFE 4111 05. It was only 
when the GRU officer Oleg Pen 'kovskii began to pass information to the British early in 1961 that they acquired 
proof of the immense scale of the USSR's programme of chemical weapons development (c. M. Andrew & O. 
Gordievsky, KGB: The Illside Story a/its Foreigll Operatiolls/rolll Lellill to Gorbachev, p. 390). 
697STIB Interview Report No. 149 dated 27 February 1954 on Dr. Wilhelm Dames, DEFE 21 /42. 
6981t appears from a letter dated 5 February 1953 (DEFE 41117) that it was from a letter intercepted as part of 
Operation 'Dragon' that British Intelligence learned of Steenbeck 's move to Leningrad. 
699M. Steenbeck, IlIIpulse ulld Wirkullgell: Schritte aU/llleillelll Lebellsweg, .p. 291 . 
700por example, Joachim Redenz was a member of the aero-engine development team deported from BMW-
Staf3furt to Zavod 2 at Kuibyshev on 22 October 1946. In the summer of 1948, the BMW and Junkers groups 
were merged to concentrate on the design and manufacture of the 022-type engine, of which they produced a 
series: the 022A, 022A/O, 022M (coupled 022As), 022K and the 'D' -type engines. Redenz, working in the 
thermodynamic department, was given the task of drawing up graphs indicating the flight performance 
characteristics of the compressor and turbine installed in all five of these engines. Having done this at Kuibyshev 
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Eduard Krochmann also worked ,in Leningrad, at an important naval research 
institute, NIl. 400. Not only did he work alone, he did so in a laboratory eighteen-feet 
square. With the exception of a design for an amplifier for torpedo guidance, he was 
not told the objectives of the tasks given to him, nor did he attend any sea trials of the 
amplifiers he had designed or built (which would have made clear what they were 
meant for). Examining the tea leaves closely, it was deduced that the Soviets could 
probably have begun the manufacture of a passive acoustic homing torpedo in 1954. 
There was no direct evidence that this torpedo was in production, so all this 
intelligence constituted was a possibility. If the torpedo was in production and if the 
Soviets had incorporated Krochmann's amplifier into it, the British would know how 
the amplifier worked. Tests on a prototype active acoustic homing torpedo had 
probably begun and it might go into production in 1957 or 1958.701 Such uncertainty 
is typical of the scientific and technical intelligence acquired from the 'Dragon 
Returners' . 
The above examples are examples of Germans who actually worked at secret 
installations. Therefore, their intelligence at least revealed or confirmed that 
particular installations were of military significance. Nevertheless, another Soviet 
security measure - and a highly effective one - was to place the deported Germans at 
an institute cut off from any parallel or related Soviet research or development 
over a period of years , he was able to draw up for the British a useful table showing the performance 
characteristics of these engines, He was also able to recall the characteristics of the compressors and turbines of 
these engines in flight and draw graphs setting out this information, However, his usefulness as a source was 
limited by the fact that he had never been given the results of the engines' air-tests (STIB Interview Report No. 
168 dated 10 June 1954 on Dipl. Ing. Joachim Redenz, DEFE 21/42), Some members of the Grottrup rocket 
group formed an exception to this rule, Helmut Grottrup, Fritz Viebach, Alfred Klippel and others did take part in 
the first set of V -2 test-firings at Kapustin Yar in the autumn of 1947, 
701 DSI Report 88, April 1956, entitled ' Abstract of Acoustic Research at NIL 400, Leningrad , USSR, during 
1946-54', DEFE 44/1 2, An active torpedo is one which emits pulses to find its target; a passive torpedo is one 
which merely reacts to pulses emitted by its target, 
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programme. The most isolated of ~ll were the rocket engineers who worked, initially 
under Helmut GrOttrup, on the island of Gorodomlia in Lake Seliger. 
The German development groups strongly believed that Soviet groups were engaged 
in parallel work. The Sukhumi groups were convinced of this, and some of their 
members met scientists, such as Isaak Kikoin, who were undertaking such parallel 
research. Kikoin even sent diffusion barriers down to Sukhumi to be tested by Karl-
Franz Zuhlke. The Riehl Group knew full well that Zinaida Yerzhova had devised a 
competing process for uranium purification. Zavod 2 at Kuibyshev, where jet engines 
were developed, was so called because, as the Germans knew, its work ran in parallel 
to work done at . the main institute for aero-engine development, Zavod 1 in 
Leningrad. Herbert Mummert's KreiselgeriHe group assembled German gyro 
apparatus and primitive wartime computers at NIl. 49 in Leningrad; Mummert was 
convinced that Soviet engineers carried out parallel development work 
independently. The group also contained four members who worked on high-
frequency or electronic problems. This was the core of the institute's work and, 
naturally, these four Germans were never granted access to the principal laboratories 
of the institute.702 
Consequently, the operation yielded little or no hard intelligence of value concerning 
key targeted technologies. This accorded with expectations of it, which were small 
from the start. 703 Interest in the development of the USSR's strategic air power and 
702STIB Interview Report No. 213 dated 5 May 1955 on Herbert Mummert, DEFE 4111 04. 
703David Evans told the JlC (Germany) in January 1950 that, 'It would be u'nwise to be unduly optimistic' about 
the intelligence yield of 'Dragon Return' (minutes of JlC (Germany) meeting on 10 January 1950, DEFE 41/65). 
The reason for his caution was, ' the segregation of Germans in Russia from their Russian colleagues'. The 
Chairman of the JS/JTIC, Dr. B. K. Blount, told the JlC meeting on 16 December 1949 that, ' there was a growing 
belief on the part of many Germans employed in Russia that they were soon to be allowed to return home. 
Whereas these men might provide a potentially important source of intelligence, he now understood that they 
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guided missile capability was great. Yet 'Dragon Return' yielded little intelligence of 
guided missile developments and none at all of Soviet work on long-range bombers. 
In 1944, the US Army Air Force considered that the Soviet Union's lack of a long-
range bomber force would prevent it from being much of a threat. 704 The Soviets' 
tests of atomic and thermonuclear weapons increased interest in their delivery 
systemsJ05 Germans who had worked on aircraft development at Podberez'ye, some 
120 kilometres south of Moscow, brought back information on a medium-range jet-
bomber called the EF-150. This information excited interest for the aeroplane would 
plug the gap between the lighter 11-28 tactical bomber and the Tu-16 medium-range 
bomber. However, it crashed on its test flight in May 1952 and the Soviets decided 
not to put it into production. 7(Xj Heavy bombers would need powerful engines and 
intelligence of Soviet aero-engines was sought. 707 Although a certain number of 
reports on the work of the Junkers and BMW aero-engine development teams are 
available to historians, there are not yet enough for a complete picture to be formed. 
were segregated in Russia and had little contact with their Soviet colleagues. We should not, therefore, bank on 
receiving a significant amount of intelligence from those sources' (extract from minutes of HC meeting on 16 
December 1949, DEFE 41/132). 
704L. Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 64. 
705L. Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 65. Since it would take time for the Soviet 
bomber force and air bases to be prepared for an attack on the USA, the prevailing view in Washington DC was 
that the United States would have days or even weeks of strategic warning before an attack. Even if the Soviet 
bomber force did manage to make a surprise attack, it would require up to thirty days to deliver the whole of its 
nuclear stockpi le, giving the SAC more time in which to launch a knockout blow on the USSR. Soviet 
development of guided missiles, which, travelling at speeds approaching 18,000 miles per hour, could effect 
delivery of the whole Soviet nuclear arsenal in an attack of which there would be little warning, would exclude 
the option of a pre-emptive strike, leaving in Eisenhower' s hands only the militarily-inadequate option of a 
wholly retaliatory strike and the political dynamite of a first strike. Furthermore, intercontinental ballistic missiles 
would allow the USSR to pose an unprecedented threat to the USA, threatening not just to massacre its 
population and pulverize its industry, but also to destroy its nuclear strike force. Britain being so much closer to 
the USSR than was the US, and so much smaller, she was mortally threatened by Soviet progress in the arms race 
well before intercontinental ballistic missiles were put into service. She could be attacked with a V -2 (perhaps 
armed with an atomic, biological or chemical warhead) fired from Western Europe if it were overrun; one 
improved to gi ve it a longer range could strike Britain from occupied Germany. When the Tu-16 medium-range 
bomber (called' Badger' by NATO) became operational in 1954, the threat to Britain grew. The growth of the 
Soviet submarine fleet also menaced her (D. Ball & J. Richelson, Strategic Nllclear Targeting (article by L. 
Freedman on 'British Nuclear Targeting' ), p. 113). 
7(XjU. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Well mann, Die Speziaiisten, p. 139. 
707J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 40. 
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The Germans worked in competition with Soviet teams 708 and no 'Dragon Returner' 
seems to have known whether the engines the Germans designed had actually been 
installed in a Soviet aircraftJ09 The most that they were able to say was that a 
particular engine had been air-tested or put into production. In fact, German designs 
were adopted. The Jumo-022K turboprop engine designed by the Junkers-BMW 
team at Kuibyshev was developed by a Soviet team and, as the MK-12M, installed in 
the four-engined Tu-20 bomber. The AM-3, a Soviet development of another of the 
team's designs, powered the Tu-104.710 The Jumo-012, unfinished in 1945, was 
developed to completion and became a well-known Soviet aero-engine, the AI-20Jll 
Other designs were too poor to be of interest to the SovietsJI2 However, in general it 
is unlikely that the returners' information allowed the British to determine what use 
the Soviets had made of the German designs. Their time in quarantine will also have 
diminished the value of their information. 
Intelligence on Soviet air defences was also sought, for the SAC's strategic offensive 
on the USSR was the key element in both the Eisenhower Administration's basic 
708-rhe Junkers team at Zavod 2 in Kuibyshev knew that all its working drawings were sent to Zavod 1 in 
Leningrad, doubtless to keep its Soviet rivals there up-to-date with the progress it was making (STlB Interview 
Report No. 242 dated 10 October 1955 on Dip!. Ing. Kurt PfI(jgel, DEFE 4111 06). 
709See, for example, STlB Interview Reports Nos. 142, 168, 173, 179, 183, 194 and 200 (all from 1954-5 and all 
in DEFE 21 /42) , 96 (DEFE 41/98), 180 (DEFE 411 I 02) and 242 (DEFE 4111 06). These informants were able to 
provide details of engines developed in the Soviet Union, but could not say whether they had been installed in 
aircraft. In fact , only a few seem to have known of series production of engines they had been concerned with . 
Examples of sources who did are Kurt PfI(jgel (STlB Interview Report No. 242 dated 10 October 1955, DEFE 
411106) and Fritz Henke (STIB Interview Report No. 142 dated 29 January 1954, DEFE 21/42) , who both rightly 
maintained that the Jumo-O 12 had gone into series production (PfI(jgel said in Kazan'). Dr. Josef Vogts (STlB 
Interview Report No. 183 dated I I September 1954, DEFE 21/42) thought that the Jumo-022K would go into 
series production in its original form, but had no hard information with which to support this statement. 'Jumo' 
stands for' Junkers Motor' . 
7IOA. C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, Vo!. 3, 1945-65, p. 264. The Jumo-004 
and BMW-003 became the early Soviet jet engines , the RD- 10 and RD-20 (see Sutton, p. 262), but these engines 
had long been superseded by the time the Junkers and BMW teams were returned to Germany. Joachim Redenz 
(STlB Interview Report No. 168 dated 10 June 1954, DEFE 21/42) and Kurt PfI(jgel (STlB Interview Report No. 
242 dated 10 October 1955, DEFE 4111 06) are examples of sources who provided technical details of the Jumo-
022K, known as the 'Type K' engine. 
711U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann , Die Spezialisten, pp. 130-1 . 
712U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialisten, pp. 131-2. 
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national security policy of 'Massive Retaliation' and any pre-emptive strike on the 
Soviet Union (and the Administration did not exclude the possibility of such a 
strike). By 1954 the SAC's plan was to overwhelm Soviet air defences, launching a 
simultaneous attack by all of its (then) 735 bombers,?13 Intelligence of the missiles 
used in Soviet air defence batteries and of the radar systems which supplied early 
warning screens with information was therefore keenly sought. With air defence in 
mind, the Soviet government had by the summer of 1946 initiated highly-prioritized 
radar development projects,?14 However, the group of Germans under Herbert 
Mummert who were deported to NIl. 49 in Leningrad were not put to work on radar 
control of missiles. Instead, they had the more mundane task of re-constructing from 
drawings or existing models the low-tech, electrically-operated calculating machines 
and pieces of equipment (angle calculators, optical sightings and the like) which 
made up the standard German target predictor gear for the Wasserfall, Schmetterling 
and Rheintochter anti-aircraft missiles. The purpose for which the group seemed to 
have been deported to Leningrad was to make Soviet engineers familiar with the 
workings of the predictor gear and gyro techniques,?15 The little intelligence yielded 
by the operation on Soviet radar sets seems to have been only 'of historical value' . 
Intelligence of Soviet fighter-interceptors was eagerly sought and here the operation 
yielded a success. Siegfried Gunter, Heinkel's Chief Designer during the War, 
returned from Podberez'ye in 1954 with news of a 'delta wing fighter'. This had 
been the principal task on which he had been employed in the USSR, keeping him 
7130 . Ball & 1. Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Rosenberg article), p. 44. 
7140 . Holloway, The Soviet Ullioll and the Arllls Race, p. 21 . 
715STIB Interview Report No. 213 dated 5 May 1955 on Herbert Mummert, OEFE 411104. In 1951, more 
ambitiously, the Germans were commissioned to design in outline a computer for the salvo firing of missiles of 
the Schmetterling and Rheintochter types. However, they did no work on radar control of missiles for the purpose 
of air defence and such was the surveillance to which they were subjected that they came by no evidence that any 
Soviet team at NIL 49 was engaged in such work. 
229 
busy from 1948 to 1951. It was a novel design for a rocket-driven, triangle-shaped 
aircraft without a tailplane. Gunter gave full details of the two versions of the design 
he had developed to his interrogators. One version had a high wing, the other a mid-
wing and round fuselage. The Soviets told him that the Committee of Experts 
considered his design important; the design bureau in which GUnter worked 
thereupon removed all indications that this was a German design from the technical 
drawings of the aircraft. Gunter believed that this was so that the design could be 
presented as a Soviet one; work on the aircraft was, he maintained, continued by 
Soviet designers after he was taken off the project, and a very similar aircraft was put 
into production.716 This claim is of much interest, since in 1955, the year following 
his interrogation, the MiG-21 ('Fishbed') was flight-tested for the first time. As a 
MiG fighter, its design was attributed to the Soviet designer Mikoyan. Although 
different in important respects from either of GUnter's designs, it was a mid-delta-
wing aircraft and so may well have owed something to his mid-wing design. The 
degree to which the MiG-21 drew on GUnter's design cannot yet be fully established, 
but it is clear that he was able to give British Intelligence advance warning of the 
appearance in the Soviet Air Force of a light, delta-wing interceptor. Because of its 
delta wing, the Russians nicknamed the MiG-21, 'Balalaika'. Early versions of the 
fighter could only serve as day interceptors. Rather than the rocket engine GUnter 
716STIB Interview Report No. 182 dated 3 September 1954 on Dip!. Ing. Siegfried GUnter, DEFE 411102. 
GUnter's role in Soviet aircraft development has been the subject of considerable speculation, largely because he 
had a great fan in his wartime boss, Ernst Heinkel. In his autobiography, Stiir/llisches Lebell ('A Stormy Life ' ), 
Heinkel wrote that at the War ' s end GUnter was ' the most significant aircraft engineer and aerodynamicist ... 
Europe had'. He could not believe that such a man could have failed to make a notable contribution to Soviet 
aircraft design (U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Well mann, Die Speziaiistell , pp. 144-5). Soviet interest 
in GUnter 's delta wing design meant that, as alternatives to rocket motors, details of jet engines which could be 
installed in the aircraft were made known to him. He passed this information on to the British. Although it was 
particularly out-of-date, this information all owed the rate of Soviet progress 'in developing such engines to be 
estimated. GUnter believed that Soviet jet engines were as good as any others , if not better, and considered Arkhip 
Liul'ka an outstanding designer. The Soviets' interest in the project also led to revelations of the quality of other 
pieces of their aeronautical equipment being made. GUnter was probably invited to defect , but hostility to the 
Soviet Union was his chief motive for defecting. The evidence for encouragement to him to defect is that he was 
made a 'Matchbox' -style consultant. This smacks of a deal to lure him West. 
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had planned, it had a single R-ll. jet engine giving 12,000 pounds of thrust, which 
gave it a capability of Mach-2. The aeroplane went into service in 1959 and was 
exported in large numbers to other countries, in time becoming the most widely-used 
fighter in the world.?17 
The limited use made of the German torpedo and mine development groups which 
worked at the outstation in Lomonosov of NIL 400 (in Leningrad) meant that little 
intelligence of value was acquired from them. All that the interrogation of members 
of the Lawitschka Group established was that it was possible, in the light of the 
length of time since the group had been taken off the project (in 1951), that a high-
speed, long-range, Ingolin-propelled, torpedo capable of following a pre-determined 
course was in production, fitted with acoustic homing to enable it to find its target 
and a proximity pistol to enable it to explode at the appropriate moment.7l8 In the 
case of some technologies of interest, such as biological warfare and proximity fuses 
for missiles and shells, no intelligence seems to have been yielded by 'Dragon 
Return' at all. 
Although the Soviets succeeded for the most part in concealing their war-related 
research and development projects from the deported Germans, they could not 
conceal their system of scientific and economic management. The principal benefits 
of 'Dragon Return' were an insight into the workings of the Soviet military-industrial 
complex and a substantial amount of information on the people and installations that 
made it up. As part and parcel of this, a certain amount of valuable intelligence was 
717K. Whiting, Soviet Air Power, p. 42. 
7l8DSI Report 78, September 1955, entitled, 'Leningrad PtF 500: The German contribution to Soviet Torpedo 
and Mine Development at OTB. and Nil. 400, Lomonosov', DEFE 44110. Ingolin is high-concentration hydrogen 
peroxide. 
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gathered on at least three technologies of interest: atomic energy, guided missiles and 
electronics. 
C. The targeted technologies 
Atomic energy 
The '1037(P) Moscow' returners 
Plutonium and the isotope of uranium known as uranium-235 (U-235) are used as 
fissionable material in atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Plutonium, which does 
not exist in nature, is produced by an atomic reactor using uranium fuel. The 
plutonium created is separated from the rest of the irradiated fuel, made into 
plutonium metal, concentrated in a 'critical mass' and used as explosive. The 
fissionable isotope of uranium is U-235, which must likewise be concentrated in a 
'critical mass' in which an explosive chain reaction can be unleashed. Uranium is 
chiefly a mixture of two isotopes, U-235 and U-238. Three methods have been used 
to separate U-235 from U-238: separation by gaseous diffusion, by gas centrifugation 
and by electro-magnetism. All three methods make use of the different weights of the 
isotopes of uranium to concentrate U-235. Such concentration of this isotope is 
generally called, 'uranium enrichment'. Gaseous diffusion and gas centrifugation 
involve the use of uranium in a gaseous form (uranium hexafluoride is a uniquely 
suitable feed for both processes). The gaseous diffusion method was that first 
preferred both by the scientists of the Manhattan Project and by their Soviet rivals. 
Uranium hexafluoride gas is diffused through a great number of porous barriers 
(sometimes known as 'diaphragms' or 'membranes') arranged in an immense 
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cascade. The light isotope, uranium-235, passes faster through the barriers, thus 
becoming increasingly concentrated in the gas. For use in a weapon, the gas must be 
so enriched that 90% or more of it is uranium-235. This yield is then turned into 
metal and used as explosive. 
According to the gas centrifugation method, the heavy and light isotopes are 
separated by bringing about a counter-current flow of uranium hexafluoride gas 
within a fast-rotating centrifuge cylinder. This counter-current flow is achieved by 
creating a temperature difference within the cylinder, into which the gas is 
continuously fed. According to the electro-magnetic separation method, gaseous ions 
are beamed through a magnetic field, which causes them to move in semi-circular 
paths. The light ions move in a smaller semi-circle than the heavier ones, allowing a 
collector to catch them, but not their undesired, heavier fellow-ions,?19 
Most of the Germans forced to work in the USSR lived under strict surveillance, 
forbidden to go more than a certain distance from the factory or institute at which 
they worked and followed everywhere by a snoop working for the Ninth Directorate 
of the MVD. In the field of atomic research, the institutes at Sukhumi and Obninsk 
were chiefly for Germans and so were under the control of this Directorate, which 
was responsible for them. But one group was held on a looser rein, since the plant at 
which they worked, Factory No. 12 at Elektrostal' , near Moscow , was a key 
installation in the USSR's atomic complex and was therefore subordinate to the 
Second Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the Council of Ministers, and not 
to the MVD. Of course, MVD personnel dominated the higher echelons of the First 
719D. Holloway, Stalill alld the Bomb, p. 190. 
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Chief Directorate.720 The much lighter supervision of the Second Directorate meant 
that this particular group of Germans had considerable freedom of movement within 
the plant,?21 They had a further advantage as intelligence sources in that, being close 
to .Moscow, they formed close links with some of the leading managers and scientists 
of the First Chief Directorate. As a result, they acquired more of a perspective on 
Soviet research and development than any other German research team. In particular, 
they became familiar with an unusually large number of people and places. This was 
the group led by Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, which from the autumn of 1945 worked at 
Elektrostal' on the production of pure uranium metal from uranium ore and 
concentrates. When it became clear, at the end of 1946, that the group had succeeded 
in its task of manufacturing pure uranium metal on an industrial scale, it was 
showered with prizes. Riehl received the highest Soviet award, becoming a Hero of 
Socialist Labour. He also received a cash reward, winning a Stalin Prize First Class, 
which was worth 200,000 rubles. The Order of the Red Banner of Soviet Labour was 
awarded to Wirths, Thieme and three Soviet scientists who had worked with them. 
Consequently, they shared 100,000 rubles,?22 
Their interrogation of members of the Riehl Group allowed the British and 
Americans to penetrate the Soviet atomic complex deeply. The Group provided 
720STIB Interview Report No. 211 dated 23 April 1955 on Herbert Schmitz, DEFE 21/43. According to Schmitz, 
the First Chief Directorate of the Council of Ministers was itself divided into two directorates. The First 
Directorate was responsible for research and development, and for the mining and processing of ore. Its director 
was P. Ia. Antropov; its deputy director A. P. Zaveniagin. It therefore allocated R&D tasks to atomic 
installations. However, the construction and operation of atomic plants was the responsibility of the Second 
Directorate. Also involved in the operation of atomic installations was the Ninth Directorate of the MVD, which 
was headed up by Zaveniagin, who thus held two posts. Nikolaus Riehl had the great advantage, in forging 
relationships with some of these people, that he spoke fluent Russian. He had been born in St. Petersburg in 190 I 
and had spent much of his childhood in Russia , where his father was working for the Siemens company. 
721 Part I(iii), STIB Interview Report No. 211 dated 23 April 1955 on Herbert Schmitz, DEFE 2 1/43. 
722paragraph 118, STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on Dr. GUnther Wirths, DEFE 
41 II 04. This report states that Wirths was interrogated by both British and American officers. All information 
cited below as provided by Wirths is taken from this report. 
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much very valuable Order-of-Ba~tle intelligence on Soviet atomic science, which 
was, indeed, the most valuable intelligence acquired in the course of Operation 
'Dragon Return ' . They identified scientists, engineers and, above all, installations 
involved in atomic research and development, the mining of uranium and thorium, 
the processing and enrichment of uranium, plutonium production and weapons 
design. Other '1037(P) Moscow' returners identified the first Soviet uranium 
enrichment plant. The two most valuable informants were Riehl himself and his 
colleague, GUnther Wirths, to whom he had delegated much of the detailed scientific 
work. Whereas Wirths, the practical problem-solver, excelled in his knowledge of 
scientific processes, Riehl, the astute politician, excelled in his knowledge of the 
people and places who had driven the Soviet atomic project forward . His interrogator 
commented that Riehl had that quality of 'valuable inquisitiveness, so that his range 
of contacts and experiences ... is exceptional' .723 
Riehl and his group had been working on rare earths, including uranium, at the Auer 
Gesellschaft during the War. Their plant was overrun by Soviet forces and they were 
flown to Moscow in the first half of June 1945. They began their work at Elektrostal' 
in September 1945. In its final form, the group was made up of fourteen scientific 
workers . With their dependents, they numbered thirty-one,724 Their task was to 
723part I(ii) , STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl , DEFE 4111 04. This 
report states that Riehl was interrogated by both British and American officers. Consequently, his Order-of-Battle 
information on the Soviet atomic complex became available to the Americans and was used in planning 
overflights of the places concerned. Riehl was interrogated a second time. The report of this interrogation is STIB 
Interview Report No. 261 dated 12 December 1955, DEFE 4111 06. All information cited below as provided by 
Riehl is taken from these two reports. 
724U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Well mann, Die Speziaiislen, p. 57 footnote 22. The Riehl Group 
returned to Germany, and some of its members defected to the West, in the spring and summer of 1955. In 
February 1955, a mere two months before Riehl's return, the tunnel dug by MI6 and the CIA under the border of 
the American Sector of Berlin into the Soviet Sector had been completed (Operation 'Gold '). Interception of 
communications passing along high-security Soviet military cables running close to the border with the American 
Sector began in May and las ted until April 1956 (D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Balliegrollnd Berlin, 
pp. 225-9). The intercepted communications revealed the locations of atomic installations in the Soviet Union as 
well as the names of several hundred people working in them. Apparently, the Americans checked the similar 
intelligence gathered from the Riehl Group and other 'Dragon Return ' atomic scientists against the intelligence 
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design a process for the productioq in bulk of pure uranium metal for use as fuel in 
an atomic reactor. Their value as sources resulted from two key features of their 
work. Firstly, they were charged with an urgent task, on which the progress of the 
Soviet atomic project depended. Without the uranium metal which it was its task to 
manufacture, the atomic pile planned at Kyshtym could not operate and so could not 
produce plutonium. Without plutonium, a plutonium bomb could not be made. The 
second was that the process developed by the group for the manufacture of uranium 
metal was (unusually for German designs) adopted by the Soviets. There was a 
competing process , which actually yielded uranium metal superior in quality to the 
'German method', as the Soviets called it, put forward by the group. This process 
had been designed by Zinaida Yerzhova of the Institute of Rare and Fine Metals and 
was tested at Factory No. 12 at the same time as the Riehl Group's own process. 
However, the Soviets soon gave preference to the latter because it had the crucial 
advantage that it would yield uranium metal in bulk quickly,725 The driving idea 
behind the Soviet atomic project was that the United States' monopoly had to be 
ended quickly, or else the USSR would be in mortal danger from the West,726 
Towards the end of 1945, the manufacture of uranium metal according to the Riehl 
Group's method began. The main problem was that the process developed by the 
Auer and Degussa companies produced metal which was not sufficiently pure. 
Zaveniagin put great pressure on the group to make swift progress in improving it. 
Early in 1946 a Russian edition of the Smyth Report on the Manhattan Project 
revealed that the Americans had used an ether extraction method to remove 
on the Soviet atomic complex acquired in the course of Operation 'Gold'. According to the authors of 
Battlegro/(nd Berlin , this was, ' the tunnel's main contribution to scientific-technical information ' (p. 425). 
725U. Albrecht , A. Heinemann-Griider, & A. Well mann, Die Spezialisten , p. 58 . 
726c. M. Andrew & O . Gordievsky : KGB: The Inside Story , pp. 309-10. 
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impurities from uranium oxide. ,With the help of Wirths and Thieme, Riehl 
developed such a method for use on an industrial scale. He and Wirths made another 
amendment to reduce the uranium more quickly after purification, changing to a 
fluoride reduction process. After a further change - the use of sublimated calcium -
the group's process satisfied the purification requirements. 727 Wirths and Riehl 
described it in full to their interrogators after their defection in 1955. A small 
uranium refining plant operating according to this process was in full production by 
February 1946. Its success led to a much bigger uranium purification plant, with a 
much larger production capacity, being constructed in 1947. It was in operation by 
the end of that year,728 At the end of 1946, when it was clear that the production of 
uranium metal in bulk according to the Riehl Group's process was running smoothly 
at Elektrostal', Zaveniagin began to talk of other tasks for it. The Group's success 
meant that over the next few years the FCD sought its advice on a wide range of 
problems. Consequently, they - and Wirths in particular729 - were able to reveal a 
great number of chemical processes in use at various atomic installations. However, 
this information was of course out-of-date. The Group's members did not know 
whether these processes were still in use. In some cases, they either knew for a fact 
that the processes had been superseded, an example being the ether extraction 
method used at Elektrostal'730, or they did not know whether they had been taken 
up,731 Nevertheless, this information must have been of considerable value in 
727p. 9, Annexure IV dated 15 September 1955 to STIB Interview Report No, 232 dated 30 September 1955 on 
Dr. GUnther Wirths, DEFE 41 II 04, 
728paragraph 48, STIB Interview Report No. 221 dated 19 July 1955 on Dr. Karl Zimmer, DEFE 21/43. 
729 Annexure IV dated 15 September 1955 to STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on Dr. 
GUnther Wirths (DEFE 4111 04) contains a mass of detailed scientific information on a considerable number of 
processes used, at one time or another, at Soviet atomic factories. Annexure III is a long list, containing detailed 
information, of people at work in Soviet atomic laboratories and factories. 
730pp. 5-6 & 16, Annexure IV dated 15 September 1955 to STIB Interview Report No, 232 dated 30 September 
1955 on Dr. GUnther Wirths, DEFE 4111 04, 
731p. 12, Annexure IV dated 15 September 1955 to STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on 
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assessing the quality of Soviet ato~ic science, the speed of its progress and the lines 
along which it was running. 
Riehl confirmed Soviet interest in gaseous diffusion by disclosing that a plant for the 
production of nickel membranes (or diaphragms) for isotope separation by diffusion 
had gone into operation in about 1950. Riehl believed that it had been enlarged since 
he had left Elektrostal' and its output therefore had to be considerable. Riehl and 
Wirths gave their interrogators a good idea of Factory No. 12's capacity for uranium 
metal production. Naturally, this information was also out-of-date by the time it 
reached the West, but it gave the British figures to work with in estimating how 
many atomic bombs the USSR could have. By the time Riehl left the factory in 1950, 
output of uranium metal per month was of the order of thirty tons 732 (Wirths 
estimated that it was twenty tons733). In interrogation, Riehl doubted that the plant 
had been enlarged or that production was any greater than it had been when he left, 
but he felt that production had been increased by building similar factories 
elsewhere. As evidence, he referred to the extensive programme at Elektrostal' of 
training engineers for transfer to other plants. Riehl identified one such plant, the 
Plant of Chemical Concentrates at Novosibirsk, which was established in 1949.734 
He thought its production capacity was greater than that of Elektrostal'; he based this 
inference on the fact that the best engineers and technicians from Elektrostal' were 
Dr. GUnther Wirths, DEFE 411104. 
732paragraph 9, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 4111 04. 
733paragraph 115 , STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on Dr. GUnther Wirths , DEFE 
411104. 
7340n p. 190 ofT. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssian 80111b: Frol11 Stalin to Yeltsin, it is 
stated that the plant was established in 1949. On p. 191 it is claimed that the plant only started producing uranium 
fuel for plutonium production reactors in the late 1950s or early 1960s. By contrast, both Riehl and Wirths 
suspected that uranium fuel was produced at the Novosibirsk plant during their time in the USSR (paragraphs 20 
& 30, STIB Interview Report No. 234 on Riehl and paragraph 106, Report No. 232 on Wirths). Whichever is the 
case, it is clear that by the early 1960s at the latest the plant was important to the USSR 's efforts to manufacture 
uranium metal. 
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sent there. Another was the plant at Glazov in the Udmurt SSR 735, which was a copy 
of Elektrostal', being mostly concerned with the production of pure uranium metal 
from raw concentrates, but having a small section which carried out the recovery of 
uranium from the fission products obtained from a reactor. Riehl thought its capacity 
for the production of uranium metal was roughly the same as that of Elektrostal' .736 
Wirths also provided information on this plant. In addition to the recovery of 
uranium, the plant was meant to extract plutonium (like 'Installation B' at 
Cheliabinsk-40, and according to the same process) and separate fission products. 
Zaveniagin had in the summer of 1945 given Riehl a choice of munitions and 
industrial factories for his plant. He had therefore been taken to a number of places, 
scattered throughout the USSR, to look over the facilities available. He chose 
Elektrostal', because of its proximity to Moscow. One of the four sites he turned 
down was a platinum factory near Krasnoyarsk. Asked whether these four factories 
might have been turned into atomic plants, Riehl replied that three were 'definitely 
very unsuitable' and there could be 'no question' of atomic plants being there. The 
Krasnoyarsk site was 'much more attractive', but he thought that the idea of building 
an atomic installation there had been rejected,?37 The platinum factory near 
Krasnoyarsk may have become the complex of plutonium production reactors known 
735T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin at p. 190 of Makillg rhe Russiall BOlllb maintain that this plant was 
founded in 1951. This cannot be true, for Riehl (in Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955, DEFE 411104) states 
that when he and Wirths visited it in December 1949, the plant was manufacturing uranium metal. Wirths 
maintained (in Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955, DEFE 4111 04) that uranium metal of satisfactory purity 
was being produced at the factory (without use of the ether extraction method) from mid-1949. 
736paragraph 28, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 4111 04; 
paragraph 31 , STIB Interview Report No. 261 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 4111 06. 
737paragraph 52, STIB Interview Report No. 261 dated 12 December 1955 o~ Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 4111 06. 
These places are also mentioned in paragraph 3 of Riehl's main interrogation report, STIB Interview Report No. 
234 dated 16 August 1955, DEFE 4111 04. lulii Khariton, one of the fathers of the Soviet hydrogen bomb and 
from 1946 to 1992 the scientific director of the USSR's principal nuclear weapons design laboratory, Arzamas-
16, was also at this time taken to a number of former munitions factories and told to choose which one he thought 
most suitable. He chose Sarov as the site of Arzamas-16 because of its isolation (Y. Gubarev, Arsalllas-16, p. 42). 
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as Krasnoyarsk-26, which stands some fifty kilometres NE of the city,738 Certainly, 
Riehl pointed U-2 spyplanes in the right direction. Overflight may well have 
established what use the FCD had made of this redundant factory. 
Riehl and Wirths were not the only members of the group to provide information on 
atomic installations of great interest,739 Karl Zimmer and Herbert Schmitz brought 
intelligence of the Sungul Radiological Laboratory and, confirming the PoWs' 
information, of the plutonium production reactor near Kyshtym, which lay some 
forty kilometres south of the laboratory,740 Zimmer and Schmitz were sent to Sungul 
from Elektrostal' at the start of 1948. Word of the reactor soon reached the ears of 
these men, who came to know it by its Russian nicknames of 'Techi' (the reactor lay 
by the Techa River, and the village of Staraya Techa was subsumed into the 
complex), 'Shkala' and 'Miass'. From high ground above the laboratory at Sungul, 
Schmitz had even caught sight of Techi.741 Without ever having been there, Riehl 
73&r. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssian Bomb, p. 149. A further indication of this is the 
fact that the man Riehl knew as the Director of NII. 9, Y. B. Shevchenko, had previously been in charge of this 
NKYD-controlled platinum factory (pp. 2 & 22, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955, DEFE 
411104). 
73~he first member of the Riehl Group to defect to the West was Herbert Schmitz, its young and passionately 
anti-Soviet technician. He was a good catch for British Intelligence, because during his wartime service in the 
Abwehr he had acquired a vocation for intelligence work and while working at Elektrostal ' and Sungul he 
devoted himself to finding out as much as possible about the MYD which held him in its grip and its role in 
Soviet atomic research. A more important source was the biological physicist Dr. Karl Zimmer, who defected 
soon after Schmitz. He was one of a number of people who Riehl knew were having a hard time in jail. To rescue 
them, he suggested that these men - Zimmer, his young friend Schmitz, Dr. Born and Dr. Alexander Catsch - be 
brought to work at Elektrostal' . Once there, there was nothing, given their specialisms, for Zimmer, Born and 
Catsch to do. So in December 1947 Born and Catsch left for the Radiological Laboratory at Sungul, behind the 
Urals ; Zimmer and Schmitz followed on 2 January 1948. The British clearly thought highly of the intelligence 
obtained from such men. David Evans in May 1955 (before the defection and interrogation of Nikolaus Riehl and 
Gunther Wirths) informed a colleague that, ' the 1037 group of returnees are providing the most positive and 
valuable information with regard to the status of the native Russian atomic energy programme. It is anticipated 
that the 908 group will be similarly vital in the field of guided missiles' (STIB/PIII777 dated 18 May 1955, DEFE 
411142). 
740D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 322. 
741STIB Interview Report No. 211 dated 23 April 1955 on Herbert Schmitz, DEFE 21143. As the Jung Group 
had already done, having spent some time at the Sungullaboratory and having there received flasks of radioactive 
caesium which had, reportedly, come from a nearby installation. They had also seen the name 'Tech ' printed on a 
map of the area (STIB Interview Report No. 140 dated 28 January 1954 on the Jung Group, DEFE 21142). 
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was able to shine a light on Techi's workings. The reactor was graphite-moderated 
and water-cooled. The graphite he had seen in the USSR was of excellent quality and 
he thought it likely that graphite of the same quality had been used to moderate the 
pile. The uranium slugs (approximately ten centimetres long and three centimetres in 
diameter) manufactured at Elektrostal' had been sent to this pile; thus his description 
of the purification process used at Elektrostal' took British Intelligence into the very 
heart of the reactor. From what he had heard, Riehl estimated that 'Installation A' 
had been designed to operate on 100 tons of uranium, but Antropov, Deputy Minister 
at the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, had indicated to him in conversation that it 
had begun to work effectively on thirty tons. Since the managers of the Soviet project 
showed such interest in regeneration, he assumed that they did not leave irradiated 
uranium in the pile for long. He assumed that there were a number of regeneration 
plants in the USSR. The fission products used at Sungul for research into the effects 
of radioactivity on living creatures came from the pile at Techi. 
The purpose of the reactor (,Installation A', or 'Annushka') at Cheliabinsk-40 was 
the creation of plutonium. However, once this plutonium had been created, it still had 
to be separated from the uranium in the reactor. This was the function of the radio-
chemical plant at Techi known as 'Installation B', which began to produce plutonium 
early in 1949. It operated using the precipitation process of separation which had 
been used successfully in the Manhattan Project and the success of which had been 
made known to the Soviet atomic research team by the Smyth Report. David 
Holloway, in his history of the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear projects, states that 
the process 'was based on slightly soluble sodium uranyl acetate precipitation from 
nitric acid solutions of irradiated uranium'. 742 Riehl, in his interrogation report of 
742D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 188. 
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1955, gave a precise description of the process, a fact which is remarkable since he 
was recalling a lecture eight years before on a topic with which he was not himself 
directly concerned. The lecture had been given, in the office of Vasilii Emelianov, 
the head of the FCD's scientific-technical directorate, by A. P. Ratner of the Radium 
Institute in Leningrad (who had, together with B. A. Nikitin, devised this method of 
separating plutonium from irradiated uranium). Riehl believed - rightly - that this 
process had been put into operation, partly because he had heard from Volmer that 
the latter's competing separation method had not been accepted by the Soviets and 
partly because he had actually seen factory plans for Ratner and Nikitin's process. 
Riehl did indeed mention that he thought a plant using this separation method had 
been constructed at Cheliabinsk-40,?43 
Riehl told them more. He made known to them how and where plutonium was being 
turned into explosive for nuclear weapons. When the problem of producing pure 
uranium metal had been solved at the end of 1946, Zaveniagin had given Riehl the 
task of designing a building for the conversion of plutonium oxide into pure 
plutonium metal. He was eventually shown a plan for 'a U-shaped, double-storey 
building, in one wing of which was to be the plutonium plant and in the other a U-
235 purification plant. He believed it was to be situated in a large area, in the 
neighbourhood of other big buildings and therefore linked it with Techi'. 744 This was 
indeed 'Installation V' at Cheliabinsk-40 ('V' is the third letter of the Cyrillic 
alphabet), where the plutonium from the separation plant was purified and converted 
into metal for use in bombs. Wirths and Thieme had given advice on the design. 
743Paragraph 31, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 41/ I 04. 
744paragraph 32, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 41/\04. 
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Wirths proved forthcoming on the subject in interrogation, but said that he had been 
told that fundamental changes had been made to his plan for the plant. 
T~e above information amounted to a guided tour of Techi as it was at the end of the 
1940s. Karl Zimmer, having worked at the nearby Sungul Radiological Laboratory, 
even knew Techi's Soviet codename, 'Cheliabinsk-40', which he passed on to the 
British. 745 Even though Riehl had never been there, he had seen the site from Sungul, 
a mere forty kilometres away. He rightly said that the site was enormous and that 
further reactors had probably been built there, in addition to 'Installation A' . Three 
further graphite-moderated and water-cooled reactors were built there in the early 
1950s, together with a heavy water reactor and a reactor for isotope production.746 
In August 1949 the first Soviet atomic test was successfully carried out and the need 
for German help diminished. From 1950, the pressure on the various German groups 
involved in atomic research to yield results which would carry the bomb project 
forward was reduced. As a result, the speed of the work done by the various groups 
declined. 747 The Riehl Group was actually disbanded. Riehl wanted to go home, but 
instead Zaveniagin sent him to the Radiological Laboratory at Sungul, behind the 
Urals, of which he was director until 1952.748 Other members of the group who had 
already been sent to the Laboratory left it at about the same time as Riehl himself. 
One of these was Dr. Karl Zimmer, who defected to the West soon after his return to 
745Paragraph 83, STIB Interview Report No. 22 I dated 19 July 1955 on Dr. Karl Zimmer, OEFE 21/42. 
7460. Holloway, Stalill alld the Bomb, p. 189. 
747U. Albrecht , A. Heinemann-GrOder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialistell , p. 75. 
748He was succeeded as scientific director of the laboratory by an Austrian scientist called Schintlmeister, who 
was in 1953 sent to Sukhumi to 'cool off' and in the summer of 1955 sent back to Austria. MI6 targeted him for 
information (Berlinll 130 dated 27 January 1956, OEFE 4(1144). 
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Germany in 1955. He provided another target for overflight. His interrogation report 
states: 
Towards the end of their stay at Sungul, it became rumoured that there was an 
intention of constructing a large plant for separating isotopes in the 
neighbourhood, probably working on the ion exchange principle.... The 
clearing of ground for this plant had started when Informant left,749 
In suggesting that the Laboratory was about to be transformed into an installation of 
much greater significance for Soviet development of nuclear weapons, Zimmer was 
absolutely right. He was wrong only about the purpose of the new installation. It was 
not to be an isotope separation plant; instead, in 1955 the Sungul Radiological 
Laboratory became one of the USSR's two principal nuclear weapons design 
laboratories and was known thenceforth as Cheliabinsk-70 (although in 1958 it 
moved to a site ten kilometres further north). One-third of Arzamas-16' s scientific 
personnel were transferred to Cheliabinsk-70 in 1955 to start it up.750 It is clear that 
the laboratory has been overflown and photographed, for a recent study of the 
Russian nuclear industry refers to satellite images of the site,751 
749paragraph 89, STIB Interview Report No. 221 dated 19 July 1955 on Dr. Karl Zimmer, DEFE 21142. 
75Or. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the Russiall BOlllb, pp. 42-3. Zimmer was not the only one who 
noticed that the departure of the German scientific personnel from the institute at which they worked presaged an 
important change in its function. On the disbandment of the Riehl Group, GUnther Wirths and others were sent to 
Obninsk to work with the Pose Group, which was engaged chiefly in researching into the suitability of beryllium 
oxide as a moderator for a high-temperature reactor and that of sodium and potassium as coolants. There was 
little official interest in the Pose Group's work and it received no prizes, a sure sign that its work was not highly-
valued. It was disbanded in October 1951 when the Scientific-Technical Council of the FCD stated its lack of 
interest in fancy reactor technology. The Pose Group at once became superfluous and most of its members were 
sent off to Sukhumi for 'cooling off' (U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialistell, p. 
63). Wirths remained at Obninsk. Shortly after the others had left, some 500 Soviet scientists and technicians 
arrived and the institute became a hive of activity: 'evidently a reactor would be built there' , he told his 
interrogator. This was indeed the first civil atomic power plant in the USSR, which was commissioned in 1954 
and initiated the Soviet atomic power programme (T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the Russiall 
BOlllb, p. 193). A German scientist who in the early 1950s witnessed the construction of this reactor and passed 
on news of it to the British was the electronics specialist and former chief of the Reichstelle fUr Rohrenforschung, 
Dr. Ernst Busse (STIB Interview Report No. 200 dated 27 April 1955 on Dr. Ernst Busse, DEFE 411116). 
751T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the Russiall BOII/b, p. 43. 
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Herbert Schmitz provided the following information on a new atomic plant In 
Siberia: 
According to rumours which the Germans were never able to confirm, the 
building of new installations had started at the beginning of 1948 in the 
region of Lake Baikal and these were supposed to be much larger than Techy. 
Unfortunately, they could not find out any details whatsoever. However, it is 
certain that from 1949 onwards that region has to be considered as the real 
centre of the Soviet atomic industry.752 
Schmitz overstated the case. The Lake Baikal area never became the centre of the 
Soviet atomic industry . But a uranium enrichment plant was built there. The 
Electrolyzing Chemical Combine was built at Angarsk, on the river Angara thirty 
kilometres NW of Irkutsk, which stands on Lake Baikal. The plant began operations 
in 1954, using the gaseous diffusion method of enrichment. Significantly, the 
gaseous diffusion method requires an immense supply of electrical power. It was this 
high electricity consumption which caused the Soviets to replace the gaseous 
diffusion method with gas centrifugation. The subcritical gas centrifuges now in use 
in Russia use 3-5% of the electricity consumed by gaseous diffusion apparatuses.753 
Angarsk stands near large sources of electricity. In this connection, the links of 
British Intelligence with Siemens-Schuckert, the electrical engineering element of 
the Siemens group, yielded information which indicated that Schmitz might well 
have been right that an atomic plant was situated near Lake Baikal. In February 
1956, a contact, an engineer called Baudisch at the Siemens-Schuckert -Werke, gave 
STIB Berlin information about the construction of an electrical grid in the USSR. 
Baudisch had learned that the Soviets intended to build large generating stations in 
Northern Siberia along the Yenisei, Lena and other rivers and to transmit direct 
752paragraph 120, STIB Interview Report No. 211 dated 23 April 1955 on Herbert Schmitz, DEFE 21/43. 
75~. Cochran, R. Norri s & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian BOII/b , pp. 185-6. 
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current from the Northern Regions over long distances to Southern Siberia, where 
industrial centres were being set up. Direct current was to be transmitted by 
underground cable. The key words of the report are: 
According to the latest information in the possession of Herr Baudisch, the 
Russians plan to build another test-line over a distance of about 600 to 700 
km. for 700 to 800 KV transmission somewhere in Siberia, probably in the 
area north of Lake Baikal on the river Angara. It is already known that 2 large 
generating stations are under construction on the river Angara with an output 
of about 3 million KW, to supply electric current to an industry complex in 
the Baikal area, which may become one of the centres of Atomic Power 
operated industry. 754 
In the light of Schmitz's information, the news that two large generating stations 
were being built on the river Angara, and that more electricity was to be sent south 
by cable to this area from Northern Siberia, will have been of great interest. 
Alternatively, the British may have received intelligence of an atomic installation in 
the Lake Baikal area from another source. By the early 1950s STIB was certainly 
aware of an atomic plant of some sort near Lake Baikal, for on a list from 1952 of 
atomic targets in the USSR appears the entry, 'Cheremkovo - Lake Baikal Area' .755 
754Berlinll451 dated 20 February 1956, DEFE 41/136. STIB had long before received word of an industrial 
complex on Lake Baikal. A refugee called Wolfgang Boeklen, who fled from the Soviet Zone to the British in 
December 1948 and was made a 'Matchbox' consultant, brought news of 'Project Krasnoi ' . This was a plan to 
build a large industrial complex, employing 30,000 workers, on the shore of Lake Baikal. Its core purpose would 
be to manufacture plant, machine tools, bearings and other products essential to large-scale engineering, but there 
would also be a super-benzine plant (JSJTISTO(49)51, DEFE 411146; CHIJSJT/49119 dated 5 February 1949, 
DEFE 41/131). Information about the 'Lubricating Oils Plant Krasnoi ' was also acquired from the Production 
Manager of the Leunawerk, Dr. Otto Hoffmann, who was evacuated to the British Zone in October 1948. He had 
been responsible for the planning of the plant, which was to be the largest synthetic lubricating oil plant in the 
USSR (STO/14/NO/40, DEFE 411145) . Another 'Matchbox' evacuee, probably Dr.-Ing. Otto Winter, provided 
information on three hydrogenation plants he had helped to design while working for the USSR Ministry of Fuel 
in the Soviet Zone of Germany. One was to be built in the area of Lake Baikal (he believed near Verksyansk); a 
second was to be built at Krasnoi; he did not know the location of the third. The plant at Verksyansk was to 
manufacture high-grade octane. He thought that the other two plants would also be put to the production of fuel 
for aircraft propulsion. He provided the British with details of the methods he had devised for the manufacture of 
synthetic fuel (report 9A, DEFE 41188). That this source was Winter is indicated by the similarity between the 
details given about the source in report 9A and the details given about Winter in letters dated IS February and 2 
March 1950 (DEFE411132) . 
755DEFE 41/29. The file is numbered 5011113 . 
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Other '1037 (P), returners identified another key installation in the Soviet nuclear 
complex: the uranium enrichment plant, using the gaseous diffusion method, called 
the Urals Electrochemical Plant and codenamed Sverdlovsk-44. This plant, located 
near Verkh-Neyvinsk, some fifty kilometres NW of Sverdlovsk, commenced 
production of highly-enriched uranium early in 1949,756 The former name of Verkh-
Neyvinsk had been Kefirstadt. 757 The uranium initially produced there was only 40% 
enriched, and the degree of enrichment had to be 90% or more if it were to be 
suitable as an explosive in an atomic bomb,758 To help solve the problem, six of the 
leading German experts on gaseous diffusion, including Gustav Hertz, Peter-Adolf 
Thiessen and Heinz Barwich, were flown from Sukhumi to Sverdlovsk and then 
driven to a place they heard called 'Kefirstadt' ,759 The British learned of this visit 
from'1037(P)' returners who defected to the West. One identifiable source was Dr. 
Karl-Franz Zuhlke, who had worked at the Hertz institute at Agudzeri on the testing 
of diffusion barriers. He was on the A-list of scientists to be kept in the DDR which 
the Soviets passed to Ulbricht. Zuhlke knew the reason for the visit to Sverdlovsk-44 
and a remark by his interrogator suggests that 'Dragon Return' information, though 
out-of-date, indeed allowed the quality of Soviet atomic science to be assessed. The 
report states: 
There is cause also for interesting speculation in the light of his revelation 
that the efficiency of the Kefirstadt plant was considerably lower than 
expected and in the underlying alleged theoretical grounds of such lack of 
efficiency.7fiJ 
756y. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Rllssian BOII/b, p. 183. 
757T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Rllssian BOII/b , p. 38. 
7580. Holloway, Stalin and the BOII/b, p. 191 . 
759U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Wellmann, Die Spezialisten, p. 74. 
7fiJpart I(iv), STIB Interview Report No. 253 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Karl-Franz ZUhlke, DEFE 4111 06. 
ZUhlke, first contacted by STIB, was interrogated by both British and American officers. 
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In fact, the Germans were unC\ble to find out why the diffusion cascade at 
Sverdlovsk-44 was not producing sufficiently-enriched uranium. It was Kikoin's 
Soviet group which established that uranium was being lost inside the compressors 
and corrected the process, which was functioning properly by the end of 1950. In the 
following year, the plant began to produce uranium with more than 90% of the light 
isotope. Before his interrogators, Zi.ihlke also underestimated the size of the plant. He 
considered that there were about 3,000 compressors in the cascade; in fact, there 
were at least 6,000,761 
Although Zi.ihlke did not himself know where the plant was, he was able to name 
Barwich, Thiessen and Schi.itze as scientists who had been flown to it to find out why 
the cascade was malfunctioning. By the time of Zi.ihlke's interrogation the British 
seem to have known of the plant anyway: his interrogator noted that Zi.ihlke 
'admitted knowing the name Kefirstadt'. Riehl suggested that Kefirstadt might be 
Zlatoust, which lies some 200 kilometres south of Verkh-Neyvinsk,762 Wilhelm 
Menke gave a clue that Kefirstadt lay in the Cheliabinsk area, saying that Thiessen 
and Barwich (both working on uranium enrichment) went several times to that 
region, perhaps to a diffusion plant. 763 Since Barwich and his wife managed to defect 
to West Germany in the summer of 1964, the location of the D-l plant cannot have 
remained secret after that. 764 However, it is likely that simply by examining old 
761 D. Holloway gives the figure of 6,000 compressors (Stalill alld the Bomb , p. 192). According to Cochran, 
Norris and Bukharin, Sverdlovsk-44 was by 1950 achieving 90% uranium-235, using 7,040 apparatuses 
organized in fifty-six cascades (Makillg the Rllssiall BOII/b , p. 184). 
762Paragraph 46, STIB Interview Report No. 261 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 411 I 06. 
He also suggested that it might be Orenburg, which lies much further away from Yerkh-Neyvinsk. The region 
around Ziatoust was important in its own right, for it became home to Zlatoust-36, a warhead assembly factory . 
Zlatoust-36 lies in Cheliabinsk Oblast, eighty-five kilometres SE of Ziatoust (T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. 
Bukharin, Makillg the Rllssiall BOII/b, p. 50). 
763Paragraph 14, STIB Interview Report No. 224 dated 5 May 1955 on Dr. Wilhelm Menke, DEFE 21/43. 
764U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-Gruder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialistell, p. 66, footnote 48. 
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maps for Kefirstadt British Intelligence was able, long before 1964, to find out where 
the first Soviet gaseous diffusion plant lay. 
The Riehl Group's connections with the leading figures of the First Chief Directorate 
had given it even more scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence to pass on. Riehl 
himself had come to know P. Ia. Antropov, one of Vannikov's deputies at the FCD, 
quite well. Antropov was directing the FCD's search for uranium and other rare ores 
and Riehl realized from his contact with Antropov that great efforts were being made 
to find these ores. Riehl's impression was that thousands, if not tens of thousands, of 
geologists were engaged in the search for uranium. Once again, he was right. Not 
only had the Ministry of Geology arranged special expeditions of its own to prospect 
for uranium in various parts of the USSR, it had instructed all other geological 
organizations to keep an eye out for uranium while conducting their own projects. 765 
Riehl had learned that these various teams had had some success in their work and 
that, in consequence, the USSR was not entirely dependent on Eastern European 
uranium ore. He thus added to the information on the Soviet Union's deposits of 
uranium ore which informants in the Erzgebirge and returning PoWs had provided. 
His interrogator commented in his report: 
... during conversations informant is sure that he had heard from Antropov 
that there is some object in Krivoi Rog where something takes place. He is 
unable to supply fuller details or indicate importance. Informant also 
recollected at this point that he had heard from some of the Suchumi Germans 
that there was something in the Caucasus in the north somewhere near the 
Deljal Gorge where foreign visitors are not allowed. He stated that before the 
war he had read about the existence of uranium in the Caucasus. In 1946, the 
exact month unknown, he heard the name of Krivoi Rog again, this time in 
765D. Holloway, Stalin and the BOlllb , p. 176. 
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Elektrostal', when one of the administrative staff was posted there. He 
believes that he has heard the name of Krivoi Rog two or three times,?66 
This was Krivoi Rog in the Ukraine, where uranium deposits had been found in the 
interwar period. David Holloway writes that these deposits were not mined until 
later. Thus this is probably the place which Cochran, Norris and Bukharin, in their 
survey of Soviet nuclear development, call 'Krivorozh' and where they claim 
uranium deposits were discovered by exploration teams of the USSR Ministry of 
Geology in the 1940s. Further deposits of uranium were found there in the 1960s. 
The names are so similar that one must be a corruption of the other. The different 
dates given to their discovery can be reconciled by saying that the deposits were 
found at some time between the Wars and only mined after the end of the war with 
Nazi Germany. Antropov ordered extensive searches for uranium in a number of 
areas where deposits were already known to exist and, as a result, substantial new 
deposits were found. 767 By the end of 1948 mining work had begun near Zheltye 
Vody in the Krivoi Rog region of the Ukraine. It had also begun near Piatigorsk in 
the northern Caucasus, to which Riehl was probably making vague reference in the 
above quotation,?68 
Despite these discoveries, early Soviet post-war exploration efforts concentrated on 
Central Asia, where there were a number of known uranium deposits . Before the 
War, uranium had been found in the region at Taboshary, Uigar-Sai (Atbashi), Maili-
Sai and other places. The ore mined was taken to the First Chief Directorate ' s 
766Paragraph 45, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, OEFE 411104. 
7670 . Holloway, Stalill alld the BOII/b , p. 34; cf. , T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the RlIssiall 
BOII/b, pp. 175-6. 
7680. Holloway, Stalill alld the BOII/b, p. 176. 
250 
Combine No.6, which was at Chkalovsk, near Leninabad in Tajikistan, at the 
western end of the Fergana Valley. Combine No.6 was a processing plant in which 
the ore was treated with acid to yield a fairly pure uranium salt, which was sent on to 
Factory No. 12 at Elektrostal' for conversion into uranium metal according to Riehl's 
process. Riehl knew that the processing plant lay near Leninabad since scientific and 
technical personnel had been sent there from Elektrostal' and from the FCD itself in 
Moscow; it followed that there were uranium deposits nearby. Wirths also mentioned 
that uranium ores came from the Fergana Valley. 769 Sources in the Erzgebirge had, 
of course, earlier brought word of uranium-mining in the Fergana Valley. Riehl 
informed the British that the ores there varied in quality, some being rich in uranium. 
Wirths was more precise, commenting that the concentration of uranium was 
generally between 32% and 40%, and sometimes as high as 50%. Moreover, Riehl 
stressed that the chemical process used at Combine No. 6 was effective in 
concentrating almost all of the ore mined, turning it into sodium or ammonium 
uranate. The only slip he made was that he thought the plant was called 'Combine 
No.5' ,?70 This intelligence of deposits of high-grade uranium ores was of great 
significance for British Intelligence, because it overturned a long-held belief that the 
USSR lacked domestic deposits of high-grade ores. The HC maintained in 1947 that 
the Soviet Union suffered from: 
a serious shortage of uranium. This shortage is likely to continue until she can 
evolve methods of extracting this material from her comparatively large 
supplies of low-grade ores, or alternatively until a supply of appreciable 
quantities of high-grade ore is found within her own territory,?71 
769Paragraph 48, STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on Dr. Gunther Wirths, DEFE 
411104. 
770paragraphs 48-9, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl , DEFE 411104. 
771 Paragraph 57, JIC(47)7 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities ', CAB 
15811. It will be remembered that in 1949 the Joint Committees had maintained that, 'a shortage of uranium ore 
will be the governing factor in [the Soviets') programme' (p. 5, Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and 
entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' , DEFE 
411150, see footnote 249 above). 
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Five years later, the Division of Atomic Energy was clearly still of the view that 
large deposits of uranium had not been found in the USSR. Its chief, Eric Welsh, told 
the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference in 1952 that, 'while we do not know 
exactly how much uranium ore is being mined in Metropolitan Russia, we have 
reason to believe that a large proportion of their total requirement is obtained from 
the Satellites' .772 Another D.At.En. representative had told the Conference the 
previous year that the Soviets were searching for uranium in various countries of the 
Soviet Bloc and were so desperate for it that they were turning their attention to the 
lower-grade uranium ores. 773 Riehl, however, had heard Antropov say in April 1951, 
'We have searched diligently and we can now say that our [i.e. the USSR's] 
resources are large enough' .774 
Riehl and Wirths had more bad news. There were vast, previously-unknown deposits 
of uranium in Estonia. In 1951, Zaveniagin and Antropov asked the two Germans to 
devise a process to extract the uranium discovered in oil-bearing shales in Estonia, 
close to its border with Russia. Wirths remembered that the proportion of uranium 
within the shales was tiny: one-tenth of 1 % (i.e. 0.1 %) or even less. But the deposits 
of shale were enormous, with the result that there were very large deposits of 
uranium. The task of extracting it was considered so important that Riehl was flown 
to Moscow from Sungul and Wirths from Obninsk to advise on the problem. These 
may well be the reserves of uranium ore which David Holloway says were found at 
Sillamae in Estonia. 775 Zaveniagin and Antropov turned to the Germans because the 
task of extracting the uranium was so difficult. The difficulty of the task also meant 
772Address to MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1952, OEFE 41/126. 
773 Address by A. Cowman, MI 10 Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951, OEFE 411125. 
774paragraph 46, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl , OEFE 411104. 
7750. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 176. 
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that it would be very expensive. In actual fact, neither German was willing to work 
on the problem and so did not know what extraction process had been selected. But 
both Riehl and Wirths knew the First Chief Directorate's attitude to these reserves of 
uranium. Zaveniagin had said that their exploitation was not an urgent task, because 
deposits already being exploited would provide enough uranium for immediately 
foreseeable needs; the Estonian shales therefore represented, 'a valuable future 
source of uranium'. Riehl's interrogator noted that: 
The problem was extremely difficult, the Russians said, because the uranium 
was distributed in all phases, and when burned some of the uranium became a 
refractory (' silicated') and soluble with difficulty. It was on this occasion 
when Antropov said that the problems of uranium supply in 'our country' 
were solved, (excluding Estonia), but that the technology of the Estonian 
uranium extraction processes remain unsolved and interesting. He [Riehl] 
believes that processes were tried such as burning and retorting without 
oxygen for gases and organic by-products, attempting to use energy derived 
from the combustible products to work the uranium extraction processes. He 
believes that production might at that time have been attempted but that the 
results were not important. An object certainly existed and a large one, being 
of the nature of an experimental rather than a successful production plant. 
There were postings of administrative personnel to this Object in 1947 and 
1948 but nothing more was known of this . ... Informant here adds the 
comment that Russian planning was extremely good and far-sighted, and that 
they had well-thought-out long-range schemes for utilising all uranium which 
they could recover, and that deposits such as the Estonian shales were being 
carefully studied as a future investment, for when existing producers were 
completely worked out. 776 
Riehl reported that the Soviets were also searching high and low for thorium.?77 In 
1946, from the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metals (where Antropov had previously 
been deputy People's Commissar) the Second Chief Directorate of the Council of 
Ministers had been formed to administer the search for, and use of, this rare ore. In 
Riehl's hearing, Antropov had told a commission of geologists: 
776Paragraph 49, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 4111 04. 
777Thorium was sought because it could act as a substitute for uranium. When thorium-232 absorbs further 
neutrons it becomes thorium-233, which then decays to uranium-233, a fissionable isotope (D. Holloway, Slalill 
alld Ihe BOII/b , p. 174). 
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We have no good source of thorium but there is some monozit [monazite] to 
be had from the Yenesei [Yenisei] in the form of a small deposit,?78 
Wirths provided further evidence of Soviet interest in extracting pure thorium salts 
fro'm monazite, saying that at Elektrostal' Thieme had been given the task of 
devising such a process. He had performed this task, but Soviet processes had been 
preferred to his own. Riehl and Wirths were indeed right that no stone of monazite 
was being left un turned in the search for thorium, though they were not aware of its 
full scale. Monazite was mined not only in Siberia (through which the Yenisei 
flows), but also in the Altai mountains, the Urals, the Kola peninsula and the 
Caucasus,?79 Nevertheless, in Riehl's experience, production of thorium was tiny . 
There was a so-called 'thorium plant' at Elektrostal', but it was a section of the plant 
which only occupied two table-tops and was only meant to yield very small 
quantities of thorium (in 1947,2.5 grams per day),?80 
Riehl and Wirths gave British Intelligence a good view of the people and institutions 
which had driven the Soviet atomic project forward, and of many of the lines along 
which their work had proceeded. The two men laid much of the Soviet atomic 
complex, as it stood in the mid-1950s, bare. It is true that their knowledge of it was 
based, for the most part, on their work and connections in the years 1945-50, and that 
further installations of great significance had been built by the time of their 
interrogation by the British and Americans in the mid-1950s. At these places worked 
important scientists whom Riehl and Wirths did not mention. They defected to the 
West on the eve of the first Soviet thermonuclear test, but the people and places they 
778paragraph 46, STIB Interview Report No. 234 dated 16 August 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl , DEFE 4111 04. 
7790 . Holloway, Stalill alld the Bomb, p. 176. 
780paragraph 49, STIB Interview Report No. 261 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl , DEFE 4111 06. 
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mentioned were still of importance, At the time of their interrogation, uranium was, 
as they said, being mined in the Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The nuclear fuel factories at 
Elektrostal', Glazov and Novosibirsk were still in operation. The principal plutonium 
production reactors in the mid-1950s were the four at Cheliabinsk-40. The Riehl 
Group seems to have provided no intelligence on the plutonium production reactors 
and other plants at Tomsk-7 (the first reactor came into service in November 1955), 
Krasnoyarsk-26 (the first reactor came into service in 1958), or the uranium 
enrichment plants known as Krasnoyarsk-45 and Angarsk. Nevertheless, the British 
certainly acquired information about some of these from other sources, and it may be 
that the remainder came to their knowledge as well. Other returners supplied 
information about the gaseous diffusion plant at Kefirstadt. 
Almost all the plants mentioned by the members of the Riehl Group in interrogation 
remained significant parts of the Soviet Union's atomic complex throughout the Cold 
War. In the 1980s, much of the uranium mined in Eastern Europe and the USSR was 
transported to the plants at Glazov and Novosibirsk, where the ore was purified and 
converted into metal. The metal ingots, sealed in aluminium, were sent to the 
plutonium production reactors at Cheliabinsk-40 (by then codenamed Cheliabinsk-
65), Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 to act as uranium fuel. The irradiated fuel was 
reprocessed at the recovery plants at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26. The plutonium 
extracted was sent to other plants for installation in nuclear weapons. Recovered 
uranium was converted to uranium hexafluoride at Tomsk -7 and Angarsk, and then 
enriched to the necessary levels of enrichment at the centrifugation plants at 
Sverdlovsk-44, Tomsk-7, Krasnoyarsk-26 and AngarskJ81 
781T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the RlIssiall BOII/b , pp. 171-3. 
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The'1037(P)' returners' knowledge of scientific processes in use in Soviet plants 
some years before was also of value, since it gave some idea of the efficiency of 
Soviet plants, the quality of Soviet atomic science and the rate of its progress. STrn 
considered Karl-Franz Zuhlke's information useful, because it provided figures to 
work with in assessing the efficiency of diffusion processes using Soviet-made 
diffusion barriers and German barriers produced in trial batches at Sukhumi.782 
Zuhlke had tested both Soviet flat barriers and the German wire-mesh-backed and 
extruded barriers. Since Wirths had visited a number of plants to advise on problems 
there, he was able to estimate their combined uranium metal production capacity in 
the late 1940s. Of course, this information was out-of-date and might have been 
incomplete. Wirths could not be sure that he had seen all the manufacturing 
plants. 783 
No German source seems to have been aware of Arzamas-16 or the hydrogen bomb 
project it was carrying forward.784 They seem not to have been allowed near it. But 
they did name other institutes engaged in nuclear research and described their work. 
The principal research centres they named were NIl. 9 (,Nauchno-issledovatelskii 
institut No.9'; Scientific Research Institute No.9) and Laboratory No.2 of the 
Academy of Sciences, where the first Soviet reactor ('F-l ') was built and operated. 
782part I(iv) , STIB Interview Report No. 253 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Karl-Franz ZUhlke, DEFE 4111 06. 
783paragraph 10, STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on Dr. GUnther Wirths, DEFE 
411104. 
7840ne source, however, did express an opinion on the subject. Wunibald Kunz, who had worked on beta and 
gamma spectroscopy at NIl . 9 during his time in the USSR, commented accurately on the Soviet attitude to their 
thermonuclear ambitions: 'He made mention of the Russian Hydrogen Bomb when being asked about this 
question of German participation and stated that in his opinion no German was very near this project which in 
itself he thought was kept entirely separate from the rest of the programme, even so far as the Russians engaged 
in it were concerned. He could throw no light on the programme but believed that it may have been conceived on 
original lines rather than repeating foreign work as had been done in the rest of the programme' (STIB Interview 
Report No. 257 dated 9 November 1955 on Dr. Wunibald Kunz, DEFE 4111 06). 
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The main research laboratories when the Riehl Group began work were NIL 9 and 
Laboratory No.2. Riehl knew that Kurchatov was the director of the latter laboratory 
and also knew Kurchatov's importance. He accurately distinguished its work from 
that of NIl. 9 by saying that while Laboratory No.2 was concerned with physics and 
related technology, NIl. 9 was concerned with the metallurgy of plutonium and 
uranium and related matters of chemistry and radio-chemistry. NIL 9 had indeed 
been set up during the War with the principal task of researching into the metallurgy 
of plutonium and uranium.785 When Riehl and Wirths first visited it in the winter of 
1945, it was under the control of the First Chief Directorate and they felt the close 
presence of the MVD. Wirths showed his interrogators where it was on a map of 
Moscow: on the outskirts of the city, north-west from the city centre. Riehl provided 
a broad survey of the institute' s work and told the British that it played a central role 
in nuclear research. He described it as 'really the main centre of Soviet atomic 
research' and 'three or four times the area of a nearby railway terminus' in size.786 
Riehl and Wirths, the latter even more than the former, provided a good deal of 
information on Soviet scientists. They named the leaders of Soviet nuclear science, 
such as Khariton, Kikoin, Flerov, Cherniaev, Bochvar, Vinogradov, Blokhintsev and 
Leipunski, indicating that Kurchatov was generally considered to be the scientific 
head of the whole undertaking. Riehl had even attended two meetings of the FCD's 
Scientific-Technical Council, which Kurchatov chaired. He stated the particular 
responsibilities within the project of some of them. For example, he mentioned that 
Kikoin ' s tasks included isotope separation by diffusion. He had met many of these 
people, seen them at the Scientific-Technical Council and had gone to lectures at the 
7850 . Holloway, Stalill alld fhe Bomb, p. 114. 
786Paragraph 52, STIB Interview Report No. 26 1 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl , DEFE 4111 06. 
257 
FeD's offices in Moscow at which ,he had heard these men, leading scientists in the 
Soviet nuclear project, set out their plans for its development. This was not 
information of merely 'historical value'. Generally speaking, those Riehl and Wirths 
named remained in 1955 important figures in Soviet nuclear science. Some had 
grown in importance. For instance, I. H. Golovanov, the director of Elektrostal' from 
about 1951, and Spitsin were, Riehl said, now the' Soviet Riehls' ,787 
Gaseous Diffusion 
The work on which the Hertz Institute at Agudzeri was chiefly engaged was the 
development and testing of two types of diffusion barrier: the Thiessen, fine-wire-
mesh-backed barrier and the Reichmann ceramic extruded barrier. Both were tubular. 
The Thiessen barrier was completed in late 1948; the Reichmann barrier (completed 
after his death by a Soviet chemist called Yermin) at the end of 1950. The Germans 
were fully aware that Soviet scientists were also developing diffusion barriers, 
because available to them at Agudzeri were flat (or plate-type) barriers. Karl-Franz 
ZUhlke, for one, believed that the manufacture of this type of barrier was a task 
allocated purely to Soviet scientists. In 1950, he had been given 200-or-so such 
barriers to test, of a type which he believed had been developed by Isaak Kikoin. 
Kikoin was indeed the Soviet scientist chiefly responsible for the development of a 
gaseous diffusion apparatus and in 1946 he was appointed scientific director of the 
first great Soviet uranium enrichment plant, Sverdlovsk-44,788 Soviet work on 
isotope separation focused on gaseous diffusion from the publication in early 1946 of 
787paragraph 52, STIB Interview Report No. 261 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 411l06. 
7880 . Holloway, Stalill alld the Bomb, p. 190. 
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the Smyth Report, which revealed that it was the Americans' preferred method,?89 
ZUhlke provided some technical information on these plate-type barriers. 
The barrier designed by Reinhold Reichmann at Agudzeri was tested and the first 
batch tested was found acceptable either in late 1948 or in early 1949. This barrier 
was put into mass production at Elektrostal', as was the Thiessen barrier.790 The 
latter was considered by the Soviets to be mechanically superior (at least according 
to Thiessen), but from the point of view of isotope separation the two barriers 
performed equally well. However, at the end of 1950 or beginning of 1951 all 
projects connected with barrier calculations at Agudzeri were cancelled by the 
Soviets,?91 This must have been connected with the fact that by the end of 1950 the 
problems with loss of uranium inside the compressors at Sverdlovsk-44 had been 
entirely resolved and the plant was at last producing in quantity uranium enriched to 
the point at which more than 90% of it was U-235.792 In 1951 a further enrichment 
plant on the site commenced operation, increasing the output of enriched uranium 
sixfold,?93 The Soviets no longer needed the Germans ' diffusion barriers. 
ZUhlke maintained that both tubular barriers designed by the Germans were more 
efficient than the plate-type barriers he had tested. Nevertheless , he was under no 
illusions that the Germans had made much of a contribution to Soviet development 
of gaseous diffusion technology. He thought that the German teams together had 
789-r. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian BOlllb , p. 183. 
790Confirming that the Thiessen barrier had been put into mass production: STIB Interview Report No. 245 
dated 19 October 1955 on Dr. Gunther Fuchs, DEFE 4111 06. 
791 Paragraph 14, STIB Interview Report No. 253 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Karl-Franz Zuhlke, DEFE 
411106. 
7920 . Holloway, Stalin and the BOlllb, p. 192. 
79~. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian BOlllb , p. 184. 
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contributed 'less than 20%' to the gaseous diffusion project. His interrogator noted 
that: 
He pointed out as an example of Russian self-sufficiency that the first barrier 
was definitely Russian, that it was used in the first gaseous diffusion plant 
whose design was Russian, that the Russians had already worked along the 
lines of barrier testing and theory, worked with and defined delta in tests with 
air, etc., before the Germans arrived,?94 
Zuhlke recalled a figure for the 'flow conductivity of the diaphragms' in the 
cascade.795 He also recalled the approximate dimensions of the barriers and had a 
rough idea of how they were arranged in stacks,?96 Zuhlke therefore concluded with 
regard to the barrier installed in the D-l plant that it was, 'supposed to be similar to 
the one described for the Lab 2 pilot plant and consisted of flat plates rather than 
tubes. Source stated that the properties of this barrier were inferior at that time to 
those of the subsequent Thiessen tubes' .797 Nevertheless, the information he and 
others could provide on the efficiency of the Sverdlovsk-44 cascade (which was 
hearsay anyway), the Soviet barriers they had seen at Sukhumi and the barriers 
designed by Reichmann and Thiessen could only be of limited value since it was 
long out-of-date. The Soviets had had years in which to improve the performance of 
the diffusion barriers in use and would have been able to draw on the (supposedly 
794p. 6, Annexure B to STIB Interview Report No. 253 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Karl-Franz ZUhlke, 
DEFE 411106. ZUhlke's reason for believing that the diffusion barriers which made up Sverdlovsk-44's cascade 
were of Soviet and not of German design was false. He believed that the atomic bomb tested at Semipalatinsk on 
29 August 1949 had been a uranium-235 bomb and argued, very reasonably, that the Thiessen barrier, having 
only been completed at the end of 1948, could not have been put into service fast enough to produce the highly-
enriched uranium used in this bomb. But the bomb was, in fact, a plutonium bomb. Despite his error, ZUhlke was 
unquestionably right that the barriers which made up the fifty-six cascades at Sverdlovsk-44 were of Soviet 
design, and he was right to focus on the timetable of atomic development in the USSR as establishing this. The 
D-l plant codenamed Sverdlovsk-44 commenced operation early in 1949, far too soon after Thiessen finished his 
barrier for it to have been mass-produced and installed in the D-I plant 's cascadeS (T. Cochran, R. Norris & 
O. Bukharin, Makillg the Rllssiall Bomb , p. 183). 
7950LB/B/56/63 dated I June 1956, DEFE 411159. Specifically, ZUhlke stated that 'gamma' was 2/1,000. 
7960LB/B/56/63 dated 1 June 1956, DEFE4I1l59. 
797 p. l, Annexure B to STIB Interview Report No. 253 dated 12 December 1955 on Dr. Karl-Franz ZUhlke, 
DEFE 411106. 
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superior) German designs in doing so, but in ways the British could not ascertain. 
Since the Soviets had clearly preferred their own design in building the cascade of 
Sverdlovsk-44, the intelligence that tubular barriers had gone into production 798 and 
the performance characteristics of the Thiessen and Reichmann tubes therefore 
represented mere background information. 
Gas Centrifugation 
Plenty of intelligence of Soviet interest in the ultracentrifuge designed by Max 
Steenbeck reached the British. A number of 'Dragon Return' defectors who had 
worked at Sukhumistated that it had been put into production on an industrial 
scale,799 But in 1953 work on Steenbeck's ultracentrifuge design was cancelled and 
the development of indigenous designs preferred.8oo British Intelligence were 
informed that the project had been abandoned by Steenbeck's personal assistant, 
Rudolf Scheffel, who had had the news from Steenbeck himself. 801 The technical 
information on the Steenbeck ultracentrifuge acquired from returners from Sukhumi 
who defected to the West represented, not hard intelligence on an apparatus adopted 
by the Soviets for uranium enrichment, but background information. It may have had 
one use: it may have established the minimum performance characteristics of the 
centrifuge actually put into operation by the Soviets. For the Soviets may only have 
adopted an indigenous design if it were at least as efficient in enriching U-235 as 
Steenbeck's ultracentrifuge. Consequently, in estimating the efficiency of the Soviet 
7980LB/B/56/63 dated I June 1956, DEFE 411159 . 
799STIB Interview Report No. 252 dated 29 October 1955 on Manfred Multhaup, DEFE 411106; STIB Interview 
Report No. 300 dated 27 February 1956 on Dr. Heinz Frohlich, DEFE 411107. 
800r. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb, p. 185. 
80l0LB/B/57/268 dated 23 January 1957, DEFE 411141. 
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Union's enrichment plants, the British may have been justified in assuming that they 
were at least as efficient as Steenbeck's ultracentrifuge. Whether that is the 
assumption they made is not known. By contrast, according to Scheffel, Steenbeck 
mai~tained that his ultracentrifuge had been more efficient than any rival apparatus 
but that Soviet industry was not capable of mass-producing such sophisticated 
devices. 
Electro-l11.agnetic separation 
Von Ardenne's 'Applied Physics Group' was in mid-1946 charged with effecting 
isotope separation by electro-magnetism according to the Dempster method. The 
group was eventually successful in building and operating a practical electro-
magnetic separator. It was a crudely-assembled 300-ton magnet, constructed at the 
Elektrosila plant in Leningrad, thanks chiefly to the efforts of Heinz Frohlich and 
Hubert Uerlings. Uerlings worked at the plant from 1947 to 1950 and was in 1948 
appointed Head of Laboratories there. He gave full technical details of the separator 
he had made to British Intelligence.802 However, he was fully aware that in another 
part of the same plant a Soviet team was working on its own electro-magnetic 
separator. In 1949, he even caught a glimpse of a design put forward by Arzimovich 
for a 1,000-ton separation magnet. This will have signalled to the British that the 
German design might well not have been put into service. Their task complete, in 
August 1950 all the Germans concerned with the development of the electro-
magnetic separation apparatus - Uerlings, Frohlich, von Ardenne and a few others -
were removed from Elektrosila.803 
802ST1 B Interview Report No. 210 dated 18 April 1955 on Hubert Uerlings, DEFE 21143. 
803STIB Interview Report No. 300 dated 27 February 1956 on Dr. Heinz Frohlich , DEFE 411107 . 
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Uerlings was able to tell the British that the Soviets now had an electro-magnetic 
separator. He was not able to say whether they were making much use of it. Shortly 
afterwards, his colleague Frohlich brought the news that the Soviets were not much 
inter~sted in the electro-magnetic separation method, whether that devised by the 
Germans or any other. Frohlich learned from conversations at Elektrosila that the 
electro-magnetic separation method was not being used on a large scale in the 
USSR.S04 This was entirely correct: at the turn of the 1940s the First Chief 
Directorate decided not to build a large-scale electro-magnetic plant, and the work of 
the small plant already built at Sverdlovsk-45 was no longer regarded as having top 
priority.S05 In fact, the Germans' separator was not of much interest to the Soviets. 
Their own separation apparatus, a 'calutron' installed at Sverdlovsk-45, came into 
service early in 1949, before the German team completed its separator. Manfred von 
Ardenne received only a small prize (and complained about it). S06 His co-workers 
received nothing. Information about their device taken from such defectors from von 
Ardenne's group as Frohlich and Uerlings can therefore have been of little value, 
since it did not penetrate the workings of Sverdlovsk-45. The 'calutron' there was, in 
fact, eventually closed down.S07 
The intelligence on isotope separation assessed 
The Sukhumi returners believed - rightlySOS - that they had merely been engaged on 
research tasks which paralleled research work being undertaken by Soviet groups. As 
S04STIB Interview Report No. 300 dated 27 February 1956 on Dr. Heinz Frohlich, OEFE 411107. 
S050. Holloway, Stalin and the BOII/b, p. 192. 
S06STIB Interview Report No. 232 dated 30 September 1955 on Dr. Gunther Wirths, OEFE 41/104. 
S07T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssim/ BOII/b , p. IS4. The American influence on Soviet 
nuclear science is again evident, for a 'calutron' is a type of cyclotron from the University of California (R. 
Rhodes, The Making of the Atoll/ic BOII/b, p. 4SS). 
SOSSee T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian BOII/b , pp. IS3-5. 
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sources, they stressed Soviet interest in two methods of uranium enrichment, and 
provided substantial technical information on these methods: the Thiessen gaseous 
diffusion method and the Steenbeck gas centrifugation method. All the British had to 
go on was the clear evidence that these were the processes in which the Soviets had 
shown most interest. Their interest in gaseous diffusion will not have been 
surprising: this was the process favoured by the Americans, as the Smyth Report had 
revealed to the world. 809 It would have been logical to deduce from this interest that 
these were the methods on which the Soviets' own research and development 
projects focused. The reason for such a deduction would have been that, since the 
Sukhumi groups were shadow groups, performing research and development tasks in 
which Soviet teams were also engaged, Soviet interest in the Germans' work either 
meant that their own teams were making no progress, in which case it was planned to 
adopt the German apparatus, or that the Soviets wanted to compare the German 
apparatus and their own counterpart. In either case, the Soviets ' interest in the 
Germans' work meant that they were considering using this method of uranium 
enrichment on an industrial scale. There is no indication of what deduction the 
British made from the intelligence taken from the Sukhumi Germans. But these 
sources were entirely right in pointing them towards gaseous diffusion and gas 
centrifugation as the means by which the Soviets were enriching uranium. The 
information acquired from 'Dragon Returners ' that a gaseous diffusion plant existed 
at Kefirstadt established that Soviet interest in that enrichment method was genuine 
and indicated that it was the favoured method of producing U-235. Of course, the 
Germans did not provide intelligence of the actual apparatuses in service in the 
USSR, because in both cases Soviet designs were preferred. Although a plant was 
built on the Sverdlovsk-45 site for the enrichment of uranium, on an industrial scale, 
8<»r. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the RlIssian BOII/b, p. 210 footnote 38. 
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by electro-magnetism, gaseous diffu.sion was the principal Soviet method for the 
manufacture of highly-enriched uranium until the 1970s, when it was superseded by 
gas centrifugation.810 
Of course, as was related in Chapters 2 and 3, the British had already guessed that 
the Soviets were enriching uranium by gaseous diffusion because of information, 
provided by contacts, such refugees as Nikolaus Treu and probably by agents as well, 
that nickel wire mesh was being produced for the Soviet Military Administration in 
the Eastern Zone. The British also gathered in Germany intelligence of Soviet 
attempts to buy at least some of the fine mesh they needed in the West. Late in 1950 
the British were aware of clandestine deliveries of fine mesh from Western countries 
to the Western Sectors of Berlin. Intelligence had also been acquired of deliveries of 
phosphor bronze wire suitable for mesh to Czechoslovakia and Poland.811 Moreover, 
insofar as the Sukhumi Germans made their interrogators aware of Soviet interest in 
gaseous diffusion, the information they provided, while of value, postdated the 
decision of the First Chief Directorate's Scientific-Technical Council to concentrate 
on developing this method of uranium enrichment. This decision was made in early 
1946, in the wake of publication of the Smyth Report. 812 However, the intelligence 
of Soviet interest in gas centrifugation predated the Soviet move, from the late 1950s 
onwards, to phase out all gaseous diffusion plants, owing to their high electricity 
consumption. The first pilot-production centrifuges were constructed in 1952, but it 
was only in 1957 that a pilot production facility containing enough gas centrifuges to 
81Oy. Cochran, R. Norris & O . Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb , p. 185. 
811 Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 24 November 1950, DEFE 4111 O. A key question which was raised 
by these deliveries was: should they be stopped or should they be allowed to continue and monitored, thus 
yielding leads as to their destination? This was a matter for Technical Section. See also minutes of STIB 
Technical Meeting on I September 1950 (DEFE 411 I 0) for a reference to STIB ' s monitoring of fine wire mesh 
production in the Soviet Zone. The destination in the USSR of the deliveries of mesh was unknown. 
812T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb, p. 183. 
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enrich uranium on an industrial scale came into service at Sverdlovsk-44 and a full-
scale plant did not become operational there until 1964. Uranium enrichment is now 
carried out at all four Russian enrichment plants (Angarsk, Sverdlovsk-44, Tomsk-7 
and Krasnoyarsk -45) entirely by means of gas centrifugation. 813 
Heavy water 
The group of scientists deported from the 1. G. Fat'ben Leunawerk near Merseburg in 
East Germany told an interesting and not untypical tale. The group was formed as 
part of the Leuna research programme in 1946. The Soviets charged its members, 
thirteen Leunawerk scientists, with carrying out research into heavy water, hydrogen 
peroxide and hypergol fuels. But the Four-Power 1. G. Farben Administration 
decreed that such work would infringe the Occupation Statute. So the Soviets formed 
a special group working independently of the main Leuna research programme and 
called the SMA Research Group because it was working directly for the Soviet 
Military Administration. Its members, led by Dr. Paul Herold, were instructed to 
conduct research in these fields. 814 
On 26 October 1946 the group was taken from the Leunawerk to Moscow, where 
they worked at the Institute of Physical Chemistry, which had been working since 
about 1944 on the physical chemistry of electrolytic cells in aid of the Soviet heavy 
water project. However, the Germans had been deported for nothing, since the Soviet 
heavy water project was already so well-advanced that their assistance was not 
needed. In mid-1948 they were transferred to other work, of little significance, 
813T. Cochran, R. Norris & O. Bukharin, Makillg the Russiall BOII/b , pp. 186-7. Moreover, all Russia ' s 
centrifuges are based on subcritical designs . The rival ultracentrifuge design was discarded entirely (p. 185). 
814STIB Interrogation Report No. 292 dated 16 July 1951 on Dr. Alois Gemassmer, DEFE 21/41. 
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conducted at other plants.815 The r.eason for this, though they did not know it, was 
that the Soviets had no further need of their design for a heavy water plant, since the 
Nitrogen Combine at Chirchik had begun to produce heavy water in large quantities. 
It ~as in 1947 that the first large delivery of heavy water produced at Chirchik had 
been made to the prototype heavy water reactor at Laboratory No.3 of the Academy 
of Sciences. 816 
The Germans never acquired much of a role in the Soviet heavy water project. Such 
role as they had they lost quickly. In consequence, they were not able to provide 
intelligence on the processes used by Soviet scientists to manufacture heavy water 
for use as a moderator in an atomic pile. However, they conform to the general 
pattern of informants on scientific questions in that they were still sufficiently 
involved in Soviet defence projects to pass on scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence. 
Dr. Alois Gemassmer, whose speciality was catalyst plant development, mentioned 
that he had been commissioned to prepare plans for the construction of a catalyst 
reduction plant on the site of a combine at Chirchik.817 Since catalysis is a process 
involved in the manufacture of heavy water, it followed that the combine might be 
devoted to such a purpose (as, indeed, it was). That this was the case was further 
suggested by information supplied by one of Gemassmer's former colleagues, who 
also defected to the West. Dr. Walter Schmidt had supervised the dismantling of a 
heavy water plant at Leuna, prior to its shipment to the USSR. The destination 
'Chirchik near Tashkent' was printed on all the packing cases.818 This is merely one 
815STIB Interrogation Report No. 292 dated 16 July 1951 on Dr. Alois Gemassmer, OEFE 21141. 
8160. HoJloway, Stalin and the BOII/b, p. 189. 
817STIB Interrogation Report No. 292 dated 16 July 1951 on Dr. Alois Gemassmer, OEFE 21/41. 
818STIB Interrogation Report No. 304 dated 24 October 1951 on Dr. Walter Schmidt, OEFE 21/41. Schmidt also 
thought that the plant at Leuna which had manufactured heavy water according to the Harteck-SUss method had 
been erected behind a high fence on the premises of the Institute of Physical Chemistry in Moscow. 
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example of a number of highly-secret Soviet war-related scientific establishments 
which were betrayed to the British by the labels on cases of equipment being 
transported there from dismantled German plants with a similar purpose. The rocket 
research institute NIl. 88, near Podlipki, and the nerve gas production plant at 
Beketovka, near Stalingrad, are other examples. 
Guided missiles 
Unfortunately for British Intelligence, there was no counterpart in the guided missile 
field to the Riehl Group. The Germans were, for the most part, held at a distance 
from Soviet missile development. It is true that the GrottlUp Group briefly worked at 
the heart of Soviet rocket science, at NIl. 88. But the Soviets soon felt this to be a 
mistake and in 1948 exiled the group to the island of Gorodomlia in Lake Seliger 
(between Moscow and Leningrad), where they took over a former NKVD camp and 
established a rocket research institute, Branch No.2 of NIl. 88. It may well be that 
they were moved to Gorodomlia because Soviet rocket engineers wanted to carry out 
more secret work at NIl. 88. 819 This group - often called the 'Ostashkov' group 
because the nearest town bore that name - acted as consultants, retained to advise on 
particular problems which arose in Soviet rocket programmes. Their links with 
leading figures in Soviet rocket science, both in the years 1945-6 in Germany and, 
after their deportation, in the USSR, were close enough for the more important of 
them to be able to name such men as Korolev (chief designer at NIL 88) and Glushko 
(the GDL-OKB' s chief designer). However, that they had little insight into Soviet 
development is illustrated by the fact that even GrottlUp, their leader until 1950, did 
not know precisely whom they were working for. In interrogation at the end of 1953, 
819This is suggested in STIB Interview Report No. 85 dated 6 October 1952, DEFE 41/98 . 
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he maintained that Soviet missile research and development was directed by a 
committee, chaired by General Gaidukov, which was subordinate to the Supreme 
Soviet. The Scientific-Technical Committee which administered the missile 
programme was in fact subordinate to the Council of Ministers and was chaired by 
Ustinov.820 
Both the British and the Americans started their intelligence assault on the Soviet 
guided missiles programme by making a big mistake: they underestimated the rocket 
scientists of the USSR. Very impressed, as they were, with German achievements in 
rocketry, both assumed that the Soviets would aim to improve the models designed 
and developed by the Germans. They were encouraged in this belief by the important 
defector, Grigorii Tokaev. As was related in Chapter 2, because Tokaev's post-war 
work had been entirely in Germany, he had little idea of plans being made in the 
USSR. Relying heavily on the intelligence he provided, a joint British-American 
team concluded in March 1949 that the Soviets' immediate aim was to put into 
service a selection of reasonably effective guided missiles as soon as possible. These 
missiles would have accuracy and range greater than those of the Germans' wartime 
missiles, but speed of development was the overriding aim, and to make quick 
progress the Soviets would accept relatively unsatisfactory missiles rather than wait 
years for better ones. 821 Although the report conceded that the USSR had a long-term 
research and development programme, it stated the key assumption that: 
It is assumed that the effort allotted to short-term research is concentrated on 
the German missiles, and hence that during the next five years no purely 
8200. Holloway. The Soviet Ullioll alld the Arms Race. pp. 21-2. 
821 Paragraphs 3-4. Summary. and paragraph 13. Appendix Q. A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: 
Joint Anglo-American Conference. OEFE 41/160. 
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Soviet-designed missile will appear. This assumption is held to be fully 
justified by the evidence presented. 822 
This assumption was wrong. Although it was rightly predicted that, in the immediate 
future, Soviet missiles would not depart fundamentally from German designs, Soviet 
ability to do without German help was gravely underestimated. When this report was 
written, the introduction of the first Korolev-designed missile into service was only 
one year away. Korolev's R-l and R-2 entered service with the Soviet armed forces 
in 1950 and 1951 respectively.823 Although they were only much-improved versions 
of the V -2, the R-2 had a range of 600 kilometres, twice that of the V -2 or R-l. 
British Intelligence should have anticipated the development of this missile, because 
a few prototypes of a lengthened V-2 with a range of 600 kilometres were made at 
the Nordhausen-Bleicherode missile development complex in the Harz mountains in 
1946, and news of these prototypes had reached the British. The British and the 
Americans underestimated the Soviet designers: their team considering Soviet guided 
missile work believed that, although it would be possible for the Soviets to develop 
the design to completion, they would need 'a considerable period' to do so.824 
And Korolev's plans were greater still. In March and April 1953 (within the five-
year period the British and Americans thought would yield only Soviet rockets 
derived from German models) his R-5 was flight-tested. It was radically different 
from the V-2, having a separable nose cone, integral fuel tanks and a range of 1,200 
kilometres. 825 Starting from the wrong assumption, and armed in fact with too little 
822paragraph 15, Summary, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, OEFE 41/160. -
8230. Holloway, Sralill and rhe BOlllb, p. 248. 
824paragraph 80, Appendix 0, A Study of the Soviet Guided Missile Programme: Joint Anglo-American 
Conference, OEFE 41/160. 
8250. Holloway, Sralill alld rhe BOlllb , p. 249. 
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evidence to justify the conclusion state.d above, the British and Americans greatly 
underestimated the scale of Soviet ambition and skill in the field of guided missiles 
and so underestimated the speed of Soviet development. 826 Even by 1954, they had 
not corrected this mistake. 827 Their misconceptions applied not only to Soviet 
intentions, but also to the USSR's capability. They doubted whether Soviet industry 
was capable of manufacturing the fine machinery and equipment required on the 
necessary scale. 828 
It is against this background that the first intelligence of rocket development in the 
USSR should be set. This was the information provided in the autumn of 1950 by the 
defector and V-2 propulsion unit engineer, Werner Baum, who had been a member 
of the German rocket engine development team in the design bureau of Zavod 456 at 
Khimki. Baum made it clear to his interrogators that this was an important 
development centre, designed for the 'large-scale development of liquid fuel rocket 
motors for missiles of the V -2 type'. 829 But he had had too little to do with the Soviet 
826rhe Americans' approach to Soviet guided missile development started from an assumption which, again, 
reflected a profound underestimation of the skill of Soviet rocket engineers. Essentially , they assumed that all 
good fundamental ideas in the field of rocket development were German. This was unwise, since Soviet designers 
departed significantly from those ideas. A British paper criticizing the Americans' approach summarized it as 
follows: 'The American approach has ... been to superimpose factual intelligence upon the framework formed by 
their assessment of what constitutes the optimum development of German projects' . Since there was no 
consideration by the Americans of Soviet intentions, such an approach also tended ' to turn what is an estimate of 
technical ability into an estimate of Russian intention' (DSUJTIC(52) 16 dated 28 July 1952, DEFE 41/153). The 
Americans assumed that it was the Soviets ' intention to achieve all that was technically possible within the 
framework of the PeenemUnde designs. This assumption was a good one insofar as they assumed that the Soviet 
designers meant to achieve all that was technically possible. But since they took the original German designs as 
their framework for development, they tended to set them in stone. 
827The conclusion, in paragraph 371, to DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided 
Weapon Development' (DEFE 44/2) fails to mention that the development of long-range missiles was the main 
aim of the Soviet rocket project. The Soviets were sti ll regarded as seeking to exploit German rocket technology 
to the maximum possible extent, while simultaneously developing their own designs. 
828The Director of Scientific Intelligence informed the Director of STIB that the Soviet guided missile 
programme would need 'a large team of high-grade scientists, a larger team of first-class engineers, and then a 
large pool of highly competent manufacturing capacity capable of mass production to very close tolerances. This 
latter has not yet been shown to be available in Russia in any comparable field of activity' (letter dated 6 March 
1951, DEFE 411124). 
829STIB/PF.80370/DR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951, DEFE 21/31. 
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engineers in the design bureau to provide information on their quality or the full 
scope of their work. The intelligence he gave the British seemed to penetrate missile 
development in the USSR, but in fact it barely broke the skin of the Soviet rocket 
project. 
Baum updated the information provided by PoWs about the complex. The factory in 
which he had worked, Zavod 456, was merely intended for experimental 
manufacture, turning the ideas of the design bureau into hardware. It had produced 
ten complete V -2 power plants of the standard German type per month since the 
withdrawal of all the PoWs in February 1948. These engines had twenty-five tons of 
thrust. In mid-1949, Zavod 456 began the manufacture, also at the rate of ten a 
month, of a power plant with thirty-five tons of thrust. In consequence, the total 
production of both the factory and the design bureau between 1948 and 1950 
amounted to fewer than one hundred complete propulsion units . No greater 
production was planned. This production programme served, presumably, only to 
train Soviet technicians in the method of manufacture, while also yielding enough 
units for test-firings. The power plants made were sent over to Zavod 88 at Podlipki 
for installation in V-2 frames. All the necessary parts for these V-2s were made at 
Zavod 88, except the control instruments which came from Leningrad. Since Zavod 
456 was, according to Baum, the only factory manufacturing V -2 propulsion units, it 
followed that production of actual V -2 missiles at Zavod 88 could not be greater than 
ten per month. In short, Baum painted a picture of a small-scale project which had 
the aim of improving the German missiles. Since the British had concluded the year 
before that the factories at Podlipki and Khimki were engaged in small-scale 
developmental production, and not mass production, they will have been only too 
willing to believe Baum. Nevertheless, this was production, and not mere 
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experimentation. Although there WqS no evidence that the Soviet version of the V-2 
was being manufactured in considerable numbers, it was clear from what Baum said 
that the project had reached the production stage. 830 In fact, the R-1 actually went 
into service in 1950. So Baum enabled the British more or less to keep up with the 
first step in Soviet missile development. For this reason, he was an important 
informant. But he failed to provide any intelligence of any Soviet research and 
development which did not make use of either German personnel or German missile 
designs and so he gave no indication of the immense effort going into missile 
development in the USSR. The information he provided was similar to that taken a 
couple of years earlier from Tokaev: though good as far as it went, it did not go 
nearly far enough. 
Baum provided other important information. The work of Zavod 456 revealed one 
trend in Soviet missile development, since by 1950 the manufacture of propulsion 
units of thirty-five tons of thrust had given way to production of a new unit of one 
hundred tons of thrust 831 and Baum learned from conversations with Soviet 
engineers that it was to power a large V-2-type missile (a large single-stage rocket 
with no wing surfaces). 832 Therefore, the engine was meant for the Soviet version of 
the V -2. Baum, who knew it backwards, gave the British full and reliable technical 
830Minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 7 November 1950; minutes of its meeting on 21 November 1950, DEFE 
41174. But, even as late as September 1954, no intelligence whatsoever had been acquired that Soviet versions of 
the V -2, or indeed any other surface-to-surface missiles, were being manufactured in quantity (paragraphs 35 & 
217, Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II, Report by the Guided Weapons Working Party , DEFE 
44/3). 
831STIB Interrogation Report No. 308 on Rudolf Chwalczyk dated 14 December 1951 , DEFE 21/41. By 
contrast, Baum maintained that by September 1950 it had not actually gone info production. Though no full-scale 
model of it had been built by the time he was sent back to Germany, the Soviet design staff did claim to have 
completed the design and to have built most of the engine (with the exception of the full-scale combustion 
chamber) (STIB/PF.80370/DR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951 , DEFE 21/31). The engine had a sea-level thrust 
of 105 tons. 
832STIB/PF.80370/DR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951 , DEFE 21/31. 
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details of it. 833 Such an engine, or one very like it, does indeed seem to have 
powered the first Soviet-designed missile to enter service with the Soviet armed 
forces, the R -1. This engine, the RD-lOO, designed by Valentin Glushko, was indeed 
an improved version of that which had powered the V _2 .834 Baum made clear to his 
interrogators that the Soviets were very interested in the German design for this 
engine. The German team had completed their design in the spring of 1948 and a 
Soviet team then took over the project. 835 Obviously, such a development will have 
confirmed the view that the Soviets were looking to increase the range of the V -2, as 
will Baum's revelation that the design bureau at Zavod 456 studied the problem of 
making a propulsion unit with 250 tons of thrust. 836 He also provided much 
information on the propulsion units of twenty-five and thirty-five tons of thrust. 837 
So British Intelligence kept up with the very first step of Soviet rocket engine 
development. Baum's information was considered valuable by Scientific Intelligence 
in London.838 His information on the propulsion units he had helped to make at 
Khimki was particularly highly-regarded: Squadron-Leader Cadwallader of the Air 
Ministry wrote to the DSI that, 'Details of the combustion chambers [in the 
propulsion units] and the hot beds are perhaps more important than anything else 
Source has to tell us and this information was not previously available'. 839 Baum 
833STIB Interview Report No. 53 dated 23 April 1952 on Werner Baum, DEFE 41/96 (re-interrogation report; 
Baum was re-interrogated at the request of the USAFE). 
8340. Holloway, Stalill alld the B011lb, p. 248. 
835STIB Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 200 on Dip!. Ing. Werner Baum, DEFE 41/135. 
836STIBIPF.80370IDR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951, DEFE 21/31. . 
837STIB/PF.80370IDRlGWWP dated 9 February 1951 , DEFE 21131. 
838Minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 7 November 1950, DEFE 41174; note DSI.D/50/599 dated 24 November 
1950, DEFE 21 /31. Baum was made a 'Matchbox Consultant' (letter dated 17 October 1950, DEFE 41/132). 
839Letter dated 23 January 1951, DEFE 21131. 
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also identified Glushko as the' Man<,tging Director' of Zavod 456 and Korolev as the 
'Managing Director' of Zavod 88.840 
The V-2s made at Zavod 88 were, Baum said, all sent for test-firing 'to a proofing 
ground situated between Stalingrad and Tashkent'. 841 This is a huge distance - some 
2,000 kilometres - and Baum meant that the missiles were fired from the Stalingrad 
area and landed in Tashkent. The British certainly concluded from the interrogation 
that the V -2-type missiles made at Podlipki were 'test-launched at a range in the 
Stalingrad area' .842 Baum gave the name of a colleague of his at Zavod 456, Ing. 
Alfred Klippel, who had been present at test-firings at the range in 1947 and had seen 
foundations being laid for a very large V -weapon factory in the neighbourhood. 843 
Ing. Fritz Viebach, who had also participated in the test-firings, was later able to 
provide more information on the missile factory at Kapustin Yar. He had seen an 
enormous amount of dismantled equipment from Peenemtinde at the testing site. The 
loot of Peenemtinde was gathered together in a dump between three and five 
kilometres long and 100 metres deep. Included in the haul were machine tools of 
numerous kinds and even the largest building at Peenemtinde, Hall 7, which was big 
enough to accommodate seven V -2s undergoing vertical testing. 844 When, in 1953, 
840STIB/PF.80370/DR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951 , DEFE 21/31. In addition, he told his interrogators that 
Zavod 456 was being converted to undertake aircraft production. 
84ISTIB Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 200 on Dip!. Ing. Werner Saum, DEFE 41/135 . 
842STIB/PF.80370/DR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951, DEFE 21/31. Tokaev, of course, had said that the testing 
site lay in the general area 'between Stalingrad and Astrakhan' (some 380 kilometres apart). 
843STIB Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 200 on Dip!. Ing. Werner Saum, DEFE 41/135. 
STIS/PF.80370/DR/GWWP dated 9 February 1951 (DEFE 21/31) relates what Baum said in interrogation about 
Klippel's account of his journey to the site. In paragraph 24, it is stated that, 'Klippel was not willing to say very 
much about his journey when he returned to Zavod 456, but he did say that he went by train as far as Stalingrad ... 
and then on " to the edge of the desert area". Klippel was left with the train but whilst the trials were in progress 
he was collected by car and taken to the range to give some technical assistance', and then returned to the train. 
Source therefore concluded that the launching site is not far from the railroad ' . 
844STIB Interview Report No. 152 dated 3 March 1954 on Ing. Fritz Viebach, DEFE 21/42. Viebach was told by 
Korolev himself that further test stands were going to be built there, which must have confirmed to the British the 
importance of the testing site at Kapustin Yar. Viebach, being more precise than Klippel, said that the only firing 
direction was North-north-east into the steppe, passing between Lake El'ton and another lake. Quashing any 
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the RAF sent a plane to overfly Kqpustin Yar, its motive must in part have been to 
take photographs of the factory there.845 The DSI reacted to the identification of the 
principal Soviet missile testing site by making efforts to intercept signals emitted 
there. 846 
Another 'Dragon Returner', Ing. Heinz Jaffke, identified another missile testing site 
in the Soviet Union. Late in 1946, he had been taken to Zagorsk, north-east of 
Moscow, to advise on the installation at a site there of V -2-type rocket test stands for 
static-tests. Jaffke concluded that the site would be suitable but did not know whether 
a development range was in fact constructed there.847 The site outside Zagorsk 
indeed became the first Soviet static-test range for large rockets. 848 
remaining doubt that the Soviets were now able to make rocket-fuel-grade hydrogen peroxide, Viebach recalled 
that hydrogen peroxide had been used for the tests; it was said to be Soviet-made and yet was indistinguishable in 
quality from German wartime hydrogen peroxide. The construction of this factory clearly followed Soviet 
practice. The Dyhernfurth tabun and sarin factories had been dismantled and transported to Beketovka for the 
manufacture of nerve gas there; the equipment of the Institut Berlin had been shipped to NIL 88 at Podlipki. 
845See p. 35 , 'Canberras over the USSR', by P. Lashmar, Aeroplalle MOllthly, Vol. 23 , No.2 (February 1995), p. 
32-5. In this article, a Russian intelligence officer, Colonel Alexander Orlov , is quoted as asserting that Kapustin 
Yar had been overflown because the British and Americans wanted to know what kinds of missiles were being 
manufactured there. Presumably , actual testing of missiles at the range was monitored by radar detection and 
interception of signals. Proof that the British took note of the information about a possible missile factory at 
Kapustin Yar is provided by paragraph 238, Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II, Report by the 
Guided Weapons Working Party, DEFE 44/3. 
846rhis is my interpretation of the remark by Professor R. V. Jones at p. 32 of his book, Reflectiolls 011 
Illtelligellce , that one legacy of his time as Director of Scientific Intelligence (from September 1952 to December 
1953) was that 'a fruitful watch on Russian rocketry was established' . Why I thus interpret this remark is made 
clear in Chapter 6. 
847STIB Interview Report No. 233 dated 31 August 1955 on Ing. Heinz laffke, DEFE 21143. Like most of the 
Germans, laffke underrated Korolev. In the list of Soviet personalities in this report appears his comment about 
the designer, 'Age about 55. His capabilities are more in the direction of technical organisation rather than purely 
technical, but his activities are much restricted by heart weakness ' . In his Interview Report No. 262 dated 31 
December 1955 (DEFE 4111 06), laffke mentioned a 'Glushkov' at Khimki and expressed a good opinion of his 
talents. 
848F. I. Ordway III & M. R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team, p. 338. Helmut Grbttrup was also asked while on 
Gorodomlia island to design a large rocket testing site which was planned for Zagorsk. Like laffke, he did not 
know whether it had actually been constructed. But he suspected that it might have been, because Zukhomlinov, 
the director of the institute on Gorodomlia, was in 1952 transferred to Zagorsk (STIB Interview Report No. 138 
dated 23 December 1953 on Dipl. Ing. Helmut Grbttrup, DEFE 411100). Other sources had heard of plans for a 
motor testing site at Zagorsk and the British took note of their information (see paragraph 155, Study of Soviet 
Guided Weapons (1954), Part II, Report by the Guided Weapons Working Party, DEFE 44/3) . Harry Rositzke 
claims that German scientific workers who had worked in institutes or factories concerned with the development 
of anti-ballistic missiles identified installations involved in the Soviet ABM programme, particularly in the 
Leningrad area (The CIA 's Secret Operatiolls: Espiollage. COl/llter-espiollage alld Covert Actioll, p. 60). Jeffrey 
Richelson, claiming to be relying on this very page of Rositzke's book, suggests that the Germans' information 
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The Ostashkov Germans, who returned to Germany between 1951 and 1953849, had 
been held at such a distance from Soviet rocket development that they could only 
suggest possibilities as to how it might be proceeding.850 Only in December 1953 did 
the most valuable of these sources, the former leader of the group, Helmut Grottrup, 
state his belief that there was a parallel Soviet rocket development programme under 
Korolev. Others supported this and said that the Soviet programme was a big one. 851 
Korolev was, Grottrup said, working on a missile called the K-1, and it was in fact as 
a result of such 'Dragon Return' intelligence that the British and Americans 
concluded in September 1954 that there was indeed a native Soviet guided missiles 
programrne.852 GrOttrup described the missile as a lengthened V -2 with fuel tanks of 
a new design and said that he had heard that it had been flight-tested in 1949; on this 
on ABM sites even included news of construction of the testing range at the great ABM complex at Sary Shagan 
in Kazakhstan (Americall Espionage and the Soviet Target, p. 55). Rositzke, however, does not in fact mention 
Sary Shagan by name; he merely says that information was received on 'the construction of a new testing range'. 
849U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-Griider & A. Well mann, Die Speziaiisten, p. 109. 
850Just how narrow a perspective most of the Ostashkov Germans had been given on rocket development in the 
USSR is illustrated by the intelligence acquired by the test engineer Fritz Viebach, which was profoundly 
misleading. Viebach was a man the Soviets valued. During the War, he had taken part in the firing of no fewer 
than 785 V-2s at London and Antwerp and test-fired thirteen rockets at Kapustin Yar in the autumn of 1947. 
Despite his conversations with Soviet rocket engineers, he suggested that the Soviets' interest in the V -2 excluded 
work on new designs. He told his interrogators that he did not think that the Soviets took seriously German 
proposals to develop missiles greatly superior to the V -2, including their design for a missile with a range of 
3,000 kilometres. He also regarded the Ostashkov Germans as having been retained essentially to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the V-2. He thought that Korolev's improved version of the V-2 would be put into service and the 
new rocket features proposed by the Ostashkov Group in its original R-I 0 design would be taken up and 
incorporated into Soviet missiles as they were shown to be reliable (for example, the idea that the missile' s 
exhaust gas be used to drive its turbo-fuel-pumps, which Viebach thought a significant improvement). However, 
Viebach's interrogators were reluctant to accept his view that the Soviets were trying only to achieve as great an 
improvement in the range of the V-2 as was possible, without making any fundamental change to the design. He 
was, however, able to provide them with some accurate intelligence. He believed, on the basis of conversations 
with Soviet rocket engineers, that a modified V -2 with a range of some 600 kilometres had gone into production 
in quantity by the time of his defection. This was, of course, the R-2, which indeed had a range of 600 kilometres 
and had gone into service with the Soviet armed forces in 195 I. Given the use made of Viebach, it was 
understandable that he thought that the Soviets' aim was to improve the V-2. Although Soviet rocket designers 
did make other use of the Ostashkov Group, such use was connected with no specific rocket development 
programme which was made known to it. Viebach's attitude to the Germans' exploitation in the USSR was 
therefore strongly influenced by his participation in the V -2 tests at Kapustin Yar in 1947 (STIS Interview Report 
No. 152 dated 3 March 1954 on Ing. Fritz Viebach, DEFE 21/42). 
85 I R. V. Jones, Reflectiolls all Illtelligellce, p. 25 . 
852paragraphs I & 3, Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II, Report by the Guided Weapons Working 
Party, DEFE 44/3. 
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account, it could have been either the R-l or the R-2. Given its name, it was probably 
the former, although GrOttrup thought that it had a range of 800-850 kilometres. 
During a conference at the Scientific-Technical Council in December 1948, Grottrup 
had seen a chart of the K-l on an office wall. He assumed that the design had been 
discussed at the conference. 
Grottrup set before his interrogators very interesting possibilities as to Soviet long-
range missile development. For instance, he and his team had designed a radically-
modified version of the V-2, which they called the R-IO. The modifications greatly 
interested Korolev. The V-2's body was re-designed and its components significantly 
re-arranged. The power plant incorporated an important innovation: instead of a 
separate high-test peroxide system being used to drive the fuel pumps, the exhaust 
gas was channelled back to the pump turbines to drive them. Other innovations in 
which Korolev had shown interest were a separable warhead; an electrical 
determination of the point at which fuel cut-off took place (the warhead separated 
itself from the missile when fuel cut-off occurred); and the use of gasified oxygen for 
the servo controls. 853 Grottrup believed that some of these ideas might have been 
853STIB Interview Report No. 138 dated 23 December 1953 on Dipl. Ing. Helmut Grottrup, DEFE 4111 00. Full 
technical details of these innovations are given in DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR 
- Guided Weapon Development', DEFE 44/2. Albrecht, Heinemann-GrUder & Wellmann 's assessment of the 
German influence on Soviet rocket development is unsatisfactory because it concentrates too much on rocket 
names. On p. 110 of Die Spezialislell, Arend Wellmann maintains - wrongly - that the Grottrup Group worked 
until April 1949 on the design of a multi-stage missile called the 'R-5 '. GrOttrup' s interrogation report provides 
no support for this claim. The project in question was, in fact , the R-IO project and Grottrup' s design was for a 
single-stage missile with a separable warhead, not a multi-stage rocket. Well mann is conflating Grottrup's R-I 0 
design and his design for a two-stage rocket, which he was told to abandon in the spring of 1949. Because 
Korolev's R-5 missile shared a name with a project he believes the Grottrup Group worked on, Well mann 
assumes that the German team 'worked indirectly on the preliminary studies' for Korolev 's missile and goes on 
to find similarities between it and the Germans' design. Partly by accident, he is right: Grottrup's R-IO design did 
influence Korolev's R-5 design. Likewise, because the GrOttrup Group worked on a project for a single-stage 
ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 kilometres called the R-14, Well mann looks for a connection between its 
design and the characteristics of the R-14 (known to NATO as the SS-5) which was designed by a team under the 
Soviet designer M. K. langel' , test-flown at the end of the 1950s and put into service in 1961. This missile was 
also a single-stage rocket and had a range of 3,500 kilometres. Well mann argues that some of the Germans' ideas 
were incorporated into the Soviet-designed missile and may be right. Nevertheless, he concedes (on p. 108) that 
the differences between the two designs were too great for the R-14 to be considered a creation of the Grottrup 
Group and it may be that the possession of the same name was accidental. 
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incorporated into the project he kn,ew as the K -lor later missiles. He recalled that 
Korolev thought that the separable warhead in particular was a 'very good idea' .854 It 
accorded with Korolev's own thinking and the nose cone of the R-5, tested in the 
spring of 1953, was indeed separable from the rest of the missile. As with the nose 
cone of Grottrup's R-I0, that of the R-5 separated itself from the rest of the missile at 
fuel cut-off. In both cases, the reason for separability was the same: it increased the 
range of the weapon. Changes in the design of the missile to reduce its weight would 
only be possible if the nose cone were separable, for in that case the body of the 
missile would only need to be designed to withstand the lower temperatures endured 
while the engine was powering it. The missile body would not need to be designed to 
withstand the greater temperatures encountered when the engine stopped and the 
weapon reached maximum speed. 855 To this extent, therefore, the intelligence 
Grottrup provided of his R-lO did indeed reveal to his interrogators how the R-5, 
tested nine months earlier, had been designed. He suggested to his interrogators that, 
in all the circumstances, it could be assumed that the Soviets had a missile of the R-
10 type which was beyond the development stage, had been tested and was therefore 
either ready for series production or in production. 856 Despite obvious differences -
for instance, the R-lO design only provided for a range of 910 kilometres, whereas 
854Paragraphs 66 & 113, DSIIlTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled , 'USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development' , DEFE 44/2. In this connection, intelligence provided by the valve engineer Karl Steimel will have 
interested the British. Steimel said that he knew of an institute for V -2 control systems in Moscow at which work 
on the transmission from the ground of a fuel cut-off signal was being conducted (STIB Interview Report No. 64 
dated 91uly 1952, DEFE 41/97) . 
855D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 246-9. 
856STIB Interview Report No. 138 dated 23 December 1953 on Dip!. Ing. Helmut Grottrup, DEFE 411100; 
paragraph 325, DSII1TIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled , 'USSR - Guided Weapon Development' , 
DEFE 44/2. Grottrup also thought that the control and guidance of the R-I 0 design wou ld eventually be adopted 
by Korolev (paragraph 113, DSIIlTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development ' , DEFE 44/2) . Ordway & Sharpe indeed claim that many features of the R-I 0 design, and above all 
its 'beam-riding' guidance system, were adopted for the Soviet-designed missiles made in the early 1950s (The 
Rocket Team, pp. 330-1). 
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the R-5 actually had a range of 1,200 kilometres - this was a fairly accurate 
indication of the state of Soviet missile development at that time. 
A possible design development of considerable significance which Grottrup set 
before the British was the use of multi-stage rockets. From mid-1948 to the spring of 
1949, the Ostashkov Group had worked on the design of a two-stage missile capable 
of carrying 1,000 kilograms a distance of 2,500 kilometres. The shift towards multi-
stage rockets was significant, because giving a missile more than one stage was one 
way of enabling it to carry enough fuel to reach the speed necessary for crossing all 
Europe and then the Atlantic as well. The Germans were clearly working on a 
concept then being considered very carefully by Soviet missile designers. 
Unbeknown to them, and hence to their British interrogators, only a few months 
before the Germans received this commission M. K. Tikhonravov had put together a 
report for the Research Institute of the Academy of Artillery Sciences in which he 
proposed assembling a 'packet' of rockets in a composite rocket. In July 1948, at 
about the time the Ostashkov Group began to consider the concept, Tikhonravov 
gave a lecture at the Research Institute, in which he put forward his idea. The 
'packet' concept proved controversial at the time, but ceased to be so when it was 
successfully used by Korolev as the core of his design for the R-7 .857 Grottrup was 
unable to make the British aware of the full significance of his work on a multi-stage 
design, for the project had seemed to go nowhere. The Soviets had not revealed to 
the group what they thought of the idea and had told it to abandon work on the 
project before it had finished its design.858 
8570 . Holloway, Stalill alld the BOII/b, p. 250. 
858paragraph 20, Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II, Report by the Guided Weapons Working 
Party, OEFE 44/3. This report sets out other possibilities of technical development, of which the Americans 
learned in their interrogations of other returners from Ostashkov and other rocket development centres. They, of 
course, passed all the interrogation reports on to the British. 
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Therefore, all in all, to the British the innovations Grottrup discussed could only 
constitute possible lines of development. And some of the possible lines of 
development Grottrup placed before his interrogators were false. For example, he 
thought that Soviet efforts at developing a long-range missile were tending to focus 
more on Eugen Sanger's plan for a rocket-plane than on a ballistic missile.859 The R-
10 design as a complete weapon could only represent a possible stage of 
development. 
The Grottrup Group's R-14 design, its most ambitious, represented another possible 
influence on Soviet missile design. Grottrup informed the British that his group had 
in the spring of 1949 been commissioned to design a missile capable of carrying a 
load of 3,000 kilograms to 3,000 kilometres. (Unknown to him, Korolev was then 
working on a missile with the same characteristics, the R-3).860 Having revealed this, 
Grottrup at once gave his interrogators the wrong impression by stating that, 
although he had submitted his resulting long-range single-stage ballistic rocket 
design in December 1949, he thought that it would represent too great a technical 
advance to appeal to the Soviets. 861 He had no knowledge of any parallel Soviet 
project. 862 Even before he spoke these words, Korolev had begun to design the R -7, 
the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile. 863 It was this rocket, first tested in 
August 1957, which carried Sputnik I into space the following October. 864 Moreover, 
859He could give no evidence of this, which troubled his interrogators : see paragraph 91 , DSIIJTIC Report No. 
13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon Development', DEFE 44/2. 
8600. Holloway, Stalin and the BOlllb, p. 249. 
861STIB Interview Report No. 138 dated 23 December 1953 on Dip\. Ing. Helmut Grottrup, DEFE 411100. 
862Paragraph 91, DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development' , DEFE 44/2. 
863D. Holloway, Stalin and the BOlllb, p. 250. 
864D. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the A rills Race, p. 66. 
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a design team led by Mikhail langeI: began work on a missile called the R -14 at the 
beginning of the 1950s, soon after Grottrup had submitted his design. Although in 
essence a Soviet design, the missile bore traces of the Germans' influence. 865 
In addition, Grottrup indicated to the British that the age of missile silos was not far 
off. His interrogator noted that: 
Source has also reported the paper study of an underground Assembly factory 
combined with an operational underground firing point, the rocket being fired 
upwards through a vertical shaft. Grottrup pointed out that road transport will 
subject any rocket to unnecessary stresses and that with a range of several 
1,000 km, it was pointless to run the risk of damage for the sake of a few 100 
km change in firing position. The Russians however insisted on road 
transport as an alternative. 866 
The V-I and V -2 apart, the British by the early 1950s had been able to acquire 
almost no intelligence of Soviet development of other forms of missile. This 
illustrates the success of another Soviet security measure. They generally 
commissioned their German missile development teams to work on only one part of 
the missile (for example, as in the case of the Monino group, a target-seeking, anti-
aircraft missile head), with the result that the members of no German team were able 
to form an idea of the complete missile. Moreover, though they did paper studies of 
inertial and stellar guidance systems for long-range missiles867, the Germans 
provided British Intelligence with no 'substantial direct information' on Soviet 
development work in the field of missile control. 868 This was a very significant 
865U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Well mann , Die Speziaiislell, p. 108. 
866STIB Interview Report No. 138 dated 23 December 1953 on Dip\. Ing. Helmut Grottrup, DEFE 411100. 
867Paragraphs 193-5, DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development', DEFE 44/2; paragraphs 97 & 101 , Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II , Report by the 
Guided Weapons Working Party, DEFE 44/3. A report was even received of practical work on photo-cells 'for 
astroguidance' at NIl. 885, Novaya. 
868Paragraph 72, Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II , Report by the Guided Weapons Working 
Party , DEFE 44/3. However, some intelligence was gathered on German work on missile control from ' Dragon 
Returners ' who had worked at 'Construction Bureau 1323' at 228, Leningrad Chaussee, Moscow. The technical 
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intelligence failure. Consequently, the British could only speculate on what might be 
brewing in the missile development institutes of the Soviet Union. The material for 
this speculation was provided by knowledge of German wartime work, the work of 
German deportees on missile control problems in the USSR in the years 1946-53, the 
opinions these deportees formed, published information on Western development 
work (which would, of course, be available in the Soviet Union) and such knowledge 
as existed of Soviet work in related fields like electronics and radio communications. 
Soviet electronic devices, samples of which had been acquired, were in 1953 
considerably more efficient than corresponding models of even a few years 
before. 869 As far as other lines of development were concerned, all the 'Dragon 
Returners' could give their interrogators was information about particular electronic 
devices they had been commissioned to design and manufacture. On the basis of this 
information, technical intelligence analysts inferred what kind of missile the 
electronic equipment was meant for. These inferences were just another set of 
possibilities. In 1953, Captain H. F. Protheroe, of the Guided Weapons section of the 
War Office's Technical Intelligence staff, concluded that indications obtained from 
'Dragon Returners' 'could suggest' (note how tentatively he phrased this assessment 
of the intelligence) that a surface-to-air Wasserfall-type missile with a command 
mechanism and/or a semi-active homing device was being developed in the 
USSR.870 He also used intelligence from 'Dragon Returners' who had talked of 
director of this institute was Lavrentii Beria 's young son Sergo. The Germans designed the remote control device 
of an air-launched, radio-controlled, target-seeking missile for use against shipping; they knew it as the 'Comet' 
missile. The design of the control device was taken from an American technical publication (see, for example, 
STIB Interview Report No. 212 dated 28 February 1955 on Dr. Fritz Klaiber, OEFE 41 /11 6). From a description 
of the control system the British could form an idea of the missile itself (STIB Interview Report No. 155 dated 14 
March 1954 on Dr. Ing. Walter Thrun, OEFE 21/42). Nevertheless, the information was out-of-date when it 
reached them. Sergo Beria, then in his twenties, was awarded the Order of Lenin and a State Prize for the 
completion of this project (S . Beria, Moi Dlels - Lavrelllii Beria, p. 429). 
869 Address of Captain H. F. Protheroe, MI IOC (Guided Weapons), to the MI I 0 Technical Intelligence 
Conference 1953, OEFE 411126. 
87~his conclusion was probably based on information received from members of the group which had worked 
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Soviet use of television in their military and civilian development programmes to 
suggest that an air-to-surface and possibly air-to-air command control missile with a 
television aid might be in preparation. 871 
However small in quantity and limited in utility it might be, 'Dragon Return' 
intelligence on developments in the USSR was of importance because it formed the 
major part of the little information available. Protheroe told his listeners, Assistant 
Military Attaches from Britain, Canada and the USA, that: 
Information about Guided Weapons is very slim indeed. Most of what we do 
know is gained from repatriated German specialists relating to their own 
work or that of their colleagues in Russia, plus any indications seen by them 
of work done by Russian nationals. This information gives only an indication 
of the possible trends in Russian development because these German 
specialists are kept in virtual isolation towards the last year of their stay to 
'cool off' so that the information gained is one or two years 0Id. 872 
at Monino, near Moscow, under Josef Eitzenberger and Werner Buschbeck on a semi-active homing head for an 
anti-aircraft missile. The most notable defector from this group who can be identified was Ing. Walter Klages. 
The information he provided is contained in STIB Preliminary Interview Report No. 73 dated 29 August 1952 
and STIB Interview Report No. 70 dated 13 August 1952 (both in DEFE 411114). 
871 Address of Captain H. F. Protheroe, MI 10C (Guided Weapons), to the MI 10 Technical Intelligence 
Conference 1953, DEFE 411126. 
872Address of Captain H. F. Protheroe, MI 10C (Guided Weapons), to the MilO Technical Intelligence 
Conference 1953, DEFE 411126. Paragraph I of the Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part 11, Report by 
the Guided Weapons Working Party (DEFE 44/3) states that the main sources of intelligence for the report were 
returned German scientific workers and that they had been able mainly to give information on work that they had 
done, and not on Soviet work in the field. Professor R. V. Jones, Director of Scientific Intelligence at precisely 
this time (1952-3) recalled that the DSI received little scientific and technical intelligence on the USSR during his 
time there (interview, 7 May 1996). That the information provided by 'Dragon Return' rocket specialists was of 
limited value is confirmed by Professor Lawrence Freedman in his book, US Illtelligellce alld the Soviet Strategic 
Threat . He writes: 'As they had been kept ignorant of the full scope of the Soviet effort the German scientists 
could provide only limited information' (p. 68). The paucity of intelligence reaching the West from the USSR 
was, indeed, the reason for the inauguration of the Technical Intelligence Conference for Assistant Military 
Attaches in 1950. Though the 'Dragon Returners' formed the main source of intelligence on war-related 
developments in the USSR, they were confined to particular factories or instit.utes. So Military Attaches and their 
assistants throughout the Soviet Bloc were put to work to improve the flow of technical intelligence. They 
performed a function similar to that of Brixmis in East Germany. They were spies, under instructions to keep a 
lookout for any new weaponry or military equipment. Armed with cameras, and trained how to use them, they 
played an important role in British intelligence-gathering in the Warsaw Pact countries in the 1950s. As Protheroe 
remarked at the 1953 conference, ' If it were not for their efforts we would be running completely blind on 
metropolitan Russia '. 
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Protheroe's conclusion shows that . 'Dragon Return' barely penetrated Soviet missile 
development. Even in 1953 British Intelligence had no information that the Soviet 
rocket programme was anything more than a research and development programme. 
He commented that: 
It must be stated that there is no evidence that Guided Weapons have been 
produced on a scale other than that commensurate with normal research and 
development. Russia apparently has the necessary technical capability and 
capacity to complete the development of any weapon but the production on 
an operational scale depends on, first , her being convinced of the need, and 
second, allocating priorities for the equipment, manpower and material 
required. 
How can we improve our knowledge? First by maintaining a constant look-
out for the production of special items [such] as small rugged gyros, 
hydraulic actuators, and electrical unit packages as TV or IR heads, and 
second, trace the movement of any suspected personnel, equipment or 
material which has become associated with GW.873 
It is clear from the above quotation that the British had no direct insight into the 
principal Soviet rocket projects. Instead, they had to concentrate their efforts on 
trying to keep an eye out for the movement of resources essential to the manufacture 
of advanced missiles . These resources were sophisticated electronic equipment and 
high-grade scientific personnel. The same approach was taken in the field of atomic 
intelligence. The Ministry of Supply's Division of Atomic Energy searched for 
information on the scientists at work on the Soviet atomic project because their pre-
war publications might disclose, for example, their views on the various methods of 
uranium enrichment and whether they favoured plutonium or uranium-235 as 
fissionable material. This would in turn help D.At.En. to make a guess at the number 
873 Address by Captain H. F. Protheroe, MI I DC (Guided Weapons) , to the MIlO Technical Intelligence 
Conference 1953, DEFE 411126. 'TV ' stands for ' television ', ' IR' for ' infra-red ', GW for 'guided weapons'. 
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of atomic bombs the USSR might have. Information on people involved in it might 
also give an idea of the size of the programme. 874 
Electronics and scientific development 
Although 'Dragon Return' did not procure the intelligence of Soviet war-related 
developments in electronics which was sought, it nevertheless yielded intelligence of 
real value. The operation produced hard evidence of Soviet backwardness in 
electronics. It took British Intelligence into the workings of the Soviet economy and 
showed some of the obstacles which the command system put in the way of 
technological innovation. 
The Steimel Group at Fryazino was sent back to Germany in two instalments of 
roughly equal size. The first, which returned such men as Gerhard Dobbrack and 
Otto Biersack to their homeland, arrived in the DDR in December 1950. The second, 
in which Karl Steimel himself made his return, arrived in April 1952.875 During the 
War Steimel had been regarded in Germany as the country's leading valve research 
and production engineer. In the USSR he was chief of the German electronics group 
at NIl. 160 at Fryazino and a consultant on thermionic valve development and 
production problems. Consequently, he, like his fellow-countrymen there, was able 
to provide some information on development work at Fryazino, but, once again, 
Soviet security measures had ensured that he was, 'largely out-of-touch with the day-
to-day activities of NIl. 160, and therefore much of his information is couched in 
874Address by Cdr. Eric Welsh, D.At.En ., MI IO Technical Intelligence Conference 1952, DEFE 411126. 
875U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrUder & A. Well mann, Die Spezialistell , p. 163. 
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general terms' .876 His intelligence was considered so important that the Americans 
flew him off to Washington in August 1953 to repeat there what he had told them in 
Germany.877 
Six engineers and scientists who were returned to the DDR in the first 
'Spezialistenaktion' of electronics specialists were important sources on Soviet 
scientific development. 878 They had been put to work in four different institutes 
concerned with electronics research: NIL 160, Fryazino; NIl. 34, Leningrad; and NIl. 
11 and the Lenin Institute, Gor'kii. All the sources stressed that Soviet engineers 
tended slavishly to copy Western designs. There were two principal reasons for this. 
The first was centralization. All the institutes were controlled by the Ministry of 
Telecommunications Equipment in Moscow, which specified what was to be 
researched into and laid down completion dates for the research programmes. Once a 
particular piece of equipment had been designed, permission to alter it had to be 
obtained from the Ministry in Moscow. It would take months for permission to be 
given. To experiment with a design therefore involved a substantial time cost. This 
time cost was unacceptable, since the Ministry took a dim view of failure to meet the 
completion date it had set. Compliance with this date was essential to meeting its 
876STIB Interview Report No. 64 dated 9 July 1952 on Dr. Karl Steimel, DEFE 41/97. 
877 'Dragon Return ' Progress Report dated 24 August 1953 for the period up to 31 July 1953, DEFE 41/90. 
87~he information these men provided was clearly thought to be of use. The report itself, DSIIJTIC(51)6 dated 
27 April 1951 (DEFE 41/153), states that, 'much useful information was obtained during the interrogations'. It 
was considered interesting enough to deserve a wide distribution. Nevertheless, the DSI did not know whether 
what the six men had seen at Fryazino was representative of the whole of Soviet electronics, and so distanced 
itself from the report by adding a note stating that it set out the opinions of the Germans concerned and not those 
of the DSI (STIB/D 181304 dated II May 1951 , DEFE 41/92). However, the information acquired on Soviet 
management of scientific development was consistent with information obtained later from sources who had 
worked in other fields of science. For instance, Helmut Grbttrup likewise spoke of 'outstanding rigidity in the 
Russian development planning. A time by which the work must be completed is fixed beforehand and nobody 
dare deny his ability to adhere to this programme. All would therefore report that they were ready at the planned 
time although this might mean that they would have to fire rockets some of whose components were not ready for 
test ... ' (paragraph 220, Study of Soviet Guided Weapons (1954), Part II, Report by the Guided Weapons 
Working Party, DEFE 44/3). He, echoing the 'Dragon Return' electronicists, maintained that in the field of 
rocketry, 'Production consists mainly of copying' (paragraph 306, DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and 
entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon Development', DEFE 44/2). 
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production target; this production t:;u'get was essential to the State Plan; and the Plan 
was the basis of the Party's propaganda. 
In consequence, Soviet engineers preferred to copy existing Western designs which 
were known to operate satisfactorily. Copying them involved no risk . Such caution 
served the designers well; one source gave the example of an American altimeter 
being copied down to the last detail, winning the designer concerned a Stalin Prize. 
Their caution was reinforced by their sense of technical backwardness and huge 
admiration for Western (particularly American) equipment and technical 
publications. However, the conservatism which the system of scientific management 
encouraged held Soviet electronics back, discouraging the experimentation necessary 
to progress. It also held back the skills of Soviet electronic engineers, who had no 
incentive to make the modifications which would broaden their experience. 
The Germans also all agreed that their Soviet counterparts had received a much 
narrower technical education than was given to engineers in the West. In the valve 
factory attached to NIl. 160 at Fryazino appointment to the more important positions 
depended on political reliability ; the definition of the more important positions 
reached as far down as the foremen. As a rule, the workers in the factory were not 
interested in their work and were, consequently, inattentive and inefficient. This was 
also the case in the production shop in the Lenin Institute at Gor'kii, where the 
workers were interested only in achieving the monthly norm. Once this had been 
achieved, the workers put no further effort into their work, because there was no 
reward to be gained from it. Such norms were extremely low by Western standards. 
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The returners observed that scientific and technical journals, especially from the 
United States and Britain, were readily available at the institutes in question. Two of 
them, who had worked at different institutes, thought that Soviet electronics was so 
dependent on American technical publications that, if the supply were cut off, 
research in electronics would quickly come to a standstill. The McGraw Hill 
magazine 'Electronics' was stated to be the publication most prized by the Soviet 
engineers at both of the Institutes in question. 879 There was general agreement 
among the 'Dragon Returners' that Western technical literature saved the Soviets 
years in research and development time.880 It accelerated development programmes 
by obviating the need for much basic research work; this point was made by 
Germans who worked in such fields as missile control systems881 , other aspects of 
electronics and aircraft design882. Siegfried GUnter remarked that Western technical 
literature was very valuable to research and development at TsAGI (the Central 
Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute), because it saved the institute the trouble of having to 
do much, otherwise necessary, work, to which scarce scientific, engineering and 
technical personnel would have to be devoted. He estimated that Western technical 
publications saved the Soviets some two years in development time.883 TsAGI, 
though it had very capable people in every department, simply did not have enough 
well-qualified personnel to undertake all the tasks it would have to undertake, were 
879DSIIJTIC(51)6 dated 27 Apri l 1951, DEFE 411153 . See also Steimel to the same effect in STIB Interview 
Report No. 64 dated 9 July 1952 on Dr. Karl Steimel, DEFE 41197. 
880e.g. STIB Interview Report No. 218 dated 31 March 1954 on Dr. Fritz Klaiber, DEFE 411116. Acquired in the 
same period as Operation 'Dragon Return ' was a great deal of intelligence on research and development projects 
in MGB 'Sharashki ' (prison camps housing research institutes), in which Germans arrested by Soviet security 
agencies in East Germany had been forced to work. A discussion of this intelligence is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it was learned, for example, that most of the new development tasks and research techniques at the 
MGB 's electrotechnical research-institute-cum-camp at Marfino were taken from the pages of Western (mostly 
American) technical publications (OLBfBf571258 dated 10 January 1957 (DEFE 41114 I) , which contains 
information acquired by interrogating Wilhelm Poschel , who had been made to work in the valve department at 
Marfino from 1950 to 1952). 
881STIB Interview Report No. 198 dated 17 December 1954 on Dr. Fritz Klaiber, DEFE 411116. 
882STIB Interview Report No. 182 dated 3 September 1954 on Dip!. Ing. Siegfried GOnter, DEFE 4111 02. 
883Report on an interview with GOnter dated 29 October 1954, DEFE 21114. 
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Western technical literature not available. In Gunter's opinion, part of the reason for 
the USSR's scientific backwardness was the lack of capable engineers. The 
percentage of good engineers was very small there, smaller than in the West, and 
although there were probably enough engineers for the principal weapons 
development projects, there were insufficient for technical progress in civilian life. 
Gunter naturally believed that the post-war expansion of scientific education and 
practical training for engineers would increase the potential of Soviet engineering, 
but in the years immediately after the War Western technical literature had greatly 
facilitated technical progress, and particularly in the field of aircraft development.884 
The returners in December 1950 from Fryazino and other electronics institutes were 
entirely right to point their interrogators towards failings in the Soviet system of 
economic and scientific management as the causes of the country's backwardness in 
electronics. Like these six Germans, Richard Judy, in his pioneering study of the 
progress of Soviet computer technology up to 1968, finds the cause of the USSR's 
profound backwardness to be lack of motivation to improve computer technology. 
One root cause of this lack of motivation he considers to be the lack of competition 
88411 seems that the Western intelligence services responded to evidence of the USSR's technological 
backwardness and tendency to copy Western weapons and war-related devices by instituting operations of 
scientific deception . Technical literature was, at least according to the Soviets, doctored to deceive them. The 
Soviet aero-engine designer Arkhip Li ' ulka told Siegfried GUnter that he believed that false technical information 
was put into the British press to conceal British technical progress (STIB Interview Report No. 182 dated 3 
September 1954, DEFE 4 I /I 02). The interrogator of the atomic scientist Karl-Franz ZUhlke noted that, 'Source 
mentioned that the Russians told the Germans that they were aware of the fact that Americans had planted in 
some cases obviously wrong information in the technical literature' (p. 5, annexure 'B' to STIB Interview Report 
No. 253 dated 12 December 1955, DEFE 4 I /I 06). There is some evidence to support this claim. Scientific 
deception was certainly a theme of British intelligence operations from 1950. The London Controlling Section, 
which during the War had organized deception operations against Nazi Germany, was maintained on a care and 
maintenance basis between 1945 and 1950, when it was revived as the 'Forward Planning Section ' and charged 
with the task of leading Stalin down the primrose path which led away from advanced military technology 
(interview with Sir John Harvey-Jones on 15 July 1997). Sir John joined the Section fn January 1947. Its staff 
was then made up of three people: one representative of the Army, one of the Air Force, and one of the Navy (Sir 
John himself). He was responsible for devising naval craft and weapons which it would be unfruitful to develop. 
Intelligence of these craft and weapons was then passed to the USSR through agents in Britain and abroad by 
MIS and MI6. That the London Controlling Section became in 1950 the Forward Planning Section and in 1951 
the Directorate of Forward Planning is clear from documents in DEFE 28/70). 
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between Soviet enterprises. He argpes that, 'In the Soviet Union, it is in no one's 
personal or organizational interest to aggressively seek improvements in hardware, 
develop software that makes computers more accessible to more users, or furnish 
systems help'. Another root cause, entirely consistent with the views of the six 
Germans interrogated early in 1951, was that the overriding imperative, taking 
priority over technological improvements, was that planned production targets be 
met. This tended to discourage innovation. Judy notes that, 'Until 1965, the criterion 
by which enterprises in the Ministry of Radio Industry were judged was the gross 
value of output. The annual plan was stated in terms of this criterion, and bonuses 
were linked to the fulfilment of the plan as stated'. Such an approach simply did not 
suit a fast-developing field like computer technology. The managers of Soviet 
enterprises had to meet the planned output targets. To avoid failing to do so, they 
ensured that modest targets were set and took no risks in pursuing them, preferring to 
stick to tried-and-tested designs rather than introduce new products. Finding 
solutions to the difficulties which inevitably arise in the development of new 
products would consume resources and so jeopardize fulfilment of the plan. Thus, in 
Judy's words, 'the system has encouraged the production of obsolete machines (e.g., 
Ural-1 and -2) long past the point when greatly superior technologies were 
available'. Judy is able to analyse the reasons for the obsolescence of Soviet goods 
and the frustration of technological progress by the bureaucratic rigidities of the 
Soviet system with greater sophistication than the 'Dragon Returners' of 1951, but 
the point made is the same: in the Soviet Union there was little incentive to improve 
the technology available. 88S This was the reason for the country's backwardness; it 
88SS. Wasowski (ed .), East- West Trade alld the Techllology Gap: A Political alld Ecollomic Appraisal (article by 
R. Judy on 'The Case of Computer Technology ' ), pp. 68-70. Tokaev, of course, had also stressed that the Plan 
tended to inhibit the progress of research. The need to fulfil the targets set out in it was so strong that scientists 
deliberately made modest forecasts of what they could achieve, even going so far as to withhold research results 
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was not that Soviet computer scientists were lacking in skill. Quite the contrary, they 
were obviously very competent people.886 
Like ~he 'Dragon Returners', Judy lays stress on the consistency with which Soviet 
scientists and engineers have copied Western designs, right from the very earliest 
days of computer technology. A business machine factory was established in 
Moscow in 1932 to manufacture copies of earlier models of Western machines. By 
the late 1960s, the Soviets were still energetically copying well-established Western 
technology, although they modified the equipment more often. Soviet computer 
technology had been almost wholly imported from the West. Systematic copying, 
combined with the inherent flaws in the Soviet system of economic management, 
locked the USSR into permanent backwardness. Advances in Soviet computer 
technology only took place when Western advances were taken up in the USSR. In 
Judy's words, 'All significant technological innovations in computer technology 
have occurred in the West' .887 Soviet computer developments consistently imitated 
Western advances, but occurred later. This is true of all generations of Western and 
Soviet computers. Valves (sometimes known as vacuum tubes) and other electronic 
circuitry were first installed in the first electronic computer, the 'Electronic 
Numerical Integrator and Calculator' (ENIAC), made at the Moore School of 
Engineering in Philadelphia, in 1946. The first generation of Soviet computers, 
from publication so as to avoid being burdened with further tasks (see Chapter 2). Judy adds another reason for 
the ineffectiveness of the Soviet system in encouraging innovation. In the West, there is strong industrial demand 
for computers so that much less efficient labour can be dispensed with. Tn the Soviet Union, there was a weak 
demand among industrial enterprises for computers because, politically, it was impermissible to lay workers off. 
The result was that Soviet computers were designed to meet the needs of scientists and not those of industry (pp. 
70-1). 
886S. Wasowski (ed.) , Eas(- West Trade alld (he Techllology Gap (Judy article) , p. 66. Helmut Grbttrup also made 
this point. His opinion was that , 'The link between science and industrial output - development - is lacking' 
(paragraph 305, DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon Development', 
DEFE 44/2). 
887S. Wasowski (cd.), Eas(- West Trade alld (he Techllology Gap (Judy article), p. 64. 
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initiated by the BESM-l in 19~3, was also based on valve technology. The 
electrostatic cathode ray tube was developed in Britain in 1950 as a device for 
storing memory; four or five years later, an electrostatic cathode ray tube was 
installed in the BESM-6. The Whirlwind computer, built at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, pioneered magnetic core storage in 1952; from 1959, when 
the BESM-2 and Ural-2 came into service, magnetic core was the main means of 
internal storage in Soviet computers. Magnetic tape was first used for data storage in 
the US in 1951; it was widely-used in Soviet computers from 1953, when the BESM-
1 and the Ural-1 made their appearance. Another form of memory storage was the 
magnetic drum, used at Manchester University in its computer in 1949; magnetic 
drums appeared in Soviet computers in 1953. The transition to the second generation 
of Soviet computers, like the evolution of the first, followed a Western development 
path. The replacement of valves by transistors and other semiconductors began in the 
United States in 1951 when semiconductor diodes were installed in the Whirlwind 
computer. By the late 1950s, such solid-state circuits had replaced valves in all large 
computers made in the West. From 1963 they were widely used in the manufacture 
of computers in the USSR. This list includes only certain early advances in computer 
technology. It could be considerably extended to include other instances of copying 
in those years or in later years. Western advances were taken up and copied by 
Soviet scientists and engineers using two means with which the 'Dragon Returners ' 
made British Intelligence very familiar: Western technical literature and Western 
computers.888 
888S. Wasowski (ed.), East- West Trade and the Technology Cap (Judy article), pp. 63-5. Unlike Judy some two 
decades later, all six of the ' Dragon Return' informants on Soviet electronics interrogated between January and 
March 1951, regardless of where they had worked, thought Soviet engineers to be of a low standard. The two 
returners from NIl . 160 at Fryazino had a low opinion of the electronic engineers they had met, when compared 
with engineers in the USA or Western Europe, but thought that there must be better Soviet engineers elsewhere. 
According to the two returners from NIl . II , they were certainly not to be found in Gor'kii, but they too were 
convinced that there must be better engineers elsewhere, presumably in big cities , such as Moscow and 
293 
The result of this revolution was the transformation of the computer from a calculator 
of ballistic trajectories to machines with a multitude of applications. The computers 
of the late 1960s were capable of performing arithmetic 13,000 times faster than the 
first computers of the late 1940s. Arithmetic processing speeds increased in that 
period from fewer than a thousand to several million operations per second. 889 The 
most powerful Western computer in service at any time from the late 1940s to the 
late 1960s was always much more powerful than the most advanced Soviet computer 
in service.890 In the mid-1970s, a Soviet author estimated that the USSR trailed the 
USA in the technology of automation equipment, including computers, by eight-to-
ten years. 891 According to the generally-accepted Western estimate, there were only 
5,000-6,000 computers in the USSR in 1970.892 In 1968, the gap between Western 
and Soviet software was even greater than the difference in their computer hardware, 
Soviet software in that year being no more advanced than Western software had been 
in 1959.893 A key technological factor also operated to hold back the computer 
industry. This was the backwardness of Soviet electronics. 894 Very capable scientists 
Leningrad , which would attract the most talented. Against this background, the intelligence of the returner from 
NIL 34 in Leningrad was considered particularly interesting, since he maintained that the engineers he had met 
were 'quite unbe lievably and monstrously primitive' in their outlook and working methods. Their unski lfulness 
caused them to be grossly wasteful with raw materials , even high-grade materials. Nevertheless, intelligence of 
better Soviet technicians who were not so wasteful with raw materials was also yielded by the operation (minutes 
of DSIIJTIC meeting on 17 July 1951 , DEFE 41/75). All in all, the Germans encountered remarkable contrasts in 
the intelligence and specialist knowledge of the Soviet scientific workers with whom they worked . Working 
conditions also varied considerably (address by STIB Director to MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference 1951 , 
DEFE 411125). 
889S. Wasowski (ed .), East- West Trade and the Technology Gap (Judy article) , pp. 43-5 . 
890See table on p. 61 of S. Wasowski (ed.), East- West Trade and the Technology Gap (Judy article); R. Amann, 
J . Cooper & R. W. Davies (eds.) , The Technological Level of Soviet/ndllstry (chapter by R. W. Davies on 'The 
Technological Level of Soviet Industry: An Overview'), p. 44. 
891R. Amann, 1. Cooper & R. W. Davies (eds.), The Tecllllological Level ofSoviet/ndllstry (article by M. Cave 
on 'Computer Technology'), p. 393. 
892R. Amann, 1. Cooper & R. W. Davies (eds.), The Tecllllological Level of Soviet/ndllstl), (Cave article), p. 
392. By contrast, Richard Judy estimates, at p. 53 of East- West Trade and the Technology Gap , that in 1968 the 
number of non-military computers in service in the USSR was probably no greater than 2,000 (and might have 
been as small as 750). 
893S. Wasowski (ed .), East- West Trade and the Technology Gap (Judy article), pp. 62-3. 
894R. Amann, J . Cooper & R. W. Davies (eds.) , The Technological Level of Soviet/ndllstr)' (Davies chapter), p. 
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had very mediocre equipment to work with. The weakness of Soviet electronics held 
back the machine tools and several other industries. Backwardness in electronics 
held back the development of Soviet machine tools by denying them suitably-
advanced control systems.895 Indeed, A. C. Sutton has characterized the Soviet 
system of economic management as so incapable of transforming scientific ideas into 
new products and processes that it achieved no fundamental industrial innovation 
between 1917 and 1965. The USSR only improved its technology by making use of 
Western technological innovations. 896 Its lack of innovativeness meant that, between 
the 1950s and the 1970s, in such key industries as computers, iron and steel-making, 
machine tools, electric power and chemicals, Western technology remained superior 
to that of the Soviet Union.897 Structural weaknesses affected Soviet military as well 
as civilian technology. All in all, despite the high priority given to defence projects, 
David Holloway has found a rather slower rate of innovation in military technology 
in the Soviet Union than in the USA. For example, the rate of improvement in the 
accuracy of the USSR's missiles during the Cold War was not half the USA's rate. 
American guidance systems and multiple warhead technology were consistently 
superior to those of the USSR. 898 To a considerable extent, Soviet missiles' inferior 
accuracy and multiple warhead capability resulted from weaknesses in electronics 
and computer technology. 899 
45 . 
895R. Amann, 1. Cooper & R. W. Davies (eds.) , The Tecl11l010gical Level of Sovietllldusl/)' (Davies chapter), p. 
41. 
896xxv, introduction to A. C. Sutton, Westem Techllology alld Soviet Ecollomic Developmellt, Vol. 3,1945-65. 
897R. Amann, 1. Cooper & R. W. Davies (eds.), The Techllological Level of Sovietilldustry (Davies chapter), pp. 
44 & 66. 
898R. Amann, 1. Cooper & R. W. Davies, The Techllological Level of Sovietilldllstry (chapter by D. Holloway 
on 'Military Technology'), p. 486. 
899R. Amann, 1. Cooper & R. W . Davies, The Techllological Level of Sovietilldustry (Holloway chapter), pp. 
472 & 477. 
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Karl Steimel gave the British an insight into particular weaknesses in Soviet 
electronics which confirmed the intelligence provided by sources in the first wave of 
returners from Fryazino. He made three basic points in interrogation: the Soviets 
were copiers, particularly of American and British electronic equipment; they were 
more interested in quantity of production than quality; and they were backward in 
fundamental respects which he specified. The Soviets clearly had difficulty in 
manufacturing efficient valves in quantity: 
Steimel stated that the Russians were very backward in thermionic 
techniques. They did not appreciate the need for pure metal for anodes, and 
consequently, ran into great vacuum and cathode poisoning troubles. They 
also showed great obstinacy at times ... . In the winter of 1950 Dr. Kurt 
Richter and lng. Sperling (Dragon Return case), were sent to the Novosibirsk 
valve factory to straighten out production troubles. The troubles fell under 
three main headings: (a) impure metals, (b) bad metal-ceramic joints due to 
irregular thickness of metal (bad tooling), (c) gas from the ceramic causing 
cathode poisoning. Steimel stated that at this time the production at 
Novosibirsk consisted of a range of valves for the 10 cm. band.900 
The standard of the electronic apparatus manufactured in the USSR was generally 
poor. This was a fact of considerable military significance, for if such apparatus was 
to be put to military use, it needed to be manufactured to a very high standard. 901 
Steimel's interrogator noted that: 
A revealing statement by Steimel was that if an article, e.g. a valve, is 
developed and there seems to be a chance of the originator obtaining a Stalin 
prize ... all concerned in assessing the worth of the developed valve conspire 
to get it through its acceptance tests. By this means, a prototype which will 
not meet the specification claimed for it, frequently goes into production 
although all the technical personnel concerned know it is faulty. Once a 
production run is started, moreover, no one is willing to stop it, even for 
essential modifications to the product. The great thing is quantity, and 
Steimel estimates that in the aggregate Russian valve production carries on 
with 60% rejection or with only 40% good production. When the 
900STIB Interview Report No. 64 dated 9 July 1952 on Dr. Karl Steimel , DEFE 41/97. Dr. Kurt Richter, 
mentioned in this quotation, made an appearance in Chapter 2 as the chief valve development engineer at the 
Werk fiir Fernmeldewesen (the re-named Oberspreewerk) in the mid-1950s. His long connection with Steimel 
allowed the latter to acquire from him valuable information on high-technology projects at the WF. 
90INID LC Report No. I dated 17 August 1949, DEFE411151. 
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interviewing officers express~d surprise that this state of affairs should be 
tolerated, Steimel said that it was because the electronics industry is still 
young, and therefore is allowed much latitude. He mentioned that cases had 
occurred of people who were responsible for initiating faulty production runs, 
having later received Stalin prizes for improving the product during its run. A 
contributory cause of faulty production is the prevalence of wrong measuring 
techniques .... Steimel noted that such happenings are characteristic at 
. present, but would, of course, gradually decline as the technical personnel 
gained experience. 
Exploitation of both instalments of returners established that the Soviets were trying 
to develop at NIl. 160 Fryazino the electronic devices to which the War had given 
rise in the West. 902 The institute was concerned mainly with valves. 903 For the most 
part, the Germans there had been made to copy and improve American radar 
equipment, most of which operated on the three-centimetre and ten-centimetre 
902This is the essence of such reports as STIB Interview Report No. 54, DEFE 41/96; STIB Interview Report 
No. 64 dated 9 July 1952 on Dr. Karl Steimel , DEFE 41/97; and STIB Interview Report No. 124 dated 31 July 
1953 on Ing. Herbert Anhalt, DEFE 411114. The Germans were required to develop devices which formed part of 
the revolutions in television, computers and military electronics: magnetrons , detectors, klystrons, cathodes and 
cathode ray tubes. They had been required to devote much attention to the development of the magnetron. This 
was a British invention, a radio valve which greatly extended the range of radar sets by producing bursts of 
microwave radiation of over 100 kilowatts (KW). It has been described as 'the single most important piece of 
electronic equipment developed during the course of the war' (D. Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: the Tizard 
Mission and the Scientific War, p. 190). The combination of a cavity magnetron's power and the use of a 
centimetric wavelength allowed radar sets to detect small targets. Thus a bomber could detect the target beneath it 
more accurately; a nightfighter could detect and intercept an incoming bomber; and a surfaced submarine could 
be detected by aircraft overhead (G. Hartcup, The Silelll Revollltion: The Developlllent of Conventional Weapolls 
1945-85, p. 5). The development of magnetrons also formed part of the work of a secret department at the 
institute, to which the Germans were denied access from 1951. Steimel commented that an early task had been to 
make a prototype copy of a British magnetron, an eight-segment valve which gave 200-300 KW peak output, to 
operate on a wavelength of ten centimetres. When Steimel left, the factory attached to NIl. 160 was producing 
between 1,500 and 2,000 magnetrons annually for ground radar systems. Although ground radar operating on the 
three-centimetre wavelength was developed to some degree, the tendency was to concentrate on the higher 
wavelengths. In other words, the radar sets made at Fryazino were low-tech. The shorter the wavelength, the 
more useful the radar set and the Americans had made a prototype three-centimetre magnetron as early as 1941 
(D. Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchallge, p. 191). At Fryazino, thirteen centimetres was allocated as the 
communication band. The first satisfactory Soviet copy of the SCR-584 radar set had been produced in 1948-9. 
Magnetrons were also developed for the purpose of jamming. From 'Dragon Return ' information on work on 
electronics the British and Americans tried to trace the general pattern of Soviet electronic development. The aim 
of the first Five Year Plan had been to copy existing equipment. Much of this equipment was German and 
German scientists and technicians had accordingly been taken to the Soviet Union to give support to this effort. 
Their repatriation coincided roughly with the end of the first Plan; the aim of the second Plan was probably to 
develop electronic equipment of Soviet design. This is recorded as the view of George Turney, speaking at the 
DSIIJTIC meeting on 18 November 1952 (the minutes of this meeting are in DEFE 41/76) . But Turney was 
commenting on the reports produced at a recent joint British-American conference on Soviet electronics and 
seems to have been summarizing the argument of the reports. 
903Minutes of STIB Technical Meeting on 8 March 1951, DEFE 41110. 
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wavelengths.9G-1 These were, of course, the wavelengths conventionally used in the 
West. Because Soviet engineers were such copiers of Western technology, they were 
condemned to using wavelengths with which the radar engineers of the West were 
wholly familiar. This made Soviet radar very vulnerable to jamming. Steimel, asked 
why Soviet development kept to such conventional wavelengths, said that Soviet 
engineers were incapable of original research. Moreover, they did not have to engage 
in it, since the series of books on electronics published by the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, together with American and British periodicals, set out Western 
circuit techniques for them. 
With regard to the scientific and technical personnel of the institute, Steimel 
commented, echoing a refrain heard from a number of 'Dragon Returners' across 
various specialisms, that their grasp of theory was excellent, but they suffered from a 
severe lack of knowledge of experimental techniques. For this reason, Steimel 
considered that the Soviet Union would be unable to wage an 'electronic war' for 
another four or five years (he was interrogated in 1952). 
Soviet interest in the projects gIven to the Germans varied, which made the 
intelligence acquired from the returners of limited utility. 905 Although their work at 
NIl. 160 was of scientific value, the Germans did not work directly on any project of 
great military significance (which would have given them intelligence value), nor do 
they seem to have made an important contribution to Soviet progress in electronics. 
This conclusion is suggested not merely by the interrogated returners' own accounts 
of what they did in the USSR, but also by the fact that the Soviets sent them back to 
904STIB Interview Report No. 54, DEFE 41/96. 
905STIB Interview Report No. 124 dated 31 July 1953 on lng. Herbert Anhalt, DEFE 411114. 
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Germany quite early, in comparison with those who worked on atomic or guided 
missile projects. A good number of the electronic specialists were returned a mere 
four years after their original deportation; the remainder were repatriated some five-
and-a-half years after 'Osoaviakhim'. Thus, they were among the first groups to be 
returned in full to Germany. Had they been regarded as possessing intelligence of 
value, they would have been kept longer in the USSR.9CX5 
The Germans' information clearly influenced the Directorate of Scientific 
Intelligence, which in the early 1950s doubted that Soviet electronicists were as able 
or as well-trained as their Western counterparts.907 That said, they were obviously 
making great efforts to overcome their backwardness. German knowhow had been 
exploited, students were being trained in electronics in greater numbers, systematic 
use was being made of Western technical publications and much research and 
development work was being undertaken in such fields as propagation of electronic 
signals, valve design and manufacture and component manufacture. Moreover, there 
was by the early 1950s greater use of electronic devices manufactured in the DDR. 
With assistance from all the sources available to them, German, American and 
British, Soviet electronic engineers had clearly managed to improve the standard of 
the electronic devices in service with their armed forces. They had developed valves, 
magnetrons and klystrons for all wavelengths . They had manufactured good 
centimetric radar, which could either be used at airfields or as target-detecting gun or 
missile control equipment or could serve as a weapon of electronic warfare in itself, 
jamming the enemy's radio communications. They had reached the stage at which 
906For a simil ar assessment of German work in the field of electronics, see U. Albrecht, A. Heinemann-GrOder 
& A. Well mann , Die Spezialisfell , pp. 163-4. 
907Minutes of DSI/JTIC meeting on 18 November 1952, DEFE 41176; DSIIJTIC(52)15 dated 18 July 1952 and 
entitled , 'The Ability of the Ru ssian Economy to Sustain the Production of Modern Armaments ' , DEFE 41/153 . 
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they could do without German help, and produce original designs . In short, they had 
made much progress, but their electronics equipment was not yet the equal of that of 
the West.908 
However, the intelligence from Fryazino and other electronics institutes was of 
greater significance than that. It gave the intelligence services of Britain and the 
United States an understanding of the workings of the Soviet system of scientific 
research and development. This knowledge stood them in good stead, since features 
of the command system with which they became familiar - pre-eminently, its 
addiction to copying Western ideas and the reasons for this - endured throughout its 
life. The command system's inability to be as innovative, technologically or 
otherwise, as the open, market-driven systems of the West condemned it to lasting 
dependence on Western science and technology. In the early 1980s, more than 160 
weapons used by Warsaw Pact forces depended on Western military technology. Up 
to 70% of all new weapons put into service by the Warsaw Pact in that period, such 
as the intermediate-range SS-20 nuclear missile, incorporated crucial illegally-
acquired and copied Western technology.909 This technology, either stolen or 
purchased, was smuggled to the East in defiance of the ban on the sale of strategic 
goods to the Soviet Bloc monitored by the Coordinating Committee for East-West 
Trade. Since the USSR consistently lagged behind the West in electronics, electronic 
devices (computer chips, for example) were much copied. A chip which its great 
military significance caused the KGB and GRU to target was the very-high-speed 
integrated circuit (VHSIC). A project to develop the VHSIC was initiated in 1978 by 
the US Department of Defense. VHSICs were faster, more reliable in operation and 
908Address by Major H, G, Frost, MIIOC, MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference 1953, DEFE 411126, 
909J. Tuck, High-Tech Espionage: Ho w the KGB Smllggles NATO's Strategic Secrets to Mosco\V, p, \08-9 , 
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more resistant to radiation than previous chips and were to be installed in missiles, 
other weapons, satellites and communication systems. They were designed and built 
by computers and one task of Soviet Intelligence was to acquire enough of the 
computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems to 
equip an entire factory,9l0 
Western computer technology was much copied in the 1980s because it was 
enhancing the effectiveness of a whole range of weapons and Soviet science could 
not keep up with the pace of Western development. By the mid-1980s, acquisition of 
Western computer technology was the highest priority of Soviet Intelligence and 
perhaps also of its East German partner-in-crime, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklarung 
of the MfS. By that time, Directorate T, the KGB department responsible for 
acquiring advanced Western technology, is estimated to have had a worldwide 
procurement network of some 20,000 agents. 911 The French managed to penetrate 
Directorate T in the 1980s and learned from their agent, codenamed 'Farewell', that 
in 1980 the Military-Industrial Commission had given instructions for 3,617 
technological 'acquisition tasks', of which 1,085 were carried out within the year, 
benefiting 3,396 Soviet research and development projects. North America was the 
main hunting-ground for high technology: 61.5% of the scientific and technical 
intelligence gathered in 1980 was acquired there. In that year, Directorate T managed 
to lay its hands on 5,456 'samples'. Of this haul, 44% was distributed to war-related 
industries and 28% to the KGB and other government bodies.912 
9101. Tuck, High-Tech Espial/age, pp. 84 & 107. 
9111. Tuck, High-Tech Espial/age , p. 15. The Directorate was itself only one organization in a many-pronged 
Soviet attack on Western technology. Also involved in the effort were a secret unit of the Academy of Sciences, 
the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), the State Committee for External Economic Relations 
(GKES) and, naturally , the GRU. All these bodies received their procurement instructions from the Military-
Industrial Commission (VPK) , which was responsible for all weapons production. 
912c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky: KGB: The II/side StOI), (Sceptre paperback edition, 1991), pp. 622-3. 
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In the late 1960s the USSR abandoned its attempt to make a mainframe computer of 
its own and simply stole and copied the IBM 360/S. The Soviet copy of the IBM 
360/S ~as the Ryad-1, which became available in quantity in 1972. It used the IBM 
operating system DOS, IBM software and IBM ancillary equipment. The service 
manuals provided to customers were the original IBM 360/S service manuals, 
translated word-for-word into Russian. 913 The Ryad-2 computer, available in 
quantity from the late 1970s, was an exact copy of the IBM 370/S, down to the last 
detail, having likewise been copied from stolen prototypes.914 One use of these 
computers was to operate Soviet air defence systems.915 Behind these copying 
projects of the 1960s and 1970s was the same motive as that behind those of the 
1940s and 1950s: a desire to save research and development time and resources. It 
was simpler, safer, cheaper and quicker to steal Western ideas. The West had already 
paid the research and development costs. The USSR paid no royalties on its copy. No 
risks accompanied the development project, which had already proven successful in 
the West. 916 Parts, instruction manuals and ancillary equipment could be bought or 
stolen in the West. Illegally-exported computers could even be sent back to the West 
for secret servicing and repair work, and sometimes were. 917 These considerations 
lay behind the Soviet decision to copy the plutonium bomb tested at Alamogordo in 
July 1945; the thermionic valve and other electronic equipment development 
programmes in the late 1940s and early 1950s described by 'Dragon Returners'; and 
9131. Tuck, High-Tech Espial/age, p. 52. This operation, undertaken at the Research Centre for Electronic 
Computer Technology in Moscow, benefited from the advice of East German experts from the Robotron 
computer factory in Dresden , who went to Moscow, like the 'Osoaviakhim' deportees more than twenty years 
earlier, to hold the hands of their Soviet colleagues. -
914 1. Tuck, High-Tech Espial/age, pp. 52 & 57. 
9151. Tuck, High-Tech Espial/age, p. 109. 
9161. Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, pp. 137-8. 
9171. Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, p. 70. 
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the decisions to copy the IBM 360/S c;lnd 370/S computers in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, copying had the same disadvantage whenever it was undertaken. It set the 
Soviet projects in question firmly on a Western research and development track. 
Thus it tended to preserve a certain Western technological lead. By the time the 
Soviets had completed their copy, Western research and development had moved 
beyond the technological stage it represented. Although the DSI was unsure whether 
some of the 'Dragon Return' intelligence on Soviet electronics gave a balanced view 
of scientific development in the USSR918, the fact is that it did reveal ways in which 
the command economy built by the Soviet Communist Party held the country in 
technological backwardness. Later intelligence on Soviet electronics also emphasized 
its inferiority to that of the West. Oleg Pen' kovskii told his controllers that 
backwardness in electronics was hampering missile development. 919 In particular, it 
was holding back the development of guidance systems for intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.920 
In his book on the piracy of the KGB and GRU, Jay Tuck quotes Jack Vorona, the 
head of the Science and Technology Department of the Pentagon's Defense 
Intelligence Agency in the mid-1980s, as saying that the foundation of Soviet 
capability in radar was laid by the United States. During the War, American SCR-
584 radar sets were given to the USSR as part of Lend-Lease. They, together with the 
book on radar theory published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 's 
radiation laboratory, yielded the early generations of Soviet radar sets.921 This 
918See footnote 878. 
919J. Schecter & P. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World: How A Soviet Colonel Challged the COllrse of the 
Cold War, p. 70. 
920J. Schecter & P. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, p. 73. 
921 J. Tuck, High-Tech Espiollage, p. 113. The Science and Technology Department of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency is the direct American counterpart to the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate of the Defence 
Intelligence Staff (Ministry of Defence). This Directorate has since 1964 been responsible for scientific 
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statement accords entirely with, the 'Dragon Returners" account of Soviet 
technological development after the War. Karl Steimel said that the first satisfactory 
copy of the SCR-584 was made at NIl. 160 in 1948-9.922 He also mentioned MIT 
books on electronics. Another 'Dragon Returner' , Fritz Klaiber, referred to the very 
same book as Vorona, MIT's twenty-eight-volume 'Radiation Laboratory Series' , 
which, he said, had greatly influenced Soviet engineers' understanding of radar 
theory .923 This is no coincidence, for Vorona's knowledge of Soviet radar 
development will have come from 'Dragon Return' intelligence (which he would call 
'Prodigal' intelligence) . Vorona's comment demonstrates that 'Dragon Return' 
intelligence did indeed shape the understanding of Soviet science of US Scientific 
Intelligence. It is interesting that Vorona then goes on to speculate how Soviet 
scientists might have used the American microcircuitry acquired by their intelligence 
services in the 1980s, maintaining that, while possessing 'excellent radar theorists', 
without such acquisitions from the USA Soviet science lacked the engineering skill 
to turn its advanced ideas into military hardware light and small enough to be 
installed in an aeroplane. That is an assessment of Soviet engineering in accordance 
with Karl Steimel's view of Soviet methods of valve production thirty years earlier. 
It is reminiscent of Helmut Grottrup's comment that in the USSR, 'The link between 
science and industrial output - development - is lacking' .924 This also suggests that 
'Dragon Return' helped to shape British and American intelligence analysts' 
perception of Soviet science and engineering. Likewise, it indicates that, just as 
intelligence analysis. STIB was the German outpost of the bodies which were in the 1950s responsible for 
scientific intelligence analysis, the DSI and the JTIC. Its American counterparts, chief among them the Returnees 
Exploitation Group, will have sent their 'Prodigal ' (i.e. 'Dragon Return ') intelligence reports to Vorona's 
predecessor. 
922 See footnote 902. 
923STIB Interview Report No. 218 dated 31 March 1955 on Dr. Fritz Klaiber, DEFE 411116. Klaiber worked on 
the remote control device of Sergo Beria's 'Comet' missile. 
924paragraph 305, DSIIJTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development ', DEFE 44/2. See footnote 886. 
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Soviet engineering was unable to overcome the handicaps with which the command 
economy burdened it, so their view of it did not fundamentally change. Moreover, 
like Vorona, the scientists of the DSI probably used earlier intelligence of copying to 
made educated guesses at resulting trends in Soviet development. 
D. Order-of-Battle Intelligence on Soviet Science 
Scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence is intelligence of the people and places which 
make up a country's scientific establishment and the military-industrial complex 
which turns its ideas into military hardware. 925 As far as hard intelligence on the 
Soviet Union is concerned, this was the principal benefit of 'Dragon Return'. Every 
'Dragon Return' interrogation report ended with a section on personalities of 
intelligence interest at work in the USSR, above all scientists, engineers and MVD 
project managers. Thus the personalities identified worked in all the fields in which 
Germans were employed.926 Significantly, among those named were the leading 
figures in Soviet atomic and rocket science. Interrogation of defectors from the 
925The accumulation of scientific Order-of-Battle intelligence on powerful countries was early a high priority for 
British Intelligence. The reason for this was that war-related science simply consists of particular applications of 
broader scientific knowledge. Almost any scientific research can give rise to knowledge of military application. It 
follows from this that any country's capability in the field of advanced weaponry is simply part of its general 
scientific capability, its leading defence scientists and engineers receive a conventional education in those 
disciplines and form part of that country's stock of scientific personnel. The greater a country's scientific 
achievements, the greater (in general) its military capability. The connection between general scientific progress 
and the development of advanced weapons was the reason for the JIC's policy of building up an Order of Battle 
of Soviet Science. In JIC(47) 15(0) dated 7 March 1947 and entitled, 'The Collection of Scientific Intelligence -
Proposed Organisation for an Order of Battle' (CAB 158/1), the JIC recommended that a Scientific Order of 
Battle Section be set up in the Ministry of Defence. In the Annex to this report, the JIC stated that the 
accumulation of information on foreign scientists and scientific institutions and the whole range of their research 
was of 'extreme importance' . Its main function would be 'to provide the background of knowledge of the whole 
which will enable the collection of intelligence on secret work to be systematically inspired and the results to be 
properly evaluated. Without this knowledge, the collection of scientific intelligence will have to be done on 
haphazard lines and will be so dependent on chance that its chances of success will be small'. The main sources 
of the information sought would be foreign and domestic scientific journals. 
926It is not yet possible to say how many Soviet scientific workers became known to British Intelligence as a 
result of 'Dragon Return' information, since not all the intelTogation reports are yet available to researchers. 
However, the number will have been large. One benefit of knowledge of the interests and skills of particular 
scientists and engineers was that it allowed the work of institutes with which they were connected to be guessed 
at. 
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German rocket groups allowed long lists of people involved in the Soviet rocket 
programme to be prepared. Listed were Soviet personalities connected with the 
Ostashkov group and those encountered by Germans at Kapustin Yar, at NIL 88 at 
Podlipki, at NIl. 885 at Novaya, at Zavod 456 at Khirnki and at NIl. 49 and NIl. 380 
in Leningrad (the latter was essentially a television research centre, but was believed 
to have a secret department carrying out work connected with guided missile 
guidance). The various sources together revealed the leading figures in Soviet rocket 
development and many others besides. Grottrup finally made Korolev's importance 
as a designer clear, describing him as 'an outstanding specialist on ballistic rockets' 
and 'definitely a future high-level leader in this field' .927 The various lists display 
awareness of the existence and function of further Soviet research and development 
institutes.928 Because there was so little intelligence to go on, this information on 
personalities influenced thinking about the Soviet missile project. What was most 
striking about the Ostashkov Group's commission to design a missile with a payload 
of 3,000 kilograms and a range of 3,000 kilometres was that it came from Ustinov, 
the Armaments Minister whom Grottrup described as 'the real power behind the 
rocket effort'. 929 This indicated that there was political pressure to build long-range 
missiles. Similarly, the Americans' National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 1955, 
written against a background of profound ignorance of Soviet missile development, 
927 Appendix B to DSI/JTIC Report No. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, ' USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development', DEFE 44/2 . 
928Lists attached to Guided Weapons Working Party Note dated II September" 1953 , DEFE 411124. The sources 
for this information were often but not always ' Dragon Returners'. By the names of some Soviet personalities 
there appears the entry, '''cx'' reports ', indicating that MI6 had acquired the information, while in other cases the 
information had been taken from Soviet scientific journals. 
929paragraph 370, DSI/JTIC Report l'l0. 13 dated April 1954 and entitled, 'USSR - Guided Weapon 
Development' , DEFE 44/2. 
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concluded that the programme had to be a big one in the light of the number of 
'personalities and activities' connected with it.930 
The information was also used in identifying Soviet scientists who would be worth 
persuading to defect and in making an approach to them. From the adoption of the 
policy of enticing defections by Soviet scientists in 1948, TCS had 'operational 
responsibility' for such operations. Its targets were inaccessible to it while in the 
USSR, but were to be pursued as soon as they left it, whether on a long-term mission 
or for a short visit. The information about them which was kept on file enabled TCS 
to act quickly when a target arrived in the West. 931 
The most valuable Order-of-Battle intelligence yielded by 'Dragon Return' 
concerned atomic installations, but a wealth of information on factories and research 
institutes connected with other war-related technologies was also gathered. 932 
Obviously, information on where such establishments were and from whom sought-
after intelligence could be obtained facilitated the penetration of these places,933 Not 
930J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Illtelligellce Analysis alld Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 60. The quoted words 
are those of Prados, who is referring to NIE 11-3-55, 'Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action 
Through 1960' dated 17 May 1955. 
93 I TCS/44 I dated 6 September 1949 from A. Lang-Brown (TCS) to R. D. Neville (JS/JTIC), DEFE 40/26. This 
memorandum also mentions that defection had yielded a certain amount of information on Soviet biological 
warfare research, but TCS was 'up against a blank wall' as far as chemical warfare was concerned. 
932For example, in the field of electronics, Karl Steimel mentioned valve factories at Novosibirsk and Tashkent 
and a magnetron factory at Saratov on the Volga (STIB Interview Report No. 64 dated 9 July 1952, DEFE 41/97). 
Werner Kluge had visited 'Electro-Zavod 632' in Moscow, where prototype cathode ray tubes manufactured at 
the Oberspreewerk were put into production (STlB Interview Report No. 66 dated 28 July 1952, DEFE 41197). In 
the guided missiles field, Walter Klages knew of a V-2 factory and Artillery Institute at Bolshevo (STIB 
Preliminary Interview Report No. 70 dated 13 August 1952, DEFE 41/97) and the research and development 
complex at Novaya, near Moscow, encompassing NIL 885 and Zavod 886 and subordinate to the Ministry of 
Telecommunications (STIB Preliminary Interview Report No. 73 dated 29 August 1952, DEFE 411114). In the 
torpedo field, information was obtained from a number of Germans that there was a torpedo testing station at 
Feodosiya on the Black Sea (DSl Report 78, September 1955, entitled 'Leningrad PF. 500' , DEFE 4411 0). These 
are only examples. The total number of war-related installations revealed by the operation will have been 
significant and this intelligence will have supplemented that obtained from returning prisoners-of-war, German 
wartime intelligence documents and intercepted letters sent from the USSR. 
933For this reason, the ready avai lability in the British press and scientific and technical journals of information 
on British defence research establishments and the people who worked in them caused the scientific intelligence 
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merely did the Germans say where reactors, factories and research and development 
institutes lay, they revealed the connections between them. The intelligence acquired 
from the Riehl Group is the outstanding example. But, in the field of missile control, 
Kurt Milller, who worked at the institute at 228, Leningrad Chaussee, in Moscow, 
named the factories which supplied it. The ZIS factory in Moscow supplied it with 
raw materials such as sheet iron and screws; the Mayak factory in Leningrad 
supplied certain testing equipment; the Sachsenwerk-Radeberg near Dresden 
supplied oscillators; valves came from the Oberspreewerk in East Berlin (the first 
Soviet valves appeared at the institute in 1950); refrigerators were supplied by VEB-
Ktilte in the DDR; fixed condensers came from the Orion Works in Budapest; 
voltmetres came from Vienna; other equipment from the United States and 
Britain.934 
The value of Germans forced to work in the USSR in identifying places of 
intelligence interest there is a theme much neglected in historical writing. The 
existing historiography mentions that German PoWs provided intelligence of targets 
for air attack if it came to war, but that this information, and that provided by 
deported scientists and technicians, was used in spying operations is a neglected 
aspect of intelligence history. For example, Jeffrey Richelson in his book, American 
Espionage and the Soviet Target, makes no reference to deported German scientific 
workers as sources of target intelligence. However, he does discuss the 'Redskin' 
programme, under which CIA officers interviewed businessmen, scientists, 
sportsmen and others who had returned from visits to the Soviet Union. The aim of 
the operation was to use 'ordinary travel itineraries to gather intelligence about 
community great concern (JS/JTIC(48)5 dated 29 June 1949 and entitled ' Disclosure of Information in Scientific 
and Technical Periodicals' , DEFE 411149). 
9340LB/B/57/374 dated 20 September 1957, DEFE 411141. 
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facilities in [the] main metropolitan areas and along the main transportation routes' 
and 'the information provided by the Redskin program helped to close many 
information gaps concerning the Soviet Union' .935 In particular, these private visitors 
are said to have given the CIA a mass of intelligence on important targets, such as 
ICBM manufacturing and deployment sites and SAM installations. They also 
provided a great deal of valuable information on such technologies as biological 
warfare and space exploration and on such weapons as long-range bombers and 
atomic propulsion units. They even brought back electronic goods for examination. 
Knowing the itinerary of the visitor, the CIA often gave him very precise briefing 
information and asked him to bring back information on a particular target. The 
location of the target, Professor Richelson claims, had very often been yielded by a 
U-2 flight. 936 He mentions no other source of briefing information, but it is implicit 
in what he says that there were other sources. So how did the CIA know of the target 
when it had not been located by a U-2 flight, of which there were only twenty-four 
anyway? The intelligence on war-related factories and research and development 
establishments obtained from 'Dragon Returners' undoubtedly provided the CIA and 
MI6 with targets and briefing information for people who were to visit the USSR. 
Moreover, even when the target was located by a U-2, why did the plane fly where it 
did? This is a question which Professor Richelson neither asks nor answers. 
9351. Richelson, AlIlerican Espionage and the Soviet Target, p. 54. 
936J . Richelson, AlIlerican Espionage and the Soviet Target, pp. 54-5, relying on H. Rositzke, The CIA's Secret 
Operations, pp. 59-60. Like the 'Redskin' sources, some ' Dragon Returners' brought back with them to Germany 
goods (for example, radio sets) which they had bought in the USSR. Sometimes they had retained the passes they 
had carried to gain access to particular installations; these were handed over to Technical Section, doubtless to be 
used in secret intelligence operations (STIB Interview Report No. 193 dated 30 December 1954 on Erich 
Hoppenz, DEFE 21142), Like the 'Redskin' sources, the 'Dragon Returners ' had seen serial numbers on Soviet 
equipment, or other markings which indicated whether they were being manufactured in quantity or not. 
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CHAPTER 6 
OVERFLIGHT 
Scientific and technical intelligence influences military strategy because it 
determines what kind of war to prepare for. 937 It helps to answer the question: what 
weaknesses does the enemy have which can be exploited and what strengths does he 
have against which defence must be made? Thus it determines what weapons to 
develop and what strategy to pursue. The intelligence of Soviet weapons and military 
equipment gathered in Germany during the years of the Occupation was passed to the 
weapons design offices of the Ministry of Supply to guide them in their work of 
designing and manufacturing the weapons which would best enable Britain to 
contend with the Soviet Union's growing military power.938 The subject of NATO 
military strategy is too large and too secret to be discussed here. Not merely that, but 
a significant part of the intelligence of value gathered in Occupied Germany was not 
scientific and technical intelligence at all. Rather, it was Order-of-Battle intelligence 
on Soviet war-related science. This information certainly influenced military 
strategy, by enabling the USAF and RAF to draw up plans for an attack on the 
USSR. Nevertheless, it was also used for an intelligence-gathering purpose. The 
Germans told their interrogators where to look for key installations in the Soviet 
military-industrial complex; if they could not identify specific installations of 
937George Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6 in the 1950s, has stated that technical intelligence gathered by the 
Americans played an important role in determining NATO military strategy during the Cold War (xv, foreword to 
A. Cavendish, Illside Illtelligellce) . 
938See, for example, DSIIJTIC(52) 14 dated 16 June 1952 and entitled 'Targets for STIB in Eastern Germany' , 
DEFE 411153. It is here stated that the War Office could give no satisfactory guidance to the Ministry of Supply's 
weapons development establishments on: Soviet guided weapons (either in production or planned); electronic 
warfare measures for use against British radar sets and VT fuzes; anti-aircraft radar and its predictor; and field or 
anti-aircraft guns' VT fuze. STIB was instructed to search for the intelligence the War Office lacked . 
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intelligence interest, they identified cities, like Sverdlovsk, which were of such 
industrial significance that a closer look at them was clearly going to pay dividends. 
This intelligence was used in choosing the routes to be taken by the spyplanes which 
in the 1950s were sent over the Soviet Union on aerial reconnaissance missions. 
These missions yielded scientific and technical intelligence which had a decisive 
impact on American defence policy. 
The deported Germans were not the only sources of information on war-related 
installations in the USSR, but they were an important one. Intercepted radio 
communications and electronic emissions were other important sources. By the end 
of 1952, some 300 Soviet radar stations had been identified, doubtless largely by 
'Ferret' flights and other SIGINT operations. 939 In the later 1950s, communications 
intelligence revealed possible locations for ICBM sites, including the location of the 
first such site, at Plesetsk in north-western Russia.940 By the mid-1950s, whatever 
the nature of their sources, the Americans had clearly had considerable success in 
identifying targets for air attack and intelligence operations, though intelligence is 
said then still to have been 'severely limited'. At the end of 1956, the SAC's basic 
war plan target list contained 2,997 targets. Overflight by U-2 in the late 1950s 
identified a great many new targets, chiefly guided missile bases, airfields related to 
the USSR's growing nuclear strike capability and air defence systems.941 
939Minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 18 November 1952, DEFE 41/76. R. V. Jones, who was Director of 
Scientific Intelligence when these minutes were taken, mentions at p. 15 of Reflectiolls all Illtelligellce that by the 
1950s the USAF had a programme of 'Ferret' flights which had the aim of systematically plotting Soviet radar 
stations. Christopher Andrew's book, For the Presidellt's Eyes Dilly: Secretilltelligence and the American 
Presidency from Washing tall to Blish, tells how 'Ferret ' missions in this period established that in northern 
Siberia there was a large gap in the USSR's air defence system, which would have allowed a nuclear attack to be 
made over the polar icecap, of which the Soviets would have had no warning (p. 220). 
940L. Freedman, US Illtelligence alld the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 72. 
941 D. Ball & J. Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targetillg (Rosenberg article), p. 49. The number would have 
been greater, had the SAC still been responsible for retarding an attack on Western Europe by Soviet 
conventional forces. 
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Evidence exists that the British were overflying the USSR as early as 1948. Among 
the bases used were those at Habbaniya in Iraq and in Crete, which, being close to 
the Soviet Union, allowed the RAF to fly deep into Soviet airspace. The Soviets 
claim that flights were made from Iran. The USAF also sent planes over Soviet 
territory, as the SAC was keen to acquire intelligence of the Soviet air defences it 
would encounter if it ever had to make an attack (and its Commander, Curtis LeMay, 
seems to have hoped that that day would come). The two air forces agreed to 
exchange target intelligence in 1948.942 However, in May 1950 a US Navy Privateer 
was shot down by Soviet fighters off the coast of Latvia and President Truman 
forbade flights over the USSR by American pilots. Electronic and photographic 
reconnaissance flights along its borders continued. Dwight Eisenhower, President 
from 1953, was equally minded to avoid an international incident and only rarely 
authorized overflights. The USAF turned to the RAF to circumvent the spinelessness 
of its Presidents . From April 1952 a special unit of the RAF, equipped with 
American planes and cameras, undertook regular overflights of the USSR, as part of 
a combined RAF-USAF operation codenamed 'Robin'. In return, the USAF passed 
to the RAF photographs of the radar images of targets in the USSR. Such images 
were essential to a bombing assault on the USSR, which would be made at high 
altitude and (since Soviet fighter-interceptors had not then been fitted with radar) 
might take place in bad weather or at night, making it impossible for navigators to 
identify their targets with the naked eye. Flights seem to have been made over 
Moscow and the region to the south of the city, and over targets, including industrial 
942Letter from Maj-Gen . Cabell . the USAF Director of Intelligence. to Air Vice-Marshal Pendred. the Assistant 
Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence). November 1948. Director of Intelligence USAF HQ files . File 2-30003/2-
3099. Box 42. RG 341. USNA. quoted at p. 97 of R. J. Aldrich (ed.). Espionage, Security and Intelligence in 
Britain, 1945-70. 
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cities, throughout southern Russia apd the Ukraine. They certainly penetrated deep 
into the USSR, sometimes 1,000 miles or so into the country. This would take them 
approximately as far as Kuibyshev or Stalingrad, but not as far as the Urals. The 
aircraft the RAF pilots flew were RB-45Cs, which could fly high (up to 38,000 feet) 
and fast. They had an in-flight refuelling capacity which greatly increased their 
range. 943 Flying at night, Soviet fighter-interceptors' lack of radar made them very 
difficult to track down. But the RB-45Cs were rapidly becoming obsolete, and were 
unlikely to have the speed or height to evade their pursuers for much longer. 944 From 
1953 the Canberra was used because it was capable of flying beyond the reach of 
Soviet fighter-interceptors. In May 1953 a Canberra B-2 WD952 set a world record 
for altitude of 63,668 feet. Consequently, it could take photographs during the 
day.945 
So in the early 1950s, the burden of deep penetration of the USSR was borne by the 
RAF. Operation 'Robin' is still shrouded in mystery, but seems to have involved 
both flying along the border of the Soviet Bloc, sometimes straying into its airspace, 
and actually penetrating deeply into the airspace of the Soviet Union itself. In the 
former case, photographs were taken with a 100-inch focal length camera given to 
the RAF by the Americans and so installed in a specially-converted Canberra that it 
pointed out through the side of the aircraft. British overflights of the USSR continued 
throughout the 1950s, although by the mid-1950s they were fewer than American 
overflights.946 A photograph of Baku, taken from a Canberra and dated' 1956' is 
943p. 11 , 'Skulduggery at Sculthorpe', by P. Lashmar, Aeroplalle MOllth/y , Vol. 22, No. 10 (October 1994), pp. 
10-15. That the USAF regarded 'Robin ' as its operation is confirmed at p. 91 of P. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the 
Cold War. 
944p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 67 & 74-5. 
945p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, p. 78. 
946p. 344, 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold War', by R. 1. 
Aldrich, Revielv of Illtematiollal SI/Idies, Vol. 24, No.3 (July 1998), pp. 331-51 . 
313 
~~~ ...................................................................................... . 
held at the Public Record Office. 947 In 1956, at an air show in Moscow, Khrushchev 
threatened a general of the USAF that all his Canberras would be turned into 'flying 
coffins' if they continued their violations of Soviet airspace.948 When President 
Eisenhower, in 1958, became particularly reluctant to authorize the CIA to send its 
U-2s over Soviet territory, the Agency, like the USAF before it, turned to the RAF 
for help. In consequence, four British pilots were assigned to the U-2 programme and 
Harold Macmillan was given the right to order them to overfly the Soviet Union . 
This right he used very sparingly. Some overflights of Soviet territory by USAF 
aircraft in the 1950s may not have had Presidential authorization. For instance, in 
1954 LeMay sent planes over Murmansk, the Kola Peninsula and then deep into the 
USSR, but there is no evidence that Eisenhower was even notified of these flights. 
As often seems to have been the case, the planes' targets were airfields. LeMay, as 
the principal user of the intelligence acquired by aerial reconnaissance, greatly 
influenced the targets of the missions undertaken. The Kola Peninsula, in the very 
north of the USSR, was a well-placed forward area from which bomber strikes could 
be made on the United States. LeMay was understandably eager to find out what 
aircraft were stationed at airfields in the region and consequently sought photographs 
of them.949 Given the proximity of Norway, a member of NATO, it may be that 
signals intelligence gathered by listening posts in Norway had revealed the existence 
and location of the airfields in the peninsula. The northern USSR was also overflown 
in 1956. The USAF flew missions over Eastern Siberia too.950 
947p. 35, 'Canberras over the USSR', by P. Lashmar, Aeroplalle MOllthly, Vol. 23, No.2 (February 1995), pp. 
32-5. This may have no connection with the 'Robin' mission to Baku, but even by 1949 the British were aware of 
no fewer than seven airfields and one flying boat base in and around Baku, as Appendix H to JIC(48) 116 dated 4 
August 1949 (CAB 158/5) shows. 
948p. 35, 'Canberras over the USSR' , by P. Lashmar, Aeroplalle MOllthly , Vol. 23, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 
32-5. 
949p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 84-8 & 91. 
950p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, pp. 90-2. 
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Given the urgency of gathering intelligence on Soviet guided missile technology, a 
natural target for overflight was the testing site at Kapustin Yar. The RAF did indeed 
send a plane to overfly Kapustin Yar, probably in 1953; a modified Mark II Canberra 
took photographs of the site before making its way to Iran. 951 There is uncertainty as 
to how the British and Americans found out about Kapustin Yar which it is now 
possible to resolve. R. H. Mathams, the first Australian scientific intelligence analyst, 
who worked for British Scientific Intelligence in 1955 when COMINT was 
beginning to flow to it from Kapustin Yar, claims in his memoirs that the British 
located the site by close examination of intercepted radio traffic. He also maintains 
that communications intelligence from Kapustin Yar was used to test whether the 
'informed speculation' about Soviet missile development obtained from 'Dragon 
Return' sources like Grottrup and Viebach was in fact correct. Radio 
communications made in the area of the site and intercepted by GCHQ were studied 
very closely and yielded information about the dates, times and success rates of test-
firings. On the basis of this information, the distances covered by the tested missiles 
were estimated. This gradually revealed flight characteristics of the missiles being 
tested and allowed specific types to be distinguished. The rate and sequence of the 
test-firings of the various kinds of missiles enabled conclusions to be drawn about 
the course of Soviet missile development. 952 In late 1954 and early 1955 the 
Americans built a line-of-sight radar at Samsun in Turkey. Using radar detection and 
interception of telemetry signals, they acquired much useful information on Soviet 
951p. 33, 'Canberras over the USSR ', by P. Lashmar, Aeroplane Monthly, Vol. 23, No.2 (February 1995), pp. 
32-5. It is clear from a mention of ' the firing range at Kapustin Yar' by one of the speakers at the 1953 Technical 
Intelligence Conference for British, American and Canadian Assistant Military Attaches that British Intelligence 
by then had knowledge of its location (address of Captain H. F. Protheroe, Mil OC (Guided Weapons) , to the 
MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference 1953 , DEFE 411126). 
952R. H. Mathams, SlIb Rosa, pp. 27-8. 
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medium- and intermediate-range missile tests and on the characteristics of the 
missiles being tested. 953 Further intelligence will have been acquired when a U-2 
overflew Kapustin Yar in 1957.954 U-2s also flew missions along the Soviet border 
during tests at the site, to intercept ground-level telemetry signals.955 
What Mathams says in his memoirs is all very interesting, but in one respect he is 
wrong. Intercepted signals did not reveal the location of the testing site to British 
Scientific Intelligence. It was Operation 'Dragon Return' which did that (building, of 
course, on the general indication of where it lay provided by Tokaev). In the minutes 
of the DSI meeting on 3 July 1951 it is stated that David Evans: 
gave the Meeting some advance details of a report on the interrogation of a 
repatriate who had worked on the Guided Missile range in the Stalingrad 
area. 
The Chairman intervened to ask whether noise listening might produce any 
results from this area and whether the organisations concerned had been 
briefed. 
Mr. Garrard replied that there was very little chance of intercepting signals 
from this area. The Southern end of the Caspian Sea would probably provide 
the best listening site. The ADI (Science) Overseas Party detachment at 
Habbaniya had been briefed although it was not to be expected that any 
useful results would be obtained.956 
What actually happened, it seems, was that a 'Dragon Returner' who had worked 
there provided precise information on where Kapustin Yar lay . Intelligence taken 
953L. Freedman, US Illtelligellce (md the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 69; C. M. Andrew, For the Presidellt's Eyes 
Dilly, pp. 219-20. According to Professor Freedman, it was as a result of U-2 overflight that Kapustin Yar was 
finally established to be a testing site for medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles . This is unlikely. 
Intercepted radio communications will have established this . 
954p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, p. 146; 1. Richelson, A Celltllry of Spies: Illtelligence in the 
Twentieth Centllry, p. 267 . 
955c. Pocock, Dragoll Lady, p. 35. There was a need for these flights because the mighty radar at Samsun could 
only track the missiles being tested once they rose above the radar horizon, while the signals interception stations 
in Turkey were also too far away to intercept important signals made in the early part of the missile's flight. 
956Minutes of DSIIJTIC meeting on 3 July 1951, DEFE 41175 . ' Noise listening' is now called ELI NT (electronic 
intelligence). 
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from him confirmed the conclusion reached by the British, on the basis of the 
interrogation of Werner Baum, that the V -2-type missiles made at Podlipki were 
'test-launched at a range in the Stalingrad area' .957 Despite initial scepticism as to 
whether it would be possible to intercept signals made at the site, such messages 
were, in time, intercepted and revealed much about the missiles tested there. Who 
was this informant? The report, advance details of which Evans gave to the DSI 
meeting, establishes that in July 1951 he was a thirty-three-year-old test engineer, 
whose wartime service had been at Peenemiinde, Nordhausen and Lehesten, but it 
does not disclose his name, probably because he was then still working in the Soviet 
Zone. On his return to East Germany from Khimki in September 1950, he was given 
a job at the VMW Kombinat in Chemnitz, which manufactured machine tools. An 
acquaintance of his, a commercial contact of STIB, sought to find him a job in West 
Germany and put him in touch with STIB as well. He arranged a trip to Berlin, where 
he gave a STIB officer an account of his experiences in the USSR. Though he had 
worked with Baum at Khimki, unlike Baum he was a test engineer and was taken to 
Kapustin Yar in 1947 in the company of Grottrup and other Germans. The test site 
was, he said, 'near Stalingrad'. He described the route taken thus: 
The journey took about a week and they travelled via Moscow to Kuibyshev. 
From there they travelled south, joining a branch line from Saratov. This line 
would eventually go to Astrakan. The FMS train, however, joined the branch 
line to Stalingrad at Bastkunschak. They finally came to a stop at a place 
called Kapustinyar [of which he drew a map].958 
957STIB/PF.80370/DRlGWWP dated 9 February 1951, DEFE 21131. 
958STIB Interview Report No. 25 dated 5 July 1951 , DEFE 41/89. The source was almost certainly Ing. Alfred 
Klippel, who had worked with Werner Baum at Zavod 456 and whom Baum mentioned to his interrogators as 
having been present at test-firings at the missile testing site near Stalingrad (STIB Preliminary Interrogation 
Report No. 200 on Dip!. Ing. Werner BaUIn, DEFE 41/135). F. !. Ordway III and M. R. Sharpe, at p. 331 of The 
Rocket Team, confirm both that Klippel was a propulsion test engineer and that he attended the test-firings at 
Kapustin Yar in 1947. Klippel also provided information on the test-firings themselves. He said that about thirty 
missiles had been fired there over the period from August to October 1947. The missiles were V -2s. In the case of 
most of the missiles fired, fuel cut-off took place under normal accelerometer control, but in some cases cut-off 
was controlled by radar. The firing was eastwards towards the salt lakes. 
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This report was copied to various branches of US Intelligence: the US Liaison 
Officer at Intelligence Division, the Office of the Director of Intelligence at the 
USAFE's HQ and the Office of the Director of Intelligence at HICOG.959 
Consistently with this, the Americans claim to have learned the location of Kapustin 
Yar from 'Dragon Returners '. The former CIA officer Dino Brugioni told a recent 
historian of overflights, 'We found out about the missile tests at Kapustin Yar from 
the German scientific returnees' yffJ The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence in the 
1950s, Bob Amory, later said that the Agency first learned of the site's location 'in 
1952, or about then' .961 This actual year was of course 1951, but the British and the 
Americans will indeed have learned more about the site in 1952, when returners from 
Ostashkov arrived back in Germany, among them Fritz Matheis, a technical 
photographer who had in this capacity attended the test-firings at Kapustin Yar in 
1947, of which he gave an account. 962 
959'HICOG' stood for 'High Commissioner for Germany ' . 
9ffJp. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, p. 76. In the light of Brugioni' s statement and the information on 
Kapustin Yar obtained from Tokaev, Baum and Klippel, Jeffrey Richelson's account of how US Intelligence 
found out where the principal Soviet missile testing site was located is clearly wrong. Professor Richelson relates 
that, 'Late in 1954, a number of apparent telemetry signals from Soviet missile launches had been intercepted 
from the vicinity of the Kapustin Yar area. Certain characteristics of the signals revealed a similarity to the 
telemetry system designed by German scientists for the Soviets, but the data were not ambiguous ... . Obtaining 
photographs of the center became a top priority for the CIA .... The CIA turned to the British, who flew a 
Canberra all the way from Germany to the Volga and down into Persia - obtaining "some fair pictures'" 
(Americal/ Espial/age al/d the Soviet Target, p. 139). He tells the same story on p. 264 of A Cel/tllry of Spies. This 
story sounds like disinformation, used to cover up a source of intelligence. The mention in the quotation of 
information obtained from German scientific deportees is interesting, since, of course, it indicates the real source 
of the information. John Prados gives a completely different account of how and when the location of Kapustin 
Yar was discovered. He maintains (in The Soviet Estimate at p. 57) that its location was known from the spring of 
1947 and that in 1948 a British communications intelligence team, posing as archaeologists, monitored missile 
tests at Kapustin Yar from Iran. He cites no source for either claim and I treat these assertions as unreliable in 
themselves and inconsistent with other evidence. Prados also maintains (at p. 58) that Kapustin Yar, which is in 
fact in Russia, lies in the Ukraine. 
961p. 32, 'Canberras over the USSR' , by P. Lashmar, Aeroplal/e MOl/thly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 
32-5. 
962STlB Interview Report No. 97 dated 19 January 1953 on Fritz Matheis, DEFE 41/98. A fact which was 
considered significant by those who analysed his information (the passage is underlined in the report) was that 
before the firing trials all V-2s later fired were tested on a normal A-4 test stand, which had been brought from 
the firing site at Lehesten in Thuringia. This piece of intelligence probably indicated that the missiles fired at 
Kapustin Yar were not much different from the V-2s for which this test stand had been built. 
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R. H. Mathams makes the point that one intelligence target, being connected with 
other war-related installations, tends to lead to others. During his brief work-
experience placement with British Scientific Intelligence, he was asked: 
to plot aircraft movements in the vicinity of the range to delineate the areas 
closed to general air traffic and thus roughly define the limits of the firing 
range. Also, by studying and correlating a mass of information on aircraft 
movements, I was able to identify aircraft (by their registration) that were 
specifically associated with the range-head airfield and, by identifying other 
airfields used frequently by these aircraft, was able to propose certain 
industrial towns for closer investigation as likely candidates for missile 
development or production.963 
The great age of overflying the Soviet Union began in July 1956, when the first 
overflights by Lockheed U-2s were made. The U-2 could fly at 70,000 feet, beyond 
the range of Soviet air defences.964 Unwilling to increase the tension between the 
superpowers, President Eisenhower was very reluctant to give permission for flights 
over the USSR and only twenty-four U-2 missions were flown over Soviet territory 
in the four years of the operation. 965 The operation began against a backdrop of 
American fears of a 'bomber gap' and accordingly among the planes' targets were 
most of the known Soviet bomber bases. The very first flight, on 4 July, 
photographed long-range bomber bases in the Western USSR. 966 An important base, 
overflown in one of the earliest U-2 flights, was the Ramenskoye base, near 
Moscow.967 This was an important flight, for among the aircraft stationed below 
were Myasishchev M-4 ('Bison') long-range bombers. When nine of these planes 
had appeared at the Air Force Display of 1955, the Soviets had artfully flown them 
twice past the reviewing stand, so giving the Americans to believe that they had 
963R. H. Mathams. Sub Rosa. p. 28. 
9640. Brugioni. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the ClIban Missile Crisis . p. 18. 
965p. Lashmar. Spy Flights of the Cold War. p. 152. 
9660. Brugioni . Eyeball to Eyeball. p. 30. 
967p. Lashmar. Spy Flights of the Cold War. p. 143. 
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eighteen of the planes and provoking fears of a 'bomber gap' ,968 This, like the first 
Soviet thermonuclear test two years before, had spurred on the U-2 development 
programme.969 But when they were photographed and counted at Ramenskoye 
airfield, there proved to be far fewer of them than had been feared. 97o This is of 
much interest, since Germans had had much to do with Ramenskoye. A Junkers team 
had worked at the Ramenskoye airfield, testing the Soviet version of the V-I and 
other aircraft. One of its members, a mechanic called Horst Richter, fled the DDR in 
1951 and gave British Intelligence the location and a general description of the 
airfield. He had also been to two further airfields in the Moscow region , Toplistan 
and Borki, and gave their location. 971 Tokaev had mentioned the base, because 
TsAGI, the principal Soviet centre for aerodynamic research and development, was a 
couple of kilometres away. 972 Of course, by the mid-1950s, the prominence of the 
airfield was such that even air attaches of Western countries were allowed to visit 
Ramenskoye. 973 
968.1. Prados , The Soviet Estill/ate, p. 43. 
969c. M. Andrew, For the Presidellt 's Eyes Dilly, p. 221 . 
970p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, p. 143. 
971 STIB Interrogation Report No. 305 dated 25 October 1951 on Horst Richter, OEFE 41196. Richter al so 
provided information on the aircraft based at these airfields. However, he was considered a ' low-grade source' 
and his information was only to be relied upon if there was confirmation for it. Moreover, this was not the first 
intelligence the British received of the airfield. OSIIJTIC(50)6 dated I November 1950 and entitled, 'Places of 
Interest to OSIIJTIC in the USSR ' (OEFE 41/152) refers to Ramenskoye as an experimental flight testing centre. 
The last information received on it had concerned the airfield in January 1946. No PoW camp is stated to lie 
nearby , so it is unlikely that the information came from a PoW. Perhaps it came from Tokaev. Other Germans 
must have become aware of the airfield, because there was a 'cooling off' camp, 5110/48, for Germans nearby, 
between ll'ynskaya and Ramenskoye. Herbert Schmitz, the Ri ehl Group technician, was held there for more than 
four years before being sent back to Germany (STIB Interview Report No. 211 dated 23 April 1955 on Herbert 
Schmitz, OEFE 21/43). 
972See, for example , the mention by 'Excise' (Tokaev's codename) of 'the Gasodynamics Laboratory ofTsAGI-
Ramenskoye' at paragraph 16 of his comments on the Stalin Prizewinners in 1952, OSI Memorandum No. 13 
dated 18 April 1952, OEFE 41/153 . He will , of course, have discussed the centres of Soviet airpower in his 
debriefings of 1948-9. 
973J. Richelson, AII/ericall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target, p. 51. 
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U-2 overflights undermined the idea of a 'bomber gap', because they yielded no 
evidence of a large bomber force. By December 1956, only a few months after the 
start of the operation, estimates of the size of the Soviet long-range bomber force had 
been greatly reduced. 974 They were reduced further in the light of intelligence 
acquired by U-2 flights in 1957 and 1958. In time, the 'bomber gap' disappeared (for 
the Americans at least).975 U-2 photography also undermined the 'missile gap' scare, 
which had begun in August 1957, when the first Soviet test-firing of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile had been detected, and had risen to fever pitch with 
Sputnik's flight the following October. U-2s overflew production and possible 
deployment areas in the Urals region and Siberia, but failed to locate any ICBM 
deployment site. By the end of 1960, only one such site had been identified -
Plesetsk.976 Satellite reconnaissance late in 1960 established conclusively that the 
USSR's force of ICBMs was tiny - only four missiles, deployed at Plesetsk. 977 
Khrushchev's repeated claims of superior missile strength were a bluff and the 
Americans, partly thanks to U-2 photography, knew it. This encouraged them to 
stand firm in Berlin.978 
Airfields and missile sites were not the U-2s' only targets. Atomic production and 
development installations were among their targets in the years 1957-9.979 According 
to Jeffrey Richelson, they 'searched for atomic energy installations along the Trans-
9741. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 46; P. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War , p. 144; C. Pocock, Dragon 
Lady: A History of the U-2 Spyplane, p. 29. 
975c. M. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. 224; L. Freedman, US Intelligence alld the Soviet Strategic 
Threat, p. 67; J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 49. 
9760. Brugioni , Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 35-6. 
977c. M. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. 250; O. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 54-5. 
9780 . Brugioni , Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 39-40. 
9790 . Brugioni , Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 35. 
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Siberian Railway' .980 They probably. looked for them there, because, thanks to 
Germans, they already knew that the Cheliabinsk-40 reactors and the Cheliabinsk-70 
laboratory were located close to that very railway. The U-2s sent on missions over 
the USSR always had specific targets; although they did fly along railway lines 
fishing for finds, they did so while making their way to specific targets. 981 Most of 
the '1037(P), returners were interrogated by both British and American 
representatives.982 The CIA will therefore have acquired their information on atomic 
installations. It is known that uranium mines, processing installations, weapons 
production facilities and stockpile sites were all overflown to confirm intelligence 
received of them.983 To this list should be added reactors and enrichment plants.984 
German sources, by providing intelligence of the location of uranium mines, 
processing sites and atomic plants, helped to guide the U-2s to some, at least, of their 
atomic targets. Khrushchev was particularly enraged by a flight on 9 April 1960 
which passed over Kazakhstan and took photographs of three of the USSR's most 
secret installations, all central to the development of its military technology: the great 
complex at Sary Shagan where missiles to intercept incoming ballistic missiles were 
being developed, the Baikonur missile test and space-launch site at Tyuratam and 
finally the thermonuclear weapon test site near Semipalatinsk.985 How the CIA first 
learned of the location of the Semipalatinsk test site is unknown; it may have been 
from Alexander Koch and his fellow-refugee in 1955. These two certainly gave their 
interrogators a general indication of where it lay. Interrogators representing all the 
980J. Richelson, A CenllIry of Spies, p. 267. 
981c. Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 35. 
982See Chapter 4. 
983c. Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 36. 
984rhat these were overflown was stated by none other than the Director of Central Intelligence himself, Allen 
Dulles: see below. Since PoWs and ' 1037(P)' returners certainly provided intelligence of them, they must have 
been overflown in part to confirm this intelligence. 
985y. Zubok & c. Pleshakov, II/side the Kremlin 's Cold War, p. 203. 
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principal Western intelligence services were stationed at refugee camps in West 
Germany.986 This important find led to another one, for a U-2 stumbled across the 
Baikonur Cosmodrome, quite by accident, on its way to Semipalatinsk.987 This was a 
find of great significance, for Baikonur was the Soviet testing site for intercontinental 
and other long-range ballistic missiles and intelligence interest in such sites was then 
avid. 
Gary Powers' fateful flight in 1960, the most ambitious of all the U-2 overflights for 
he was to cross the whole of the USSR, followed a route marked out by Germans. He 
took off from Peshawar in Pakistan and entered the USSR in the Dushanbe region, 
where Soviet radar defences were poor. He overflew Stalinabad (where, according to 
intelligence acquired by STIB in Germany, uranium was mined988), passed over 
Tyuratam and then, according to one of the CIA's interpreters of U-2 photography, 
made his way north to overfly 'the nuclear plants in the Urals' .989 He passed over 
Cheliabinsk, no doubt photographing Cheliabinsk-40 and Cheliabinsk-70 as he did 
so, and made for Sverdlovsk. His plane was shot down near Sverdlovsk on 1 May.990 
Two uranium enrichment plants (Sverdlovsk-44 and Sverdlovsk-45) were located 
near the city. In the same region lay the warhead assembly plant codenamed 
Zlatoust-36. The CIA had received information on Sverdlovsk-44 from Karl-Franz 
Zuhlke, in 1955, and from other 'Dragon Returners'. Zuhlke said it lay in the Urals; 
986K. Eichner & A. Oobbert, Headquarters GerlllallY: Die USA-Geheillldiellste in Deutsch/alld, p. 204. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the location of the Semipalatinsk test site was determined earlier, using seismic 
monitoring devices. Jeffrey Richelson relates, at p. 89 of Alllericall Espiollage alld the Soviet Targ et , that several 
American seismic monitoring devices were by the early 1950s situated in Iran, alert for any Soviet atomic test. 
However, they were removed late in 1952 (or thereabouts) because it was feared that the Shah was about to fall. 
987c. Pocock, Dragoll Lady, p. 36; P. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, p. 14'6. Pocock writes that the 
Baikonur Cos mod rome was discovered in 1957, Lashmar that this happened in 1958. 
988See Chapter 2. 
9890 . Brugioni , Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 43. 
990c. Pocock, Dragoll Lady, p. 48; 1. Richelson, Alllericall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target, p. 150. 
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another source may have known its precise location.991 Many thousands of German 
PoWs had worked in the Sverdlovsk area and their interrogation had established the 
city's importance. The exploitation of German intelligence documents had stressed 
the wartime relocation of Soviet war-related industry to the Urals region, as well as 
Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. 992 Even if Sverdlovsk-45 was not among 
Powers' targets, it will have been too big for any U-2 to miss. Even then it was a 
very large complex, incorporating a number of plants, where not only was uranium 
enriched, but warheads were also assembled and weapons stored. Powers had been 
meant to fly on to the ICBM base under construction at Yurya, the missile test centre 
at Plesetsk where ICBMs were being deployed, the submarine shipyard at 
Severodvinzk, various of the many military installations in the Kola Peninsula and, 
lastly, the naval bases at Murmansk, before landing in Norway.993 
Some of the instructions given to the U-2 pilots were so precise that it is difficult to 
believe they can have come from any source other than a human source who had 
9910LB/B/56/63 dated I June 1956, OEFE 41/159. Zuhlke had been told this by Thiessen, Barwich and Schutze, 
who had been to the plant. As related in Chapter 5, Wilhelm Menke remarked that Thiessen and Barwich had 
been several times to the Cheliabinsk region, perhaps to a diffusion plant. 
992That the CIA was aware of the wartime relocation of more than 1,500 war-related factories is clear from pp. 
5-6 of Oino Brugioni 's book, Eyeball to Eyeball. Brugioni comments that the plants had been transported from 
the Western USSR to 'the Urals, Siberia, and to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Cities like Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, 
Omsk, Novosibirsk and Tashkent had grown phenomenally. Little was known, however, about the precise 
location or production operations at these reconstructed and expanded plants. Since most of them had been 
dedicated to defense production, it was essential to know how many aircraft, tanks, guns, and missiles they were 
producing at their new locations. It was known that a nuclear industry was being established in the Urals, but 
little detailed information was avail able. We also knew that the Russians were dismantling many of the German 
missile, aircraft, armament plants, and research establishments and relocating them in newly constructed plants 
beyond the Urals'. It is likely that this information came more-or-less wholly from German sources: wartime 
intelligence reports on the relocation of Soviet industry, German pri soners-of-war and scientific workers with 
knowledge of construction and development work in the USSR, and refugees from, or agents in, factories 
dismantled by the Soviet authorities in Germany. The map at Appendix B is based on information obtained from 
some of these sources. All the areas mentioned by Brugioni are marked on the map-as areas of industrial 
development. 
9930 . Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 43; C. Pocock, Dragon Lady, pp. 47 & 56. Pocock relates at p. 47 of 
Dragon Lady that Powers was to fly over Plesetsk because signals intelligence had given ri se to the fear that it 
was being turned into an ICBM base. It appears from pp. 35-6 of Brugioni 's Eyeball to Eyeball that by the end of 
1960 the CIA had established that ICBMs had indeed been deployed at Plesetsk. 
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worked either in or near the targeted installation. For example, on one occasion a 
British U-2 pilot managed to obtain photographs of a new type of bomber. He had 
targeted the very factory in which it was made, as he himself has related: 
The picture I was most proud of was of an aircraft factory. The CIA told me 
to fly exactly down this road through a town. They didn't normally have 
maps of the town but they did of this town. It was essential to go down this 
road because on one side of the road was the airframe factory, on the other 
side was the engine factory. I was able to film both sides.994 
So 'Dragon Return 'I' Project Prodigal' intelligence played a notable role in providing 
U-2s and other reconnaissance aircraft with targets. By a pleasant irony, the most 
common nickname for the U-2 was 'Dragon Lady'. This nickname owed nothing to 
the intelligence operation of a similar name, but was inspired by an Oriental 
character in an American comic strip. However, 'Dragon Return' cannot have been 
the only intelligence operation in Germany to yield information about places of 
intelligence interest in the USSR. The information acquired in the great prisoner-of-
war interrogation operations of the late 1940s and early 1950s also provided targets 
for overflight, as, clearly, did SIGINT operations, Operation 'Matchbox' and 
Operation 'Gold'. Its 'Wringer' interrogations of returned prisoners-of-war were 
clearly of significance for the USAF's later overflight initiatives. One of these did 
not involve aeroplanes at all; rather, under the half-baked 'Genetrix' programme 
balloons equipped with high-altitude cameras were released in Europe and sent 
drifting over the USSR to Japan. The aerial photographs of the Soviet Union which 
the USAF possessed at that time were German wartime photographs captured at the 
end of the War. As such, they were increasingly out-of-date and they were of those 
parts of the Soviet Union which lay west of the Urals. The USAF was keen to 
994p. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, p. 153 . 
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acquire photographs of the Eastern USSR because it lacked, in the words of a 
memorandum written in October 1950, at the birth of the operation: 
prints to aid in the confirmation or denial of such reports as those of atomic 
production centers, of new industrial developments, of new rail yards, and 
airfields.995 
In other words, the USAF wanted photographs of such installations as Cheliabinsk-
40 and Tomsk-7, of the existence of which the PoWs had informed them. Five 
hundred and sixteen balloons were released in the first three months of 1956. 
Although one 'Genetrix' balloon stumbled across the Dodonovo nuclear refining 
facility in Siberia, the operation was not of much value, because it proved impossible 
to tell precisely where the pictures had been taken. Consequently, it was called off 
early.996 
German sources, in giving the U-2s many of their targets, enabled a penetrating 
investigation to be made of the USSR's military-industrial complex and war-making 
capability. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1960: 
The U-2 program has helped confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range 
bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has 
established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new 
medium-range bomber with supersonic capabilities. The U-2 program has 
covered many long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the 
location of bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also 
acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them. 
Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground 
facilities involved with respect to the Soviet missile system programs .... 
Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of 
Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the 
995J. Richelson, AlIlerican Espionage and the Soviet Target, p. 129. 
996J. Richelson, AlIlerican Espionage and the Soviet Target, pp. 138-9. 
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use ... which the Soviet Union is making of these sites for training troops and 
the operational use of the short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. 
The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy 
program. . .. This coverage has included the production of fissionable 
materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, 
and size of many stockpile sites .... The Soviet nuclear testing ground has 
been photographed with extremely interesting results more than once. 
The photography also has given us our first firm information on the 
magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium 
processing facilities vital in estimating the Soviet fissionable material 
production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and 
forward storage facilities. 997 
In short, the U-2 programme was a resounding success. Richard Helms, Director of 
Central Intelligence 1966-73, declared in 1975 that the U-2 flights had yielded 90% 
of the hard intelligence on Soviet military developments which US Intelligence had 
acquired in the four years of the programme's life.998 The programme established 
both that the USA's war-related scientific research and development was of better 
quality than that of the Soviet Union and that its actual military capability was 
greater.999 It demonstrated that the United States had better weapons than the USSR 
and that its strategic weapons - long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles - were more extensively deployed . Moreover, the United States' military 
997quoted at pp. 151-2 of J. Richelson, Americall Espiollage alld the Soviet Target. Furthermore, it appears from 
p. 37 of Dino Brugioni 's Eyeball to Eyeball that biological and chemical warfare installat ions were photographed 
in the course of the U-2 programme. The British were certainly interested in acquiring intelli gence on such targets 
from overflights. The Air Ministry in the mid-1950s pressed the scientific intelligence community for tips as to 
' recognition features' which would allow the Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (UK) to identify 
from photographs atomic installations and biological and chemical weapons factories (letter dated 14 July 1954 
from Air Intelligence (6) to the DSI; letter dated 12 August 1954 from ADSI 2 to DCDRD, Ministry of Supply, 
DEFE 41/156). However, the reply was that it was unlikely that aerial reconnaissance could help in identifying 
either weapons factories or testing ranges, because the factories would look no different from ordinary industrial 
factories and, as a general rule, the testing ranges would look no different from ordinary artillery ranges 
(documents entitled, 'Notes on Recognition of CW Activities' and 'Notes on Recognition of BW Activities from 
the Air', both attached to letter dated 4 December 1954 from DCDRD to ADSI 2, DEFE 41/156). However, 
thanks to their German sources of the 1940s and I 950s, the British and Americans did not have to locate some of 
these installations; they already knew where they were. Missile sites and atomic installations, of course, were far 
more easily recognizable from the air. 
998J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 102. 
9990. Brugioni , Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 37 & 42. 
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advantage was growing. ICXXl U-2 photography showed the 'bomber gap' to be a myth 
and, in combination with satellite reconnaissance, established that Khrushchev's 
claims to a strong ICBM force were false. Eisenhower declared in a radio broadcast 
that~ 'the over-all military strength of the Free World is distinctly greater than that of 
the Communist countries' . This awareness caused him to resist demands for 
expenditure on weapons to counter weapons he now knew the Soviets did not have. 
U-2 aerial reconnaissance thus averted a further escalation of the arms race and 
helped to stabilize the Cold War.HX)J 
lCXXlO. Brugioni , Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 55. 
lOOlc. M. Andrew, For the President 's Eyes Only, pp. 241-3; D. Brugioni, E);eball to Eyeball, p. 52. Eisenhower 
wrote at p. 547n of his memoirs , The White HOllse Years, Vol. II , Waging Peace, that, ' the U-2 program produced 
intelligence of critical importance to the United States. Perhaps as important as the positive information - what 
the Soviets did have - was the negative information it produced - what the Soviets did not have' . The U-2 
'provided proof that the horrors of the alleged "bomber gap" and the later " missile gap" were nothing more than 
imaginative creations of irresponsibility' . 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
This is a story of Soviet post-war reconstruction and of the role of Germans in it. The 
Soviets made very poor use of the Germans they forced into their service. Even at the 
time, they realized that the benefit being extracted from the Germans was small. In 
the autumn of 1948 Boris Vannikov visited Sungul. Morale among the Germans was 
low and they complained to him about the laboratory regime and the restrictions 
placed on their movements. He was not interested in their complaints. When it was 
pointed out to him that such conditions could not but harm their work, he replied that 
he and the government he represented knew full well that the use of compulsion was 
diminishing the benefit being derived from their labour, but there was no intention of 
changing their working conditions. In an effort to console them, he told the following 
crude and familiar story: 
During a very cold winter, a small bird flew across Siberia. Because of the 
great cold, it got tired after a while, and fell to the ground. While it lay there 
exhausted and helpless and believing its end to be near, a cow came along 
and let something warm drop on its almost frozen body . The little bird 
recovered after a while because of the warmth and began to move about and 
beat its wings. It had just succeeded in freeing itself from the stuff that held it, 
the very stuff that had saved it from death, when a passing cat saw it and 
devoured it on the spot! Now, you see, gentlemen, this story has a triple 
moral; not everybody who throws muck at you is your enemy! If you are 
down and out in the 'muck', do not kick too much. Not everybody who gets 
you out of it is your friend. 1002 
A different moral is to be drawn from Vannikov's story. The story depicts the 
dilemma of German scientists, engineers and technicians with knowledge of military 
l002paragraph lIS , STIB Interview Report No. 211 dated 23 April 1955 on Herbert Schmitz, DEFE 21/43. 
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application in the ten or so years after the Second World War. In the West they were 
in the Dustbin; in the East they were in shit. 
The Germans' natural response was to flee from both. Dr. Paul Herold, one of the 
Directors of the Leunawerk, is a case in point. In June 1945 he was evacuated by the 
Americans from Leuna, to deny him to the Soviets . On his release from American 
control in West Germany, he returned to Leuna, presumably because the Americans 
were unwilling to give him a proper job. 1003 His value to the Soviets was such that in 
October 1946 they deported him to the USSR, where he spent several unhappy years. 
On his return to the DDR he was re-appointed a Director at the Leunawerk so that he 
would stay in the East. BI.H he fled to West Germany in 1958.1004 
In Professor Naimark's excellent book, The Russians in Gennany, is a chapter on 
'The Soviet Use of German Science', in which the author concludes that: 
Clearly there would have been a Soviet space program without the Germans 
and a Soviet atom bomb without Wismut and the German physicists. But 
there is no question that German science, technology, research methods and 
material were important, if not indispensable, to these accomplishments. 
In the light of Chapter 5 of this thesis, Professor Naimark's argument looks glib. 
Setting to one side for a moment uranium from the Erzgebirge and Soviet use of their 
research data and equipment, German scientists were far from being indispensable to 
the projects on which they worked in the USSR; indeed, for the most part, their help 
was dispensed with.lOO5 Vannikov's visit to Sungul in 1948 shows that it was 
lOO3Herold's name is on p. 25 of an undated list (headed 'EP 254-86') of those evacuated from central Germany 
in June 1945 which is held in FO 1031/67. JSJT/STO(49)59 dated 16 February 1949 (DEFE 411146) states that 
he returned to Leuna from Rosenthal in the US Zone in the autumn of 1945. 
lOO4Report dated 23/4/59 and entitled, 'Bericht tiber die Republikabgange aus der chemischen Industrie', DY 
30/1V 219.04/669, SAPMO. The report notes that of the fifty-five returners from the USSR who had taken up jobs 
at the three large chemical plants in Bitterfeld, twenty-six had defected to the West. 
IOO5David Holloway makes the same assessment of the German role in the Soviet atomic project, arguing that 
the only significant German contribution to it was the Riehl Group's rapid production of uranium metal (Sla/ill 
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understood at the highest level that poor use was being made of the Germans, but 
there was no intention of using them more productively. 
Of course, good use was made of some German scientists. Pride of place goes to the 
Riehl Group. Steenbeck gave assistance to the development of the ultracentrifuge 
and Thiessen, Ziehl and Reichmann to the development of diffusion barriers. 1006 The 
mouths of Steenbeck and Thiessen were stopped with gold, but their inventions were 
not actually put into service. Counterpart Soviet apparatuses were preferred to them. 
Siegfried Gunter probably influenced the development of Soviet fighter design. 
It may be that little use was made of many of the Germans deported in October 1946 
because no thought had been given to what they would do in the USSR. They may 
well have been regarded by the MVD merely as part of the equipment transported 
East in the great wave of factory dismantling which had taken place in the summer of 
that year. However, the Soviets were clearly keen to use Germans to accelerate their 
scientific and technical progress, while at the same time keeping their war-related 
research and development projects secret from them. With the outstanding exception 
of the Riehl Group, which had an urgent task to perform on which the Soviet atomic 
project depended, the Germans were held at arm's length from Soviet research and 
development. The Soviets restricted the nature of the work done by the Germans and 
separated them physically from Soviet development projects. In effect, they were 
consultants used to generate ideas. Considerable use was made of some Germans -
for instance, the Grottrup rocket group, the Hertz and von Ardenne teams in Sukhumi 
and, most of all, the Riehl Group - while very little was made of others. 
alld the Bomb: the Soviet Unioll alld Atomic Ellergy 1939-56, p. 221 ). 
l006STIB Interview Report No. 221 dated 19 July 1955 on Dr. Karl Zimmer, DEFE 21143. 
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The Soviet government's failure to make good use of scientific workers it took 
drastic measures to keep in its grip reflects its character: incompetent and very 
suspicious. The struggle between the Occupiers of Germany for her scientific 
knowhow helps to establish how and when the Cold War came into being. It did not, 
as Martin McCauley suggests, begin in 1943, when quarrels between the 
superpowers came to dominate world politics. l007 Rather, it began when, with its 
conquest of Eastern Europe in 1944 1008 and Eastern Germany in 1945 the USSR's 
power became threatening. Most fundamentally, fear of the Soviet Union was fear of 
its weaponry. German technology threatened to increase Soviet military power and 
Britain and the United. States evacuated scientific workers from the Eastern Zone in 
an attempt to prevent this from happening. In the secret world of the intelligence 
services, East and West were fighting one another by 1945. The Berlin Blockade, 
though it signalled to the world that a Cold War had begun, was just another clash in 
the struggle for power over Germany. Scientific intelligence gathered in Germany in 
the 1940s fuelled hostility to the Soviet Union and so helped to start the Cold War. 
The resulting awareness of Soviet military strength spurred on British and American 
weapons development and drove the two countries into close collaboration in 
gathering intelligence and organizing their defence. 
Therefore, at the heart of the Cold War was the arms race. The exploitation of 
Germans, by both East and West, provided fuel for it. Many of the arms at issue were 
German. Soviet exploitation of German scientific workers and prisoners-of-war for 
their labour and knowledge yielded an intelligence benefit to Britain and the USA, 
l007M. McCauley, The Origills of the Cold War 1941-1949, p. 99. 
l008Which, according to Richard Nixon at p. 16 of Seize the MOII/ellt: All/erica's Challellge ill a Olle-
Superpower World, is when the Cold War began. 
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which they exploited in an attempt to follow the pace of technological development 
in the USSR. This subject has been neglected in historical writing. For instance, 
Professor Lawrence Freedman comments at p. 65 of his book, US Intelligence and 
the Soviet Strategic Threat, that, 'Prior to overhead reconnaissance, the only 'hard' 
evidence on the Soviet military effort came either from information produced by the 
Soviet government, which was sparse and not trusted, or else from visible 
observations'. This statement obviously needs revision in the light of this thesis. 
Much intelligence of Soviet military-industrial reconstruction and war-related 
research and development projects, both in East Germany and in the USSR itself, 
was acquired from German former prisoners-of-war and scientific workers prior to 
1956. 1009 The intelligence gathered was only not 'hard' insofar as it was uncertain 
whether the weapons developed would be incorporated into the Soviet arsenal. In 
establishing the range of possible weapons which NATO faced, this intelligence will 
have had a profound effect on military strategy. 
Other historians have also omitted to take the intelligence exploitation of Occupied 
Germany sufficiently into account when considering the West's intelligence assault 
on the Soviet Union. John Prados, in his book, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence 
Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, maintains that in the late 1940s American 
analysts of the Soviet atomic project knew only that the MVD was actively mining 
for uranium in Czechoslovakia and that reports had been received from 'German 
sources after 1948' that uranium was being mined in the Soviet U nion. IOIO In fact, 
both the Americans and the British knew much more than that. Most obviously of all, 
they knew that a huge mining effort was underway in the Erzgebirge in East 
1009 At p. 68 of US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat Professor Freedman does indeed mention the 
interrogation of the Ostashkov group and other returning rocket specialists in the early 1950s. 
10101. Prados, The Soviet Estill/ate: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 19. 
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Germany, which was yielding an un~xpectedly large amount of uranium. Prados 
omits to mention this. Moreover, at the very least, they knew from German sources 
that the Soviets had deported to the USSR experts in the manufacture of pure 
uranium metal and put them to work on its production at Elektrostal' near Moscow, 
had established research projects on the Black Sea involving German specialists in 
isotope separation, were manufacturing wire mesh in East Germany of such fineness 
that it could serve as a filter in a device for uranium enrichment and were acquiring 
even more such mesh in the West. They knew that calcium for the Soviet atomic 
project was being distilled at Bitterfeld in the Soviet Zone and transported to 
Elektrostal' for use in the manufacture of uranium metal. 1011 They knew that reactors 
for the production of plutonium were being built near Cheliabinsk and Tomsk. Thus, 
even before the first Soviet atomic bomb was tested, British Scientific Intelligence 
knew that the fissionable material used in it would be plutonium. 1012 Prados also 
comments that the acquisition of important sources of intelligence on the USSR 
came after the atomic test in August 1949.1013 While this is true, two qualifying 
remarks need to be made. Some important sources were tapped before August 1949 
(Blumenkamp and other PoWs, for example) and another was the body of deported 
German scientific workers, whose profitable exploitation in the 1950s was merely 
the culmination of events which had occurred, and work the Germans had done, 
before the Soviet test. Indeed, the test ended the active participation of most of the 
Germans in the First Chief Directorate's projects, for they were no longer needed. 
10110. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battiegrolllld Berlill: CIA vs. KGB ill the Cold War , p. 14. By the 
spring of 1947 word had already reached the British of shipments of uranium ore to Elektrostal' and more 
information was sought on the activities of the plant there (letter dated 2 April 1947 from the JS/JTIC to EPES, 
FIAT, FO 1031/61). 
101;. 5, Annex to JS/JTIC(49)55 dated 22 June 1949 and entitled 'Summary of Intelligence on Russian 
Development for the Defence Research Policy Committee' , DEFE 4 III 50. See Chapter 3. The Joint Committees 
may have guessed from Klaus Fuchs ' confession in January 1950 that the Soviet bomb tested on 29 August 1949 
had been a copy of the plutonium bomb tested at Alamogordo , New Mexico, in July 1945. 
1013The Soviet Estimate , p. 24. 
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I ~ 
In the history of British Intelligence, the years 1945-55 were the years of the 
Germans. The obstacles to the success of COMINT operations, the great scarcity of 
IMINT. until 1956 and the repeated failure of efforts to infiltrate agents into the 
USSR meant that in this period Soviet security was chiefly penetrated by exploiting 
the sources of intelligence available in Germany and Austria, where East and West 
met face-to-face. These sources were mainly human, but not entirely so. 
Communications intelligence on the USSR began to flow to Britain and the United 
States when their secret services managed to tap cables of the Soviet authorities in 
East Berlin and Vienna which ran close to Western Sectors of those cities. 
Since Germany abounded in human sources of information, British Intelligence was 
able there to remain a genuine partner of the Americans . In the world as a whole in 
the 1950s, it dwindled to a very junior partner, because Britain could not afford the 
international network of computers and interception stations on which the 
Americans' pre-eminence in post-war intelligence-gathering has been based.1014 
However, acquiring information from human sources is cheap. The main investment 
of the STIB team in Berlin was in time, effort and charm. Although David Evans 
described his organization in 1951 as ' an extremely junior partner' 1015 of the 
Americans, British Intelligence in Germany achieved feats which indicate that it was 
an effective partner, giving as well as taking. It screened between 300,000 and 
400,000 returning prisoners-of-war and interrogated a fair proportion of these. The 
Americans interrogated more (the same number as the British screened). In the 
1014c. M. Andrew, For the Presidel1t 's Eyes Dnly: Secret intelligence and the Alllerican Presidency frolll 
Washington to Blish , p. 217. 
1015STIB Director, addressing the MIlO Technical Intelligence Conference, June 1951 , DEFE 411125. See 
Chapter 4. 
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context of Operation 'Dragon Return', STIB was at one point interrogating between 
nine and ten times as many scientific workers as the Americans, 1016 The British 
exploited their fair share of returners until the very end of the operation and 
evacuated some of the most important cases, including Nikolaus Riehl and Bernd 
von Bock, which will have meant that they succeeded in preparing an approach to 
these men more successfully than their partners,I017 
During the Occupation, and indeed until 1961, the combination of the Soviet policy 
of exploiting German scientific knowhow and manpower, the Communist 
transformation of East Germany, the vulnerability of East Germany to Western 
intelligence operations, the power to intercept letters entering or circulating in West 
Germany and the flight of millions of East Germans to the West created ideal 
conditions for gathering intelligence from human sources in Germany, Between 1945 
and 1950, intelligence of Soviet armaments projects, both in the Soviet Zone and in 
the USSR itself, came to the British in Germany from four significant human 
sources, three of them German: refugees (a proportion of them technically-qualified; 
the British evacuated hundreds of such people to the West), returning prisoners-of-
war, agents and contacts in the Soviet Zone or with ties to East Germans, and Soviet 
1016MIIO/DO/KS dated 25 July 1951, DEFE 41/6. See Chapter 4. 
1017However, the story is not entirely one of success . STIB' s work in its early years cannot have remained secret 
from Soviet Intelligence. Some of the 'Matchbox' evacuees wrote back to friends in the Soviet Zone relating how 
they had managed to leave it (Special Intelligence Report covering the period I - 31 April 1947, FO 1031/61). 
And, as I observed in my 1996 M. Phil. dissertation, there was a Soviet agent highly placed in Intelligence 
Division in Germany. Among the recipients of one long document summarizing STIB's work and entitled, 
'Internal Office Instruction No. 48/1 dated 25 August 1948: The Functions and Organization of STIB' (DEFE 
41/82), was 'Leo' Long, who had been known during the War to the NKYD First Chief Directorate as its agent 
'Elli' . At the top of p. 4a of the report appear the words, 'DISTRIBUTION - Particular attention is drawn to the 
necessity for the strictest security of this document which constitutes a comprehensive review of work being 
undertaken in the field of Scientific and Technical Intelligence' . The report gives details of STIB's tasks, 
establishment and organization and of its work in all its fields of activity. Long rose' to be Deputy Director of 
Military Intelligence in Germany. He was indeed active as an agent on behalf of the MYD/MGB after the War 
and his controller, Anthony Blunt, made two or three visits to Germany to seek intelligence from him. 
Nevertheless, he was trying to withdraw from work for Soviet Intelligence and this may have limited the amount 
of information he passed to Blunt (c. M. Andrew & O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside S(01)' of ils Foreign 
Operalions fr011l Lenill 10 Gorbachev, p. 303). 
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defectors. Fear, including fear of the regime, was the reason for most defections of 
Soviet officials to the West. 1018 Fear of the MVD drove Tokaev to defect. lOl9 The 
USSR's exploitation of its Zone of Germany and Germans in the interest of its post-
war reconstruction and security and its division of Germany into two states gave the 
British their other opportunities. These policies gave many Germans knowledge of 
developments in the Soviet Union which they were keen to pass on to British 
interrogators. The PoWs and 'Dragon Returners' were the only British agent network 
in the USSR and they owed it to Stalin. In Germany, Soviet policy recruited 
ideologically-motivated agents and informants for British Intelligence. The SED's 
second-hand revolution from above, alien to capitalist Germany, drove millions of 
Germans to flee West. The interrogation of refugees yielded leads to agents in the 
East. Thus flight intensified espionage: the Berlin Wall was the SED's attempt to put 
a stop to both. There was no Iron Curtain in Berlin until the wall of concrete went up 
in the night of 12-13 August 1961. 1020 
By the end of 1949, two valuable sources - prisoners-of-war and Soviet defectors -
were drying up. Agents, contacts, refugees and scientific workers enticed to defect 
maintained a flow of intelligence until August 1961. The refugees both continued the 
work of 'Matchbox' by frustrating the development of the DDR's economy and 
brought news of its problems to the West. From 1961, agents and contacts were the 
only significant human sources of intelligence on the USSR and its part of Germany, 
but by that time overflight by aeroplanes had yielded priceless information on the 
lO18H. Rositzke, Th e CIA 's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counter-espionage and Covert Action , pp. 40-1. 
10190. A. Tokaev, Stalin Means War, pp. 147-9, 152-5, 161-6, 194-201. 
I020H. Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations, p. 42. 
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Soviet military-industrial complex . and far more thorough photographic 
reconnaissance was being carried out by satellites. 
It is true that neither the 'Dragon Returners' nor the prisoners-of-war nor Soviet 
defectors seem to have been able to provide much up-to-date information on research 
and development in the Soviet Union itself in the fields of the key technologies. 
Soviet security defeated British Intelligence. The Americans were likewise defeated. 
No intelligence reached them of the principal advances of Soviet military science 
during the Occupation: the manufacture of jet-powered fighters not long after the 
War had ended (the Iak-15 and MiG-9 were test-flown in April 19461021 ); the testing 
of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, much earlier than had been predicted; and 
the testing of the first-ever thermonuclear bomb in 1953, only nine months after the 
Americans had tested their first thermonuclear device. The Soviets also deployed a 
long-range bomber before the Americans, at least, expected them to. 1022 It is the 
dearth of hard information which explains why, for instance, a false view was formed 
of the aims of Soviet missile development. The importance of German missile 
designs to Soviet development plans was exaggerated because, while much 
intelligence was gathered on the Soviet exploitation of German rocketry, very little 
was obtained on missile projects in the USSR itself. 
Nevertheless, in the ten years of the Occupation, German sources provided British 
Intelligence with almost all the information it had on war-related research and 
development projects in the Soviet Union. Otherwise, all that came into its hands 
1021 D. Holloway, Stalin Gnd the BOlllb , p. 235. According to the JIC, the first Soviet jet fighter was flown in 
public in August 1946 (paragraph 50, JIC(47)7/2 dated 6 August 1947 and entitled, ' Soviet Interests, Intentions 
and Capabilities' , CAB 15811). 
1022L. Freedman, US Intelligence Gnd the Soviet Strategic Threat, pp. 77-8. 
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were photographs taken by attaches stationed at the embassy in Moscow, a little 
imagery intelligence, a thin stream of agent reports 1023 and information provided by 
defectors. The Germans are the missing link between Ultra and the U-2. Although 
the greatest intelligence success of the Second World War was a SIGINT success and 
the prized yield of U-2 overflight in the later 1950s was IMINT, the breakthroughs of 
the intervening period were chiefly in the field of HUMINT and they were achieved 
in Germany. It was from Germans that the British acquired knowledge of new Soviet 
weapons and military equipment. Among these weapons and devices were the 
Soviets' plutonium and uranium-235 bombs, their early guided missiles, their MiG-
21 fighter, their electronic valves and their nerve gases. Naturally, in response Britain 
developed similar weapons, means of defence and counter-strategies. 
Information from German sources established soon after the War that the Soviet 
Union was carrying out a general and urgent arms build-up, with the aim of making 
its weaponry at least the equal of that of the West. The USSR's exploitation of 
German science and military technology provided the first word of this build-up and 
indicated the technologies on which it was focusing: the atomic bomb, guided 
missiles, jet-powered aircraft, the hydrogen-peroxide-powered submarine, the nerve 
gases, military electronics. Soviet armaments projects in East Germany in the later 
1940s were thoroughly penetrated and much up-to-date intelligence acquired. This 
intelligence shed light on the Soviet leadership 's intentions and on the state of war-
related science and engineering in the Soviet Union itself. 
I023According to Harry Rositzke (at pp. 28-9 of The CIA 's Secret Operatiolls), there was a meagre flow of 
intelligence to the CIA from the few agents dropped into the USSR who managed to avoid arrest. [t is reasonable 
to assume that MI6 received no more. 
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Returning prisoners-of-war and the 'Dragon Returners' allowed the USSR itself to be 
penetrated, providing a wealth of sought-after information on Soviet military-
industrial reconstruction and some valuable scientific and technical intelligence. 
Most notably , the Riehl Group, other' 1037(P), returners, PoWs, sources in the 
Erzgebirge and perhaps even Alexander Koch provided critical Order-of-Battle 
intelligence on Soviet atomic science, on which the U-2 programme drew. They 
revealed the locations of Cheliabinsk-40, Cheliabinsk-70, Tomsk-7, Angarsk, 
Sverdlovsk-44, quite possibly Krasnoyarsk-26, the Chirchik heavy water plant, the 
Semipalatinsk test site, the nuclear fuel factories at Elektrostal' , Glazov and 
Novosibirsk and the uranium deposits in Central Asia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and 
Estonia. Together, these represented the major part of the USSR's nuclear weapons 
manufacturing and testing complex as it was in the mid-1950s. The Germans' 
information made it clear that the industry established in the Soviet Union was 
similar to that of the United States. Each country had started by building natural-
uranium-fuelled, graphite-moderated thermal reactors for plutonium production and 
by developing gaseous diffusion technology for uranium enrichment. 1024 The Soviets 
were copiers in the nuclear field, as in all others. 
Indeed, 'Dragon Returners' , 'Matchbox' evacuees, informants in the Soviet Zone, 
wartime intelligence documents and returning PoWs revealed the skeleton of the 
Soviet post-war military-industrial complex to the West. Further examples of a great 
number of war-related centres they identified are the chemical testing range and 
weapons factory at Shikhani, the aircraft and aero-engine factories of many cities, the 
military-industrial installations in and around Moscow and Leningrad and the 
industrial complexes of a number of regions of the USSR, such as those around 
102"'r. Cochran, R. Norri s & O. Bukharin, Makillg the Russiall Bomb: From Stalill to Yeltsill, pp. 51-2. 
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Sverdlovsk and near Lake Baikal. If Jeffrey Richelson is right, 'Dragon Returners' 
also revealed the location of the Sary Shagan ABM complex. 1025 The prisoners-of-
war informed interrogators from the USAF and RAF of a great number of airfields in 
the USSR. They provided intelligence in such quantity that three-dimensional models 
of the main Soviet cities were built. 1026 This Order-of-Battle intelligence enabled 
later IMINT, COMINT, EUNT and HUMINT operations to be successful. U-2 pilots 
knew which installations to overfly, interception stations knew where to find the 
testing sites on which they were to eavesdrop and visitors to the USSR knew which 
factories, institutes, dockyards or railway yards to observe or photograph. 
The 'Dragon Returners' gave British Intelligence an unprecedented insight into the 
Soviet system of war-related scientific research and development. They named, and 
evaluated the ability and importance of, all the scientists, engineers, MVD officers 
and ministers they had met in the USSR. They gave Scientific Intelligence in London 
an understanding of the workings of Soviet war-related science which it could not 
have acquired by other means. This understanding of the Soviet system appears to 
have influenced scientific intelligence analysts throughout the Cold War. From 
Operation 'Dragon Return' and Tokaev these men learned that their system was far 
more innovative than that of the USSR; their belief in the West's scientific 
superiority (in electronics, for instance) influenced NATO's military strategy. This 
intelligence of weaknesses in Soviet war-related science was partly of value because, 
when it was obtained, the USSR was celebrating scientific triumphs and seemed to 
be going from strength to strength. 'Dragon Return' intelligence diminished the 
1025As indicated in Chapter 5, there is no firm support for Richelson ' s claim. By contrast, John Prados maintains 
that Sary Shagan was identified by U-2 overflight (The Soviet Estimate , p. 87). 
1026c. Egan & A. Knott , Essays ill Twelltieth-eelllllry Americall Diplomatic History Dedicated to Professor 
Dalliel M. Smith (Erdmann article), p. 180. 
341 
significance of such successes as the early atomic and thermonuclear tests and the 
Sputnik flight. Rocket Man, the Gagarin-figure of Soviet propaganda, had feet of 
clay. Of course, this information could not wholly be relied upon. Intelligence 
analysts knew that the 'Dragon Returners' had only seen part of the picture. 
Khrushchev's boasts might be more than hot air. But U-2 photography confirmed 
that both the USSR's war-related science and its military capability were inferior to 
those of the West. In the words of Eisenhower's scientific adviser, George 
Kistiakowsky, 'We went looking for a body, but only found a skeleton'. 1027 The 
Germans whose exploitation had helped to give rise to fear of the USSR's armaments 
helped to establish that the West's military technology was still better. In 
consequence, there was no need for an intensification of the West's arms build-up. 
Of course, it was not all good news. In the summer and autumn of 1955, on the eve 
of the detonation of the Soviets' first hydrogen bomb, Nikolaus Riehl and Gi.inther 
Wirths revealed that the USSR had enough uranium to meet its needs. By the mid-
1950s, the supply of scientific workers and prisoners-of-war had almost dried up, but 
some 'Dragon Returners' may have been recruited as agents and left in place in the 
DDR. They will have passed information to London on research and development in 
East Germany and the Soviet Union until the building of the Berlin Wall cut them off 
from their controllers in the West. 1028 
1027Quoted at p. 37 of D. Brugioni's, Eyeball (0 Eyeball. 
1028[f any were recruited as agents, it is possible that some were betrayed to the KGB by George Blake. He 
claims to have betrayed approximately four hundred MI6 agents in the Soviei Bloc (No Other Choice, p. 207). He 
served in the West Berlin station of M[6 from the beginning of 1955 until the summer of 1959. His arrival in the 
city coincided with the return of the atomic science teams to East Berlin and other parts of the DDR. However, it 
is unlikely that Blake knew the identities of spies recruited in East German factories and research institutes , 
because he served in the political intelligence section of the station, which was wholly separate from its scientific 
intelligence unit, Technical Section (pp . 165-9). 
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APPENDIX A 
Photocopy of Plate 43, The Times Atlas of the World, Comprehensive Edition. 
Mikhailovka, in Altaiskii Krai, lies at 51.48N 79.45E. 
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APPENDIXB 
344 
Appendix B has been removed for copyright reasons. The map with the title: 
“Position of Main Russian Industrial and Development Areas in Relation to Allied Air 
Bases” can be found at The National Archives, piece reference: CAB 158/5. 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
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